USA v. Misael Cepeda

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13348
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MISAEL CEPEDA,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:16-cr-00146-JDW-TGW-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13348
Before L AGOA , BRASHER , and E DMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Misael Cepeda, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,1 appeals
the district court’s denial of his pro se motions for compassionate
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and for reconsideration of
that denial. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
In 2016, Cepeda pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), and 846. Cepeda
was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment.
In 2022, Cepeda moved pro se for compassionate release un-
der section 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act.2 In his
motion, Cepeda asserted two grounds for compassionate release.
First, Cepeda said he suffers from hypertension: a condition he al-
leged has caused loss of eyesight and “constant blackouts.” Cepeda
also contended that his hypertension puts him at an increased risk
of serious illness or death if he were to contract COVID-19. Sec-
ond, Cepeda argued that compassionate release was warranted be-
cause Cepeda’s terminally-ill father needed Cepeda to care for him.
Cepeda also asserted that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors
1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 518
F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se pleadings. See
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
2 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
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22-13348 Opinion of the Court 3
and his post-conviction rehabilitation weighed in favor of compas-
sionate release.
The district court denied Cepeda’s motion. The district
court first determined that Cepeda had shown no extraordinary
and compelling reason that would warrant compassionate release.
The district court next determined that -- even if Cepeda could
demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons -- the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors did not support a reduced sentence. The district
court later denied Cepeda’s motion for reconsideration.
“We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen-
tence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v.
Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). After eligibility is estab-
lished, we review for abuse of discretion the district court’s deci-
sion about whether to grant or to deny a defendant compassionate
release. See id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an
incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making its
determination, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id.
District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term
of imprisonment but may do so to the extent permitted under sec-
tion 3582(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345-46. As
amended by the First Step Act, section 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes a
district court to modify a term of imprisonment under these cir-
cumstances:
[T]he court . . . upon motion of the defendant
after the defendant has fully exhausted all administra-
tive rights . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13348
. . . after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds
. . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is con-
sistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
We have said that a district court may reduce a defendant’s
term of imprisonment under section 3582(c)(1)(A) only if each of
these three conditions is met: “(1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors
favor doing so, (2) there are ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’
for doing so, and . . . (3) doing so wouldn’t endanger any person or
the community within the meaning of § 1B1.13’s policy state-
ment.” See United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir.
2021). When the district court determines that a movant fails to
satisfy one of these conditions, the district court may deny com-
passionate release without addressing the remaining conditions. Id.
at 1237-38, 1240.
The policy statement applicable to section 3582(c)(1)(A) is
found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; United States v.
Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021). The commentary to
section 1B1.13 identifies four categories that might constitute “ex-
traordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a reduced sen-
tence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1). Contrary to Cepeda’s
assertion on appeal, section 1B1.13’s policy statement is binding on
district courts. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1247.
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22-13348 Opinion of the Court 5
Pertinent to this appeal, Application Note 1(A) of section
1B1.13 provides that a prisoner’s medical condition may warrant a
sentence reduction if the prisoner (1) has a terminal illness, or (2)
suffers from “a serious physical or medical condition . . . that sub-
stantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-
care within” prison. Id. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(A)). Application
Note 1(C) provides that a prisoner’s “family circumstances” might
constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” in two situa-
tions: (1) “[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the de-
fendant’s minor child or minor children” and (2) “[t]he incapacita-
tion of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner when the de-
fendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or reg-
istered partner.” Id. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(C)).
The district court committed no error in determining that
Cepeda failed to demonstrate an “extraordinary and compelling”
reason within the meaning of section 1B1.13. Cepeda has not sat-
isfied his burden of demonstrating that his hypertension currently
constitutes a terminal illness. Cf. 18 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment.
(n.1(A)(i)) (describing a terminal illness as “a serious and advanced
illness with an end of life trajectory”). Nor has Cepeda offered fac-
tual allegations or documentation that would support a finding that
his medical conditions have diminished substantially his ability to
provide self-care while in prison. On top of this omission, Cepeda
says he has completed a host of educational courses and has held a
prison job in “maintenance and electrical” throughout his time in
prison: activities that suggest Cepeda retains significant physical ca-
pabilities. Cepeda’s purported plans upon his requested release --
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13348
acting as a primary caregiver for his father and starting a business
as a tattoo artist -- also are inconsistent with a person unable to
provide self-care.
The district court also determined correctly that Cepeda has
shown no family circumstances that would warrant a reduced sen-
tence. Under Application Note 1(C), a prisoner’s family circum-
stances may constitute “extraordinary and compelling circum-
stances” only in two limited circumstances. Because Cepeda’s fa-
ther is neither the caretaker of Cepeda’s minor children nor
Cepeda’s spouse or partner, his incapacitation is no grounds for re-
lief under Application Note 1(C).3
Cepeda also contends that the district court had discretion
to consider whether -- alone or in combination -- Cepeda’s risk of
serious illness from COVID-19, the harsh prison conditions created
by COVID-19 lockdowns, his father’s illness, and Cepeda’s post-
conviction rehabilitation constituted “other” extraordinary and
compelling reasons under Application Note 1(D).4 This argument
is foreclosed by our binding precedent. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248
3 Cepeda seems to assert for the first time on appeal that his mother’s medical
condition supports his motion for compassionate release. Like Cepeda’s fa-
ther, Cepeda’s mother is neither a caretaker to Cepeda’s minor children nor
Cepeda’s spouse or partner. As a result, Cepeda’s mother’s health can be no
“extraordinary and compelling reason” under Application Note 1(C).
4 Application Note 1(D) reads this way: “As determined by the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary and
compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described
in subdivisions (A) through (C).” 18 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(D)).
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22-13348 Opinion of the Court 7
(“Application Note 1(D) does not grant discretion to courts to de-
velop ‘other reasons’ that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s
sentence.”).
Given the lack of an extraordinary and compelling reason
that would warrant relief, we need not detail whether the section
3553(a) factors would support a reduced sentence. See Tinker, 14
F.4th at 1237-38, 1240. Nevertheless, we see no error in the district
court’s determination that the section 3553(a) factors also weighed
against granting Cepeda compassionate release. The district court
noted that Cepeda had two convictions for drug-trafficking of-
fenses (one of which involved nearly 2 kilograms of methamphet-
amine and one of which involved over 220 kilograms of marijuana)
and a conviction for illegal reentry after deportation. In the light
of the seriousness of these offenses, the district court concluded
reasonably that a reduced sentence would not reflect the serious-
ness of Cepeda’s offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment, or provide adequate deterrence.
Because Cepeda has failed to satisfy all three of the condi-
tions necessary to justify a reduced sentence under section
3582(c)(1)(A), the district court abused no discretion in denying
Cepeda’s motion for compassionate release.5
5 We also reject Cepeda’s assertion that the district court violated his due pro-
cess rights by not allowing him to file a reply to the government’s response to
Cepeda’s compassionate-release motion. Cepeda alleges no facts showing --
and nothing in the record demonstrates -- that Cepeda attempted to file a reply
or that the district court otherwise prevented Cepeda from doing so.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13348
AFFIRMED.
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