William Geoffery Dobbins v. J.C. Giles, et al

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 9, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-12908
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:08-cv-00895-MHT-SRW
WILLIAM GEOFFERY DOBBINS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
J.C. GILES,
Defendant,
LEWIS HULETT,
Lt. Officer,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(January 9, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM:
Officer Lewis Hulett appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit
alleging that he used excessive force against a state inmate, William Dobbins, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. He argues that Dobbins failed to allege a
constitutional violation and that, even if he did, it was not a violation of clearly
established law.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity. Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 902 (11th Cir.
2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). A district court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom, to the extent supported by the record, “in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.” Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010). If an
inmate submits a sworn complaint, the factual allegations therein are sufficient for
summary judgment purposes, and he need not file a separate affidavit. Sammons v.
Taylor, 967 F.2d 1533, 1544 n.5 (11th Cir. 1992).
“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages
unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or
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constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts may address these prongs in either
order. Id.
The Eighth Amendment proscribes the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has made clear that this
proscription governs prison officials’ use of force against inmates. Whitley v. Albers,
475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). The core judicial inquiry in determining whether a prison
official’s use of force was excessive is “whether force was applied in a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Relevant factors in this inquiry include
“the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the
amount of force that was used, and the extent of injury inflicted.” Whitley, 475 U.S.
at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment
inquiry, but does not end it.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. “When prison officials
maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of
decency always are violated . . . whether or not significant injury is evident.” Id. at
9. However, “[t]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
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punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of
physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the
conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
After thorough review, we affirm. In Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295 (11th
Cir. 2002), we considered a § 1983 suit by a prisoner who alleged an excessive force
claim against corrections officers. We concluded, under the facts of that case, that
“a defense of qualified immunity is not available in cases alleging excessive force in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, because the use of force maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm is clearly established to be a violation of the Constitution
by the Supreme Court decisions in Hudson and Whitley.” Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, when a plaintiff making an excessive force
claim “has alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for
summary judgment” demonstrating that the officer used force maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm, he has necessarily established the two prongs required to
defeat a defense of qualified immunity. Id.
Here, Dobbins alleged, and tendered proof in the form of his verified
complaint, that Officer Hulett struck and slapped him for no reason after he expressed
an inability to transfer from his bed to his wheelchair. In particular, Dobbins alleged
that on the evening of November 2, 2008, between six and eight officers came to a
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room where he was laying on a bed to “shake down” the inmates in that room. Hulett
approached Dobbins’ bed and told him to get up. Dobbins responded that he was
unable to rise because he was wheelchair-bound and had “a boil on his butt,” which
made sitting down painful. Hulett found pencil lead in Dobbins’s drawer and threw
it in his face, swore at Dobbins, and told all the other inmates to leave the room.
According to the complaint, Hulett then struck Dobbins between the eyes with his fist
and slapped Dobbins in the face.
Taking Dobbins’ version of the facts as true, as we must for present purposes,
Hulett’s use of force was wanton and unnecessary. To the extent that the evidence
showed that there was no need for force, Dobbins pleaded and tendered sufficient
facts to support an excessive force claim. Accordingly, the district court did not err1
in denying Hulett qualified immunity. See Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301.2
AFFIRMED.
Although Dobbins does not allege the extent of his physical injuries, the Supreme Court1
has made clear that the “core judicial inquiry” is not the extent of the injury, but rather the nature
of the force, and whether it was applied “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson,
503 U.S. at 7.
Additionally, we reject Hulett’s invitation to overrule Skrtich because “only the2
Supreme Court or this [C]ourt sitting en banc could accomplish such a task.” Black v. United
States, 373 F.3d 1140, 1145 (11th Cir. 2004).
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