USA v. Michael Ray Alford

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13269
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL RAY ALFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cr-00028-RH-MAF-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13269
Before LAGOA , BRASHER , and B LACK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Ray Alford, a federal prisoner proceeding
pro se, ap-
peals the denial of a post-judgment motion for recusal she filed in
her criminal case. The Government, in turn, moves for summary
affirmance and to stay the briefing schedule.
The record shows Alford was originally convicted in 2017 of,
inter alia, one count of receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(2), (b)(1). The Honorable Robert Hinkle presided over
the case. After being found guilty by a jury, Alford appealed her
conviction and we affirmed.
See United States v. Alford, 744 F.
App’x 650 (11th Cir. 2018). During the pendency of her appeal Al-
ford sought to be released several times without success and, later
filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. In the present case, Alford asked
Judge Hinkle to recuse himself and he denied the motion. This
appeal followed.
Alford asserts, in part, that Judge Hinkle was biased against
her. She contends he incorrectly believed her to be guilty based on
the jury verdict rather than the law and evidence she presented,
leading him to state he would not release her even if he had the
discretion to do so. Alford argues he was biased against her in a
previous 2002 case and in connection with the § 2255 motion. In
support of its motion, the Government contends Alford did not
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22-13269 Opinion of the Court 3
show improper bias or pervasive bias and prejudice to merit
recusal. After review,1 we affirm.
A judge must recuse himself “in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
Thus, “[t]he test is whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer
fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal
was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s
impartiality.”
Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524
(11th Cir. 1988). Generally, a disqualification for bias under § 455
arises from an extrajudicial source.
Giles v. Garwood, 853 F.2d 876,
878 (11th Cir. 1988). Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute
a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.
United States v.
Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 2007). Unless a defendant can
show pervasive bias, a judge’s rulings in the same or a related case
are not a sufficient basis for recusal.
Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234,
1239 (11th Cir. 2000). “[A] judge, having been assigned to a case,
should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly ten-
uous speculation.”
In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891, 895 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quotation marks omitted).
We affirm Judge Hinkle’s decision not to recuse himself, as
Alford did not demonstrate he was biased against her. Her argu-
ments primarily revolve around the court’s adverse rulings against
her in her criminal case and a past criminal proceeding. Judicial
1 We review a district judge’s decision not to recuse himself for an abuse of
discretion.
United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13269
rulings alone, however, almost always do not constitute evidence
of bias.
Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 828. Further, aside from disagreeing
with how Judge Hinkle ruled, she does not show pervasive bias in
his rulings, and his adverse rulings are not sufficient to show bias.
Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239. Therefore, she has not shown bias, and the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion.
Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion for
summary affirmance and DENY its motion to stay the briefing
schedule as moot.
See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d
1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969)2 (explaining summary disposition is ap-
propriate, in part, where “the position of one of the parties is clearly
right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question
as to the outcome of the case . . . .”).
AFFIRMED.
2 In
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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