USA vs Eric Rannon Rowls, a.k.a., "E"

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 9, 2010
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 10-12024
Non-Argument Calendar
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D. C. Docket No. 4:09-cr-00016-SPM-WCS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ERIC RANNON ROWLS,
a.k.a. “E”,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(November 9, 2010)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Rowls appeals his convictions for two counts of distributing cocaine
base and one count of possessing with intent to distribute various controlled

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substances, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1). Rowls argues on
appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress drugs and cash
discovered during a traffic stop. The pre-planned traffic stop was a part of an
investigation into Rowls’s drug activities, and it was conducted to protect the
identity of a confidential informant who had previously disclosed Rowls as his
supplier. Rowls argues that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment
because it was based upon two officers’ mistaken belief that they could use
untested speedometers of their patrol cars to determine Rowls’s speed. Rowls cites
Florida law that requires any device used to determine the speed of a car, including
car speedometers, to be tested for accuracy. Rowls contends that one of the1
pacing officers had never served in traffic enforcement and had not received any
training in “pace clocking” a vehicle. Moreover, evidence did not show when, if
ever, the patrol cars’ speedometers had been tested. Rowls notes that the third
officer who stopped his car did not personally observe him commit any traffic
violation, instead relying on the information provided by the two pacing officers.
In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the
district court’s “findings of fact for clear error and its application of law to those
Florida law requires all speed measuring devices, including speedometers, to be1
regularly tested for accuracy if use for speed enforcement. Fla. Stat. § 316.1905(1); Fla. Admin.
Code Ann. r. 15B-2.011.
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facts de novo.” United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2007).
We construe all factual findings in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party—in this case, the government. Id. at 1235–36.
“The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable search and
seizure.” United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation
omitted). When police stop a motor vehicle, even for a brief period, a Fourth
Amendment “seizure” occurs. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116
S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). A traffic stop is reasonable, and
therefore constitutional, if the officers conducting the stop have “probable cause to
believe a traffic violation has occurred . . . .” Harris, 526 F.3d at 1337. A
determination of probable cause rests on objective factors, and the officers’
subjective motives in making the stop are irrelevant. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813,
116 S.Ct. at 1774. Furthermore, a “traffic stop based on an officer’s incorrect but
reasonable assessment of facts does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” United
States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003). However, a
mistake of law, “no matter how reasonable or understandable, . . . cannot provide
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a traffic stop.” Id. at 1279.
Upon review of the record and briefs, we find no reversible error in the
denial of Rowls’s motion to suppress. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
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government, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing shows that the
officers had probable cause to stop Rowls for speeding. They paced him for one
mile, with each officer’s speedometer registering a speed of ten miles above the
posted speed limit. It was not unreasonable for them to rely on their speedometers
in gauging Rowls’s speed. The Florida statute requiring speedometer testing is
irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis because an officer’s
observation of a traffic violation is enough to create probable cause under the
Fourth Amendment and the officer who actually stopped Rowls could properly rely
on information provided by other officers in conducting the stop. See United
States v. Goddard, 312 F.3d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Observations and other
information supplied by officers involved in a common investigation can, taken
together, create probable cause for a search.”) Accordingly, we affirm Rowls’s
conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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