Wendell Slater, et al v. State Farm Fire & Casualty

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 18, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-10937
Non-Argument Calendar
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D. C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-01437-JOF
WENDELL SLATER,
CHARMELL SLATER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(November 18, 2011)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case involves an insurance coverage dispute between plaintiffs

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Wendell Slater and Charmell Slater and defendant, State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company. The district court granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment
and the Slaters then perfected this appeal.
In 2008, a fire destroyed the Slaters’ house in Hampton, Georgia. At the
time, the Slaters’ property was insured with State Farm. The policy provided
coverage for certain insured losses with respect to real and personal property
owned by the Slaters, subject to the terms, conditions, and exclusions of the policy
and applicable Georgia law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of State Farm on the basis that no reasonable jury could conclude, based upon the
facts of the case, that either Wendell Slater or Charmell Slater was residing at the
dwelling when the loss occurred. Accordingly, the district court found there was
no coverage afforded by the policy.
This court reviews the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standards as those that govern the district court. Capone
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 592 F.3d 1189, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010). After reviewing the
record and reading the parties’ briefs, we agree with the district court that because
neither of the Slaters was residing at the dwelling when the loss occurred there is
no coverage afforded by the insurance policy. Moreover, the Slaters’ claim for
loss of personal property should not be treated separately from their claim for the
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loss of the dwelling because the Slaters failed to raise that issue in the district
court. Even if, however, we consider this argument raised by the Slaters for the
first time on appeal, we would conclude that this issue is without merit because
Georgia courts have previously disposed of an insurer’s entire claim based on the
insurer’s violation of the residency condition. Lastly, we conclude the Slaters are
not entitled to bad faith penalties because there is no coverage owed under the
Slaters’ policy with State Farm.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of State Farm.
AFFIRMED.
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