Don Boyd v. State of Georgia, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-14202
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-00042-JRH-WLB
DON BOYD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
STATE OF GEORGIA,
MEDICAL COLLEGE OF GEORGIA POLICE BUREAU,
OFFICER C. ROMERO,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(March 13, 2013)
Case: 12-14202 Date Filed: 03/13/2013 Page: 1 of 7

-- 1 of 7 --

2
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Don Boyd, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
complaint against the State of Georgia, the Medical College of Georgia Police
Bureau, and Officer C. Romero. In his complaint, Boyd described that as he was
driving to a medical appointment, he was pulled over by Officer Romero and given
a traffic citation for failing to stop for a pedestrian in a crosswalk. He asserted
several claims in connection with this traffic stop and citation, including violations
of his civil and constitutional rights. Before the state, the college, and the officer
were served with the complaint,1 the district court sua sponte dismissed the
complaint without prejudice on abstention grounds. Specifically, the district court
took judicial notice of the ongoing state criminal proceeding relating to Boyd’s
traffic citation. The district court then concluded that under Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971), adjudication of Boyd’s claims in federal court
would impermissibly interfere with the ongoing state court proceeding. After
careful consideration, we affirm the district court’s dismissal.
I.
Boyd raises several issues on appeal. He primarily argues that the district
court denied him due process by taking judicial notice of the online record of his
1 The State of Georgia, the Medical College of Georgia Police Bureau, and Officer Romero did
not file any briefs in connection with this appeal.
Case: 12-14202 Date Filed: 03/13/2013 Page: 2 of 7

-- 2 of 7 --

3
state criminal proceeding, and that the district court erred in applying the
abstention doctrine to this case.
A.
First, Boyd argues that he was denied due process when he was not given
fair notice or an opportunity to “rebut and cross examine” the judicially-noticed
information regarding his state criminal proceeding. We review a district court’s
taking of judicial notice for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Marizal, 421
F.2d 836, 837 (5th Cir. 1970).2
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow a court to judicially notice a fact on its
own and “at any stage of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)–(d). However,
“[i]f the court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is
still entitled to be heard.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(e). As we have explained, “[w]here
the court does take such judicial notice on its own motion, a party is entitled to be
heard on the matter if he so requests.” Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of
Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Here, the magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation referencing
“[t]he online docket for the State Court of Richmond County[, which] reflects that
2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as
binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close
of business on September 30, 1981.
Case: 12-14202 Date Filed: 03/13/2013 Page: 3 of 7

-- 3 of 7 --

4
the criminal proceeding for [Boyd’s] citation is ongoing and that the court has
issued a misdemeanor bench warrant for [Boyd].” Then, “[t]he Court [took]
judicial notice of these facts.” Boyd objected to the Report and Recommendation,
arguing that the magistrate judge violated his due process rights by referring to an
“unsubstantiated” online docket, and by taking judicial notice of information from
a court that Boyd “has never heard of or heard from.” The district judge rejected
Boyd’s arguments, adopted the Report and Recommendation, and dismissed the
case without prejudice. The district judge addressed Boyd’s “complain[t] that the
Magistrate Judge did not identify the source of the information concerning the
status of his state criminal case,” by providing a website address for “the publicly
available information concerning [Boyd’s] ongoing criminal case.”
The record is clear that the district court considered and dismissed Boyd’s
objections before taking judicial notice of the state court proceeding. The record
also shows that Boyd did not request a hearing on this issue.3 “Absent a request
under Rule 201(e) for a hearing before the district court, the fact that the court took
judicial notice of a fact or the tenor of the notice taken is not grounds for later
appeal.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1304. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in taking judicial notice of Boyd’s ongoing state proceeding.
3 While we liberally construe pro se briefs and pleadings, Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1320
(11th Cir. 2008), there is nothing in the record that we might liberally interpret as a request made
to the district court for a hearing.
Case: 12-14202 Date Filed: 03/13/2013 Page: 4 of 7

-- 4 of 7 --

5
B.
Second, Boyd contends that the district court misapplied the Younger
abstention doctrine to the facts of this case. “We review an abstention decision
only for an abuse of discretion.” 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274
(11th Cir. 2003).
The question of whether a federal court should abstain from interfering with
a state judicial proceeding “is threefold: first, do the proceedings constitute an
ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important
state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings
to raise constitutional challenges.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
First, the Georgia proceeding is an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Boyd
was charged with a misdemeanor offense on April 11, 2011, and a bench warrant
was issued for him on August 30, 2011. Boyd waited until March 27, 2012 to file
his complaint in federal court. The state court judicial proceeding against Boyd is
ongoing. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 1217 (1974)
(“When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal complaint is
filed, federal intervention does not result in . . . disruption of the state criminal
justice system . . . .”).
The first factor also “requires that the federal proceeding interfere with the
state proceeding.” 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1275. “In order to decide
Case: 12-14202 Date Filed: 03/13/2013 Page: 5 of 7

-- 5 of 7 --

6
whether the federal proceeding would interfere with the state proceeding, we look
to the relief requested and the effect it would have on the state proceedings.” Id. at
1276. The requested relief “need not directly interfere with an ongoing
proceeding”; abstention is required even when the federal proceeding will
indirectly interfere with the state proceeding. Id. Here Boyd seeks, among other
things, a finding that his constitutional rights were violated during his traffic stop.
A finding that the traffic stop was unconstitutional would interfere with the state
court’s adjudication of the validity of the traffic citation. Thus, the federal
proceeding would interfere with the state proceeding.
Second, the proceeding implicates an important state interest. In Younger,
the Supreme Court explained that absent “extraordinary circumstances,” federal
courts should not intervene in state criminal prosecutions. 401 U.S. at 45, 91 S. Ct.
at 751. Here, the state is criminally prosecuting Boyd for a misdemeanor traffic
violation. The state has an important interest in prosecuting this type of criminal
offense.
Third, Boyd did not establish that the state proceeding would fail to provide
an adequate remedy for his federal claims. See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at
1279. “Minimal respect for the state processes . . . precludes any presumption that
the state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.” Middlesex Cnty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 2521
Case: 12-14202 Date Filed: 03/13/2013 Page: 6 of 7

-- 6 of 7 --

7
(1982) (emphasis omitted). Nothing in the record suggests that Boyd will not have
an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in state court.4 Thus, the state
proceeding will provide an adequate remedy for Boyd’s federal claims.
Boyd’s state criminal proceeding is ongoing, implicates an important state
interest, and will provide an adequate opportunity for Boyd to raise constitutional
challenges. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Boyd’s complaint on abstention grounds. The district court’s dismissal is
AFFIRMED.
4 Boyd argues that he will suffer an irreparable injury if his claims are litigated in state court.
However, it does not “appear from the record that [Boyd has] been threatened with any injury
other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith.”
Younger, 401 U.S. at 47, 91 S. Ct. at 752 (quotation marks omitted). Although Boyd argues that
he will suffer the injury of delay in the state court proceeding, which will impact his ability to
present time-sensitive witnesses, “[c]ertain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and
inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves
be considered ‘irreparable’ in the special legal sense of that term.” Id. at 46, 91 S. Ct. at 751.
Case: 12-14202 Date Filed: 03/13/2013 Page: 7 of 7

-- 7 of 7 --