USA v. Chalmer Detling, II

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10630
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHALMER DETLING, II,
a.k.a. Chuck Detling,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00309-LMM-LTW-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10630 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 1 of 7

-- 1 of 7 --

2 Opinion of the Court 22-10630
Before JORDAN and L AGOA, Circuit Judges, and C ANNON ,* District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Chalmer Detling, II appeals his jury convictions for wire
fraud and aggravated identity theft. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343,
1028A(a)(1). Following oral argument and a review of the record,
we affirm.1
The government’s theory of the case at trial was that Mr.
Detling, who was an attorney at the time of the offenses, applied
for and obtained litigation advances from two financing compa-
nies—Mighty Financing LLC and Litigation Ventures LLC—in the
names of his clients without their knowledge. He then used the
fraudulently-obtained funding to pay his law firm’s general ex-
penses.
Mr. Detling first asserts a violation of the Speedy Trial Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3161. As we explain, this assertion fails.
The Speedy Trial Act generally requires a defendant’s trial
to commence within 70 days from the filing date of the indictment
or the defendant’s first appearance, whichever occurs last. See 18
U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The Act, however, excludes certain periods of
delay from the computation of time. For example, the “delay
* The Honorable Aileen M. Cannon, United States District Judge for the South-
ern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
1 As we write for the parties, we set out only what is necessary to explain our
decision.
USCA11 Case: 22-10630 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 2 of 7

-- 2 of 7 --

22-10630 Opinion of the Court 3
resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion
through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposi-
tion of, such motion” is not counted. See § 3161(h)(1)(D). We have
held that this provision “excludes all time between the filing of the
motion and the conclusion of the hearing at which it is addressed.”
United States v. Harris, 376 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (empha-
sis in original) (quoting United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1292
(11th Cir. 2003)). The “entire time from the filing of the motion to
the conclusion of the hearing is excludable, even when the hearing
is deferred until trial.” United States v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254
(11th Cir. 1991).
The district court deferred ruling on Mr. Detling’s motion
to strike surplusage in the indictment until the pretrial conference.
At that time, it heard Mr. Detling’s motion to strike surplusage and
his motion in limine—both of which concerned his disbarment
proceedings in Georgia—and ruled on both. See D.E. 168 at 46, 61–
62 (excluding evidence of disbarment at trial and ordering the gov-
ernment to “change” the indictment to get rid of language that
“Mr. Detling is currently not licensed to practice law in the state of
Georgia”). See also D.E. 139 at 2 (“The Court ordered the Govern-
ment to revise the Indictment to remove language that the defend-
ant is not licensed . . . .”). Because the time from the filing of the
motion to strike surplusage on October 30, 2018, until the pretrial
conference on October 13, 2021, was excluded for the purposes of
the speedy trial calculation, see Harris, 376 F.3d at 1289, there was
no Speedy Trial violation.
USCA11 Case: 22-10630 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 3 of 7

-- 3 of 7 --

4 Opinion of the Court 22-10630
Mr. Detling next argues that there was insufficient evidence
to support his convictions. We review a challenge to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict. See United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d
1306, 1319 (11th Cir. 2014). The question is whether “any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979) (emphasis in original). The evidence supporting Mr.
Detling’s convictions was close to overwhelming, and we therefore
affirm.2
At trial, the government more than met its burden. It pre-
sented the testimony of four former Detling Law Group employ-
ees, including Aimee Ingram (the receptionist who later became a
paralegal and office manager) and three attorneys who worked at
the firm—Mackenzie Cole, Brooks Neely, and Ben Copeland.
They testified that Mr. Detling was in charge of the firm, and that
no major decision was made without his permission. Ms. Ingram
2
To convict Mr. Detling of wire fraud, the government needed to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally participated in a scheme to de-
fraud and that he used the interstate wires in furtherance of the scheme. See
United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003). To convict him
of aggravated identity theft, the government needed to prove that he (1)
knowingly transferred, possessed, or used, (2) without lawful authority, (3) a
means of identification of another person or a false identification document
(4) during and in relation to the wire fraud offense. See United States v. Bonilla,
579 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009).
USCA11 Case: 22-10630 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 4 of 7

-- 4 of 7 --

22-10630 Opinion of the Court 5
and Ms. Cole also testified that they did not have access to or con-
trol over the firm’s accounts. The jury also heard testimony from
four representatives of Litigation Ventures and Mighty Financing
who stated that they dealt with Mr. Detling exclusively on the liti-
gation advances, and their testimony was corroborated by numer-
ous emails and other business records. They also testified that, had
they known that Mr. Detling’s clients had not authorized the ad-
vances or received the funds, they never would have approved the
funding. The evidence further showed that Mr. Detling personally
signed the applications for the advances. He also picked up and
endorsed each of the fraudulently-obtained checks.
The government also presented testimony from several of
Mr. Detling’s clients, who were victims of the scheme. They ex-
plained that they never signed or authorized the fraudulent financ-
ing. FBI Special Agent Antoinette Ferrari testified that she had
traced the fraudulently obtained funds, and she determined that
the funds did not go to Mr. Detling’s clients and instead were used
for the firm’s expenses.
Mr. Detling finally argues that the district court erred in
truncating and omitting part of the instruction on deliberate igno-
rance. The district court instructed the jury that “knowledge”
could be found if Mr. Detling was “aware of a high probability that
the fact existed” without also instructing the jury that it must first
find that he “took deliberate steps to avoid the knowledge.” We
agree with Mr. Detling that the failure to include this latter portion
USCA11 Case: 22-10630 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 5 of 7

-- 5 of 7 --

6 Opinion of the Court 22-10630
was error. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754,
769 (2011).
We nevertheless affirm because the error was harmless.
Given the nearly overwhelming evidence of intent, the truncated
deliberate ignorance instruction did not affect Mr. Detling’s sub-
stantial rights. See United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1572 (11th
Cir. 1991) (error in giving deliberate indifference instruction was
harmless because the “jury was also instructed that it could convict
based on a theory of actual knowledge” and “there was sufficient
evidence to support the convictions under that theory[.]”); United
States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 977 (11th Cir. 2008) (“instructing the
jury on deliberate ignorance is harmless error where the jury was
also instructed and could have convicted on an alternative, suffi-
ciently supported theory of actual knowledge”). Here, the jury
was instructed that it could convict based on his actual knowledge,
see D.E. 153 at 8–9, and, as explained above, there was plenty of
evidence that Mr. Detling had actual knowledge of the fraud. For
instance, the representatives of the financing companies testified
that they only dealt with Mr. Detling on the fraudulent litigation
advances, and Mr. Detling’s signature appeared on the applications
for the fraudulent financing. See D.E. 214 at 143; D.E. 215 at 194–
95, 213; D.E. 217 at 101–103, 120–21. Moreover, the government
did not argue in closing that Mr. Detling was deliberately ignorant
but rather told the jury that he intentionally engaged in fraud. See
D.E. 219 at 92 (“He’s not randomly relying on Ms. Cole and Ms.
Ingram and sticking his head in the sand and not finding out what’s
going on. He is making representation, after representation to the
USCA11 Case: 22-10630 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 6 of 7

-- 6 of 7 --

22-10630 Opinion of the Court 7
financing companies . . . .”). Given the significant amount of evi-
dence that Mr. Detling knowingly and intentionally committed
wire fraud and aggravated identity theft, the district court’s error
in omitting part of the deliberate ignorance instruction was harm-
less.
AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 22-10630 Document: 84-1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023 Page: 7 of 7

-- 7 of 7 --