Long-Lewis Sterling Western Star of Bessemer, et al v. Sterling Truck Corporation, et al

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 17, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-11910
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D. C. Docket No. 2:09-cv-00233-AAK
LONG-LEWIS STERLING WESTERN
STAR OF BESSEMER, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
STERLING TRUCK CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(February 17, 2012)
Before CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM:
Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States District Judge for the Western*
District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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Plaintiffs Long-Lewis Western Star of Bessemer and Long-Lewis Sterling
Western Star of Hunstville (collectively, “Long-Lewis”) sued Defendants Sterling
Truck Corporation and Daimler Trucks North America, LLC (collectively,
“DTNA”), for breach of contract and for violations of the Alabama Motor Vehicle
Franchise Act (“AMVFA”), Ala. Code §§ 8-20-1 to 8-20-14, and the federal
Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act (“ADDCA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221 to 1226.
The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant DTNA on all claims.
After review and oral argument, we affirm.
First, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Defendant
DTNA had not terminated the Sales and Service Agreement by which Plaintiff
Long-Lewis operated its Sterling Trucks franchise. Specifically, Long-Lewis did
not present evidence sufficient to create an issue of fact as to termination.
Because DTNA did not terminate Plaintiff Long-Lewis’s franchise, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to DTNA on Long-Lewis’s claims
under the AMVFA, Ala. Code. § 8-20-5, and the ADDCA, 15 U.S.C. § 1222.
Second, as to Long-Lewis’s claims arising from the buy-one-to-get-one
program, we conclude that the district court erred in relying on a definition of
“coerce” supplied by a 2010 statutory amendment to the AMVFA because the
definition was not enacted when DTNA created the buy-one-to-get-one program in
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2006. See Ala. Code § 8-20-3(1) (2010). Because the 2006 version of the
AMVFA did not define the term “coerce,” we apply the common definition of the
term. See Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward
County, 450 F.3d 1295, 1308 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Terms that are not defined in
the statute . . . are given their ordinary or natural meaning.” (quotation marks
omitted)). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “coerce” as “[t]o compel by force or
threat.” Black’s Law Dictionary 294 (9th ed. 2009). Similarly, Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary defines “coerce” as follows: “1: to restrain, control,
or dominate, nullifying individual will or desire (as by force, power, violence, or
intimidation) . . . 2: to compel to an act or choice by force, threat, or other
pressure.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language, Unabridged 439 (1993).
Applying this common definition, we conclude that the buy-one-to-get-one
program was not coercive because Long-Lewis voluntarily participated in the
program and presented no evidence of any force, threat, or pressure (other than
mere market forces) to participate in the program. Accordingly, the district court
properly granted summary judgment to Defendant DTNA on Long-Lewis’s
various claims stemming from the buy-one-to-get-one program.
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In light of the above, we also conclude that the district court properly
granted summary judgment on Plaintiff Long-Lewis’s remaining claims for breach
of contract and for bad faith under the AMVFA.
AFFIRMED.
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CARNES, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to emphasize that we
are not deciding one issue involving the interpretation of the Alabama Motor
Vehicle Franchise Act, Ala. Code § 8–20-4(1) (2006). That issue is whether the
Act prohibits a manufacturer from tying the sale of one vehicle to the purchase of
another or only prohibits tying when there is more coercion involved than that
inherent in the tie itself.
The Act lists some unfair trade practices in § 8-20-4(1). The infinitive
phrase before the colon preceding that list contains a coercion element or
requirement (“to coerce or attempt to coerce any motor vehicle dealer”).
Ordinarily, words preceding a colon apply to the entire list of items that follow the
colon, which would indicate that all of the conduct that is described thereafter in
§ 8-20-4(1) is prohibited only if it is coercive.
It may be, however, that the “or to require” clause, which is the last forty-
one words of § 8-20-4(1)(a), is an anti-tying provision that operates free of the
coercion element. That clause may be free of the coercion requirement because it
does not make sense to say that “any manufacturer” must not “coerce . . . or to
require a motor vehicle dealer to accept, buy, order or purchase” any items in order
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to obtain any other items. But that is exactly what the statute says if the coercion
element is read to apply to the “or to require” clause at the end of § 8-20-4(1)(a).
Not only that, but if the coercion element is read to apply to the “or to
require” clause, which is to the right of the semicolon, then that entire forty-one
word clause will have no meaning. It will have no meaning because everything
that it will prohibit—coercive tying—is already prohibited by the first part of § 8-
20-4(1)(a), the part to the left of the semi-colon. There is a strong presumption
against reading statutory language to be so redundant that it is meaningless.
This issue is interesting, or what passes for interesting when it comes to
matters of statutory interpretation, but we do not decide it. We do not decide it
because counsel for the dealer, the appellant here, has insisted with all his might
that the coercion element does apply to all of § 8-20-4(1)(a), including the “or to
require” clause, and that a tying requirement alone is not enough. We have
accepted his adamant concession and have decided the buy-one-to-get-one claim
on the assumption that he is right—that he must establish coercion above and
beyond that inherently involved in any tying arrangement. I do not object to
giving counsel the detriment of his concession, nor am I sure that we would decide
the issue differently but for his concession. I am sure, however, that whether the
“or to require” clause of § 8-20-4(1)(a) prohibits all tying, or just prohibits tying in
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which the coercion exceeds that necessarily inherent in the tie, is an issue for
another day and another case. Perhaps that is just as well, because it is the kind of
state law issue better decided by the state courts.
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