United States of America v. Terrence Warner Glaum, a/k/a Smitty, a/k/a Terrence Glaum, a/k/a Terry W. Case

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-2304
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
TERRENCE WARNER GLAUM, a/k/a Smitty,
a/k/a Terrence Glaum, a/k/a Terry W. Case,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Howard, Circuit Judges,
and Schwarzer,* Senior District Judge.
Lisa M. Sheehan for appellant.
F. Mark Terison with whom Paula D. Silsby, United States
Attorney was on brief for appellee.
January 28, 2004
*Of the Northern District of California, sitting by
designation.

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HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Defendant Terrence Glaum
appeals from his conviction and sentence for participating in a
marijuana distribution conspiracy. He raises several claims of
error. We affirm.
I. Background
We state the facts in the light most favorable to the
jury’s verdict. See United States v. Diaz, 300 F.3d 66, 69 (1st
Cir. 2002).
A. Glaum Joins the Conspiracy
The conspiracy underlying this prosecution operated to
distribute Mexican-grown marijuana throughout the United States.
The head of the conspiracy was a man known only as “Jefe.” He
raised large crops of marijuana for shipment across the border. An
individual known as the “Old Man” or “Dad” worked under Jefe as his
chief distributor. The Old Man received large shipments of
marijuana from Jefe to distribute to other dealers, including
Anthony Salsberry, who operated out of San Diego. Salsberry, in
turn, would distribute the marijuana to other smaller dealers, who
would sell the drugs to users. Among Salsberry’s customers were an
individual in New York, Ralph Martino, and two individuals in
Maine, Ronnie Kerrigan and Paul Sekenski.
As part of his operation, Salsberry employed Glaum’s ex-
wife, Sheila Case, to assist him in shipping the marijuana. In the
middle of 2000, Case asked Salsberry if he could put Glaum “to

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1 Martino later rejected the second ton because of its poor
quality.
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work.” Salsberry agreed and provided Glaum with approximately
fifty pounds of marijuana to sell in Arizona. In addition to his
work distributing marijuana, Glaum assisted Salsberry in packaging
the drugs. Working out of his garage, Glaum weighed, “shrink
wrapp[ed]” and “vacuum seal[ed]” marijuana to prepare it for
shipment. As compensation, Salsberry paid Glaum “a percentage” of
the profits.
At approximately the same time that Glaum started working
for Salsberry, the Old Man offered Salsberry a two-ton load of
marijuana to distribute. After a portion of the load was smuggled
across the border, Salsberry obtained a sample to send to Martino
to gauge his interest in purchasing the load.
In mid-October 2000, after receiving word from Martino
that he was interested, Salsberry met with Jefe and the Old Man in
San Diego to discuss the Martino deal. At this meeting, Jefe and
the Old Man told Salsberry that only one ton would be available
immediately and that the other ton would be placed “on hold”.1
Salsberry concluded the meeting by telling his superiors that he
would organize the transportation of the load to Martino.
Salsberry knew that Martino could arrange to transport
the shipment himself, but Salsberry preferred to find an alternate
method so that he could charge Martino a higher fee. In a

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subsequent conversation with Glaum, Salsberry learned that Glaum
had access to several trucks which could be used to ship the
marijuana to New York.
Soon after this conversation, Salsberry attended another
meeting with Jefe and the Old Man. This time Glaum also attended,
and Salsberry introduced him to the heads of the organization. At
this meeting, Salsberry assured the Old Man and Jefe that Glaum was
capable of organizing the transportation for the Martino deal but
that he could not begin the transport for two weeks. The
participants therefore agreed that for two weeks the deal would
remain “on hold.”
B. Salsberry’s Arrest and Cooperation
On November 14, 2000, during the two-week hiatus in the
Martino deal, Salsberry was arrested after one of his drivers
turned him in to authorities. After his arrest, Salsberry was
incarcerated in San Diego. From jail, Salsberry called Glaum to
check on the Martino deal and to inform him of his status. While
Salsberry was incarcerated, he spoke to Glaum nearly every day.
During these calls, Glaum assured Salsberry that “he wouldn’t let
[him] down” and that he “wanted to keep things going.” The two
eventually agreed that Glaum would carry on Salsberry’s business
while Salsberry was in jail.
On November 18, 2000, Glaum sent his attorney, Phil
Gagnon, to meet with Salsberry in jail. Gagnon served as an

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intermediary between Glaum and Salsberry, meeting with Salsberry on
several occasions. At one of their meetings, Salsberry provided
Gagnon with Ronnie Kerrigan’s and the Old Man’s telephone numbers.
On January 17, 2001, Salsberry decided to cooperate with
the government. Soon afterwards, Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA")
Agent Paul Wolf traveled from Maine to California to debrief
Salsberry. As part of his cooperation agreement, Salsberry agreed
to remain in contact with Glaum and Gagnon and to provide Glaum
with Wolf’s pager number. Eventually, Salsberry gave Glaum the
pager number, pretending that it belonged to Paul Sekenski.
C. The Sting Operation
Wolf returned to Maine from meeting with Salsberry on
January 19, 2001. Two days later, he received an electronic page
from Glaum. In their introductory call, Glaum identified himself
as a friend of Salsberry and asked Wolf if he wanted “to discuss
doing some business.” Glaum said that he soon would be traveling
to Maine to bring drugs to Ronnie Kerrigan and that he would be
able to deliver drugs to Wolf at that time. Wolf told him that he
would have to “check [him] out” before placing an order. Glaum
invited Wolf to call him when he was ready to deal.
On January 24, 2001, Wolf called Glaum. After Glaum
explained how he had become associated with Salsberry, Wolf
broached the subject of the Martino deal. Wolf asked Glaum if he
knew Martino. Glaum stated that he knew “of him” but that he knew

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“Dad real well.” At the conclusion of the conversation, Glaum
offered to send Wolf a small shipment of marijuana.
On January 30, 2001, Wolf and Glaum negotiated the
smaller shipment that they had initially discussed on January 24th.
Glaum agreed to send Wolf a ten-pound load. Wolf, in turn, rented
a "mail drop" box to receive the shipment at a Mail Boxes Etc. in
Saco, Maine. On February 10, 2001, Wolf provided the address to
Glaum, and Glaum told him to expect the drugs to arrive in a
package appearing to contain candles.
On February 13, 2001, Glaum and Wolf again discussed the
ten-pound shipment. This time they discussed payment. Wolf agreed
to send half of the money immediately and to pay the rest when they
met. In their next conversation, on February 18, 2001, they
discussed the possibility of a larger shipment. Glaum offered to
send a sample of the larger shipment or to bring it to Maine when
he visited Kerrigan. He told Wolf that he had just obtained “three
hun[dred]” pounds of marijuana and that the drugs were “Dad’s
thing” and were “all Dad.”
Wolf received the ten-pound shipment on February 20,
2001. Wolf called that day to inform Glaum that the shipment had
arrived. The next conversation between Wolf and Glaum took place
on February 22, 2001, during which Wolf told Glaum that Martino was
“kinda anxious” about the larger deal.

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2 During this meeting, Glaum admitted that he had been
smuggling marijuana from Mexico since he was eighteen years old and
that he had sent “300 or 400 hundred in the mail without any
problems.”
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At this point, Wolf arranged for DEA Agent Ralph Caruso
to pose as Martino, in order to expand the investigation. On
February 25, 2001, Wolf told Glaum that he had shared some of the
ten-pound shipment with Martino and that, as a result, Martino
wanted to meet to finalize the deal. Wolf asked Glaum if he could
give Martino his telephone number. Glaum agreed.
The investigation then shifted to San Diego. Caruso and
DEA Agent Judy Gustafson, who was posing as Martino’s girlfriend,
met with Glaum on February 29, 2001. Glaum told Caruso that he had
arranged to transport the drugs. At their next meeting on March 1,
2001, Glaum insisted that Caruso provide immediate payment for the
one-ton shipment.2 The DEA was unwilling to provide such a large
payment to Glaum and accordingly shifted its focus to Gagnon, in
the hope that it could arrange the Martino deal through him. After
numerous attempts over several months, the agency abandoned this
effort because Gagnon refused to take a “proactive” role in
organizing the deal.
Because Caruso was unable to make progress through either
Glaum or Gagnon, the DEA decided that Wolf should reinitiate
contact with Glaum, and on July 16, 2001, Wolf placed a call to
Glaum. During this call, Wolf asked Glaum about obtaining new

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shipments of marijuana. Glaum stated that he had quality marijuana
available but that he was upset that he had not been paid for
earlier shipments to Maine. He also said that he had a new person
working in Bangor, Maine to oversee some of his affairs.
Wolf and Glaum proceeded to discuss the logistics for
sending smaller shipments. Glaum suggested sending forty-pound
lots on the same day to two different addresses. He said that he
had been shipping between 400 and 500 pounds of marijuana every two
weeks and that, in some weeks, he had sent 600 pounds. Glaum also
explained that he had formed a shipping company called “Simply
Shipping” through which he trafficked drugs. Glaum noted that his
associate in Bangor, Eugene Monroe, had “probably about a hundred
pounds of marijuana” on hand, and suggested that Wolf meet with him
to set up a deal.
D. “Dealing” with Monroe
The day after Wolf’s conversation with Glaum, he received
an electronic page from Monroe. Monroe explained to Wolf that he
was working with Glaum and that, going forward, Glaum wanted Monroe
and Wolf to handle “the account” themselves.
On July 24, 2001, Monroe met Wolf at a restaurant in
Waterville, Maine. Monroe said that Glaum had taken over the
business after Salsberry was incarcerated. He also explained that,
because of difficulties that Glaum had encountered working with
Ronnie Kerrigan, Glaum had hired him to oversee the Maine

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3 Monroe delivered only twenty pounds of marijuana.
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operations. Monroe described the method for shipping the drugs.
The drugs would arrive from Simply Shipping in boxes with religious
logos so as to dampen suspicions about their contents. Wolf
provided Monroe with an address at a Mail Boxes Etc. in
Scarborough, Maine, where Glaum could send the drugs. Monroe
showed Wolf a sample of the available marijuana. After seeing the
sample, Wolf placed an order for 100 pounds. Monroe responded
that, prior to delivering such a large amount, he would have to
check on availability with Glaum.
Later that day, Monroe contacted Wolf and told him that,
even though Glaum had 120 pounds of marijuana in his possession,
only forty pounds were available to him. Monroe said that he would
bring twenty five pounds to the same restaurant where they earlier
had met and that Glaum would ship the rest.
On the afternoon of July 25, 2001, Monroe and Wolf met in
the restaurant parking lot. Monroe placed the drugs in the
backseat of Wolf’s car.3 The next morning, Wolf received a call
from the Mail Boxes Etc. informing him that he had received two
boxes from “Faith Unity World Service” sent by Simply Shipping.
Both boxes contained vacuum sealed bricks of marijuana.
After receiving the shipment, Wolf called Monroe to tell
him that it had arrived. Monroe stated that Glaum had just
received another 400 pounds of marijuana to distribute. On July

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30, 2001, Monroe and Wolf made plans for Wolf to receive an
additional twenty five pounds of drugs. The two agreed to meet in
Brunswick, Maine, the following day. Monroe was arrested just as
Wolf arrived at the meeting spot. At approximately the same time,
Glaum was arrested in San Diego.
E. Trial and Sentence
Glaum was charged in a single-count indictment with
conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to
distribute 1,000 or more kilograms of marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. §§
846 and 841(a)(1). After a five-day trial, the jury convicted
Glaum but specifically found that he was responsible for only
between 100 and 999 kilograms of marijuana. At sentencing,
however, the district court determined that Glaum was responsible
for 1,052 kilograms of marijuana. The court sentenced Glaum to 121
months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Glaum
timely appealed from the conviction and sentence.
II. Discussion
Glaum raises six main issues on appeal. First, he claims
that the government failed to prove his participation in the single
conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Second, he claims that he
was entrapped. Third, he claims that the district court
incorrectly instructed the jury on his entrapment defense. Fourth,
he claims that the district court erred in its drug quantity
calculations. Fifth, he claims that a portion of the drug quantity

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attributed to him should have been excluded because of sentencing
manipulation. Sixth, he claims that the district court erred by
declining to grant him credit for acceptance of responsibility. We
address these claims seriatim.
A. Single Conspiracy
Glaum argues that the government failed to prove that he
was involved in the single conspiracy described in the indictment.
The indictment alleged that, from the fall of 2000 until his
arrest, on July 31, 2001, Glaum participated in a single conspiracy
with Salsberry and others to distribute marijuana. Glaum asserts
that the evidence established two separate conspiracies. The first
involved Salsberry and concluded when Salsberry agreed to become a
government agent; the second involved Monroe and concluded when
Glaum was arrested.
Whether a given body of evidence proves one conspiracy
or multiple conspiracies is an issue of fact. See United States v.
Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 696 (1st Cir. 1999). Thus, on appeal, we
review the jury’s single-conspiracy determination by asking whether
the finding was rational given the evidence. Id. We have
identified a non-exclusive list of factors to guide this inquiry:
(1) was there evidence of a common purpose? (2) were the various
elements of the plan interdependent? and (3) was there some degree
of overlap among the participants? See United States v. Rivera-
Ruiz, 244 F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2001); Portela, 167 F.3d at 695.

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Here, there was sufficient evidence to find Glaum guilty
of participating in the charged single conspiracy. There was
evidence that, in the fall of 2000, Glaum conspired with Salsberry
to sell drugs. See Portela, 167 F.3d at 695 (goal of selling drugs
for profit satisfies common goal requirement). After agreeing to
join with Salsberry, Glaum performed several acts to further the
goals of the conspiracy, including weighing and preparing drugs for
shipment and sale and meeting with Salsberry’s suppliers.
Following Salsberry’s arrest, Glaum agreed to assume Salsberry’s
role in the business and proceeded to honor this agreement, unaware
that Salsberry had agreed to become a government agent.
Glaum contends that the charged conspiracy ended when
Salsberry became a government agent. See id. at 699-700
(explaining that a conspiracy cannot exist where one of the members
is a government agent because a conspiracy requires the existence
of two “genuine” parties). But the Portela rule has no relevance
here because there was evidence that Glaum continued to work with
other members of the conspiracy after Salsberry agreed to cooperate
with the DEA. See United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 126 (1st
Cir. 1987) (noting that the rule providing that government agents
do not count as co-conspirators is relevant “only in situations
where the conspiracy involve[d] one defendant and a government
informer”) (internal quotations omitted). For example, Glaum told
Wolf that he knew “Dad real well” and that the marijuana in his

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4 Glaum also argues that his conviction must be overturned
because the jury found him responsible for a smaller amount of
marijuana than was alleged in the indictment. There is no merit to
this argument. The amount of drugs for which a defendant is
responsible is not an element which the government must prove to
obtain a conviction. See United States v. Goodine, 326 F.3d 26,
32-33 (1st Cir. 2003).
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possession was “all Dad” and was “Dad’s thing.” The jury easily
could have concluded that Glaum’s statements were references to his
on-going work with the Old Man (whose other alias was "Dad").
There was thus sufficient evidence that Glaum continued to receive
marijuana from the supply end of the conspiracy after Salsberry’s
departure from the organization.
There was also sufficient evidence to conclude that Glaum
continued to work with the distribution end of the conspiracy. In
conversations with Wolf, Glaum described his continued work with
Ronnie Kerrigan, including his plans to travel to Maine to bring
him drugs. In addition, Eugene Monroe testified that Glaum ushered
him into the conspiracy only after Glaum encountered difficulties
working with Kerrigan. Glaum’s continuing relationship with
Kerrigan permitted the jury to conclude that he continued to deal
with distributors that he had met through his involvement in the
charged single conspiracy.4
B. Entrapment
Glaum’s second claim challenges the jury’s decision to
reject his entrapment defense. Like the single-conspiracy issue
discussed above, we review this claim under the sufficiency of the

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evidence rubric. See United States v. LaFreniere, 236 F.3d 41, 45
(1st Cir. 2001). Thus, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, asking whether a rational jury could
have rejected Glaum’s entrapment defense. United States v. Tom,
330 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2003).
The entrapment defense is two-pronged. It requires proof
of (1) improper government inducement to commit the crime, and (2)
lack of predisposition by the defendant to engage in criminal
conduct. See United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
1998). To present an entrapment defense, the defendant must make
an initial prima facie showing of proof raising the issue. See
Tom, 330 F.3d at 89. It is undisputed that Glaum made this initial
showing.
At this point, the burden shifts to the government to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not
entrapped. Id. Sufficient evidence that the government did not
improperly induce the crime or that the defendant was predisposed
towards criminal conduct defeats the entrapment defense. See
United States v. Capelton, 350 F.3d 231, 242 (1st Cir. 2003). We
focus here on predisposition, considering: (1) the character or
reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the initial suggestion of
criminal activity was made by the government; (3) whether the
defendant was engaged in criminal activity for profit; (4) whether
the defendant showed reluctance to commit the offense; and (5) the

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nature of the inducement offered by the government. See United
States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2003).
Here, there was evidence to support the conclusion that
Glaum was predisposed to criminal conduct. Glaum emphasized to
the DEA agents his prior work distributing drugs, including that he
had been distributing marijuana, imported from Mexico, since he was
eighteen years old. He also had been working with Salsberry in
packaging and distributing drugs for several months before the
DEA’s involvement, and had agreed to run the trafficking business
in Salsberry’s absence. Thus, there was ample evidence showing
that Glaum had the character and reputation of a drug dealer. See
United States v. Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 259-60 (1st Cir.
1992) (statement by defendant that he “worked with cocaine a lot”
shows defendant’s predisposition to engage in criminal conduct).
In addition, after the DEA infiltrated the conspiracy,
Glaum continued to act as an eager participant. After receiving
Wolf’s pager number from Salsberry, Glaum contacted Wolf almost
immediately and, in their first conversation, offered to do “some
business.” Thereafter, Glaum never expressed reluctance to work
with Wolf in organizing additional transactions because of their
illegality. Moreover, the evidence that Glaum received “a
percentage” of the profits from Salsberry leaves little doubt that
Glaum engaged in drug dealing for profit.

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C. Entrapment Instruction
Glaum next claims that, even if the evidence was
sufficient to defeat his entrapment defense, the district court
incorrectly instructed the jury on entrapment. Relying on United
States v. Brooks, 215 F.3d 842, 845 (8th Cir. 2000), Glaum argues
that the jury should have been instructed that, for purposes of
entrapment, the government was responsible for all of Salsberry’s
conduct whether or not it was aware of the conduct.
In formulating its instructions, a district court is not
required to parrot the language proffered by the parties. See
United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1124 (1st Cir. 1989).
Within wide margins, the district court retains the choice of the
precise words to be used in explaining the applicable law to the
jury. See United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 251 F.3d 242, 245 (1st
Cir. 2001). Our role is to determine "whether, taken as a whole,
the court's instructions fairly and adequately submitted the issues
in the case to the jury." Tom, 330 F.3d at 91.
The district court instructed that "[t]o show that
[Glaum] was not entrapped the government must establish beyond a
reasonable . . . doubt that a law enforcement officer or Anthony
Salsberry, after he began cooperating with law enforcement, did not
persuade or talk [Glaum] into committing the crime." (Emphasis
supplied). The district court also instructed that, for purposes
of entrapment, "it does not matter whether the government was aware

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5 In addition, Glaum contends that Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), forbids the district court from sentencing him
for drug quantities in excess of the quantity found by the jury.
He acknowledges that we have previously rejected this argument, see
United States v. Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 536 U.S. 949 (2002); United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279
F.3d 105, 122 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 921 (2002), but
urges us to reconsider. We decline his invitation. See United
States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 436, 438-39 (1st Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S.Ct. 1607 (2003). Relatedly, Glaum asks us to declare
21 U.S.C. § 841 facially unconstitutional because it conflicts with
Apprendi. We also rejected this argument in Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d
at 22-23, and will not reconsider it here.
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of Anthony Salsberry's communications either directly or indirectly
with [Glaum]." The court's instruction captured the essence of the
instruction requested by Glaum. There was no error. See United
States v. Dray, 901 F.2d 1132, 1141 (1st Cir. 1990).
D. Drug Quantity Calculation
Glaum's fourth claim of error is that the district court
credited unreliable evidence in coming to its drug quantity
calculation.5 Notwithstanding the jury’s determination that Glaum
was responsible for less than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, the
court concluded that he was responsible for 2,320 pounds (1,052
kilograms) of marijuana. In reaching this total, the district
court relied, inter alia, on statements by Glaum that (1) he had
300 pounds of marijuana in his possession on February 18, 2001, (2)
he dealt between 400 and 500 pounds of marijuana every two weeks
(the court took the minimum possible amount of 800 pounds for a
single two-week period), (3) in some weeks, he distributed up to
600 pounds, and (4) that Monroe had approximately 100 pounds

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available on July 16, 2001. The court also relied on statements
from Monroe that Glaum had 120 pounds in his possession on July 24,
2001 and another 400 pounds in his possession on July 25, 2001.
The district court determines drug quantity under a
preponderance of the evidence standard. See United States v.
Laboy, 351 F.3d. 578, 582 (1st Cir. 2003). We disturb a drug
quantity determination only in cases of clear error. See United
States v. Batista, 239 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2001). In cases such
as this, where "the amount [of drugs] seized does not represent the
scale of the offense, the court. . . approximate[s] the quantity of
the controlled substance." U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. (n.12). In
making such a determination, the district court need only make "a
reasoned approximation" of the quantity involved. United States v.
Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 224 (1st Cir. 1999).
As set forth above, the district court relied on
statements made by Glaum and Monroe during the course of the DEA’s
investigation. We recently observed that "the most damning
evidence of drug quantity [is] the defendant's own admissions."
United States v. Cyr, 337 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2003). In any
event, the court acted reasonably in crediting Monroe's and Glaum’s
admissions. Glaum has simply not offered a substantial reason for
upsetting the district court’s primary role in making credibility
determinations. See United States v. Picanso, 333 F.3d 21, 27 (1st
Cir. 2003) ("The appraisal of amount depends on inference drawing

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6 Additionally, Glaum argues that the district court
erroneously relied on drug quantities from both the "first"
conspiracy involving Salsberry and the "second" conspiracy
involving Monroe in reaching the total. Our conclusion that the
evidence supported the jury's determination that there was only one
conspiracy disposes of this argument. See supra, at 11-13.
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and . . . credibility and we are not only loath but forbidden to
substitute our own de novo assessment for that of the judge who
tried the case and heard the evidence first hand."); Huddleston,
194 F.3d at 224 (noting, in context of reviewing district court’s
drug quantity calculation, that “credibility calls are grist for
the trial court mill”).6
E. Sentencing Manipulation
Glaum next claims that some portion of the drugs should
have been excluded from the quantity calculation because of
sentencing manipulation. Specifically, he claims that government
agents, including Salsberry, coerced him to participate in
additional deals in order to increase his sentence.
"[W]here government agents have improperly enlarged the
scope or scale of the crime, the sentencing court has ample power
to deal with the situation . . . by excluding the tainted
transaction from the computation of relevant conduct." United
States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal
quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). However,
to prevail on a sentencing manipulation claim, the defendant must
establish "extraordinary misconduct by the government." Id. at 4

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7 Glaum also argues that he was predisposed to commit only
small drug transactions and that the DEA manipulated him into
attempting larger transactions. We are unpersuaded. Evidence
concerning the defendant's predisposition is of marginal relevance
to a sentencing manipulation claim. See Montoya, 62 F.3d at 4. In
any event, Glaum's attempt to cast himself as a small-time drug
dealer until the DEA's investigation is not the only (or even the
most plausible) reading of the record. The evidence showed that,
prior to the DEA investigation, Glaum worked to organize
transportation of a one-ton shipment of marijuana.
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(internal quotations and citations omitted). "[G]arden variety
manipulation claims" do not suffice. Id.
The district court rejected Glaum's sentencing
manipulation claim because the DEA's continued pursuit of Glaum
permitted the DEA to further infiltrate the conspiracy. The
court's analysis was reasonable. We have rejected sentencing
manipulation claims where the government extended the scope of its
investigation into the defendant's conduct because it reasonably
believed that further investigation would permit it to identify
additional drug dealers. See Capelton, 350 F.3d at 246 (rejecting
sentencing manipulation claim where government extended
investigation in order to identify additional drug dealers); United
States v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting
sentencing manipulation claim where government acted in good faith
when it extended duration of investigation to identify other
members in drug network). So too here, as the government’s efforts
resulted in Monroe's arrest.7

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F. Acceptance of Responsibility
Finally, Glaum claims that the district court erred by
refusing to grant him a reduction in his sentence for acceptance of
responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. He contends that he is
entitled to such a reduction because, before trial, he admitted
responsibility for the offense of which he was eventually
convicted.
Glaum was initially indicted for participating in a
conspiracy involving 100 or more kilograms of marijuana.
Subsequently, a superseding indictment was issued charging Glaum
with participating in a conspiracy involving 1,000 or more
kilograms of marijuana. After this superseding indictment was
issued, Glaum offered to plead guilty to the original charge. The
government refused this offer. Glaum contends that, because the
jury found him guilty only of the original charge, he should
receive credit for accepting responsibility. The district court
rejected this argument because it found Glaum responsible for over
1,000 kilograms of marijuana, and Glaum denied responsibility for
these additional quantities.
To earn an acceptance of responsibility reduction, a
defendant must, inter alia, "truthfully admit the conduct
comprising the offense of conviction." See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt.
(n. 1(a)). In addition, he must "truthfully [admit] or not falsely
[deny] any additional relevant conduct for which [he] is

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8 Glaum's decision to pursue an entrapment defense is also
inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. See Capelton, 350
F.3d at 245 (noting that acceptance of responsibility reduction
will rarely be appropriate where defendant pursues entrapment
defense).
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accountable." Id.; see also United States v. Hernandez Coplin, 24
F.3d 312, 317 (1st Cir. 1994). The district court's rejection of an
acceptance of responsibility claim is entitled to considerable
deference and can be overturned only on a showing of clear error.
See Capelton, 350 F.3d at 245.
Throughout the presentence process, Glaum denied
responsibility for the relevant conduct attributed to him by the
district court. At his sentencing, he told the court that "[w]hat
they're saying I did, that's a crock of crap." Glaum’s comment is
certainly not indicative of a criminal defendant accepting
responsibility for his conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. (n.
1(a)) ("A defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests,
relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in
a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility."); see
also United States v. Gonzalez, 12 F.3d 298, 300 (1st Cir. 1993).8
Because Glaum persisted in denying his participation in a
conspiracy involving 1,000 or more kilograms of marijuana, the
district court's rejection of his acceptance of responsibility
request was not clearly erroneous.

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III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the
conviction and sentence of defendant Terrence Glaum.

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