USA v. Stanley Wintfield Rolle

[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 19-11354
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STANLEY WINTFIELD ROLLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20869-PCH-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 19-11354
Before WILSON, J ORDAN, and BRASHER , Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
Stanley Wintfield Rolle appeals the district court’s denial of
his motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to state a crime. In
his motion, Rolle argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) does not apply ex-
traterritorially. We affirm the district court’s denial of Rolle’s mo-
tion to dismiss and hold that §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (a)(1)(A)(v)(I),
and (a)(2)(B)(ii) apply to his extraterritorial conduct.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 24, 2018, United States Coast Guard and Cus-
toms and Border Protection officers (collectively, officers) detected
a 25-foot boat in United States territorial waters, traveling west to-
ward Miami, Florida. The boat was in the United States contiguous
zone, about 19 nautical miles from the United States coast, when
the officers spotted it. Due to its erratic travel patterns, the officers
pursued the boat as it headed east. They noticed the boat riding
low in the water (indicating a heavy load), multiple people on deck,
and an expired Florida registration number on the outer hull. The
officers apprehended the boat about 20 nautical miles off the coast
of Bimini, Bahamas.
On the boat they found 16 individuals whom Rolle had
picked up in Bimini. The officers also found $23,400 in Rolle’s pos-
session. Rolle said he was working for a man in Bimini who had
given him the money, a GPS, and instructions to take the boat and
the individuals toward the United States border. There, Rolle was
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19-11354 Opinion of the Court 3
to meet another boat, onto which he would transfer the individuals
and the money. None of the 16 individuals had permission to enter
the United States.
In November 2018, the government filed an indictment in
the Southern District of Florida charging Rolle with one count of
conspiracy to encourage and induce aliens to enter the United
States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I); 16 counts of en-
couraging and inducing aliens to enter the United States, in viola-
tion of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv); 16 counts of bringing aliens to
the United States for commercial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii); and one count of conspiracy to allow, procure,
and permit aliens to enter the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1327. Rolle pled not guilty. In December 2018, the government
filed a superseding indictment with the same charges.1
Rolle filed a motion to dismiss the superseding indictment,
arguing that it failed to state a crime because his conduct occurred
outside the United States. The district court denied his motion,
finding that the charging statutes apply extraterritorially. After a
two-day trial, the jury found Rolle guilty on all counts in violation
of § 1324, but not the count in violation of § 1327. The district
court sentenced Rolle to a term of 60 months’ imprisonment and
three years’ supervised release. This appeal followed.
1 The superseding indictment only modified Rolle’s name.
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4 Opinion of the Court 19-11354
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss
an indictment for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Farias,
836 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 2016). We review whether a statute
applies extraterritorially de novo.
United States v. Obando, 891
F.3d 929, 933 (11th Cir. 2018).
III. DISCUSSION
Rolle argues we should reverse the district court and vacate
his convictions because his conduct occurred outside the United
States, and the statutes under which he was charged do not apply
extraterritorially. Because Rolle was acquitted of the § 1327
charge, we examine only whether §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (1)(A)(v)(I),
and 2(B)(ii) apply extraterritorially—an issue of first impression in
our circuit.
Section 1324(a)(1)(A) creates criminal penalties for anyone
who
(iv) encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter,
or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or
residence is or will be in violation of law; or
(v)(I) engages in any conspiracy to commit any of the
preceding acts . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A). Section 1324(a)(2)(B) provides:
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19-11354 Opinion of the Court 5
Any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of
the fact that an alien has not received prior official au-
thorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United
States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United
States in any manner whatsoever, such alien [shall]
. . .
(B) in the case of . . .
(ii) an offense done for the purpose of commercial ad-
vantage or private financial gain . . .
be fined under Title 18 and shall be imprisoned . . .
Id. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Generally, courts presume that “legislation of Congress, un-
less a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”
United States v. Bel-
fast, 611 F.3d 783, 811 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Nieman v. Dryclean
U.S.A. Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126, 1129 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Whether Congress intended a statute to apply extraterritorially is a
question of statutory interpretation.
United States v. MacAllister,
160 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). One purpose of
the presumption against extraterritoriality is to avoid clashes be-
tween the laws of the United States and the laws of other nations.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013). But
the presumption applies “across the board, ‘regardless of whether
there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a for-
eign law.’”
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 336
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6 Opinion of the Court 19-11354
(2016) (quoting
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247,
255 (2010)).
There are two approaches to analyzing extraterritoriality in
the Supreme Court’s precedents: one is set forth in
United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922), and the other is found in the more
recent
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247
(2010), and its progeny.
See RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 337;
Kiobel,
569 U.S. at 115–16. The parties dispute the continued vitality of
Bowman in light of
Morrison and its progeny. We conclude that
Bowman survives
Morrison and that, applying
Bowman,
§§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (1)(A)(v)(I), and (2)(B)(ii) apply extraterritori-
ally.
The
Bowman Court held that the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality does not apply “to criminal statutes which are, as a
class, not logically dependent on their locality for the government’s
jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government
to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpe-
trated . . . .” 260 U.S. at 98. The Supreme Court carved out this
exception because it recognized that, for some criminal offenses,
“limit[ing] their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be
greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave
open a large immunity for frauds . . . .”
Id.
Our court has long recognized
Bowman as establishing “the
rule that Congress need not expressly provide for extraterritorial
application of a criminal statute if the nature of the offense is such
that it may be inferred.”
MacAllister, 160 F.3d at 1307–08;
see also
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19-11354 Opinion of the Court 7
Belfast, 611 F.3d at 813–14;
United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221,
1230 (11th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298,
1304–05 (11th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136–
37 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289,
290–92 (5th Cir. 1980).2
We hold that we may infer the extraterritorial application of
the § 1324(a) subsections under which Rolle was charged. First, the
subsections—which prohibit encouraging, inducing, or bringing al-
iens into the United States—target conduct that can take place out-
side the United States. Second, the nature of the offenses is such
that limiting them to the United States would greatly “curtail the
scope and usefulness of the statute.”
Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
A. The Supreme Court Has Not Overturned Bowman
Rolle argues the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Morrison,
Ki-
obel, and
RJR Nabisco have abrogated—or have at least under-
mined—
Bowman, so we may not infer extraterritoriality but must
instead apply the presumption against it “across the board.”
We disagree. The Supreme Court did not indicate in
Mor-
rison,
Kiobel, nor
RJR Nabisco that
Bowman has been overturned,
and it is not our prerogative to overrule the Supreme Court.
See
Hylton v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 1154, 1161 (11th Cir. 2021)
2 All decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of busi-
ness on September 30, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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8 Opinion of the Court 19-11354
(“[O]nly the Supreme Court may overturn its precedents . . . .”).
Unless the Supreme Court overturns
Bowman, it remains binding.
Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Se. Bank N.A., 120 F.3d 1140, 1143
(11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“The courts of appeals must follow Su-
preme Court precedent that has ‘direct application’ in a case, even
if it appears that the reasoning of the Supreme Court precedent has
been rejected in other cases.” (quoting
Rodriquez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))).
Moreover, under the prior-precedent rule, we are bound by
our circuit’s own precedents interpreting and applying
Bowman.
Scott v. United States, 890 F.3d 1239, 1257 (11th Cir. 2018). There-
fore, we reject Rolle’s argument that
Morrison,
Kiobel, and
RJR
Nabisco have abrogated our caselaw applying
Bowman, which, no-
tably, includes caselaw postdating and citing
Morrison.
See Belfast,
611 F.3d at 811.
B. Extraterritorial Application of § 1324(a) May Be Inferred
Having clarified that
Bowman remains binding law, we
must now answer whether § 1324(a)’s scope and usefulness would
be greatly limited if the statute were restricted to the territorial
United States.
Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. We answer in the affirm-
ative.
Section 1324 is an immigration statute that creates criminal
penalties for, among other conduct, knowingly committing, or at-
tempting to commit, the following offenses: bringing an alien to
the United States; concealing, harboring, or shielding from
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19-11354 Opinion of the Court 9
detection an alien in the United States; encouraging or inducing an
alien to come to the United States; or engaging in a conspiracy to
commit, or aiding or abetting, any of these offenses.3 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)–(v). The statute also imposes a fine and term of
imprisonment for knowingly bringing, or attempting to bring, an
alien to the United States for financial gain.
Id. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).
By creating criminal penalties for such conduct, Congress
sought to deter people from helping unauthorized aliens enter or
remain in the United States illegally. Given the nature of illegal
immigration, much of the conduct under the statute is likely to oc-
cur beyond, at, or near our borders. This strongly suggests that
Congress intended the statute to apply to extraterritorial conduct.
See, e.g.,
United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (“This contextual feature of § 1324(a) establishes
that it is fundamentally international, not simply domestic, in focus
and effect.”). Much of the conduct is also likely to occur in foreign
countries, especially in the initial stages of an alien-smuggling op-
eration.
For example, a person in a foreign country could encourage
an alien to enter the United States and then attempt to bring the
3 The statute also creates criminal penalties for anyone who knowingly “trans-
ports, or moves or attempts to transport or move such alien within the United
States by means of transportation or otherwise.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii).
We express no opinion on this subsection. Our decision addresses only the
extraterritorial application of the subsections under which Rolle was con-
victed.
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10 Opinion of the Court 19-11354
alien into the country—direct violations of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) and
(iv)—but the plot could be intercepted before the perpetrator and
the alien reach the United States border. If § 1324(a) applied only
domestically, the government would not be able to prosecute the
exact conduct Congress intended to reach in creating § 1324.
See
Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1347.
Other circuits have similarly found that subsections of
§ 1324(a) apply extraterritorially. The D.C. Circuit came to that
conclusion in
United States v. Delgado-Garcia.
Id. at 1344. There,
the defendant, like Rolle, was charged with conspiring to encour-
age or induce aliens to enter the United States and with attempting
to bring unauthorized aliens into the United States.
Id. at 1339.
The court held that the statute’s context warranted a reading in fa-
vor of extraterritoriality.
Id. at 1345. We find the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning persuasive:
On its face, [§ 1324(a)] concerns much more than
merely “domestic conditions.” It protects the borders
of the United States against illegal immigration. . . .
[T]his country’s border-control policies are of crucial
importance to the national security and foreign policy
of the United States, regardless whether it would be
possible, in an abstract sense, to protect our borders
using only domestic measures. . . . It is natural to ex-
pect that a statute that protects the borders of the
United States, unlike ordinary domestic statutes,
would reach those outside the borders. . . . [A]s the
Supreme Court observed in
United States v.
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19-11354 Opinion of the Court 11
Bowman, “the natural inference from the character of
the offense[s]” is that an extraterritorial location
“would be a probable place for [their] commission.”
Id. at 1345 (quoting
Bowman, 260 U.S. at 99).
The D.C. Circuit went on to explain how the terms of
§ 1324(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2) suggest application to much extraterrito-
rial conduct:
Because an alien will not be in the United States if the
attempt is incomplete, the offender will ordinarily
also be outside the United States during the attempt.
This is true even if the government foils many incom-
plete attempts at the borders of the United States.
That many attempts to bring someone into the
United States will occur outside the United States is
strongly suggestive that these subsections and their
neighbors apply, as a matter of ordinary language, to
extraterritorial acts.
. . .
Certainly it is possible to induce a potential illegal im-
migrant to come to the United States from within the
United States, . . . but it is obviously much easier to
do so when in proximity to the immigrant. It is also
possible to conspire to induce illegal immigration into
the United States from anywhere in the world; but,
again, it is easier to do so outside the United States, in
proximity to those who carry out the plot.
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12 Opinion of the Court 19-11354
Id. at 1347–48.
In
United States v. Villanueva, the Fifth Circuit also held that
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies extraterritorially. 408 F.3d 193, 196 (5th
Cir. 2005). In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the
text of the statute; the statute’s legislative history; the fact that the
statute criminalizes attempts; and the context of immigration stat-
utes which, “by their very nature, pertain to activity at or near in-
ternational borders.”
Id. at 198–99.
Similarly, in
United States v. Beliard, the First Circuit held
that a conviction under § 1324 for inducing or encouraging the il-
legal entry of aliens into the United States could be sustained where
the defendant’s acts took place outside the United States. 618 F.2d
886, 887 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing to Ninth and Second Circuit cases
that held the same).
Finally, the Ninth Circuit recognized the extraterritoriality
of § 1324(a)(2) in dicta in
United States v. Lopez.
See 484 F.3d 1186,
1194–95 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The court stated that, “[i]n con-
struing the ‘brings to’ offense, we observe initially that ‘[t]he lan-
guage of the statute itself indicates that Congress intended it to ap-
ply to extraterritorial conduct.’”
Id. (quoting
Villanueva, 408 F.3d
at 198).
Our interpretation of the statute aligns with the other cir-
cuits that have ruled on this issue. The very nature of alien smug-
gling involves foreign countries, and accomplishing the crimes al-
most always requires action abroad. Thus, limiting § 1324(a) to the
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19-11354 Opinion of the Court 13
territorial United States would significantly curtail the effectiveness
of the statute because it would prevent the government from pros-
ecuting those who engage in the targeted conduct but simply fail
to cross our border.
See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. A strictly domes-
tic reading of § 1324(a) would “leave open a large immunity” for
alien smuggling, so, given the nature of the offenses, we may infer
that the statute applies extraterritorially.
Id.
Our court has applied the
Bowman exception in similar
cases despite the absence of an express statement of extraterritorial
application on the face of the statute.
See, e.g.,
MacAllister, 160
F.3d at 1306–09 (applying
Bowman and holding that a cocaine con-
spiracy statute lacking an express extraterritoriality statement ap-
plies to a Canadian citizen’s conduct abroad);
Plummer, 221 F.3d
at 1304–05 (listing cases in which our circuit and other circuits “rou-
tinely inferred congressional intent to provide for extraterritorial
jurisdiction over foreign offenses that cause domestic harm”);
Frank, 599 F.3d at 1230–32 (applying
Bowman and holding that a
child-sex-trafficking statute applies extraterritorially despite lacking
an express extraterritoriality statement). We agree with the gov-
ernment that it would defy logic to conclude that Congress—in cre-
ating a statute that prohibits attempts and conspiracies to bring or
encourage aliens to come to the United States—would hinder its
own efforts by restricting the statute to purely domestic conduct.
Bowman’s principles and the weight of authority from our
sister circuits overwhelmingly support our conclusion that extra-
territoriality may be inferred from Congress’ intent to prevent
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14 Opinion of the Court 19-11354
illegal immigration and from the nature of the offenses—each of
which contemplate conduct at, near, and beyond our borders.
Therefore, we hold that §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (a)(1)(A)(v)(I), and
(a)(2)(B)(ii) apply extraterritorially.
IV. JURISDICTION OVER ROLLE COMPORTS WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Before giving extraterritorial effect to a statute, we must also
consider whether doing so would violate international law.
Frank,
599 F.3d at 1233. Pursuant to the law of nations, a nation may ex-
ercise criminal jurisdiction under five general principles: “(1) the
‘objective’ territorial, (2) the national, (3) the protective, (4) the uni-
versal, and (5) the passive personality.”
MacAllister, 160 F.3d at
1308 n.9. Here, the protective principle allows the United States to
exercise jurisdiction over Rolle. Under the protective principle,
“jurisdiction is based on whether the national interest is injured.”
United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 1984)
(upholding jurisdiction over a non-United States citizen where con-
duct occurred abroad and the charging statutes did not include an
express statement of extraterritorial application). The government
asserts—and Rolle does not dispute—that Rolle’s attempt to bring
aliens to the United States and his conspiracy to encourage aliens
to come to the United States clearly violate our country’s border-
control interests. We agree that his conduct injures “the national
interest,”
id. at 1316, and thus the government properly exercised
jurisdiction over Rolle under the protective principle.
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19-11354 Opinion of the Court 15
V. CONCLUSION
We hold that
Bowman remains binding law and that, under
Bowman, §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (a)(1)(A)(v)(I), and (a)(2)(B)(ii) apply
to Rolle’s extraterritorial conduct. Accordingly, we affirm Rolle’s
convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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