James Robert Pitts v. Mark A. Grant, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-12759
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JAMES ROBERT PITTS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARK A. GRANT,
In his individual capacity,
LEON GATES,
In his individual capacity,
KEVIN HOLDER,
In his individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12759
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-03021-JPB
____________________
Before GRANT, L UCK , and LAGOA , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest warrant must be
supported by probable cause. An official may not knowingly
pursue a warrant without probable cause and may not base a
warrant on intentional misstatements or omissions. Either one
would be the makings of a Fourth Amendment claim of
unreasonable seizure by malicious prosecution. But neither
occurred here. The warrant for James Pitts’s arrest was backed by
probable cause, so we affirm the dismissal of his claims.
I.
James Pitts was persuaded that the Fulton County probate
court had mishandled his mother’s estate. He was particularly
frustrated with the probate judge who had been handling the case
for nearly a decade. After she repeatedly ignored his concerns, at
least as he saw it, Pitts contacted a Fulton County Commissioner’s
office in December 2016 to report his dissatisfaction. According to
Pitts, his communications with the court were lawful.
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21-12759 Opinion of the Court 3
Some weeks later, however, a threatening phone call was
made to the court. Officer Gates of the Fulton County Sheriff’s
Office responded to the situation, and the probate judge informed
him that Pitts had called the court and threatened her safety.
Because the probate judge had not answered the call herself, Gates
also interviewed the court employee who had spoken with Pitts—
Kevin Holder. When he did, he learned that this was not Pitts’s
first call to the court about the probate judge. Holder had
previously “received several non-threat[en]ing voice mails on his
phone from Mr. James Pitts,” messages in which Pitts “seemed to
be erratic and upset.” But this conversation took a turn for the
worse. Holder couldn’t quite recall the “exact words,” but he
remembered that Pitts had said “something to [the] effect of I
understand why people shoot elected officials, because of the way
they are treated . . . don’t worry about it, I’ll take care of that black
bitch myself.”
Building from Officer Gates’s police report, Officer Grant
requested a warrant for Pitts’s arrest. To support his request, Grant
drafted a “statement of witness” that explained how Pitts had
threatened to shoot the probate judge. “[W]hile speaking with
Holder,” it read, “[t]he accused made statements about
[u]nderstanding why people shoot elected officials because of the
way they are treated . . . don’t worry about it, I’ll take care of that
black bitch.”1 (last set of brackets and ellipsis in original). Grant
1 For the most part, federal courts only consider the complaint when deciding
whether to grant a motion to dismiss.
Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12759
accused Pitts of violating multiple laws: intimating a court officer,
sending harassing communications, and making terroristic threats.
See O.C.G.A. §§ 16-10-97(a)(1), 16-11-39.1, 16-11-37.
The warrant was issued, and Pitts was arrested a few weeks
later. As the case progressed, however, the prosecutor failed to
produce witnesses or a recording of the threatening call. As a
result, the state court dismissed the charges and ordered the
“indictment and arrest expunged.”
Pitts turned around and sued Holder, Officer Gates, and
Officer Grant in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that
they had violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure by malicious prosecution. The defendants
removed the case to federal court, and Officers Gates and Grant
moved to dismiss the complaint on July 27, 2020. Holder moved
for judgment on the pleadings on September 3, 2020. The officials
argued that Pitts had failed to state a claim against them and that
they were entitled to qualified immunity.
Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). We may, however, “also consider
documents attached to the motion to dismiss if they are referred to in the
complaint, central to the plaintiff’s claim, and of undisputed authenticity.”
Hi-
Tech Pharms., Inc. v. HBS Int’l Corp., 910 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 2018).
Holder attached copies of the police report and Officer Grant’s affidavit to his
motion for judgment on the pleadings, documents which Pitts quotes
extensively throughout his complaint. Because Pitts has not disputed their
veracity, we will review both documents along with the complaint.
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21-12759 Opinion of the Court 5
Five months later, on February 2, 2021, the district court
granted the motion to dismiss; five months after that, on July 26,
2021, it granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Between the two orders, the district court dismissed the malicious
prosecution claim with prejudice. It rejected the allegations that
the officers “intentionally and knowingly provided false
information” as conclusory and held that the warrant was
supported by probable cause. Pitts appeals.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or granting a motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814
F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016);
Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc., 236
F.3d 658, 660 (11th Cir. 2000). Both motions are governed by the
same standard.
Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d
1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018). When we assess the complaint, we
reject any conclusory allegations—any “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action”—and assess only the “remaining
factual allegations.”
McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333
(11th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). We view those facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and dismissal is
appropriate when the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Jones, 236 F.3d at 660.
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III.
Pitts raises two issues, one procedural and one substantive.
He argues that the district court wrongfully prevented him from
amending his complaint. He also argues that the officials violated
the Fourth Amendment when they knowingly sought an arrest
warrant without probable cause; he claims that they fabricated the
threatening statement themselves.
First, Pitts says that he was denied the “opportunity to
request leave to amend” his complaint. The district court, he says,
precluded him from amending his complaint by dismissing his
complaint with prejudice. But that’s not true. Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B), Pitts had an unchecked opportunity
to amend his complaint in response to the officials’ motions. But
he didn’t take it. Pitts also had six months after Grant and Gates
filed their motion to dismiss to ask to for permission to amend his
complaint.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). And after Holder requested
a judgment on the pleadings, Pitts had ten months to ask to amend.
But he never did.
Nor was the district court required to propose the idea itself.
On this point we have been clear. “A district court is not required
to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when
the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to
amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.”
Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542
(11th Cir. 2002) (en banc). It’s true that we have, in one instance,
required a district court “to sua sponte allow a litigant” to amend
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21-12759 Opinion of the Court 7
its complaint: when it sua sponte strikes a complaint “on shotgun
pleading grounds.”
Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291,
1295 (11th Cir. 2018). But that is the exception, not the rule.
Id.
And the run-of-the-mill dismissal here fits squarely within
Wagner.
The district court therefore was free to dismiss the complaint with
prejudice despite Pitts’s failure to amend it.
Second, Pitts claims that the three officials violated his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure by
malicious prosecution. To be more specific, he claims that his
arrest warrant was not supported by probable cause because the
officials knowingly produced or relied on false statements.
To succeed on his claim, Pitts must prove both a violation
of his “Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable
seizures and the elements of the common law tort of malicious
prosecution.”
Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1157 (11th Cir.
2020) (quotation omitted). At common law, a malicious
prosecution occurred when officials “instituted or continued a
criminal prosecution” with “malice and without probable cause”
that terminated in the defendant’s favor and caused him damages.
Id. (quotation omitted). As for the Fourth Amendment, to decide
whether a warrant-based seizure is unreasonable we ask “whether
the judicial officer issuing such a warrant” was “supplied with
sufficient information to support an independent judgment that
probable cause exist[ed] for the warrant.”
Id. at 1162 (quotation
omitted). Where probable cause exists, a malicious prosecution
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-12759
claim will fail.
Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 (11th Cir.
2022).
An official has probable cause to seek an arrest warrant
when “a reasonable officer could conclude” that there is “a
substantial chance of criminal activity.”
Washington, 25 F.4th at
902 (quoting
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588
(2018)). “Probable cause is not a high bar,” requiring “only a
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity.”
Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286
(11th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). And officials are not required
to “resolve conflicting evidence in a manner favorable to the
suspect.”
Washington, 25 F.4th at 902. When reviewing for
probable cause, we assess “the totality of the circumstances to
determine the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that a crime has
been committed.”
Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286.
A person may prove that no probable cause existed by
showing that “the officer who applied for the warrant should have
known that his application failed to establish probable cause” or
that “an official, including an individual who did not apply for the
warrant, intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or
omissions necessary to support the warrant.”
Williams, 965 F.3d
at 1165. It’s not enough, however, to prove that some of the facts
“recited in the warrant affidavit” were incorrect.
Paez, 915 F.3d at
1286–87 (quotation omitted). “Negligent misstatements or
omissions” do not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
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21-12759 Opinion of the Court 9
Pitts claims that Holder intentionally gave a false statement
when he reported that Pitts called and made violent threats against
a probate judge. But Pitts merely labels Holder’s statement as
intentionally false—and we reject such conclusory allegations.
See
McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333. Pitts levels the same accusation
against Officers Grant and Gates—saying they “intentionally”
provided “false information”—and we reject that conclusory
allegation as well.
Beyond the labels, Pitts provides no supporting facts for his
accusations. For example, the facts show neither that Holder knew
the caller wasn’t Pitts, nor that the call never happened. If
anything, the facts Pitts provides refute his claim: He does not
dispute that he called the court on several occasions or that Holder
was familiar with his voice from “several voice messages” he had
left—messages in which he had “seemed to be erratic and upset.”
Pitts fails to show that the officials were privy to any fact that
contradicted their conclusion that Pitts had made the call. Pitts
thus cannot establish that Holder knowingly—or even recklessly—
made a false statement.
Pitts also claims that Holder and Grant reworded the
threatening statement to match the elements of the crimes, and he
argues that this proves they conjured up the illegal threats
themselves. But both paraphrases of the statement contained the
same unlawful threats. Pitts was charged with, among other
things, violating section 16-10-97 of the Georgia Code, which
prohibits “any threatening action, letter, or communication” that
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-12759
seeks to “intimidate or impede” a court officer. Pitts violated the
statute whether he said “I understand why people shoot elected
officials, because of the way they are treated . . . don’t worry about
it, I’ll take care of that black bitch myself” or said “I see why
government officials and law enforcement officers are being killed
. . . I am going to take care of that black bitch . . .”—because both
were threats directed at the judge. The existence of equivalent
paraphrased statements is not evidence that either is false, let alone
knowingly false.
Pitts argues nevertheless that Holder’s statement alone was
not enough to establish probable cause—that the officials needed
to gather more evidence before pursuing a warrant. But we have
held that a single witness’s statement is sufficient to establish
probable cause.
Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir.
2002). And considering Holder’s statement, the voicemails,
Holder’s familiarity with Pitts’s voice, and Pitts’s admitted
frustration with the probate judge who had handled his mother’s
estate, the officials could have reasonably concluded that there was
a substantial chance that Pitts had unlawfully threatened the judge.
The officials therefore had probable cause to seek an arrest
warrant, so Pitts’s malicious prosecution claim fails.
* * *
“The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty
will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action
for every defendant acquitted—indeed, for every suspect released.”
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). Pitts decries the
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21-12759 Opinion of the Court 11
warrant for his arrest, accusing the officials of intentionally making
false statements against him. But the facts show otherwise—the
officials had probable cause to conclude that Pitts had threatened
the probate judge. Even though the state court eventually
dismissed the charges against him, Pitts did not suffer an unlawful
seizure pursuant to legal process.
AFFIRMED.
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