P. v. Beebe

1
Filed 8/8/18 P. v. Beebe CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOHN FLOYD BEEBE, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
C086173
(Super. Ct. No. 17CF00833)
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, defendant John Floyd Beebe, Jr., pleaded no
contest to first degree residential burglary and admitted allegations of two prior prison
terms and a prior serious felony conviction. After the trial court denied defendant’s
Romero1 motion to dismiss allegations of seven prior strike convictions, it found the prior
strike conviction allegations true and sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of
30 years to life.
Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
Romero motion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Defendant stipulated that the factual basis for his plea could be found in the
probation report. Accordingly, the facts are taken from the probation report.
1 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).

-- 1 of 6 --

2
In February 2017, defendant burglarized a residence in the City of Gridley while
residents were under a mandatory evacuation order related to the condition of the
Oroville Dam. The stolen items were valued at approximately $1,270.
Because defendant had recently been released from prison and had a history of
committing similar crimes, a policer officer contacted his mother, who lived near the
victims’ residence. Defendant’s mother told the officer that defendant stayed with her
sometimes and stored items in one of the bedrooms. After receiving consent, the officer
searched the bedroom and found several of the stolen items. The following day, officers
located defendant and arrested him.
Defendant admitted entering the victims’ residence, stealing items, and storing the
items at his mother’s house. He also admitted committing a separate theft during the
mandatory evacuation period.
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, defendant entered a no contest plea to first
degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)2 and admitted that he had served two prior
prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and had a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd.
(a)(1)). The parties agreed to a court trial on the prior strike conviction allegations. It
was also agreed that defendant’s maximum exposure without the strike priors was 13
years while his maximum exposure with the strike priors was 32 years to life.
Prior to the court trial, defendant filed a Romero motion asking the trial court to
dismiss all seven of the prior strike conviction allegations in the interests of justice.
Defendant acknowledged having an extensive criminal history, but argued the current
burglary charge was less severe than the prior strike convictions because, unlike the
priors, there were no people present during the burglary in this case. He said most of the
victims’ belongings were returned to them and the crime did not involve the use of
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

-- 2 of 6 --

3
violence, force or fear. In addition, defendant noted that he had readily admitted his guilt
to the police, had good behavior while incarcerated on the prior strike convictions, and
had a criminal history that mostly consisted of burglaries and other crimes related to his
addiction to methamphetamine. He added that he was motivated to seek treatment for his
drug addiction and to remain crime free because he had a two-year-old daughter. Finally,
defendant argued that failing to dismiss the prior strike allegations and sentencing him to
32 years to life would cross the threshold of disproportionate punishment and violate his
Eighth Amendment rights.
The People opposed the Romero motion, arguing defendant led a life fueled by
drugs and theft and had not remained conviction free for any period of time. The People
recited defendant’s lengthy criminal history as an adult, which dates back to 2003, and
consists of numerous misdemeanor and felony convictions. According to the probation
report, defendant had multiple juvenile adjudications, and his criminal history as an adult
(which spans from 2003 to 2015) consists of numerous felony and misdemeanor
convictions and probation violations. The People noted that despite seven prior theft-
related strike convictions, defendant continued to engage in such behavior. The People
also noted that defendant’s behavior was particularly egregious because he stole items
from vulnerable victims who had been evacuated due to the expected failure of the
Oroville Dam.
The trial court denied the Romero motion, explaining: “The Court has broad but
not unfettered discretion to dismiss prior convictions under Penal Code Section 1385 and
. . . Romero . . . . Nonetheless, the Court is mindful of the three strike sentencing scheme
which is intended to restrict a Court’s discretion in sentencing repeat offenders. The
striking of a strike prior is an extraordinary exercise of . . . discretion. In choosing to
strike a strike, the Court must determine whether in light of the nature and circumstances
of the defendant’s present felony and the prior serious and violent convictions and the

-- 3 of 6 --

4
peculiarities of his background, character and prospects the defendant may be deemed to
be outside the spirit of the three strikes law in whole or in part.
“Here, [defendant] appears to fit squarely within the three strikes law because he’s
continued to victimize citizens by entering their homes and stealing their property. The
Court disagrees with the defense counsel’s argument that the current residential burglary
is less serious than the seven prior strikes; six for residential burglary and one for
attempted residential burglary because the victims were not present at the time the
defendant entered their home. And they were not present because they had been
evacuated due to mandatory evacuations. He took advantage of vulnerable victims who
fled their homes during an immediate failure of the Oroville dam.
“I do not find the facts of the instant case less egregious than those underlying
[the] seven prior strikes.
“Furthermore, [defendant] continued to commit crimes after the completion of
[his] parole on the prior strike convictions. Most notably is an identity theft conviction in
2015 . . . which resulted in a state prison conviction. [Defendant was] on post-release
community supervision for that conviction at the time [he] committed the instant offense.
“So the Court is going to decline to strike the prior strike conviction[s] and the
motion is denied.”
Thereafter, the trial court found true beyond a reasonable doubt the allegations that
defendant had seven prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) that qualified
as strikes under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)). The trial
court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 30 years to life in prison and granted
his request for a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero
motion. We disagree.

-- 4 of 6 --

5
Section 1385 gives the trial court authority in furtherance of justice to order an
action dismissed. (§ 1385, subd. (a).) In Romero, the California Supreme Court held that
a trial court may utilize section 1385 to dismiss a prior strike conviction allegation for
purposes of sentencing under the Three Strikes law. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 504.) A trial court’s ruling denying a request to dismiss a prior strike conviction
allegation “is subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.”
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374 (Carmony).)
“In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts.
First, ‘ “[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a
showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be
set aside on review.” ’ [Citations.] Second, a ‘ “decision will not be reversed merely
because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized
nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’
[Citations.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.)
In Carmony, the Supreme Court explained: “ ‘[T]he Three Strikes law does not
offer a discretionary sentencing choice, as do other sentencing laws, but establishes a
sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the defendant has at least one
qualifying strike, unless the sentencing court “conclud[es] that an exception to the
scheme should be made because, for articulable reasons which can withstand scrutiny for
abuse, this defendant should be treated as though he actually fell outside the Three
Strikes scheme.” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) The circumstances where
no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three
strikes scheme must be extraordinary. (Id. at p. 378.) Reversal is justified where the trial

-- 5 of 6 --

6
court was unaware of its discretion to dismiss a prior strike or considered impermissible
factors in declining to dismiss. (Ibid.) But where the trial court, aware of its discretion,
“ ‘balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the
spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled
differently in the first instance.’ ” (Ibid.)
In deciding whether to dismiss a prior strike conviction allegation, a trial court
“must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies
and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in
whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been
convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
We find no abuse of discretion. In ruling on defendant’s motion, the trial court was
aware of its discretion, considered the relevant factors, and reached its decision in
conformity with the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The decision was neither irrational
nor arbitrary.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
Mauro, J.
We concur:
/S/
Blease, Acting P. J.
/S/
Renner, J.

-- 6 of 6 --