USA v. Munoz-Angeles

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOV 17, 2010
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 10-12180
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-20997-JAL-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANELI MUNOZ-ANGELES,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(November 17, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Anele Munoz-Angeles was convicted for illegal reentry into the United States

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and now appeals her sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment. She argues that the
sentence is substantively unreasonable because it exceeds what is necessary under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically, she claims that the district court placed overly great
weight on her criminal history without properly taking into consideration her ongoing
mental treatment and psychological problems caused by various traumatic life events.
We review a district court’s imposition of a sentence under the deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). First,
we must determine whether the district court committed any “significant procedural
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the [sentencing]
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . .” Id. at 51. The district court need not
have discussed each § 3553(a) factor individually, but need only have acknowledged
that it considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. United States
v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
If we determine that the district court’s decision was procedurally sound, we
next consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into
account “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Where the sentence
falls within the guideline range, we are free to apply a presumption of reasonableness,
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id.; the district court need only “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it]
has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its]
own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356
(2007). To ensure that the sentence imposed is reasonable, we may compare it to the
statutory maximum. See, e.g., United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 751–52 (11th
Cir. 2006) (upholding a sentence as reasonable in part because it was “appreciably
below” the statutory maximum).
Because our review is deferential—not de novo—we will not substitute our
judgment for the discretion of the district court in according weight to the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007)
(citation omitted). Although a district court’s unjustified reliance on any one
§ 3553(a) factor can indicate an unreasonable sentence, United States v. Pugh, 515
F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008), a district court is free to attach “great weight” to
one factor over others. United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). Moreover, the fact that we might “reasonably have concluded that
a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district
court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A district court should consider “every convicted
person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that
sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.”
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Id. at 52. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[t]he
uniqueness of the individual case . . . does not change the deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard of review that applies to all sentencing decisions.” Id.
Finally, the party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing that
the sentence is unreasonable in light of both the record and the § 3553(a) factors.
Talley, 431 F.3d at 788. The § 3553(a) factors include, inter alia: the applicable
sentencing-guidelines range; the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records; the nature and circumstances of the offense;
the history and characteristics of the defendant; and the need for the sentence imposed
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment for the offense and adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2),
(4) & (6).
Upon sentencing Munoz-Angeles, the district court acknowledged that it had
considered the statements of the parties, the pre-sentence investigation report with its
advisory guidelines, and the § 3553(a) factors. Since the district court committed no
procedural error—and Munoz-Angeles does not argue otherwise—the only question
remaining for us is whether the sentence was substantively reasonable.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district
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court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the record and § 3553(a) factors
supported a sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment. A sentence of 16 months falls
within the guidelines range and is far below the statutory maximum of ten years’
imprisonment. Moreover, the record does not support Munoz-Angeles’s claim that
the district court placed unjustifiably great weight on her criminal history—the court
acted within its discretion when it accorded weight to her history and characteristics,
including her criminal record. As her sentencing hearing was advanced only by five
days, Munoz-Angeles had sufficient time (over two months between the plea hearing
and sentencing hearing), to submit documentation about her mental health and
treatment. However, Munoz-Angeles failed to submit any such evidence at the
sentencing hearing, and she did not object to the statements in the pre-sentence
investigation report that she had not been diagnosed with any mental disorder. The
district court took account of Munoz-Angeles’s individual circumstances when
deciding her sentence; we will not substitute our judgment for its decision.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing her to 16 months’ imprisonment. Munoz-Angeles has failed to carry the
burden of establishing that her sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of the
record and the § 3553(a) factors.
AFFIRMED.
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