William L. Harding v. Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
WILLIAM L. HARDING,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WATCH TOWER BIBLE & TRACT
SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC;
CHRISTIAN CONGREGATION OF
JEHOVAH WITNESSES, of New York
Inc; CHRISTIAN CONGREGATION OF
JEHOVAH WITNESSES, of Muskogee,
Oklahoma; CHRISTIAN
CONGREGATION OF JEHOVAH
WITNESSES, of Oklahoma City Central
Congregation; FRANK LEE, Ministerial
Servant, ESTATE OF SAMUEL PORTIS,
Elder,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 22-6029
(D.C. No. 5:21-CV-00515-JD)
(W.D. Okla.)
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MORITZ, BRISCOE, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a);
10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 1, 2022
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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William Harding, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s order dismissing his lawsuit against multiple Jehovah’s Witness business
entities and two church leaders for failure to state a claim.1 For the reasons below, we
affirm.
Background
This lawsuit pertains to Harding’s allegation that two Jehovah’s Witness
church leaders, Samuel Portis and Frank Lee, sexually abused him when he was a
child between the ages of eight and ten. Harding maintains that he did not understand
the nature of this abuse until 1996. According to Harding, he reported the abuse to
his Oklahoma City congregation in 1997, but he contends the church took no action.
Over 20 years later, Harding filed this lawsuit against Portis’s estate, Lee, and
various Jehovah’s Witness entities, asserting federal- and state-law claims for sexual
abuse, failure to report, and negligent hiring and retention.
The case was initially assigned to a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). Because Harding moved to proceed in forma pauperis, the magistrate
judge screened Harding’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
recommended sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim. The district court
agreed and dismissed the action over Harding’s objection. Specifically, the district
court determined that (1) all but one of Harding’s federal claims failed for lack of
1 Because Harding is pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we will not
act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
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subject-matter jurisdiction because they invoked criminal statutes that provide no
private cause of action; and (2) the remaining federal claim, under 18 U.S.C. § 2255,
was time-barred. Without any valid federal claims, the district court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.
Harding timely appealed and moved the district court for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal. The district court denied the motion, concluding that
Harding failed to establish either indigence or a good-faith basis for appeal. See
§ 1915(a)(1), (3). Harding renewed his motion to proceed in forma pauperis with this
court.
Analysis
On appeal, Harding primarily challenges the district court’s dismissal of his
§ 2255 claim as time-barred and its refusal to apply equitable tolling or equitable
estoppel.2 We review § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals for failure to state a claim de
2 Harding does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his remaining
federal claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or its refusal to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims, so we do not consider those
claims. See Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1163 n.4, 1165
(10th Cir. 2003) (explaining that we do not consider dismissal of claims not
challenged on appeal). He does challenge an additional reason the district court gave
for dismissing his federal claim under 34 U.S.C. § 20341—a statute that mandates
child-abuse reporting for certain covered professionals—on the merits. But Harding
waived this argument by not appealing the district court’s primary ruling that
§ 20341 does not provide a private cause of action. See Bones v. Honeywell Int’l,
Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 877 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that appellant waived right to
appeal district court’s alternate holding by only appealing primary holding). Harding
has also waived, and so we need not address, the new civil-rights claim he raises for
the first time in his appellate brief. See Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1258
(10th Cir. 2006) (refusing to consider new claims raised on appeal).
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novo. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). We also review
statute-of-limitations rulings de novo, but we review any underlying rulings on
equitable tolling and equitable estoppel for abuse of discretion. Braxton v. Zavaras,
614 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010) (equitable tolling); Spaulding v. United Transp.
Union, 279 F.3d 901, 911 (10th Cir. 2002) (equitable estoppel).
Section 2255 “creates a civil cause of action for victims of certain sexual
offenses under federal law.” Cisneros v. Aragon, 485 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir.
2007). Specifically, as relevant here, the statute states that “[a]ny person who, while
a minor, was a victim of” certain listed federal offenses “and who suffers personal
injury as a result” of such offense “may sue in any appropriate” federal district court.
§ 2255(a). Without deciding whether Harding’s factual allegations supported a
§ 2255 violation, the district court determined that the claim was time-barred because
Harding filed it well after the statute of limitations had expired.3 A court performing
§ 1915 screening may sua sponte dismiss a complaint based on the statute of
limitations “only when [expiration of the statute of limitations] is obvious from the
face of the complaint and no further factual record is required to be developed.”
3 Like the district court, we question whether Harding’s § 2255 claim could
survive, regardless of the statute of limitations, because Harding does not clearly
state a § 2255 claim in his complaint or allege that he was the victim of any of the
predicate federal crimes necessary to state such a claim. We need not decide these
issues, however, because like the district court, we resolve this claim on statute-of-
limitations grounds.
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Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fratus v. DeLand,
49 F.3d 673, 674–75 (10th Cir. 1995)).
The statute of limitations in § 2255 requires a claim to be brought either
(1) within ten years after the date the plaintiff reasonably discovers the violation or
injury that forms the basis for the claim, whichever is later, § 2255(b)(1); or
(2) within ten years after the date the plaintiff turns 18 years old, § 2255(b)(2). The
district court found that Harding’s claim was untimely under § 2255(b)(1) because
Harding alleges he became aware of the abuse in 1996, but he failed to file suit
within ten years from this date. And the district court found the claim was untimely
under § 2255(b)(2) because Harding, who was born in 1966, failed to file within ten
years of turning 18 years old. Harding raises three challenges to these conclusions,
and we address each in turn.
Harding first asserts that the district court applied the statute of limitations to
the “wrong dates,” but we discern no error. Aplt. Br. 4. Harding reiterates on appeal
that he became aware of the abuse in 1996, which is the relevant date from which the
ten-year limitations period began to run. See § 2255(b)(1). Thus, the statute of
limitations ran in 2006, and Harding filed this lawsuit about 15 years too late. See id.
Harding suggests that he timely asserted his claim by reporting the abuse to his
congregation in 1997, but as the district court explained, Harding needed to file a
complaint with the court to meet the statute of limitations. See § 2255(b) (barring
claims unless complaint is filed within limitations period).
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Harding next argues that the district court erred by refusing to apply equitable
tolling. Assuming equitable tolling is available in this context, Harding must show
that (1) he “diligently” pursued his rights but (2) some “extraordinary circumstance”
prevented him from timely filing his claim. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1,
10 (2014). Harding does not assert, and our independent review of the record does
not reveal, that he met either condition. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to apply equitable tolling.4
As a final matter, we address Harding’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis
and to receive an appointed attorney. When, like here, the district court certifies that
an appeal is not taken in good faith, an appealing party may nevertheless move this
court for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See Rolland v. Primesource Staffing,
L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1077, 1079 (10th Cir. 2007). We will not grant the motion, however,
unless Harding shows “the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument” to
support his appeal. See id. Because Harding has not made this showing, we deny his
4 Harding alternatively asserts that the district court should have applied
equitable estoppel because he maintains that he detrimentally relied on the church to
take action after he reported the abuse. Because Harding does not allege that
defendants took active steps to prevent him from timely filing suit, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by declining to apply equitable estoppel. See Kirklin v.
Joshen Paper & Packaging of Ark. Co., 911 F.3d 530, 534–35 (8th Cir. 2018)
(explaining that equitable estoppel requires showing that defendant took “active steps
to prevent a plaintiff from suing on time” (quoting Dring v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 58 F.3d 1323, 1329 (8th Cir. 1995))); see also Schloesser v. Kan. Dept. of
Health & Env’t, No. 92-3079, 1993 WL 113725, at *1 n.1 (10th Cir. Apr. 12, 1993)
(unpublished) (same).
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motion.5 And given our disposition of this appeal, we likewise deny Harding’s
motion for an attorney. See Vreeland v. Coffman, 663 F. App’x 597, 607 (10th Cir.
2016) (unpublished) (denying motion in part because appellant’s arguments “lack[ed]
merit”).
Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of this action and deny Harding’s
motions to proceed in forma pauperis and to receive an appointed attorney.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
5 Harding requests leave to amend his complaint for the first time on appeal.
We deny this request. See Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 2017)
(denying plaintiff’s request to amend because plaintiff could have made request in
district court but instead chose to appeal).
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