Christopher D. Dyal v. Mr. Pinkston, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-11566
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cv-00933-MMH-JBT
CHRISTOPHER D. DYAL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants,
MR. PINKSTON,
MR. CARTER,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(February 5, 2021)
USCA11 Case: 20-11566 Date Filed: 02/05/2021 Page: 1 of 8

-- 1 of 8 --

2
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Christopher Dyal, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Patrick Carter and Truman
Pinkston in Plaintiff’s civil action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
contends Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious
harm posed by tasks Plaintiff was assigned to perform while he was a prisoner at
Florida State Prison (“FSP”). No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
This appeal arises out of these facts, viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. Between May and June 2016, Plaintiff was assigned to work at the FSP
Water Treatment Plant where he was supervised by Defendants. Each day,
between 300 to 400 thousand gallons of wastewater flowed through a water tank at
the Water Treatment Plant before being treated and supplied to FSP. The water
tank was equipped with a screen designed to filter trash and debris out of the
wastewater. Under normal circumstances, a machine raked the trash from the
screen and deposited the trash into a dumpster. When the machine was out of
1 We construe liberally pro se pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262,
1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
USCA11 Case: 20-11566 Date Filed: 02/05/2021 Page: 2 of 8

-- 2 of 8 --

3
order, however, the screen required cleaning by hand. During these times, the
screen would be cleaned manually 8 to 10 times a day.
Plaintiff says Defendants forced him “against his will” to clean manually the
water tank’s screen. This task involved walking down a set of 16 steps into a large
tank, raking trash from the screen, shoveling the trash into a bucket, carrying the
bucket back up the steps, and emptying the bucket into a nearby dumpster. While
working at the Water Treatment Plant, Plaintiff cleaned the screen two to three
times a day. Defendants provided Plaintiff with rubber gloves and rubber boots
and denied Plaintiff’s requests for additional personal protective equipment.2
On or about 18 May 2016, Plaintiff started developing sores on parts of his
body that had been exposed to the wastewater, including on his face, arms, chest,
2 Plaintiff contends the screen-cleaning task required additional personal protective equipment.
Plaintiff relies chiefly on a document -- “Florida Department of Corrections Housekeeping
Procedures Involving Potential Exposure to Blood and Body Fluids Lesson Plan”
(“Housekeeping Procedures”) -- instructing inmates assigned to housekeeping duties on the
proper method of cleaning “visible spills of blood o[r] other body fluids during the course of
normal housekeeping operations.” Nothing evidences that the Housekeeping Procedures are
applicable to inmates assigned to work outside the perimeter of the prison at the Wastewater
Treatment Plant. Nor has Plaintiff introduced evidence that blood or other body fluids were
visible in the wastewater or near the water tank’s screen. Also, even to the extent the
Housekeeping Procedures might be applicable to inmates working at the Wastewater Treatment
Plant, the violation of a prison policy -- by itself -- establishes no constitutional violation. Cf.
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995) (prison regulations are not intended to confer
rights or benefits on inmates but are designed to guide correctional officials in the administration
of prisons).
USCA11 Case: 20-11566 Date Filed: 02/05/2021 Page: 3 of 8

-- 3 of 8 --

4
and neck. When Plaintiff reported his injuries to Defendants, Defendants told
Plaintiff to go to the medical staff.
Prison medical staff treated Plaintiff’s sores and tested him for potential viral
infections. Never has Plaintiff alleged that he received inadequate medical care at
FSP. Plaintiff was transferred to a different institution on 8 June 2016 where he
continued to receive medical care for his sores. Plaintiff suffered from sores for at
least two years; some of the sores have left permanent scars.
Plaintiff testified that he knew both Pinkston and Carter from his two prior
incarcerations and that he was well-liked by Defendants. When Defendants
learned Plaintiff was back in prison, Plaintiff says Defendants were “upset” and
that Pinkston told Plaintiff that Pinkston was “going to break him.” Plaintiff
testified that Defendants wanted to teach him a lesson to help Plaintiff so he would
avoid ending up back in prison.
Plaintiff filed this civil action against Defendants, alleging he had been
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.3
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
3 Plaintiff also asserted he was denied due process and equal protection in violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. In his appellate brief, Plaintiff mentions the Fourteenth
Amendment only as a vehicle for his deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiff raises no argument
in his brief about due process or equal protection; these claims are thus not before us on appeal.
USCA11 Case: 20-11566 Date Filed: 02/05/2021 Page: 4 of 8

-- 4 of 8 --

5
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Maniccia
v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 1999). We view the evidence and all
reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A “genuine” factual dispute exists “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Ave. Clo Fund,
LTD v. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp., 723 F.3d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 2013).
Although a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party, “an inference based on speculation and conjecture is not reasonable.” Id.
The Eighth Amendment -- as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment -- prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” See
U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim based on
prison officials’ failure to prevent harm, an inmate must show three things: “(1) a
substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that
risk; and (3) a causal connection between the defendants’ conduct and the Eighth
Amendment violation.” Brooks v. Powell, 800 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015).
We evaluate the substantial-risk-of-serious-harm element under an objective
standard. Id. To establish a substantial risk of serious harm, an inmate must show
USCA11 Case: 20-11566 Date Filed: 02/05/2021 Page: 5 of 8

-- 5 of 8 --

6
a “strong likelihood of injury, rather than a mere possibility.” Id. (quotations
omitted). That a prisoner was, in fact, injured -- by itself -- is insufficient to show
a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 1302.
Plaintiff has shown no objectively substantial risk of serious harm. The
evidence shows that -- during the pertinent time -- the machine that cleaned the
water tank’s screen was non-operational. Under those circumstances, for the water
tank’s screen to be cleaned manually several times a day was necessary and
routine. Other inmates besides Plaintiff had performed this task on many
occasions, including at least one other inmate that was assigned to the task at the
same time as Plaintiff. Nothing evidences that another inmate had developed sores
or suffered other injury after cleaning the screen by hand. In written declarations,
each Defendant also attested that Defendants had performed personally the
complained-of task on many occasions -- using the same protective gear (rubber
gloves and rubber boots) provided to Plaintiff -- and had suffered no injury.
Viewing this evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff has shown no “strong
likelihood” of injury. That Plaintiff was injured after his exposure to the
wastewater -- or that a mere possibility of injury existed -- is not enough to
establish an objectively substantial risk of serious harm.
USCA11 Case: 20-11566 Date Filed: 02/05/2021 Page: 6 of 8

-- 6 of 8 --

7
Moreover, even if Plaintiff could show a substantial risk of serious harm, his
proposed facts are insufficient to establish deliberate indifference under the second
part of our Eighth Amendment inquiry. To establish deliberate indifference,
Plaintiff must show that Defendants knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.” See Purcell ex. rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty.,
400 F.3d 1313, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2005). To satisfy this element, “the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and must also draw the inference.” Id.
“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived
but did not” is no infliction of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994).
Each Defendant has sworn -- and nothing refutes -- that Defendants were
unaware of any injury caused by manual cleaning of the water tank screen. That
each Defendant himself performed the screen-cleaning task on multiple occasions
and with the same equipment provided to Plaintiff also renders a finding that
Defendants knew the task was likely to cause an injury unsupported. No
reasonable inference can be made that Defendants had subjective knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious injury.
USCA11 Case: 20-11566 Date Filed: 02/05/2021 Page: 7 of 8

-- 7 of 8 --

8
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has shown no Eighth
Amendment violation.4 We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Defendants.
AFFIRMED.
4 Given our conclusion that the facts show no Eighth Amendment violation, we also conclude
that Defendants -- under the circumstances -- violated no already clearly established right. So
even if we are mistaken about whether the facts might show an Eighth Amendment violation,
Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s damage claims.
USCA11 Case: 20-11566 Date Filed: 02/05/2021 Page: 8 of 8

-- 8 of 8 --