Joy Goncalves v. Plymouth County Sheriff's Department

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 10-2063
JOY GONCALVES,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
PLYMOUTH COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,
Defendant, Appellee,
PLYMOUTH COUNTY,
Defendant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. George A. O'Toole, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Mitchell J. Notis, with whom Law Office of Mitchell J. Notis,
was on brief for appellant.
William P. Breen, Jr., with whom Charlotte L. Bednar and
Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, were on brief for appellee.
October 7, 2011

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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Joy
Goncalves ("Goncalves") appeals the district court's award of
summary judgment to her employer, the Plymouth County Sheriff's
Department ("PCSD"), on her allegations of employment
discrimination based on her gender, race, and national origin in
violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B ("Chapter
151B") and Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and her age in violation of
Chapter 151B and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")
29 U.S.C. § 623. We conclude that the district court properly
granted summary judgment as to Goncalves's claims and affirm the
district court's decision. Goncalves v. Plymouth Cnty., No. 08-
11648-GAO, 2010 WL 3191448 (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 2010).
I. Background
Goncalves, a forty-nine-year-old Cape Verdean female who
also self-identifies as black, began working for PCSD as a Budget
Administrator in February 2001. Goncalves's role as Budget
Administrator mainly required her to process invoices on a daily
basis. Her position also required her to "balance reports, run
checks, [and] maintain office supplies;" it did not require her to
perform specific duties with respect to computers or their
maintenance.
Between 2004 and 2008, Goncalves applied for -- and was
denied -- promotion to four different positions in the PCSD.
Goncalves alleged that her denials were due to unlawful
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discrimination. Only two of these positions are at issue in this
dispute, as the first two challenged decisions are time-barred.
Goncalves applied for the contested IT positions of
Systems Analyst/Programmer and Database Administrator (the "IT
Positions") in February 2008. Among the qualifications required
for the IT Positions were that the applicant hold an associate's
degree in a computer-related field and have three years of relevant
work experience. Additionally, as the district court found, the IT
Positions "required three or more years as an
intranet/internet/user interface developer with experience
developing database-driven intranet/internet applications using
IIS, MTX, COM, ASP, SQL Server (version 7.0 or higher), Access,
Visual Basic, Visual InterDev, and JavaScript." Goncalves, 2010 WL
3191448, at *2.
PCSD interviewed nine applicants for the IT Positions,
including Goncalves. Interviewers were Human Resources Director
Paul Lawton ("Lawton"), Human Resources Manager Mark Gabriel
("Gabriel"), and Deputy Director of IT Tara Cruza ("Cruza").
Interviewees included -- among others not relevant for purposes of
this appeal -- Britney Johnson ("Johnson"), a white female, and
Matthew Blais ("Blais"), a white male, both of whom were younger
than Goncalves and each of whom obtained one of the IT Positions.
These three interviewees' qualifications varied as follows.
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Although Johnson lacked an associate's degree, she had
the requisite computer experience and work background that PCSD
sought, specifically, "very, very strong" Macintosh computer skills
and web designing abilities that would allow her to "step right in
and assume" departmental duties. Indeed, Gabriel expressly noted
during his deposition that Johnson -- who had previously designed
a number of web pages, worked as a graphic designer, and used
Macintosh design programs -- possessed experience and skills that
"none of the other candidates had" and for which the IT department
was in "desperate need." Blais both satisfied the degree
requirement and had relevant work and IT experience, having worked
in the development department of a private company in which he
received extensive hands-on IT experience. Goncalves possessed the
requisite degree, but in contrast to Johnson or Blais, lacked both
the IT programming skills and relevant work experience that PCSD
was soliciting. Specifically, Goncalves testified that her current
job duties did not require her to utilize computer skills; that she
had last worked in a computer-related field eleven years earlier on
an outdated DOS-based system; and that her only experience with
building web sites consisted of starting, but never finishing, a
site.
Two critical stages in the hiring process were an
interview with the panel and a practical exam that was designed to
evaluate the candidates' IT knowledge. In the interview phase,
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Lawton, Cruza, and Gabriel graded each applicant's responses to
questions concerning their work experience, IT background, and
interest in a technical position on a scale of "A" through "C-."
Johnson received an "A" from Cruza and an "A-" from Gabriel;
Blais, a "B+" from Cruza and at least a "B" from Lawton;1
Goncalves, a "C" from Cruza and a "B-" from Lawton. During the 2
interview, Cruza noted that Goncalves appeared angry when it became
apparent that she no longer would be able to work her current 6:00
a.m. to 2:00 p.m. schedule (due to her work as a youth sports
coach) because the IT Positions would require her to be present at
work from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. to provide necessary support to
other staff. Johnson and Blais had no such scheduling demands or
restrictions.
Following the interview process, PCSD selected Goncalves,
Johnson, and Blais (along with two additional candidates) to take
the practical exam. Blais received the highest score (18 points
out of a possible 24); Johnson, one of the top three scores (15
points out of 24); and Goncalves, one of the lowest scores (10
points out of 24). Goncalves testified that she was "stressed
out," "upset," and unable to focus during the exam. Goncalves did
At her deposition, Cruza, on reviewing Lawton's interview sheet, 1
testified that it was not clear whether Lawton rated Blais an "A-,"
a "B+," or a "B."
Based on the record, Gabriel does not appear to have given a 2
letter grade to either Goncalves or Blais. Lawton's interview
report for Johnson is not in the record.
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not complete the exam in the time allotted, left several important
sections unanswered, did not try to subsequently supplement her
answers, and neither requested additional time in which to complete
the exam nor complained as to its overall length. On reviewing the
candidates' qualifications and overall performance, PCSD decided to
hire Johnson for the Systems Analyst/Programmer position and Blais
for the Database Administrator position.
On September 26, 2008, Goncalves filed a complaint in
district court alleging that PCSD unlawfully discriminated against
her when it denied her a promotion. PCSD denied Goncalves's
allegations of discrimination in its Answer and subsequently filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that the hired candidates
were better qualified for the IT Positions and that Goncalves's
gender, race, age, and/or national origin played no part in its
hiring decisions. The district court granted PCSD's motion and
held that Goncalves had not met her evidentiary burden because she
had not shown two of the four required factors to a prima facie
claim of discrimination, i.e., Goncalves had not shown she was (1)
qualified for the IT Positions and (2) similarly situated to the
hired candidates. Goncalves, 2010 WL 3191448, at *2-*3. Although
not required to -- as no prima facie case had been shown -- the
district court also found that PCSD had provided a
nondiscriminatory justification for its ultimate employment
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decision and Goncalves had not shown that PCSD's proffered reason
was pretextual. Id. at *3. Goncalves appealed.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is properly granted where the movant
"shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). We review the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, "drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-moving party while ignoring 'conclusory allegations,
improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.'" Sutliffe v.
Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 325 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting
Sullivan v. City of Springfield, 561 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2009)).
We evaluate an employment discrimination claim for which
there is no direct evidence of discrimination by applying the
three-stage framework of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 3
analysis. Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 176 (1st Cir.
2008); Rossy v. Roche Prods., Inc., 880 F.2d 621, 625 (1st Cir.
1989); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-04 (1973). First, the plaintiff must show a prima facie case
of employment discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
This analysis applies to Title VII claims and to claims brought 3
pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B. See Quiñones v. Buick, 436
F.3d 284, 289 n.1 (1st Cir. 2006). Goncalves makes no claim on
appeal that a different standard is applicable to ADEA claims.
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If the plaintiff succeeds, "[t]he burden then shifts to the
defendant to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason,
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
it discriminated against the employee, for the employment
decision." Quiñones v. Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 2006).
If the defendant provides such a reason, "the McDonnell Douglas
framework -- with its presumptions and burdens -- is no longer
relevant." Vélez v. Thermo King de P.R., Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 447
(1st Cir. 2009) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 510 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the
ball returns to the plaintiff's court, in which she must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's alleged
nondiscriminatory reason was in fact a pretext for discrimination.
Quiñones, 436 F.3d at 289.
B. Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
This case begins and ends with the first stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework. To establish a prima facie case,
Goncalves bears the burden of showing that (1) she is a member of
a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the open position for
which she applied, (3) she was rejected for that position, and (4)
someone holding similar qualifications received the position
instead. Ingram v. Brink's, Inc., 414 F.3d 222, 230 (1st Cir.
2005). The district court found, and the parties do not contest,
that Goncalves satisfies the first and third requirements of a
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prima facie discrimination case; the true query is whether she can
meet the second and fourth elements. We conclude that she cannot.
1. Qualified Individual
The record shows that Goncalves was not qualified for the
IT Positions. The IT Positions required extensive computer
knowledge and experience that Goncalves, aside from possessing the
requisite degree, admitted to lacking. According to the record, at
the time of her IT Position applications, the PCSD IT Department
was in "desperate" and "critical" need of employees with strong
Macintosh-based computer skills and web design experience that
could be applied to, among other tasks, PCSD's website development
project and to the Correctional Facility's inmate print shop design
program. During her deposition, Goncalves admitted that at the
time she applied she did not have the programming qualifications
required for at least the System Analyst position; that her then-
position as Budget Administrator did not require her to work with,
maintain, or repair computers; that she last held a computer-
related job approximately eleven years ago; that when she
previously worked in a computer-related field, it was with an
outdated, DOS-based system that was markedly different from PCSD's
then in-place computer system; and that she had never fully created
a web site.
Further, the record also reflects that, of those who took
a practical exam designed to evaluate applicants' qualifications
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for the IT Positions, Goncalves received one of the lowest scores,
whereas Johnson and Blais received among the highest. This weighs
against Goncalves's assertion that she was qualified for the IT
Positions. See Martínez-Burgos v. Guayama Corp., No. 10-1372, 2011
WL 3769063, at *4 (1st Cir. Aug. 26, 2011) (fact that applicant
failed to obtain the minimum score for a "fitting candidate" during
the interview process "defeats her contention that she was
qualified for the position").
Indeed, Goncalves's only arguments in favor of her
contention that she was qualified for the IT Positions are as
follows. First, because Goncalves advanced to the interview and
exam stages of the hiring process, PCSD effectively conceded that
she was qualified for the IT Positions. The PCSD made no such
admission. That the PCSD in an abundance of caution let her
application advance does not make Goncalves qualified. It
admittedly is confusing why PCSD permitted Goncalves to proceed
through the selection process if she clearly lacked the programming
skills and relevant work experience the IT Department specifically
sought. Nevertheless, "[o]ur role is not to second-guess the
business decisions of an employer." Rossy, 880 F.2d at 625. The
record shows that Goncalves received the lowest interview and exam
scores and that she lacked the "critical" technical skills and work
background the IT Positions required. Such undisputed facts
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evidencing a lack in qualifications make plain she has not made a
showing of a prima facie case of discrimination.
Second, Goncalves asserts that the job requirements
themselves could not have been binding as Johnson, who did not
satisfy the associate's degree requirement, still obtained an IT
Position. This argument overlooks the fact that PCSD considered
Johnson's lack of a degree, weighed it against her possessing
critically-needed skills that "none of the other candidates had,"
and determined that, overall, Johnson had precisely what the IT
department sought in qualifications for the Systems
Analyst/Programmer position, namely, strong Macintosh-based skills
and web design computer experience. See Gray v. New Eng. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 255 (1st Cir. 1986) (to establish
employment discrimination, plaintiff must show more than "that the
employer made an unwise business decision, or an unnecessary
personnel move. . . . [or] acted arbitrarily or with ill will").
Goncalves's arguments do not make a genuine-issue-of-material-fact
mountain out of an otherwise-factually-supported molehill.
For the foregoing reasons, Goncalves fails to establish
that she was qualified for the IT Positions.
2. Similarly Situated
Goncalves not only fails to show that she was qualified
for the IT Positions, but she also points to no evidence
establishing that she was similarly situated to the hired
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candidates. Similarly situated candidates must share "roughly
equivalent qualifications to perform substantially the same work."
Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). They must be similar in "material
respects," Perkins v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 78 F.3d 747, 751
(1st Cir. 1996), i.e., "apples should be compared to apples."
Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.
1989). Peeling back the record, the core of the evidence shows
that Goncalves was not similarly situated to Johnson and Blais,
whether in work experience, computer programming abilities,
interview performance, or test results.
Goncalves did not have the same work experience or IT
background as Blais or Johnson. Indeed, she had little to no
programming experience, had never fully designed a web site, and
her most relevant work experience (from eleven years prior) was
with an outmoded DOS-based system. Further, during the interview
stage, Goncalves received notably lower marks than either Blais or
Johnson, obtaining a "C" and "B-," in comparison to Blais's "B" and
"B+" and Johnson's "A-" and "A." Lastly, Goncalves was one of the
lowest scorers on the practical exam, whereas Johnson and Blais
received among the highest scores. See Masters v. City of East
Point, 313 F. App'x 239, 240-41 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming
district court's finding that applicant could not show he was
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qualified or similarly situated to other candidates for a promotion
because of his low test score).
Goncalves asserts -- as she did in support of her
"qualified individual" claim -- that because she advanced through
the selection process, PCSD all but admitted she was similarly
situated to the subsequently hired individuals, and that because
Johnson had credentials that Goncalves lacked and vice versa, the
two must have been similarly situated. Such arguments are not
sufficient for purposes of establishing a genuine issue of material
fact. Goncalves has not adverted to any IT programming, web design
skills, or work experience on her part that comparably matched
Blais or Johnson's background, nor has she compellingly contested
her consistently lower performance throughout the hiring process.
Where the record shows that an employee was in fact differently
situated from other candidates, we cannot rely on "overly
attenuated inferences, unsupported conclusions, and rank
speculation" to quiet the tolling of the summary judgment bell.
Dennis v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 549 F.3d 851, 856 (1st Cir. 2008)
(quoting Thompson, 522 F.3d at 175) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
It is not our role to "sit as super personnel
departments, assessing the merits -- or even the rationality -- of
employers' nondiscriminatory business decisions." Mesnick v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991). Employee
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"[q]ualifications are notoriously hard to judge," and "more must be
shown than that the employer made an unwise personnel decision."
Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 74 (1st Cir. 2004).
Because Goncalves has failed to show that she was either qualified
or similarly situated to the candidates selected for the IT
Positions -- whether in work experience, computer programming
skills, or overall interview and test performance -- she cannot
meet her burden of showing a prima facie case of discrimination.
We therefore conclude that the district court acted appropriately
in granting summary judgment to PCSD. We likewise end our
discrimination inquiry, as Goncalves has failed to "make it past
the first stage [of the McDonnell Douglas framework], i.e. to aver
a prima facie case," and thus, "the inference of discrimination
[for PCSD to rebut] simply never arises." Ingram, 414 F.3d at 230;
see also Martínez-Burgos, 2011 WL 3769063, at *4.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment.
Affirmed. Costs are taxed against appellant.
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