Hilda Espinosa v. Burger king Corporation

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-15205
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:11-cv-62503-JIC
HILDA ESPINOSA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BURGER KING CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(May 28, 2013)
Before BARKETT, WILSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Hilda Espinosa appeals pro se the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of her former employer, Burger King Corporation (“Burger
Case: 12-15205 Date Filed: 05/28/2013 Page: 1 of 3

-- 1 of 3 --

2
King”). She sued Burger King Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a), 1981, and the Florida Civil
Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”), Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a), (7).
Ms. Espinosa essentially alleges that she suffered sexual harassment at a
2008 conference for Burger King managers. The harassment she alleges consisted
of inappropriate sexual behavior by her roommate and other colleagues, who
engaged in drunken and inappropriate behavior in her hotel room for a brief period
of time. After being fired, Ms. Espinosa brought suit against Burger King, alleging
that her firing was discriminatory and in retaliation for her lawful complaints about
the events at the conference.
As Ms. Espinosa is a pro se litigant, we must construe her allegations
liberally, see, e.g., Smith v. School Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th
Cir. 2007) (construing pro se brief liberally), and accordingly we construe them as
pleading that her harassment, discrimination, and retaliation claims were gender-
based, which is a protected category under Title VII. We nevertheless conclude
that summary judgment was properly granted against Ms. Espinosa on each claim.
As to Ms. Espinosa’s sexual harassment claim, Ms. Espinosa has not shown
that the dinner conversation and the brief incident in her hotel room with her
drunken colleagues was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
Case: 12-15205 Date Filed: 05/28/2013 Page: 2 of 3

-- 2 of 3 --

3
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. ” Meritor
Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quotation marks omitted).
As to Ms. Espinosa’s discrimination and retaliation claims, we assume
arguendo that she has established a prima facie case. However, there is not
sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that Burger King’s proffered non-
discriminatory reasons for her firing was “pretextual or . . . that a discriminatory
reason motivated the discharge.” Lee v. Russell Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769,
773 (11th Cir. 1982). Ms. Espinosa received failing scores in all but one of her
Operation Evaluation Reports and inspections Burger King officials noted
extensive and repeated problems with the management and operation of her
restaurant. Although Ms. Espinosa points out that she received one “above
average” review and increased profits at her branch, that evidence, when viewed in
the light most favorable to Ms. Espinosa, is not sufficient to show that Burger
King’s stated legitimate reason for her termination was pretextual. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
AFFIRMED.
Case: 12-15205 Date Filed: 05/28/2013 Page: 3 of 3

-- 3 of 3 --