In re Nguyen

Filed 12/17/24 (unmodified opinion attached)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re
TAM STEVEN NGUYEN,
on
Habeas Corpus.
B329158
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. YA054763,
BH014404)
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
AND DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING [NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT]
It is ordered that the opinion in this matter, filed November
27, 2024, is modified as follows:
1. Page 2, the first full paragraph, is modified as follows:
“Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes and was
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term with the possibility of
parole. Because he is eligible for parole, Nguyen is entitled to a
parole hearing, and Penal Code section 3046 establishes a
minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) for when that hearing will
occur. Additionally, because Nguyen was under 26 years of age
when he committed his crimes, Nguyen is entitled to a youth
offender parole hearing, and Penal Code section 3051 establishes
a youth parole eligible date (YPED) for when that hearing will

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occur. Nguyen thus has two parole eligibility dates, one set by
the MEPD and the other by the YPED. Per California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department)
regulations, Nguyen can earn good conduct credit, milestone
completion credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, educational
merit credit, and extraordinary conduct credit to bring forward
his MEPD. However, those same regulations provide that only
educational merit credit can bring forward his YPED; good
conduct credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative
achievement credit, and extraordinary conduct credit do not
impact a youth inmate’s YPED.”
2. Pages 3 to 4, the first full paragraph, is modified as
follows: “Inmates serving an indeterminate life sentence with the
possibility of parole are eligible for parole. (Pen. Code, §§ 3041,
3046.) Penal Code section 3046 sets a MEPD for inmates like
Nguyen sentenced to life in prison. The MEPD applies to
inmates regardless of age. However, inmates like Nguyen who
committed their controlling offenses1 when they were 25 years
old or younger are eligible for a youth offender parole hearing
under Penal Code section 3051. Under that section, a youth
offender is eligible for parole after 15 years if sentenced to a
determinate term (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(1)), after 20 years
if sentenced to an indeterminate life term of fewer than 25 years
to life (id., subd. (b)(2)), and after 25 years if sentenced to an
indeterminate life term of 25 years to life, or to life without
parole for a crime committed before the age of 18 (id., subd. (b)(3),
“1 A controlling offense is the offense or enhancement on
which the sentencing court imposed the longest term of
imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)”

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(4)). The YPED thus provides for an earlier parole eligibility
date. (See In re Brownlee (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 720, 725 [youth
offender parole hearing is “simply one type of parole hearing”].)”
3. Page 10, the second full paragraph is modified as
follows: “The two groups are not similarly situated for the
purposes of the regulations’ restriction on credits because youth
and nonyouth offenders are distinguishable. Youth offenders are
persons who were under the age of 26 when they committed their
controlling offense. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (a)(1).) Youth
offenders therefore have two parole eligibility dates, a MEPD
under Penal Code section 3041 and a YPED under Penal Code
section 3051. In contrast, nonyouth offenders who committed
their crimes when they were 26 years of age or older have just a
MEPD under Penal Code section 3041. By design, the YPED
typically is earlier than the MEPD. Therefore, youth and
nonyouth offenders are not similarly situated with respect to how
their parole eligibility dates are determined.”
The petition for rehearing is denied. There is no change in
the judgment.
____________________________________________________________
EDMON, P.J. ADAMS, J. BERSHON, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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Filed 11/27/24 (unmodified opinion)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re
TAM STEVEN NGUYEN
on
Habeas Corpus.
B329158
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. YA054763,
BH014404)
Petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petition denied.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Petitioner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Sara J. Romano, Assistant Attorney
General, Maria G. Chan, Amanda Murray, Janine W. Boomer,
Brian C. Kinney and Charles Chung, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________

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Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes and was
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term with the possibility of
parole. Because he is eligible for parole, Nguyen is entitled to a
parole hearing, and Penal Code section 3046 establishes a
minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) for when that hearing will
occur. Additionally, because Nguyen was under 26 years of age
when he committed his crimes, Nguyen is entitled to a youth
offender parole hearing, and Penal Code section 3051 establishes
a youth parole eligible date (YPED) for when that hearing will
occur. Nguyen thus has two parole hearing dates, one set by the
MEPD and the other by the YPED. Per California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department) regulations,
Nguyen can earn good conduct credit, milestone completion
credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, educational merit
credit, and extraordinary conduct credit to bring forward his
MEPD. However, those same regulations provide that only
educational merit credit can bring forward his YPED; good
conduct credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative
achievement credit, and extraordinary conduct credit do not
impact a youth inmate’s YPED.
Nguyen has brought this petition for writ of habeas corpus
claiming that the limitation on the credits he can earn to advance
his YPED violates his right to equal protection of law. As we
explain, Nguyen has failed to establish either that the
department’s regulations impact similarly situated groups or that
there is no rational basis for any disparate treatment. We
therefore find that Nguyen’s right to equal protection has not
been violated.

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BACKGROUND
When he was about 22 years old, Nguyen committed
various crimes, and in 2003, a jury convicted him of attempted
murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), kidnapping (id.,
§ 207), and assault with a firearm (id., § 245, subd. (a)(2)). The
jury also found true firearm allegations (id., §§ 12022.53,
subd. (d), 12022.5). The trial court sentenced Nguyen to a
determinate term of 14 years, an indeterminate term of 25 years
to life, and a life term with the possibility of parole.
While incarcerated, Nguyen has earned good conduct
credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative achievement
credit, educational merit credit, and extraordinary conduct credit.
The department has applied those credits against his MEPD,
which is in February 2036. The department has applied the
educational merit credit against his YPED, which is in October
2026.
In 2022, Nguyen petitioned the trial court for a writ of
habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to have his YPED
advanced by good conduct credit, milestone completion credit,
rehabilitative achievement credit, and extraordinary conduct
credit. The trial court denied his petition. Nguyen then
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in our court. We
summarily denied the petition. Nguyen petitioned for review in
the California Supreme Court, it granted review, and the court
ordered us to vacate our order and issue an order to show cause.
DISCUSSION
I. Overview of parole eligibility dates and credits
Inmates serving an indeterminate life sentence with the
possibility of parole are eligible for parole. (Pen. Code, §§ 3041,

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3046.) Penal Code section 3046 sets a MEPD for inmates like
Nguyen sentenced to life in prison. The MEPD applies to
inmates regardless of age. However, inmates like Nguyen who
committed their controlling offenses2 when they were 25 years
old or younger are eligible for an additional parole hearing: a
youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051.
Under that section, a youth offender is eligible for parole after 15
years if sentenced to a determinate term (Pen. Code, § 3051,
subd. (b)(1)), after 20 years if sentenced to an indeterminate life
term of fewer than 25 years to life (id., subd. (b)(2)), and after 25
years if sentenced to an indeterminate life term of 25 years to
life, or to life without parole for a crime committed before the age
of 18 (id., subd. (b)(3), (4)). The YPED does not replace the
MEPD but is in addition to it. (See In re Brownlee (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 720, 725 [youth offender parole hearing is “simply
one type of parole hearing”].) Thus, a youth offender who is not
released after a youth offender parole hearing is still entitled to a
parole hearing set by the MEPD.
In 2016, voters enacted Proposition 57, the Public Safety
and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, which, among other things,
amended our California Constitution to give the department
“authority to award credits earned for good behavior and
approved rehabilitative or educational achievements.” (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (a)(2); see People v. Dynes (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 523, 526; see generally Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15,3
2 A controlling offense is the offense or enhancement on
which the sentencing court imposed the longest term of
imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
3 All further undesignated references are to the California
Code of Regulations, title 15.

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§ 3043, subd. (a) [inmates “are expected to work or participate in
rehabilitative programs and activities to prepare for their
eventual return to society”].) Per that constitutional mandate,
the department enacted regulations giving incarcerated persons
the ability to earn good conduct credit,4 milestone completion
credit,5 rehabilitative achievement credit,6 educational merit
credit,7 and extraordinary conduct credit.8 These credits advance
an incarcerated person’s initial parole hearing date, or MEPD, if
4 An award of good conduct credit requires “that an
incarcerated person comply with Departmental regulations and
local rules of the prison and perform the duties assigned on a
regular and satisfactory basis.” (§ 3043.2, subd. (a).)
5 Milestone completion credit reflects “achievement of a
distinct objective of approved rehabilitative programs, including
academic programs, social life skills programs, Career Technical
Education programs, Cognitive Behavioral Interventions (CBI)
programs, Enhanced Outpatient Program group module
treatment programs, or other approved programs with similar
demonstrated rehabilitative qualities.” (§ 3043.3, subd. (a).)
6 Rehabilitative achievement credit rewards “satisfactory
participation in approved group or individual activities which
promote the educational, behavioral, or rehabilitative
development of an incarcerated person.” (§ 3043.4, subd. (a).)
7 Educational merit credit rewards “a significant academic
accomplishment which will provide incarcerated persons with
life-long rehabilitative benefits.” (§ 3043.5, subd. (a).)
8 Extraordinary conduct credit rewards an incarcerated
person for performing a “heroic act in a life-threatening situation”
or for “exceptional assistance in maintaining the safety and
security of a prison.” (§ 3043.6, subd. (a).)

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the person has been sentenced to an indeterminate term with the
possibility of parole. Credits are subject to forfeiture. Thereafter,
our Legislature gave youth offenders a similar opportunity to
earn credit against their YPED. In 2020, our Legislature enacted
Assembly Bill No. 965 (Stats. 2019, ch. 577, § 2), which added
subdivision (j) to Penal Code section 3051. That subdivision
provides that the department may authorize youth offenders to
“obtain an earlier” YPED “by adopting regulations pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 32 of Article 1 of the California
Constitution.”9 (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (j).) The department
subsequently issued regulations authorizing educational merit
credit to “advance an incarcerated person’s” YPED. (§§ 3043,
subd. (f), 3043.5.) However, good conduct credit, milestone
completion credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, and
extraordinary conduct credit expressly “shall not advance an
incarcerated person’s” YPED. (§ 3043, subd. (f).)
In summary, good conduct credit, milestone completion
credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, educational merit
credit, and extraordinary conduct credit advance an inmate’s
MEPD. But only educational merit credit advances an inmate’s
YPED.
II. Equal protection
Nguyen claims that the difference in how the department
awards credits against an inmate’s MEPD and YPED violates
equal protection. We conclude that no violation has occurred.
9 California Constitution, article I, section 32, subdivision
(b), provides that the department “shall adopt regulations in
furtherance of these provisions,” and the department’s secretary
“shall certify that these regulations protect and enhance public
safety.”

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A. Principles of equal protection
No state may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws” under the federal constitution’s
equal protection clause. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) The equal
protection clause thus directs that all similarly situated persons
be treated alike. (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 847
(Hardin).) “ ‘At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures
that the government does not treat a group of people unequally
without some justification.’ ” (Ibid.) However, equal protection
does not mean “that different things must be treated as though
they are the same.” (In re C.B. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 118, 134; People
v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 591 [equal protection does not
require uniform application of law to persons who are different].)
Determining whether an equal protection violation has occurred
generally involves a two-part inquiry. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 848.) First, has the state adopted a classification affecting
similarly situated groups in an unequal manner? (Ibid.) At this
first stage of the inquiry, we ask whether the groups are similarly
situated for purposes of the challenged law, not whether they are
similarly situated for all purposes. (Ibid.; Cooley v. Superior
Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 252–253.) If the groups are not
similarly situated, then there is no equal protection violation.
Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at page 849, also found that in
cases involving challenges to classifications appearing on the face
of the law, the first prong of the inquiry serves no purpose.
Instead, the “only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged
difference in treatment is adequately justified under the
applicable standard of review.” (Id. at pp. 850–851.) However,
the court did not question the “utility of ‘similarly situated’
inquiries in other contexts. In cases that do not involve

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challenges to classifications appearing on the face of the law, to
ask whether a person has been treated differently from another
person similarly situated is typically how we determine whether
a person has been treated differently on the basis of group
membership or another actionable basis. We do not call into
question the established role the similarly situated inquiry plays
in, for instance, cases involving claims of group-based
discrimination against individuals, in which plaintiffs bear the
burden of showing disparate treatment along class lines, or so-
called ‘class of one’ cases that do not allege differential treatment
on the basis of class membership.” (Id. at p. 851.)
If the groups are similarly situated in all material respects,
then the second inquiry is whether the challenged classification is
justified, utilizing the appropriate standard of review. (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 848.) Where, as here, the challenged
classification does not involve a suspect classification based on,
for example, race or gender, we apply a rational basis review,
sustaining the classification if it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. (Ibid.) Only if there is no rational
relationship between a disparity in treatment and some
legitimate government purpose will an equal protection violation
be found. (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74.) “This core
feature of equal protection sets a high bar before a law is deemed
to lack even the minimal rationality necessary for it to survive
constitutional scrutiny. Coupled with a rebuttable presumption
that legislation is constitutional, this high bar helps ensure that
democratically enacted laws are not invalidated merely based on
a court’s cursory conclusion that a statute’s tradeoffs seem
unwise or unfair.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 289.)

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The party challenging the law has the burden of showing
that the challenged difference in treatment is not adequately
justified under the applicable standard of review. (Hardin,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 851.)
Here, where the parties have addressed the equal
protection issue under the traditional two-part inquiry, we do so
as well, beginning with whether the groups Nguyen identifies are
similarly situated.
B. Similarly situated groups
Nguyen asserts that youth and nonyouth offenders are
similarly situated because both seek early release from custody
by earning credits. As we explain, Nguyen fails to meet his
burden of showing that these groups are similarly situated for
the purpose of the challenged law.
Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808 (Briggs) is instructive
on how to analyze whether groups are similarly situated. Briggs
addressed an equal protection challenge to Proposition 66’s
restriction on successive habeas corpus petitions by prisoners
sentenced to death. The petitioner argued that persons
sentenced to death were similarly situated to noncapital persons
because both had the same interest in freedom from illegal or
unjust convictions or sentences. (Id. at p. 842.) The court found
this “characterization of the interest at stake” overly broad.
(Ibid.) The question instead was whether capital and noncapital
prisoners were similarly situated for purposes of the law’s
restrictions on the filing of successive petitions. (Id. at pp. 842–
843.) The court concluded that the two groups were not similarly
situated because the law addressed issues particular to capital
postconviction proceedings; for example, capital defendants
receive postconviction counsel and investigative funds, and

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abusive successive writ practices are more common in capital
cases. (Id. at pp. 842–845 & fn. 21.)
As in Briggs, Nguyen’s characterization of the interest at
stake, i.e., youth and nonyouth inmates’ shared interest in
accessing credits to obtain early release, is overly broad. (Briggs,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at 842; see Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 848
[we ask whether the groups are similarly situated for purposes of
the challenged law, not for all purposes].) The appropriately
tailored question is whether youth and nonyouth offenders are
similarly situated for the purposes of the regulation’s restriction
that good conduct credit, milestone completion credit,
rehabilitative achievement credit, and extraordinary conduct
credit count only against the MEPD and not the YPED.
The two groups are not similarly situated for the purposes
of the regulations’ restriction on credits because youth and
nonyouth offenders are distinguishable. Youth offenders are
persons who were under the age of 26 when they committed their
controlling offense. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (a)(1).) Youth
offenders therefore have two parole eligibility dates, a MEPD
under Penal Code section 3041 and a YPED under Penal Code
section 3051. The YPED typically is earlier than the MEPD, and
a youth offender who is not granted parole at a youth offender
parole hearing gets another opportunity for parole at a parole
hearing under the MEPD. In contrast, nonyouth offenders who
committed their crimes when they were 26 years of age or older
have just one parole eligibility date, a MEPD under Penal Code
section 3041. Therefore, the two groups are not similarly
situated with respect either to the number of parole hearings to
which they are entitled or to how the parole eligibility dates are
determined for each of those hearings.
Further, youth offenders are not treated differently from
nonyouth offenders for purposes of awarding credits. All parole-

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eligible incarcerated persons sentenced to a life term—including
Nguyen—are eligible to have good conduct credit, milestone
completion credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, educational
merit credit, and extraordinary conduct credit applied against
their MEPD. A subset of incarcerated persons—youth offenders
like Nguyen—receive the additional benefit of having educational
merit credit applied to their YPED. Nguyen is not being treated
differently from any other parole-eligible inmate. As a parole-
eligible inmate serving a life sentence, he receives the same
credits as all other inmates with a MEPD. As a youth inmate, he
receives the same credits as inmates with a YPED and MEPD.
Nguyen is therefore eligible for all types of credit; the only
difference is in which credits are counted against his MEPD
versus his YPED. There is no similarly situated group that is
being treated differently from any group to which Nguyen
belongs.
C. Rational basis
Because Nguyen has failed to establish the first prong of
his equal protection challenge, we need not consider whether
there is a rational basis for any disparate treatment.
Nonetheless, we consider the second prong of an equal protection
violation inquiry and find a rational basis for any disparity in the
way credits are awarded.
Juvenile offenders are treated differently for purposes of
parole eligibility. This is because they are “constitutionally
different” from adults for sentencing purposes. (Miller v.
Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471.) “Because juveniles have
diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform,” “ ‘they
are less deserving of the most severe punishments.’ ” (Ibid.,
citing Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 68 [life without
parole is unconstitutional for juvenile nonhomicide offenders]; see

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also Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [8th Amend. bars
death penalty for juvenile offenders].) Children lack maturity
and have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility that leads to
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. (Miller, at
p. 471.) They are more vulnerable to negative influences and
pressures and lack control over their environment to extricate
themselves from crime-producing settings. (Ibid.) A child’s
character is not as well-formed as an adult’s and is more
amenable to rehabilitation. (Ibid.) Although courts do not treat
juveniles (persons under the age of 18) and youths (those over the
age of 18) the same for all purposes (see, e.g., People v. Powell
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191 [death penalty for 18 year old with
“intellectual shortcomings” does not violate federal and state
constitutions]), our Legislature extended Penal Code section 3051
relief to youths, as science shows that youths’ brains continue to
develop into their twenties (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 846).
In response to this evolving understanding of youth
criminal culpability, our Legislature enacted Penal Code section
3051, which established a parole eligibility mechanism that
provides a person serving a sentence for crimes committed as a
juvenile or youth under the age of 26 the opportunity to obtain
release when the person has been rehabilitated and gained
maturity. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1; see also In re Williams (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 427, 434 [Legislature was motivated by concerns
about lengthy life sentences inadequately accounting for
diminished culpability of juvenile and youth offenders and their
greater potential for rehabilitation and maturation].) Penal Code
section 3051 reflects the law’s understanding of these differences
between juveniles and youth offenders on the one hand and
nonyouth offenders on the other. The section accordingly confers
a significant benefit to youth offenders by affording them a fixed

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YPED based on the sentence for the controlling offense. In many
instances, the YPED will occur significantly before the MEPD.
Here, for example, Nguyen was sentenced to an
indeterminate life term of 25 years to life on his controlling
offense, so his YPED is scheduled for 2026, a full decade before
his MEPD, which is scheduled for 2036. In determining that the
YPED can be offset by only educational merit credit, which
cannot be forfeited when applied to the YPED, the YPED remains
relatively fixed. (§ 3043.5, subds. (f), (h).) This contrasts with
good conduct credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative
achievement credit, extraordinary conduct credit, and
educational merit credit, all of which can be earned, forfeited, and
restored when applied to the MEPD, thereby making the MEPD
a fluctuating date. (§§ 3043.2, subd. (d) [forfeiture and
restoration of good conduct credit]; 3043.3, subd. (h) [forfeiture
and restoration of milestone completion credit]; 3043.4, subd. (i)
[forfeiture and restoration of rehabilitative achievement credit];
3043.5, subd. (f) [forfeiture and restoration of educational merit
credit]; 3043.6, subd. (d) [forfeiture and restoration of
extraordinary conduct credit].) Based on the already significant
benefit afforded only to youth offenders and on Penal Code
section 3051’s careful calibration of the YPED to the sentence on
the controlling offense, the department could rationally conclude
that youth offenders should not benefit further from an award of
credit other than educational merit credit.10 (See People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 278 [Pen. Code, § 3051
10 Because we determine that a rational basis for any
disparate treatment exists on this ground, we need not address
whether the department’s alleged technological limitations
provide another rational basis for such treatment as argued by
the Attorney General.

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“establishes what is, in the Legislature’s view, the appropriate
time to determine whether a juvenile has ‘rehabilitated and
gained maturity’ . . . so that [the juvenile] may have ‘a
meaningful opportunity to obtain release’ ”].) The credit
limitation thus ensures that the youth offender ameliorative
scheme in Penal Code section 3051 operates as the Legislature
intended.
There may be sound policy reasons for awarding good
conduct credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative
achievement credit, and extraordinary conduct credit against
inmates’ YPED, both in view of Penal Code section 3051’s
purpose and to further incentivize youth offenders to improve
themselves and to prepare for life outside of prison. However, the
logic behind a regulatory decision need not be persuasive or
sensible; it need merely be rational. (See People v. Chatman,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 289.) We cannot invalidate a law under the
equal protection clause because we might conclude its tradeoffs
seem unwise or unfair. (Ibid.) In such circumstances, as here,
the matter is one of policy, not of equal protection.

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DISPOSITION
Tam Nguyen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
ADAMS, J.
BERSHON, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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