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16-11971•Henry S. Chambers, Jr. v. Commissioner of Social Security
16-11971Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit01.12.2016
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-11971
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00056-MP-CAS
HENRY S. CHAMBERS, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(December 1, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Henry Chambers, Jr. appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits, pursuant
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to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On appeal, Chambers argues that: (1) the Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by assigning little weight to the opinion of a consultative
psychologist; and (2) the ALJ erred by relying on the vocational expert’s testimony
and recommendations for occupations. After careful review, we affirm.
We normally review the Commissioner’s decision for substantial evidence.
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). We do
not address the magistrate judge’s or district court’s reasoning, because our review
is limited to the agency decision. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d
1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). The ALJ is charged with weighing the evidence and
we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the
Commissioner even if we find the evidence preponderates against the
Commissioner’s decision. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
First, we are unpersuaded by Chambers’s claim that the ALJ erred by
assigning insufficient weight to the opinion of a consultative psychologist. In
assessing whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider the medical
opinions in a case record together with the rest of the relevant evidence received.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). Generally, the longer a treating source has treated a
claimant and the more times a treating source has seen a claimant, the more weight
the ALJ will give to the source’s medical opinion. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2). We’ve
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held that a one-time examiner need not be given deference by the Commissioner.
McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987).
Furthermore, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole,
the more weight the ALJ will give to that opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4).
The ALJ will consider a claimant’s daily activities when determining the
symptoms and severity of an impairment. Id. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). An ALJ need
not give a treating physician’s opinion considerable weight if the applicant’s own
testimony about his daily activities contradicts that opinion. See Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004). “A clearly articulated credibility
finding with substantial supporting evidence in the record will not be disturbed by
a reviewing court.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995).
However, the ALJ must “articulate specific reasons for questioning the claimant’s
credibility” if subjective symptom testimony is “critical” to the claim. Marbury v.
Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992).
Here, the ALJ did not err by assigning little weight to the opinion of a
consultative psychologist, Dr. William Beaty. First, the ALJ properly reviewed all
medical opinions in the case record, including those of the nurse practitioners,
physician assistants, and other medical personnel, to determine the severity of
Chambers’s impairments and how they affected his ability to work. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(b), (c); § 404.1513(a), (d)(1). The ALJ was permitted to attach more
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weight to the medical professionals at Meridian Behavioral Healthcare, Inc.
(“Meridian”), who treated Chambers numerous times and over a longer period of
time, than to Dr. Beaty, who examined Chambers once. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2); McSwain, 814 F.2d at 619.
Second, the consultative psychologist’s assessment was based primarily on
Chambers’s report of subjective symptoms, which the ALJ determined was not
reliable. The ALJ explained that he questioned Chambers’s credibility because
Chambers’s description of his daily activities and capacity for social functioning
suggested a greater capacity than that alleged during his hearing testimony, and
Chambers’s work history and refusal to look for new work raised a question as to
whether Chambers’s continued unemployment was actually due to medical
impairments. See Marbury, 957 F.2d at 839. Chambers had testified that he had
left his last job because he wanted to and that he had not looked for a job since. He
also testified that he was able to perform household chores, such as doing yard
work, preparing simple meals, washing dishes, vacuuming, sweeping, mopping,
making his bed, and taking out the trash, and that he went to church once a week
and used public transportation. Notes from follow up meetings at Meridian
indicated that Chambers had a good response to his medication and his symptoms
were well controlled with medication. And, when asked by a treating counselor
about his disability, Chambers made vague comments about his back and mental
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condition and refused to search for jobs, even after being told that there were jobs
that were not labor intensive and that his depression had been under control for
some time with the help of medication. Therefore, the ALJ’s credibility
determination was clearly articulated and based on substantial evidence. See
Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562.
The ALJ also determined that Dr. Beaty’s opinion was inconsistent with the
record as a whole. In particular, as we’ve described above, his opinion was
inconsistent with the opinions of Chambers’s treatment providers at Meridian and
Chambers’s own statements that he was able to use the bus and perform a good
range of daily activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). The ALJ was permitted
to consider these daily activities when determining the symptoms and severity of
Chambers’s impairment. Further, because Chambers’s own testimony regarding
his daily activities contradicted Beaty’s opinion, the ALJ did not need to give
Beaty’s opinion considerable weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i); Phillips,
357 F.3d at 1241. For all of these reasons, the ALJ did not err by assigning little
weight to Beaty’s opinion.
We also find no merit to Chambers’s claim that the ALJ erred by relying on
the vocational expert’s testimony and recommendations for occupations. If the
Commissioner determines that the claimant cannot perform his past work, the
Commissioner must establish substantial evidence that occupations exist in the
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national economy that the claimant can perform. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007,
1011 (11th Cir. 1987). For a response to a hypothetical question to constitute
substantial evidence of work available to the claimant, the question must set out all
of the claimant’s impairments. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir.
2002). If the Commissioner establishes that the claimant could perform work in
the national economy in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work
experience, the claimant must prove that he or she cannot perform the work
suggested by the Commissioner. Hale, 831 F.2d at 1011.
Job descriptions in the DOT include specific vocational preparation time
(“SVP”) numbers and reasoning levels, which supply supplemental information
about the listed jobs. Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Occupational Definitions
(4th ed., rev. 1991) (“DOT”). A job with an SVP of two means that that job
requires anything beyond a short demonstration up to and including one month of
time to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility
needed for average performance in the job. See DOT, Appendix C: Components
of the Definition Trailer, § II, SVP. Unskilled work is work which needs little or
no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of
time, usually within 30 days. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(a). The job of hospital food
worker has a reasoning level of three and a SVP of two. DOT § 319.677-014. The
job of housekeeping cleaner has a reasoning level of one and a SVP of two. Id. §
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323.687-014. If there is a conflict between the DOT and the jobs identified by a
vocational expert in response to the hypothetical question, the testimony of the
vocational expert outweighs the DOT because the DOT is not the sole source of
admissible information concerning jobs. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1229-30
(11th Cir. 1999).
Here, the ALJ established substantial evidence that occupations existed in
the national economy that Chambers could perform by asking the vocational expert
a hypothetical question that set out all of Chambers’s impairments. See Hale, 831
F.2d at 1011; Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1227. At the hearing, the ALJ told the
vocational expert to assume, among other limitations, that Chambers needed a low
stress work environment with no production line; simple tasks; and to have limited
contact with the public and co-workers. The ALJ asked the vocational expert
whether any jobs existed in the national economy that a hypothetical person could
perform assuming Chamber’s age, education, work experience, RFC, and other
limitations. The vocational expert testified that such an individual could perform
unskilled, light jobs, such as a hospital food worker and housekeeping cleaner.
Instead of arguing that the ALJ erred by failing to inform the vocational
expert of his impairments, Chambers seems to argue that the suggested
occupations do not account for the limitations required to accommodate his
impairments, specifically simple work and a low stress work environment. As for
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simple work, Chambers argues that jobs with reasoning levels of two or three
require more mental capacity than that which would be required for simple work.
But the job of housekeeping cleaner has a reasoning level of one. DOT § 323.687-
014. As for jobs labeled with reasoning levels of two or three, they may also be
jobs with simple tasks. Furthermore, although the job of hospital food worker has
a reasoning level of three, it also has a SVP of two, indicating that it requires, at a
maximum, one month of time to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and
develop the facility needed for average performance in the job. DOT § 319.677-
014. That job is, therefore, consistent with unskilled work, which needs little or no
judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of
time, usually within 30 days. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(a). Thus, Chambers has not
shown that the jobs of housekeeping cleaner or hospital food worker require more
mental capacity than allowed for in the limitations outlined by the ALJ.
As for the requirement of a low stress environment, Chambers has not
presented any evidence that the occupations of hospital food service worker and
housekeeping cleaner did not satisfy this requirement. The definitions of the
occupations do not mention stress and the vocational expert did not mention stress.
See generally DOT, Occupational Definitions (4th ed., rev. 1991). For these
reasons, Chambers has not proven that he could not perform the work suggested by
the Commissioner. See Hale, 831 F.2d at 1011.
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Lastly, Chambers’s argument that the ALJ should have questioned the
vocational expert about any inconsistency with the DOT fails. First, there was no
apparent inconsistency -- indeed, Chambers did not question the vocational expert
about any inconsistency or raise the issue before the ALJ, and the vocational expert
affirmed that his testimony was consistent with the DOT. Second, even if there
was a conflict between the DOT and the jobs identified by the vocational expert in
response to the hypothetical question, the testimony of the vocational expert
outweighs the DOT because the DOT is not the sole source of admissible
information concerning jobs. See Jones, 190 F.3d at 1230. Thus, the ALJ properly
relied on the vocational expert’s testimony.
AFFIRMED.
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