In re C.S.

Filed 5/30/19 In re C.S. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re C.S., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
2d Juv. No. B290330
(Super. Ct. No. 18JV-00064A)
(San Luis Obispo County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
The San Luis Obispo County District Attorney filed a
petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,
subdivision (a) alleging two counts of possession of drug
paraphernalia in violation of Health and Safety Code section
11364, subdivision (a). Appellant C.S. admitted one count and
the other was dismissed. The juvenile court declared appellant a
ward of the court and placed him on probation. One probation

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condition permits law enforcement to search appellant’s
electronic devices. Appellant contends this condition bears no
relationship to his offense and is constitutionally overbroad. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 15, 2017, an officer of the Grover Beach Police
Department observed Irving Segura, a known gang member,
sitting on a bench outside a restroom. Segura told the officer his
friend was in the restroom. A short while later, appellant
appeared with a backpack. The officer obtained consent to search
the backpack and recovered a glass methamphetamine pipe with
residue on it. Appellant claimed he found the backpack and
denied the pipe belonged to him. The officer subsequently
discovered the backpack belonged to appellant’s brother.
On October 19, 2017, deputies from the San Luis Obispo
County Sheriff’s Department responded to a call regarding
suspicious activity. Upon arrival, the deputies encountered
appellant and Jordan Fairbairnhern. One of the deputies saw tin
foil with burn marks on the ground next to appellant. Appellant
and Fairbairnhern denied that the foil belonged to them.
Appellant claimed the item came from a backpack he had
recently found and emptied so he could place his own belongings
inside. A search of the backpack revealed two methamphetamine
pipes and a small plastic baggie. Appellant’s mother later
informed the deputies that appellant was a methamphetamine
user and had recently been cited for the same offense.
Appellant admitted to a probation officer that he started
smoking marijuana at age 13 and has smoked every day since
then. He started using methamphetamine at age 16 and
admitted to smoking about a half gram every day. He also has
tried other drugs, including heroin. In addition, appellant

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admitted to being “popped in” to the Oceano 13 Street Gang. He
displayed his gang affiliation through clothing and a tattoo.
The juvenile court’s probation order requires appellant to
“[s]ubmit any electronic device, used to store or transmit digital
information, that you own, possess or control, to a search of any
source of electronic data identified below, at any time, with or
without probable cause, by a peace officer, and provide the peace
officer with any passwords necessary to access the data source
specified.” Sources of electronic data identified in the probation
condition are limited to: text messages, voicemail messages, call
logs, photographs, email accounts, social media accounts and
internet browsing history. The order further states that the
“rehabilitative and/or supervisory concerns addressed by this
search term include the following:” “[d]rug/alcohol use or drug
sales,” “[g]ang related behavior” and “[a]ssociation with court
ordered non-associates.”
Defense counsel objected to this search term, arguing it was
overbroad and that there was no evidence appellant used his
electronic devices to facilitate his behavior and drug use. The
juvenile court responded, “Well, initially with regards to the
[electronic search condition], I am going to make that one of the
orders. I agree, there may be nothing that we have specifically
before us that indicates he uses his cell phone or other electronic
devices to communicate with gang members or to purchase or sell
drugs, but in this day and age it’s just such a common experience.
I’m not going to deny probation the right to look into those sorts
of things when someone’s on formal probation.”
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues the electronic search condition is
unconstitutionally overbroad and bears no relationship to his
offense. The People maintain the condition is not

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unconstitutionally overbroad and that it is reasonable because it
relates to potential future criminality. As the parties
acknowledge, cases raising these issues are pending review in the
California Supreme Court. (E.g., In re Ricardo P. (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923;1 People
v. Bryant (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 396, review granted June 28,
2017, S241937; People v. Nachbar (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1122,
review granted Dec. 14, 2016, S238210; In re J.E. (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 795, review granted Oct. 12, 2016, S236628.)
Standard of Review
“We review the court’s imposition of a probation condition
for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] We review constitutional
challenges to probation conditions de novo.” (In re J.G. (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1087-1088 (J.G.).)
Reasonableness
“Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b)
‘authorizes the juvenile court to “impose and require any and all
reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to
the end that justice may be done and the reformation and
rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” . . . A juvenile court enjoys
broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation for the purpose
of rehabilitation and may even impose a condition of probation
that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper so long as
it is tailored to specifically meet the needs of the juvenile.’
[Citation.]” (In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 753-754; see
In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530 [“[T]he most significant
difference between minors and adults is that ‘[the] liberty
interest of a minor is qualitatively different than that of an adult,
being subject both to reasonable regulation by the state to an
1 On May 9, 2019, the Supreme Court ordered In re Ricardo
P. on calendar for May 30, 2019, at 1:30 p.m. in San Francisco.

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extent not permissible with adults’”]; J.G., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1088 [“Because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of
guidance and supervision than adults, the trial court has even
greater latitude in formulating the terms of juvenile probation”].)
“The reasonableness and propriety of the imposed condition is
measured not just by the circumstances of the current offense,
but by the minor’s entire social history. [Citation.]” (In re J.B.,
at p. 754.)
“The juvenile court’s discretion is not, however, unlimited.”
(J.G., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088.) A probation condition is
invalid if it “‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the
offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself
criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not
reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’” (People v. Lent
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent), superseded on another ground
as stated in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290-292.) All
three Lent requirements must be satisfied to invalidate a
probation condition. (Id. at p. 486, fn. 1; People v. Olguin (2008)
45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).)
The People concede the first two Lent factors are present
here, but contend the third factor is not satisfied. They maintain
the electronic search condition enables appellant’s probation
officer to monitor appellant’s compliance with his other probation
conditions and thus deter future criminality.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that a probation
condition “that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her
charges effectively is . . . ‘reasonably related to future
criminality’” even if it “has no relationship to the crime of which a
defendant was convicted.” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 380-
381.) In In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, the minor
committed the offense of public intoxication. (Id. at p. 291.) The

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juvenile court imposed an electronic search probation condition
despite the absence of direct evidence that the minor was buying
or selling drugs. (Id. at p. 293.) It found that “‘people . . . present
themselves on the Internet using drugs or . . . in possession of
paraphernalia, and that’s the only way we can properly supervise
these conditions . . . .’” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal agreed,
noting that the condition “enables peace officers to review P.O.’s
electronic activity for indications that P.O. has drugs or is
otherwise engaged in activity in violation of his probation.” (Id.
at p. 295.)
Appellant’s probation conditions require that he “[n]ot use
or possess illegal drugs or medications not in [his] name; not
possess drug paraphernalia, not use or possess alcoholic
beverages; not to be in any place where illegal drugs are being
used and not to associate with anyone who uses or possesses such
substances . . . .” They also prohibit appellant from associating
with gang members, from wearing gang-related apparel, from
displaying gang signs or gestures and from engaging in
assaultive or violent behavior. “[T]he electronic search condition
is reasonable because it will allow law enforcement to monitor
appellant’s compliance with these conditions.” (J.G., supra, 33
Cal.App.5th at p. 1089.) Accordingly, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion by imposing the condition.
Overbreadth
Appellant asserts that even if the three Lent factors are not
present, the electronic search condition is overbroad because it
infringes on his right to privacy. He is correct that “[a] probation
condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional
rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the
condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally
overbroad.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) As the

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majority recently noted in J.G., “[a] juvenile court does, however,
have wider latitude in drafting probation conditions for juveniles
than for adults.” (J.G., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1089.) “‘This
is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance
and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional
rights are more circumscribed. . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re P.O.,
supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 297.)
The electronic search condition at issue here permits law
enforcement to search appellant’s text messages, voicemail
messages, social media accounts, call logs, photographs, email
accounts and internet browsing history. As in J.G., “[t]hese
methods of communication are reasonably likely to reveal
evidence of appellant’s compliance with other probation
conditions, including those that prohibit [gang activity,] drug and
alcohol use and threats of violence against others. Limiting the
search condition to these forms of digital communication reduces
the likelihood that law enforcement will access medical records,
financial information or other data unrelated to criminal
activity.” (J.G., supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1089.) We therefore
conclude the condition is not overbroad.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
PERREN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J. YEGAN, J.

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Charles S. Crandall, Judge
Michael L. Duffy, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Shawn McGahey Webb and Nima Razfar,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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