Eric Watkins v. Nicolene Johnson

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-13583
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cv-60980-WPD
ERIC WATKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NICOLENE JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 22, 2021)
Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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This litigation arises from Plaintiff’s arrest for assault with a deadly weapon
on May 3, 2014. Plaintiff claims Defendant, a Broward County Sheriff’s Office
(“BSO”) sheriff’s deputy, arrested him without probable cause, unlawfully
searched his car, and unreasonably seized his machete, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Based on the alleged Fourth Amendment violations, Plaintiff,
proceeding pro se, asserted federal claims against Defendant under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in her individual capacity. The district court granted summary judgment to
Defendant on the ground of qualified immunity. After a careful review, we
AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
We assume the following facts to be true for purposes of this appeal.1 On
the morning of May 3, 2014, Plaintiff’s 1963 black Volkswagen Beetle was parked
in the Westway Towing Company (“Westway”) parking lot, located at the
intersection of North State Road 7 and West Oakland Park Boulevard in
Lauderdale Lakes, Florida. The lot was open to the public, and Plaintiff’s car was
legally parked there. The car had a “For Sale” sign in its window, and Plaintiff, a
1 When reviewing a district court’s order granting summary judgment, we construe the evidence
and draw all inferences in favor of Plaintiff. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Evie’s Tavern
Ellenton, Inc., 772 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2014). Thus, where there is a factual dispute in
the record, we have adopted Plaintiff’s version of the events.
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heavy-set black male, was sitting in the driver’s seat, with the door open and his
feet outside the car, doing legal work at a fabricated table.
While Plaintiff sat working, a man later identified as Patrick Hardy drove his
truck onto the Westway lot and parked behind Plaintiff’s car. According to
Plaintiff, Hardy got out of his truck and walked to Plaintiff’s car, leaned on
Plaintiff’s open car door and said, “No cutting grass today?” Plaintiff stood up
from where he was sitting and told Hardy to get off his car, and Hardy responded
by backing away from the car while at the same time pulling out a knife. Plaintiff
testified that he verbally warned Hardy not to approach him with the knife, and that
Hardy continued to back away from Plaintiff’s car until he reached his truck,
whereupon Hardy got into the truck and left the property. Plaintiff concedes there
was a machete in a bag inside his car at the time of his encounter with Hardy, but
he claims he never brandished or threatened Hardy with the machete.
At 12:55 pm on May 3, 2014, approximately forty-five minutes after Hardy
left the property, Defendant was dispatched to the Westway parking lot.
Defendant testified that the dispatcher advised her that a heavy-set black male had
threatened a victim (later identified as Hardy) with a machete near a black
Volkswagen Beetle that was parked in the Westway lot. The CAD report confirms
that Defendant was apprised of a black Volkswagen that was parked in the
Westway lot and advertised as being for sale, and that when the victim approached
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the car to ask about its price, a large black male came out of the car waving a
machete. The report indicates that Defendant was dispatched to the scene in
response to the victim’s 911 call reporting the incident.
Defendant testified that when she arrived at the Westway parking lot, she
saw a black Volkswagen Beetle with a “For Sale” sign in its window and she saw
Plaintiff sitting in the driver’s seat of the car. Both Plaintiff and the car matched
the description provided by the dispatcher. Defendant, along with two other
officers who had been dispatched to the scene, approached Plaintiff with their guns
drawn and ordered Plaintiff to get out of the car and onto the ground. Plaintiff
complied, stepping out of the car and getting onto the ground, where he was
handcuffed and detained by the officers.
The parties dispute the sequence and timing of the events that followed.
Construing the facts in favor of Plaintiff, Defendant immediately walked over to
Plaintiff’s car, opened the driver’s side door, and asked, “Where’s the machete?”
Plaintiff responded by telling Defendant to shut his car door and saying, “Don’t
search my car.” Defendant ignored Plaintiff’s orders and conducted a ten-minute
search of the car, during which time she found a bag in the trunk of the car that
contained a machete. When Defendant found the machete, she advised Plaintiff
that he was under arrest and instructed the other officers to put Plaintiff in their
patrol car.
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At some point after Plaintiff was detained in the back of the patrol car,
Patrick Hardy and LaJuan Bernell, an alleged eyewitness to Hardy’s earlier
encounter with Plaintiff, arrived at the Westway parking lot.2 Defendant testified,
and the CAD report confirms, that she called Hardy back to the scene so he could
identify Plaintiff and describe the incident that had occurred earlier in the day.
According to Plaintiff, Hardy and Bernell reached the scene about twenty minutes
after he was detained, and they immediately got into the back of Defendant’s patrol
car, where they remained until Plaintiff was taken to jail.3
When Hardy and Bernell arrived at the scene, Defendant put them under
oath and obtained sworn statements from them. Hardy testified in his statement
that he was driving down Oakland Park Boulevard when he saw a black
Volkswagen Beetle parked in the Westway parking lot with a “For Sale” sign in its
window. Hardy stated that he pulled into the parking lot to ask about the price of
the car and a man immediately jumped out of the car and said, “Don’t approach my
fucking vehicle.” Hardy said that as he retreated to his truck, the man spun around
and retrieved a machete from the car, then walked towards Hardy with the machete
2 Plaintiff says Hardy was alone when he approached Plaintiff’s car earlier in the day, but
Bernell testified that he remained in the passenger seat of Hardy’s truck, and thus out of
Plaintiff’s sight, during Hardy’s encounter with Plaintiff.
3 Plaintiff’s recollection as to the timing of Hardy and Bernell’s arrival at the scene is consistent
with the documentary evidence in the record. Hardy’s statement reflects that it was taken at 1:19
and concluded at 1:22. Bernell’s statement was taken at 1:26.
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in his hand stating that he was going to “fucking kill” Hardy. Hardy confirmed to
Defendant that Plaintiff was the man who had threatened him with the machete and
that the threat made him fear for his life.4
Bernell’s statement corroborated Hardy’s testimony. Bernell stated that
earlier that day, he and Hardy saw Plaintiff’s car parked in the Westway parking
lot, that the car was advertised as being for sale, and that he and Hardy pulled into
the lot to ask about the price of the car. Bernell recalled that as Hardy walked
towards the car, a man jumped out of the car and started swearing. Bernell said
that when Hardy began to retreat, the man grabbed a machete from the car and
approached Hardy with it in an aggressive manner, at which time Hardy walked
backwards to his truck, eventually getting into the truck, leaving the scene, and
calling 911 to report the incident. Like Hardy, Bernell identified Plaintiff as the
individual who had jumped out of the car and threatened Hardy with a machete.
Defendant testified that she arrested Plaintiff for aggravated assault after she
interviewed Hardy and Bernell, and that she subsequently decided to impound
Plaintiff’s car incident to his arrest. According to Defendant, she discovered the
machete when she conducted an inventory search of the car, as required by BSO
4 Plaintiff argues in his appellate brief that Hardy did not “positively identify” him as the
individual who threatened Hardy with a machete. However, Plaintiff does not present any
evidence to support this argument, and he does not otherwise refute Defendant’s testimony on
this point.
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policy when a car is impounded. Documentary evidence in the record—such as
the inventory receipt form Defendant completed itemizing the contents of
Plaintiff’s car, including the machete—corroborates Defendant’s testimony on this
point. And we note that Plaintiff’s car was impounded by Westway when he was
arrested. But for purposes of this appeal we assume, consistent with Plaintiff’s
declaration testimony, that Defendant searched Plaintiff’s car immediately after
she detained, and before she arrested, Plaintiff.
After his arrest, Plaintiff was taken to the Broward County jail and charged
with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Upon his release, Plaintiff initiated
this lawsuit against Defendant in her individual capacity. His complaint includes
two counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, each asserting a separate Fourth Amendment
violation. In the first count, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unlawfully arrested
him without probable cause. In the second count, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
unreasonably searched his car without his consent and without a warrant, and that
she unlawfully seized a machete she found in the car.
Following discovery, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In
her motion, Defendant argued that she was entitled to qualified immunity as to
both counts asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint because: (1) she had probable cause,
or at least arguable probable cause, to arrest Plaintiff for aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon based on the information she received from the 911 dispatcher and
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the sworn statements of Hardy and Bernell, and (2) her search of Plaintiff’s car was
a valid inventory search conducted in accordance with BSO policy and pursuant to
her lawful decision to impound the car.
The district court granted Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiff’s false arrest
claim. Based on the undisputed facts in the record—including the information
relayed to Defendant by the 911 dispatcher, the fact that Defendant observed a man
and car that matched the description provided by the dispatcher when she arrived
on the scene, and Hardy and Bernell’s corroborating sworn statements—the court
determined that Defendant had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff
for aggravated assault under Florida law. But the court denied Defendant’s motion
as to Plaintiff’s unlawful search and seizure claim, noting that Plaintiff’s
declaration testimony raised an issue of fact as to whether Defendant had searched
Plaintiff’s car immediately upon her arrival to the scene, and thus before she had
decided to arrest Plaintiff and impound his car.
Defendant subsequently requested and was granted leave to file a second
summary judgment motion. In her second motion, Defendant argued that her
search of Defendant’s car was a lawful search incident to Plaintiff’s arrest for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because Defendant had probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff on that charge and it was reasonable for Defendant to believe the
car contained evidence relevant to the charge—namely, the weapon used in the
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assault—based on the information she had received from the 911 dispatcher.
Defendant also argued that the search was lawful under the exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement announced in Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925), because Plaintiff’s car was “readily capable” of being used on the
highways and Defendant had “probable cause to believe [the car] contain[ed]
contraband or evidence of a crime.”
The district court granted Defendant’s second summary judgment motion
based on the Carroll exception.5 The court emphasized that Defendant was
dispatched to the scene in response to a 911 call reporting that a large black male
had wielded a machete at a victim who had stopped to inquire about the man’s
black Volkswagen, which was parked in the Westway parking lot and advertised as
being for sale, and that when Defendant arrived on the scene she encountered a
heavy-set black male sitting in a car that matched the description relayed to her by
the dispatcher with a “For Sale” sign in its window. Under those circumstances,
the court concluded, Defendant was authorized, per the rationale of Carroll, to
5 While Defendant’s second motion for summary judgment was pending, Plaintiff filed two
motions for reconsideration of the district court’s decision as to Defendant’s first motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the district court erred when it denied his
motions for reconsideration, but he has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by
denying either motion. See Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1254 (11th Cir. 2007)
(noting that this Court reviews the denial of a motion to reconsider under the abuse of discretion
standard). On the contrary, the district court denied Plaintiff’s motions to reconsider pursuant to
this Court’s well-established rule that a motion to reconsider is a limited remedy that should be
used sparingly, and not to “set forth new theories of law” or relitigate issues that have already
been considered by the court. See Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997).
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search Plaintiff’s car specifically for the machete, the weapon allegedly used in the
crime reported to the 911 dispatcher.
Having disposed of both claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint, the district
court entered judgment in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff appealed. As he did in the
district court, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se on appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Jarvela
v. Crete Carrier Corp., 776 F.3d 822, 828 (11th Cir. 2015). We apply the same
standard as the district court, construing the facts and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See id. Viewing the evidence in
that manner, summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Tolan
v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656–57 (2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
II. Qualified Immunity
A. Standard
Defendant argues she is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims. “Qualified immunity protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct
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violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When properly applied, it protects all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To be clearly established, a right must be “sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In other words, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate” and thus given the official fair warning that
his conduct violated the law. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Fair warning
is most commonly provided by materially similar controlling precedent. See
Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012). Alternatively, authoritative
judicial decisions may “establish broad principles of law” that are clearly
applicable to the conduct at issue or, very occasionally, it may be obvious from
“explicit statutory or constitutional statements” that conduct is unconstitutional.
Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007).
A defendant who asserts qualified immunity has the initial burden of
showing she was acting within the scope of her discretionary authority when she
took the allegedly unconstitutional action. See Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247,
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1250 (11th Cir. 2005). Assuming the defendant meets that requirement, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to establish that qualified immunity is not appropriate by
showing that (1) “the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right”
and (2) “the constitutional right was clearly established at the time” of the alleged
misconduct. Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff
does not dispute that Defendant was acting in her discretionary authority when she
arrested him and searched his car on May 3, 2014. The burden thus lies with
Plaintiff to show that the arrest and search violated a constitutional right that was
clearly established at the time of the incident. See id. As discussed below,
Plaintiff has not met this burden as to either his false arrest or his unlawful search
and seizure claim.
B. False Arrest
Plaintiff claims he was arrested on May 3, 2014 without a warrant and
without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A warrantless
arrest lacking probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and can therefore
underpin a § 1983 claim. See Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 734
(11th Cir. 2010). On the other hand, “the existence of probable cause at the time of
arrest is an absolute bar” to a § 1983 claim challenging the constitutionality of the
arrest. Id.
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“Probable cause exists where the facts” within an officer’s knowledge,
“derived from reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to cause a person
of reasonable caution to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being
committed.” Id. It requires only “a probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
243 n.13 (1983). In the qualified immunity context, the relevant inquiry is whether
an officer had “arguable” probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. See Lee v. Ferraro,
284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002). “Arguable probable cause exists where
reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge
as the [defendant] could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest.” Id.
(emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Wood v. Kesler,
323 F.3d 872, 878 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he inquiry is . . . whether an officer
reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed, in light of the
information the officer possessed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Whether an officer has probable cause or arguable probable cause “depends
on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern.” Brown, 608
F.3d at 735. The rationale behind qualified immunity is that an officer who acts
reasonably should not be held personally liable merely because it appears, in
hindsight, that she might have made a mistake. The concept of arguable probable
cause thus allows for the possibility that an officer might “reasonably but
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mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Under this Court’s governing precedent, such an officer cannot be held
personally liable for false arrest. See id.
Defendant arrested Plaintiff for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (a
machete). Under Florida law, an assault is defined as “an intentional, unlawful
threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an
apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in
such other person that such violence is imminent.” Fla. Stats. § 784.011(1). An
assault is aggravated if it is committed “[w]ith a deadly weapon without intent to
kill.” Fla. Stats. § 784.021(1)(a).
Plaintiff does not dispute that a machete, brandished in the manner alleged
by Hardy, would qualify as a deadly weapon for purposes of the Florida statute.
We agree that the machete constituted a deadly weapon under the circumstances,
and we conclude further that Defendant had at least arguable probable cause to
believe Plaintiff had committed an assault with the machete when she arrested him
on May 3, 2014. See P.J.A. v. State, 152 So. 3d 805, 806–07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
(holding that a steak knife, held and twisted in the defendant’s hand while he
threatened to kill the victim, was a deadly weapon under the Florida statute).
Again, Defendant responded to the Westway parking lot after being apprised
by a 911 dispatcher that a large black male in a black Volkswagen, which was
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parked in the lot and advertised for sale, had threatened a victim who inquired
about the cost of the Volkswagen while waving a machete at the victim. When
Defendant arrived at the scene, she encountered Plaintiff, a heavy-set black male
who matched the 911 dispatcher’s description of the perpetrator, sitting in the
driver’s seat of a car that also matched the dispatcher’s description—a black
Volkswagen with a “For Sale” sign in its window. Shortly thereafter, the victim
returned to the scene and provided sworn testimony in which he stated that
Plaintiff had brandished a machete while threatening to “fucking kill” him, causing
the victim to fear for his life. An eyewitness who returned to the scene with the
victim provided a sworn statement corroborating the victim’s testimony.
At some point during her investigation, Defendant searched Plaintiff’s car
and found the machete allegedly used to assault the victim. But even if Defendant
had not found the machete, an officer in Defendant’s position “reasonably could
have believed”—and likely would have believed—there was probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff for aggravated assault under Florida law, given the information
Defendant received from the 911 dispatcher, the corroborating facts she discovered
at the scene, and Hardy and Bernell’s sworn testimony. See Wood, 323 F.3d at
878. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s false
arrest claim.
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B. Illegal Search and Seizure
In accordance with its prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Fourth Amendment generally requires an officer to have a warrant supported by
probable cause to search an individual’s personal property. See United States v.
Wilson, 979 F.3d 889, 910 (11th Cir. 2020). The Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement is subject to several well-established exceptions, however. See id.
Most relevant here, the “automobile exception” recognized by the Supreme Court
in Carroll v. United States permits the warrantless search of a car where (1) the car
is “readily mobile” and (2) “probable cause exists to believe [the car] contains
contraband.” Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153–56 (upholding the warrantless
search of a car that officers had probable cause to believe contained illegal liquor).
Plaintiff does not dispute that his car was operational and thus “readily
mobile” when Defendant conducted the search. See United States v. Alexander,
835 F.2d 1406, 1409 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The vehicle does not have to be moving at
the moment when the police obtain probable cause to search.”). Plaintiff concedes
further that his car was parked in a public parking lot at the time of the search, in a
location where he would have no reasonable expectation of privacy. Compare
Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1668 (2018) (holding that the automobile
exception did not permit an officer to conduct a warrantless search of a motorcycle
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that was parked in the curtilage of a home and covered with a tarp). The first
requirement of the automobile exception is thus met in this case.
The probable cause requirement is also satisfied in this case. For purposes
of the automobile exception, probable cause exists when “there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle under the
totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Delva, 922 F.3d 1228, 1243 (11th
Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the “totality of the
circumstances” here, it was reasonable for Defendant to conclude there was a “fair
probability” Plaintiff’s car contained a machete that had been used earlier in the
day to commit an aggravated assault. See id. (“Facts provided by a confidential
informant and then independently corroborated by the government can support
probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband.”).
To recap briefly, Defendant was advised by a 911 dispatcher that a large
black male had threatened a victim with a machete when the victim had stopped to
ask about the price of a black Volkswagen Beetle that was parked in the Westway
parking lot and advertised as being for sale. When Defendant arrived at the
Westway parking lot, she observed Plaintiff, a heavy-set black male, sitting in a
black Volkswagen Beetle that was parked in the lot with a “For Sale” sign in its
window. Defendant had no reason to doubt the credibility of the information
provided by the 911 dispatcher, and the corroborating facts she discovered when
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she arrived at the scene provided probable cause to search Plaintiff’s car
specifically for the machete allegedly used in the earlier assault. According to
Plaintiff’s version of the events, that is exactly what Defendant did—ordering
Plaintiff to get out of his car and proceeding to search the car after stating, “Where
is the machete?” Based on those undisputed facts, the district court correctly
granted qualified immunity to Defendant on Plaintiff’s unlawful search and seizure
claim pursuant to the automobile exception.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing discussion, we conclude that Defendant
had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for aggravated assault in
violation of Florida law, and that her search of Plaintiff’s car and seizure of the
machete she found in the car were permitted under the automobile exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district
court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s § 1983 false
arrest and unlawful search and seizure claims.
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