Kenneth G. Goodman vs Commissioner of Social Security

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JANUARY 6, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-11595
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-00180-MP-AK
KENNETH G. GOODMAN,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Michael J. Astrue,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(January 6, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth Goodman appeals from the district court’s order affirming the

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Social Security Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability benefits.1
Goodman argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by finding that
his intellectual functioning and mood disorder were not severe impairments.2
Goodman relies on a psychological evaluation finding that he had borderline
intellectual functioning and a “poor” ability to function in several areas. However,
the ALJ afforded those findings little weight because they contradicted the record
on the whole, which demonstrated that Goodman’s mental condition had no more
than a minimal effect on his ability to do basic work activities. See Brady v.
Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984). The ALJ provided specific and
detailed reasons for this finding, which Goodman does not challenge on appeal
and which we conclude are supported by substantial evidence. See Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005). We further find no reversible
error in the ALJ’s use of the Medical Vocational Guidelines instead of a
vocational expert when determining Goodman’s ability to perform jobs in the
“[W]e review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner’s decision is1
based. However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but rather such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
Goodman also argues that chronic pain and neuropathy were severe impairments, but2
we do not address these arguments because he failed to raise them in the district court. See Jones
v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999).
2

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national economy. See Passopulos v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 642, 648 (11th Cir.
1992). Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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