Donna Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 29, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-14305
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:10-cv-00078-HLM
DONNA BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(February 29, 2012)
Before BARKETT, HULL and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Donna Brown appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security

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Administration’s (“the Commissioner”) denial of her application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Brown argues that the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) lacked substantial evidence for this decision
because the ALJ improperly discounted the testimony of her consultative
psychologist, Dr. David Rush.1
The ALJ concluded that Brown is capable of performing light work and of
performing her past relevant work as a meter reader. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(e), 1567(b). This conclusion was supported by the treatment notes
prepared by Brown’s treating physician and the opinions of two non-examining
psychologists who reviewed the available medical evidence and whose
determinations were supported by the record. The ALJ also considered and gave
“some weight” to the opinion of Dr. Rush, and the ALJ was not required to accord
additional weight to Dr. Rush’s opinions because he examined Brown only once.
See Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir. 2004)
(holding that opinion of doctor who examined claimant once need not be given
great weight). The ALJ’s decision to give only “some weight” to Dr. Rush’s
opinions based on a single examination was sufficiently supported by evidence
We review the district court’s decision de novo. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,1
1221 (11th Cir. 2002). We review the Commissioner’s factual findings for substantial evidence.
Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). We may not reweigh the
evidence or make new factual findings. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
2

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that Brown had made statements about her condition that were inconsistent with
Dr. Rush’s testimony, and by the opinions of Brown’s treating physician and the
two reviewing psychologists, which contradicted many of Dr. Rush’s opinions.
Finally, although the ALJ erroneously found that Brown had not sought treatment
for her mental health issues over an eighteen-year period prior to 2007, this error
was harmless because the remaining evidence provided a substantial basis for the
ALJ’s conclusion. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983)
(affirming ALJ decision including harmless factual error).
AFFIRMED
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