USA v. Miguel Plancarte-Sanchez

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEBRUARY 12, 2010
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 09-13875
Non-Argument Calendar
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D. C. Docket No. 09-00120-CR-ODE-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MIGUEL PLANCARTE-SANCHEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(February 12, 2010)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Miguel Plancarte-Sanchez appeals his 65-month sentence following his

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guilty plea to illegal re-entry of an aggravated felon in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). On appeal, he argues that the sentence imposed by the
district court was greater than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) because although the court mentioned the seriousness of
his offense and his criminal history, it never discussed or specifically referenced
the mitigating circumstances he had raised. Thus, he contends that meaningful
appellate review of his sentence is not possible.
We review the final sentence imposed by the district court for
reasonableness. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008).
The Supreme Court has clarified that the reasonableness standard means review for
abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S.Ct. 586, 594, 169
L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). “[T]he burden of establishing that the sentence is
unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors lies with the party
challenging the sentence.” Williams, 526 F.3d at 1322.
Once we conclude that the district court made no procedural errors, we then
consider “the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,” under the totality of the
circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. In conducting this review,
we will look to see whether the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors;
however, “[t]he weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter
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committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Williams, 526 F.3d at
1322 (quotation omitted). Moreover, there is no requirement that the district court
explicitly discuss its consideration of each of the § 3553(a) factors on the record, as
long as the sentencing judge “set[s] forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that
he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising
his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356,
127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). An acknowledgment by the
district court that it has considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a)
factors is sufficient to meet this requirement. See United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d
1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005). However, even in the absence of an express
acknowledgment that it considered the § 3553(a) factors, a district court’s
explanation is sufficient if it is clear from the record that the court did in fact
consider those factors. See id. at 1329 (citing United States v. Eggersdorf, 126
F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 1997) (reviewing defendant’s motion to reduce
sentence and stating that “when – as here – the record shows that the district court
considered the pertinent section 3553(a) factors, the district court does not abuse its
discretion in declining to detail its determinations”)). Moreover, a district court’s
failure to specifically discuss the arguments a defendant makes in mitigation does
not lead to the conclusion that “the court erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to
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consider this evidence in determining [the defendant’s] sentence.” United States v.
Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).
Section 3553(a) provides that district courts must consider, inter alia, (1) the
applicable guideline range; (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (3) the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (4) the need for the sentence imposed
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense; (5) the need for adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; (6) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and (7) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(6).
In Rita, the Supreme Court held that, in reviewing sentences for
reasonableness under § 3553(a), a federal appellate court may apply a presumption
of reasonableness to a district court sentence imposed within the guideline range.
Rita, 551 U.S. at 347, 127 S.Ct. at 2462. Although we do not apply such a
presumption, we will “ordinarily . . . expect a sentence within the guidelines range
to be reasonable.” United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008).
Here, the sentence imposed by the district court was not unreasonable
because the court implicitly considered the § 3553(a) factors and was not required
to expressly discuss its reasons for rejecting Plancarte-Sanchez’s mitigating
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arguments. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly,
based on our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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