USA v. Steven Krpata

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 21, 2010
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 09-15132
Non-Argument Calendar
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D. C. Docket No. 08-00060-CR-4-SPM-WCS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEVEN KRPATA,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(July 21, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Steven Krpata appeals his convictions and sentences for receipt (“Count

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One”) and possession (“Count Two”) of child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (a)(5)(B), respectively. With respect to Count One,
in August 2008, federal authorities were notified that, in July 2006, Krpata had
purchased child pornography from a website operated by Sergio Marzola, an
individual who engaged in the mass production and sale of child pornography via
the internet. With respect to Count Two, federal authorities conducted a separate
investigation of a commercial child pornography website which revealed that on
January 13, 2007, Krpata had purchased access to a member-restricted website
containing video files and images of child pornography. On or about October 15,
2008, federal authorities searched Krpata’s parents’ residence, where Krpata
resided, and discovered a collection of child pornography containing DVD’s from
Marzola’s website, as well as downloaded files, cut-out photo images, and other
DVD’s. Following the district court’s denial of Krpata’s motion to dismiss based
on double jeopardy grounds, Krpata agreed to plead guilty with the right to appeal
the issue of whether the conviction and sentence for both counts violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
Krpata argues on appeal that his convictions and sentences violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause because possession of child pornography in violation of
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) is a lesser-included offense of receipt of child pornography in
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violation of § 2252A(a)(2) under the “same-elements” or Blockburger test. See
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182 (1932).
Moreover, he asserts that when applying this test, the facts of the particular case
should not be taken into consideration.
We review claims of double jeopardy de novo. United States v. Bobb, 577
F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment guarantees that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. This guarantee
prohibits, among other things, multiple punishments for the same offense. Bobb,
577 F.3d at 1371. Thus, “where two statutory provisions proscribe the same
offense and there is no clear indication that the legislature intended multiple
punishments for the offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against
multiple punishments protects a defendant from being convicted under both
provisions.” Id. at 1371-72.
The test for determining whether two statutory provisions prohibit the same
offense “is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not.” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S. Ct. at 182. Applying this test in Bobb,
we determined that § 2252A(a)(2), prohibiting receipt of child pornography, and
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), prohibiting possession of the same, proscribe the same conduct
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because “by proving that a person ‘knowingly receives’ child pornography, the
Government necessarily proves that the person ‘knowingly possesses’ child
pornography.” 577 F.3d at 1373. Moreover, we found “no clear indication of
legislative intent to impose multiplicitous punishment for receipt and possession of
child pornography” and therefore acknowledged that possession of child
pornography is a lesser-included offense of receipt of child pornography. Id. at
1374 (citation and quotation omitted).
However, we nevertheless affirmed defendant Bobb’s convictions for both
receipt and possession because the “convictions were based on two different
offenses, occurring on two different dates, and proscribed by two different
statutes.” Id. at 1375. In so doing, we, in part, relied upon the evidence presented
at trial. Id. Although our analysis in Bobb was conducted for purposes of plain
error review, our opinion does not indicate that our reasoning would be any
different in the context of preserved error. See Id. Moreover, in United States v.
Mendez, we reviewed the double jeopardy claim de novo and also “assess[ed] the
elements [of each offense] in light of the facts” presented at trial. 117 F.3d 480,
487 (11th Cir. 1997).
Here, the district court did not err in denying Krpata’s motion to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds. In this case, two different groups of child pornography
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images were being relied upon to support the charges alleged in Count One and
Count Two. With respect to Count One, the government would introduce evidence
that Krpata had purchased and received child pornography from Marzola in July
2006. With respect to Count Two, the government would introduce evidence that
in October 2008, Krpata possessed additional DVD’s and images of child
pornography. Therefore, because Krpata’s convictions and sentences were based
on two distinct offenses, occurring on different dates, and proscribed by two
different statutes, Krpata’s convictions and sentences do not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
AFFIRMED.1
Appellant’s request for oral argument is DENIED.1
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