USA v. Wilfredo Gonzalez Arce

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11063
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILFREDO GONZALEZ ARCE,
Defendant- Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-20672-KMM-6
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11063
Before WILSON, L UCK , and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Wilfredo Arce appeals his sentence of 26 months’ imprison-
ment following the revocation of his supervised release. He argues
that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district
court failed to “meaningfully consider” his personal or individual
history and varied upward solely based on his criminal history
while on supervised release. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review a sentence’s reasonableness for abuse of discre-
tion, regardless of whether that sentence falls inside or outside of
the guideline range.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
“The party challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that
the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference afforded
sentencing courts.”
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249,
1256 (11th Cir. 2015).1 Under this standard, we will affirm a sen-
tence even if we would have imposed a different sentence had we
1 When imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release, the dis-
trict court considers the following § 3553(a) factors: the nature and circum-
stances of the offense; the defendant’s history and characteristics; the sen-
tences available and relevant sentencing range; the need to deter criminal con-
duct, protect the public, provide the defendant with training or other correc-
tional treatment, avoid disparities between defendants, and provide for resti-
tution; and any pertinent policy statements. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(3),
3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B) (D), (a)(4)-(7).
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22-11063 Opinion of the Court 3
been in the district court’s position.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d
1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (
en banc).
The district court’s “unjustified reliance on a single factor
may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence.”
United States v.
Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotations omit-
ted). “However, significant reliance on a single factor does not nec-
essarily render a sentence unreasonable.”
Id. Notably, we “com-
mit[] to the sound discretion of the district court the weight to be
accorded to each § 3553(a) factor,”
United States v. Perkins,
787 F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2015), and the district court is “per-
mitted to attach great weight to one factor over others,”
United
States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotations
omitted). A sentence is substantively unreasonable only when the
district court “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors
that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judg-
ment in considering the proper factors.”
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d
at 1256 (quotations omitted). Indeed, we will vacate a sentence as
substantively unreasonable “only if we are left with the definite and
firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence
that is outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.”
United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222
(11th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted).
Section 3553(a)’s “overarching” instruction to sentencing
courts is that any sentence must be sufficient but not greater than
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11063
necessary to comply with the purposes listed in § 3553(a)(2).
Kim-
brough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). “We do not presume that a sentence outside the guide-
line range is unreasonable and must give due deference to the dis-
trict court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, as a whole, justify
the extent of the variance.”
Goldman, 953 F.3d at 1222
. When a
district court varies from the guideline range, its “justifications
must be compelling enough to support the degree of the variance
and complete enough to allow meaningful appellate review.”
United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009) (quota-
tions omitted). However, the district court is not required to dis-
cuss each of the § 3553(a) factors or explicitly state that it consid-
ered each of the factors.
Kuhlman, 711 F.3d at 1326. Rather, it
must acknowledge that it considered the factors.
United States v.
Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007).
Here, Arce has not shown that his 26-month sentence -- fol-
lowing the revocation of his supervised release -- is substantively
unreasonable. See
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256. As the record
reflects, Arce was originally convicted of and sentenced for conspir-
acy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, and
served 15 months’ imprisonment. However, while he was serving
the term of supervised release that followed, Arce violated its terms
by committing fraud; leaving the judicial district without permis-
sion; failing to report to the probation officer as directed; associat-
ing with a convicted felon; failing to notify the probation officer
within 72 hours of being arrested; and submitting monthly reports
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22-11063 Opinion of the Court 5
with false information. As a result, Arce’s term of supervised re-
leased was revoked and he was sentenced to another 10 months’
imprisonment.
While he was on supervised release following this 10-month
term of imprisonment, Arce violated the terms of his supervised
release once again. This time, his supervised release was revoked
for burglary, theft, and failing to contact his probation officer by
the terms of his bond, among other things, and he was sentenced
to a 26-month term of imprisonment -- the one at issue in this ap-
peal. Arce’s primary argument to us is that the district court erred
when it sentenced him this time because it only considered one fac-
tor -- his history while on supervised release. However, the record
reveals that the district court expressly considered several of the
other § 3553(a) factors, including the need to promote respect for
the law, the need to promote specific deterrence, and his underly-
ing conduct. The court also said that it had carefully considered
the statements of all parties, which included Arce’s arguments at
sentencing and his and his wife’s testimony.
On this record, we cannot say that the court failed to con-
sider Arce’s personal or individual history. Rather, it exercised its
discretion to weigh other factors more heavily.
See Perkins, 787
F.3d at 1342;
Riley, 995 F.3d at 1279. These factors centered on
Arce’s violation of supervised release --
two times -- by committing
serious offenses like fraud and burglary, his evasion of arrest for
over two years, and his lying to police. The district court was well
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11063
within its discretion to weigh the factors in the way it did in this
case.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Arce above the guidelines’ range to 26 months’ impris-
onment. We therefore affirm Arce’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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