Burbank Unified School District (PERB I015E)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
BURBANK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Charging 	Party,
v.
BURBANK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
Case No. 	LA-CO-12 5
PERB Order No. 	IR-15
April 	4 , 	1980
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Appearances; 	Susan I. 	Covey and William F. 	Kay, 	Attorneys
(Whitmore 	& Kay) 	for Burbank Unified School District;
A. 	Eugene Huguenin, 	Jr., 	Attorney for Burbank Teachers
Association.
Before Gluck, 	Chairperson; 	Gonzales and Moore, 	Members.
DECISION AND 	ORDER
On March 27, 	1980, 	the Burbank Unified School District
(hereafter District) 	filed an 	unfair practice charge against
the Burbank Teachers Association 	(hereafter Association) 	in
which 	it 	alleged 	that 	the Association violated 	sections 	3543.6(c)
and 	(d) 	of 	the Educational 	Employment Relations 	Act1 by
The 	Educational 	Employment 	Relations Act 	(hereafter 	EERA)
is 	codified at Government Code 	section 	3540 	et 	seq. 	Unless
otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory references 	are 	to 	the
Government Code.
Section 3543.6(c) 	and 	(d) 	provide:
It 	shall 	be unlawful 	for an employee 	organization 	to:
(c) 	Refuse or 	fail 	to meet and negotiate 	in
good 	faith with 	a 	public 	school 	employer of

any of 	the 	employees 	of which 	it 	is 	the
exclusive 	representative.
(d) 	Refuse 	to participate 	in good 	faith
in 	the 	impasse procedure 	set 	forth 	in
Article 9 	(commencing with Section 354 8 ) .
engaging in work 	stoppages. 	In addition, 	the District requested
relief 	in accordance with the PERB 	rule 	38100 	et 	seq. 	as 	codified
in 8 Cal. Admin. Code.2
In reviewing 	the 	District's 	injunctive 	relief 	request,
the 	Board has 	examined 	the 	unfair 	practice 	charge which 	forms
the basis 	for 	that request as well 	as 	the 	documents 	offered 	in
support 	thereof. 	The question raised 	in 	the 	instant 	injunctive
relief 	request 	currently before 	the 	Board must be 	considered 	in
light of 	PERB 	rule 	38105 	which 	governs 	injunctive 	relief 	requests
which include a charge, 	as does the instant case, 	that the
employee 	organization's 	conduct 	violated 	section 	354 3.6(d)
of 	the EERA. 	That rule requires 	that 	such requests 	be 	in
writing 	and 	"shall 	include 	a 	copy of 	the 	unfair 	practice 	charge
and 	shall 	conform in 	substance 	to 	pleadings 	required by 	the
superior court 	in 	similar cases." 	(Emphasis 	added.) 	Based on
this 	requirement, 	the District's 	failure 	to 	include 	sufficient
2On March 26, 	1980, 	the Association also 	filed an unfair
practice charge 	including, 	among the remedies requested, 	that
PERB 	issue 	appropriate 	cease 	and 	desist orders 	against 	the
District's 	alleged unfair 	practice conduct. 	While 	the
Association may 	have 	intended 	that 	the 	Board 	consider 	their
unfair practice charge 	as an 	injunctive 	relief request, 	PERB's
rules, 	noted above, 	establish a separate and specific procedure
for 	the 	initiation of 	such 	requests 	to which 	the Association
failed 	to 	comply. 	We 	therefore do 	not consider 	the 	unfair
practice 	allegation as 	such 	a 	request 	and make 	no 	comment
on 	the 	substance of that charge.
2:

facts 	in 	support of 	its 	request 	for 	injunctive 	relief 	is 	critically
deficient 	and 	therefore 	precludes 	our 	finding 	that 	the 	injunctive
relief 	requested 	rests 	on 	an 	unfair 	practice 	likely 	to 	succeed 	on
the merits.
Based on 	the 	foregoing, 	the Board ORDERS 	that 	the 	District's
request 	for 	injunctive 	relief 	is 	DENIED.
Barbara D. Moore, Member
Raymond J. 	Gonzales, Member, concurring:
The 	majority 	decision 	to 	deny 	the 	District's 	request 	to
seek 	injunctive 	relief, 	and 	at 	the 	same 	time 	refuse 	to
relinquish 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	strike, 	should 	be 	recognized
as 	an 	ill-disguised 	attempt 	to 	allow 	the 	strike 	to continue.
It 	would 	be 	more 	forthright 	for 	my 	colleagues 	to 	simply 	state
that 	they 	approve 	of 	the 	strike 	or 	sanction 	it 	as 	a negotiating
pressure 	tactic. 	However, 	they contrive 	to 	achieve 	this 	result
by 	simply 	refusing 	to 	seek 	injunctive 	relief 	while 	at 	the 	same
time 	refusing 	to decide 	whether 	PERB has 	jurisdiction, 	thereby
blocking 	the 	District's 	access 	to 	superior 	court. 	The
transparency of 	this 	design 	is 	evidenced 	by 	the 	flimsy,

unprecedented 	reason 	offered 	for 	denying 	the 	District's
request: 	that 	the 	injunction 	request 	did 	not 	fully 	comply 	with
section 	(c) 	of PERB rule 	38105. 	This 	is 	tantamount 	to 	stating
that 	the 	request 	was 	not 	submitted 	in 	proper 	form.1
The 	decision 	fails 	to 	indicate 	in 	any way 	how 	the
District's 	request 	failed 	to comply with 	section 	38105(c),
referring 	vaguely 	only 	to 	some 	unspecified 	"failure 	to 	include
facts 	in 	support 	of 	its 	request," 	and 	concluding 	that 	this
"failure" 	was 	"critically deficient." 	Furthermore, 	the
majority 	conveniently 	forgets 	that 	pursuant 	to 	its 	own 	rules
the 	decision on whether 	to 	seek 	injunctive 	relief, 	and 	whether
the 	charge 	is 	likely 	to 	succeed on 	the merits, 	is 	to be made
based 	on 	the 	general 	counsel's 	investigation 	provided 	for 	by
PERB 	rule 	38110. 	In 	adopting 	these 	rules we painstakingly 	took
care 	to 	establish 	a method of 	gathering 	information 	about 	the
circumstances 	of 	work 	stoppages. 	We 	also provided 	the
investigating Board 	agent 	with 	the 	power 	to 	call 	and 	question
such 	persons 	as 	the 	agent 	deems 	necessary 	to 	effectuate 	the
investigation. 	The general 	counsel 	then prepares 	a written
1Given 	the 	fact 	that 	the 	injunctive 	relief 	request 	was
submitted by the District on March 	27, 	1980, 	and 	that 	the
report 	of PERB's 	investigation of 	the 	request 	was 	filed 	on
March 	28, 	and 	that PERB deliberated 	this 	request 	on April 	1,
one 	can 	only wonder 	why 	it 	has 	taken 	until 	today 	for 	the
majority 	to 	render 	a 	decision 	indicating 	that 	the 	injunction
request 	must 	be 	denied 	for 	insufficient 	pleadings.

report 	detailing 	facts 	related 	to whether 	there 	is 	reasonable
cause 	to 	believe 	that 	the EERA is 	being 	violated. 	This 	report
was 	in 	fact 	submitted 	to 	the Board, 	although 	the majority
apparently 	seems 	not 	to 	have 	considered 	it.
As 	if 	the majority's effort 	to expediently 	avoid making 	a
decision 	on 	whether 	it 	has 	jurisdiction 	in 	this 	case 	and 	yet
allow 	the 	strike 	to continue 	were 	not obvious 	enough, 	one 	need
only 	compare 	the District's 	injunction 	request 	in 	this 	case
with 	requests 	in 	other 	cases 	in which 	the majority has 	sought
injunctive 	relief 	in 	order 	to 	understand 	the 	result-oriented
reasoning 	applied 	here. 	In 	none of 	the 	other 	cases 	were 	the
pleadings 	any more 	complete 	or 	in 	conformance 	with 	court
requirements. 	In comparison, 	the District's 	request here was
quite 	complete. 	It contains 	an 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	alleging
violations by 	the Association of 	sections 	3543.6(c) 	and 	(d),
and 	includes 	a 	detailed 	statement 	of 	factual 	allegations 	of 	the
conduct 	alleged 	to 	constitute 	an 	unfair 	practice 	in 	accordance
with 	section 6(d) 	of PERB's 	unfair 	practice 	form. 	The 	request
for 	injunctive 	relief 	is 	seven pages 	in 	length 	and 	is
accompanied 	by 	a memorandum of 	points 	and 	authorities 	in
support 	thereof. 	In 	its substance, 	the 	request 	states 	that
there 	is 	a 	likelihood 	that 	the 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	will
prevail 	on 	the merits, 	that 	irreparable 	harm will 	result 	if 	an
injunction 	is 	not 	issued, 	and 	the 	legal 	remedy 	is 	inadequate
under 	the 	circumstances 	to 	recompense 	the District 	for 	the 	harm

which 	would 	result 	if 	the 	conduct 	complained 	of 	was 	not
enjoined. 	The 	request 	was 	accompanied 	by 	a declaration 	under
penalty of 	perjury 	in 	support 	of 	the 	injunctive 	relief 	from 	the
District 	superintendent 	alleging 	pertinent 	facts 	supporting 	the
District's claims.
I 	believe 	it 	is 	proper 	to 	seek 	an 	injunction 	against 	the
strike 	in 	this 	case. 	Based on 	the 	facts 	alleged 	by 	the
District 	and 	developed 	in 	the 	PERB 	investigation,2 the
District 	has 	stated 	a prima 	facie 	case 	of 	bad 	faith
negotiations 	by 	the Association, 	that 	there 	is 	reasonable 	cause
to believe 	that 	the 	charge will prevail on 	the merits, 	that 	the
strike will 	cause 	irreparable 	harm, 	and 	that 	no 	adequate 	remedy
at 	law exists.
I would 	also 	seek 	an 	injunction 	against 	the 	District 	to
prohibit 	it 	from 	insisting 	to 	negotiate 	a no-strike 	clause. 	I
believe 	as 	a matter 	of 	law 	that 	this 	is 	not 	within 	the 	scope of
representation 	and 	therefore 	it 	is 	illegal 	to 	insist 	on
negotiating 	it. 	The 	Association's 	charge 	and 	our 	own
investigation 	both 	indicate 	that 	it 	is 	very 	likely 	that 	such
insistence 	is 	standing 	in 	the 	way of 	agreement 	between 	the
District 	and 	the Association. 	Although 	the 	Association
2our 	investigation 	was 	conducted 	pursuant 	to PERB 	Rule
38110. 	The 	written 	investigation 	report 	provided 	for 	in PERB
rule 	38115 was 	submitted on March 	28 	and March 	30. 	No
recommendation 	was 	submitted.

requested 	only 	a 	"cease 	and 	desist" 	order 	against 	the 	District,
I 	believe 	PERB 	on 	its 	own 	motion 	should 	seek 	extraordinary
relief 	in 	order 	to 	bring 	an 	end 	to 	the 	strike 	and 	effectuate
the 	purposes 	of 	the 	EERA 	as 	indicated 	by 	EERA 	section 	3540,3
in 	a 	way 	that will 	further 	the public 	interest 	in maintaining
the 	continuity 	and 	quality 	of 	educational 	services. 	(See 	San
Diego Teachers Assn. 	v. 	Superior Court of San Diego County, 	24
Cal.3d 	1.)
PERB's 	investigative 	report 	and 	declaration 	submitted 	by
the 	District 	indicate 	numerous 	relevant 	facts 	regarding 	the
negotiating 	status between 	the parties 	in 	the 	strike.
Negotiations 	between 	the 	District 	and 	the Association 	began 	on
June 	15, 	1979, 	for 	a successor 	contract 	to the one expiring
September 	1, 	1979. 	There 	were 	a 	number 	of 	negotiating
sessions, 	and 	impasse was declared on September 	13, 	1979.
Approximately 	nine mediation 	sessions 	were 	held. 	On
December 	3, 	1979, 	the mediator certified the dispute 	for
factfinding. 	On February 7, 	1980, 	the 	factfinder 	issued
recommendations 	to 	the 	parties 	regarding 	a contract. 	The
parties 	engaged 	in 	a 	number 	of 	post-factfinding mediation
sessions. 	At 	these 	sessions, 	each 	side made 	various 	new
authority 	for 	PERB 	to 	seek 	injunctive 	relief 	on 	its
own motion 	is 	amply 	implied 	in EERA sections 	3541.3 (i) 	and
(j). 	See San Diego Teachers Assn. 	v. 	Superior Court of San
Diego County, 	24 Cal.3d 1, 	p. 	15.

proposals. 	Among 	the proposals, 	two of 	the most 	troublesome
seemed 	to 	be 	the Association's 	request 	for 	binding 	arbitration
and 	the District's proposal 	for 	a no-strike 	agreement. 	On
March 17, 	1980, 	the Association proposed 	accepting 	advisory
arbitration 	in 	place 	of 	binding 	arbitration 	and 	requested 	the
District 	to drop 	its 	proposal of 	a no-strike 	agreement. 	It
contended, 	as 	it did all along, 	that 	the no-strike clause was
outside 	the 	scope of 	representation. 	The District did 	not
agree 	to this proposal. 	On March 26, 	1980, 	the Association
filed 	a 	charge 	with 	PERB 	alleging 	the 	District 	had 	committed 	an
unfair 	practice 	for 	having 	negotiated 	to 	impasse 	on 	an
out-of-scope 	subject. 	The 	investigation 	report 	indicates 	that
as of March 28, 	1980, 	although no new meetings 	to negotiate
were 	presently 	scheduled 	between 	the 	parties, 	they 	are 	willing
to continue 	negotiations 	and may meet 	during 	the 	week 	of
March 31, 	1980.
Approximately 	75 	to 80 	percent of 	the District's 	secondary
teachers 	are observing 	the 	strike, 	while 	approximately 50
percent 	of 	the 	elementary 	teachers 	are 	observing 	it. 	In
addition, 	approximately 80 	percent of 	the 	secondary 	students
have 	failed 	to 	report 	to class. 	The 	elementary 	students
apparently 	continue 	to 	report 	to 	school 	as 	usual.
The 	District's 	declarations 	also 	indicate 	a variety 	of
picket 	line 	conduct 	by 	the Association.

It 	is well 	settled 	that 	the EERA requires parties 	to
negotiate 	and 	participate 	in 	impasse 	procedures 	in 	good 	faith
regarding 	matters 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	representation. 	The
Association's 	proposal 	for 	binding 	arbitration of 	grievances 	is
clearly within 	scope. 	The District's charge, 	which 	is 	attached
hereto, 	alleges 	that 	the Association violated 	sections
3543.6(c) 	and 	(d) 	of 	the EERA by 	striking 	"in 	the midst of
progressive 	collective 	bargaining 	between 	the 	parties 	which 	was
being 	facilitated 	by 	means 	of 	the 	post-factfinding 	mediation
process." 	This 	"constituted 	a 	failure 	to negotiate 	and
participate 	in 	impasse 	procedures 	in good 	faith."
I believe 	that 	under 	the 	circumstances of 	this 	case, 	the
facts 	alleged 	by 	the 	District 	indicate 	that 	the Association 	had
an obligation 	to 	negotiate 	and 	participate 	in 	good 	faith 	in
impasse procedures. 	While 	I do not believe 	that
post-factfinding 	negotiation 	is 	obligatory 	for 	exclusive
representatives, 	or 	employers, 	and cannot be 	resurrected merely
by a gesture 	from one 	side or 	the 	other, 	it clearly 	appears
that 	the 	parties 	in 	this 	case 	have 	themselves 	voluntarily
reentered 	negotiations 	in 	the 	impasse 	procedures 	with 	the
mediator 	pursuant 	to EERA section 3548.4.4 	Thus, 	with
4Section 3548.4 	states:
Nothing 	in 	this 	article 	shall 	be 	construed
to 	prohibit 	the 	mediator 	appointed 	pursuant
to 	Section 	3548 	from 	continuing mediation

progressive 	negotiations 	under 	way, 	it 	is 	inconsistent with 	the
legislative 	intent of 	the 	impasse 	procedures 	to 	strike 	at 	this
time. 	Indeed, 	in San Diego Teachers Assn. 	v. 	Superior Court of
San Diego County, 	1979, 	24 Cal.3d 	1, 	the court 	stated 	"the
impasse procedures 	almost 	certainly 	were 	included 	in 	the EERA
for 	the 	purpose 	of heading 	off 	strikes. 	Since 	they 	assume
deferment of 	a 	strike 	at 	least 	until 	their 	completion, 	strikes
before 	then 	can 	properly 	be 	found 	to 	be 	a 	refusal 	to
participate 	in 	impasse procedures 	in 	good 	faith 	and 	thus 	an
unfair practice 	under 	section 3543.6(d)" 	(citations omitted).
Indeed, 	PERB's 	own 	rules 	adopted 	subsequent 	to 	that 	decision,
reflect 	a 	similar 	concern 	to protect 	the 	integrity 	of 	the
impasse procedures. 	(See PERB rule 	38100.)
Thus, 	under 	the 	facts 	alleged 	and 	those 	developed 	through
the 	investigative 	report, 	the parties 	themselves 	have 	chosen 	to
attempt 	to 	resolve 	their 	negotiating 	differences 	in 	accordance
and 	under 	the 	auspices 	of 	the 	impasse 	procedures 	as 	provided 	by
the Legislature 	in 	the EERA. 	Given 	that 	these 	impasse
procedures 	were 	intended 	to head off 	strikes, 	it 	is
inconsistent 	with 	the 	statute 	to 	strike 	at 	a 	time 	when 	such
negotiations 	are 	under 	way. 	As 	in other 	cases 	where 	this Board
efforts 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	the 	findings of 	fact
and 	recommended 	terms 	of 	settlement made
pursuant 	to Section 	3548.3.
10

has 	found 	a 	teachers' 	strike 	to be 	a probable violation of 	the
EERA, 	this 	strike 	also 	should 	be 	enjoined 	immediately 	while
PERB 	continues 	to process 	the 	unfair 	practice 	charges 	filed 	by
the parties. 	Associated 	unlawful 	conduct by 	the 	employer
should 	also 	be 	enjoined.
In summary, 	by this decision 	it 	is obvious 	that 	the
majority of 	this Board 	will 	use 	any 	excuse 	in 	its 	attempts 	to
protect 	or 	legalize 	strikes 	under 	the 	EERA.5 In 	this 	case,
they 	argue 	that 	"the 	District's 	failure 	to 	include 	sufficient
facts 	in 	support 	of 	its 	request 	for 	injunctive 	relief 	is
critically 	deficient." 	What 	more 	facts 	are 	needed 	than 	the
fact 	that 	PERB's 	own 	investigation 	has 	proven 	that 	a 	strike
5 In 	spite 	of 	itself, 	the 	majority may 	have 	unwittingly
yielded 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	strike 	and 	freed 	the 	District 	to
seek 	relief 	directly 	in 	Superior 	Court. 	PERB's 	rules 	(see 	rule
38120(a)), 	clearly contemplate 	that 	the Board 	will consider 	its
own 	investigation 	report 	in 	deciding 	whether 	an 	injunction 	is
warranted. 	By contrast, 	the decision on whether 	to dismiss 	a
charge 	is 	to be made on 	the 	charge 	and pleadings 	alone. 	If 	the
charge 	or 	evidence 	is 	insufficient 	to 	state 	a prima 	facie 	case,
it 	is 	to be dismissed 	(see PERB rule 32620).
The majority 	decision 	indicates 	that 	it 	has 	"examined 	the
unfair 	practice 	charge 	which 	forms 	the 	basis" 	for 	the
injunctive 	relief 	request 	as 	well 	as 	the 	supporting 	documents.
It 	nowhere 	mentions 	the 	PERB 	investigation 	report. 	By
concluding 	that 	the District's 	request 	is 	factually
insufficient, 	it may 	be 	reasonably 	inferred 	that 	the District
failed 	to 	state 	a prima 	facie 	case 	on 	its pleadings 	alone.
Therefore, 	there 	was 	no need 	to consider 	the PERB's
investigation report; 	i.e., 	if 	the 	facts 	are 	insufficient 	to
state 	a prima 	facie case, 	then 	the 	injunctive 	relief 	request
cannot 	be 	entertained 	and 	must 	necessarily 	be 	denied.
11

situation 	in 	the 	Burbank 	Unified 	School 	District 	indeed 	exists
as of March 27, 	1980.
In 	the 	Modesto 	strike 	situation6 the 	majority 	failed 	to
act 	at 	all 	until 	a Modesto Bee 	editorial 	critically 	condemned
their 	inaction: 	"By 	refusing 	to 	seek 	injunctive 	relief 	against
the 	Modesto 	strike 	and 	yet 	declining 	to 	relinquish 	jurisdiction
over 	the 	dispute, 	PERB 	has 	effectively 	blocked 	the 	contending
parties 	from direct 	access 	to 	the 	courts."
Here 	again 	the majority 	continues 	its 	efforts 	to 	do what
neither 	the 	Legislature 	nor 	the 	court 	has 	done: 	establish 	the
legality 	of 	strikes 	for 	public 	employees. 	And 	they 	do 	this 	by
hiding 	behind 	the 	flimsiest of 	excuses: 	the 	argument 	that 	the
District 	failed 	to 	technically 	comply 	with 	our 	rules 	although
the 	District's 	declaration 	and 	our 	own 	investigation 	provide
sufficient 	facts 	to prove 	that 	a 	strike 	exists. 	Even 	the
striking 	teachers 	in 	Burbank 	have 	proudly 	proclaimed 	their
strike. 	What other 	facts 	are 	needed?
Raymond J. 	Gonzales, 	Member
6See 	Modesto City Schools 	(3/10/80) 	PERB Decision No.
IR 11; 	Modesto City 	Schools 	(3/12/80) 	PERB Decision No. 	IR 12
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APPENDIX A
STATE OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
UNFAIR PRACTICE CHARGE
DO 	NOT 	WRITE 	IN 	THIS 	SPACE
INSTRUCTIONS: 	File an original and
three (3) copies of this charge in
the appropriate regional office of
the Public Employment Relations Board.
If more space is needed for any item,
attach additional sheets and number
items accordingly.
Case Name: 	BURBANK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT V.
BURBANK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
Case No: LA-CO-125
Date Filed: March 27, 1980
T. 	CHARGING PARTY: 	EMPLOYEE 	EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION 	EMPLOYER
a. 	Full name: 	BURBANK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
b. 	Mailing address: 	245 E. Magnolia Boulevard, 	Burbank, California 91502
c. 	Telephone number: 	( 2 1 3 ) 	846-7121
area code
d. 	Name, t i t l e and telephone number 	Tom D. 	B a r k e l e w , 	S u p e r i n t e n d e n t
of person f i l i n g charge: 	(213) 	846-7121
2. 	CHARGE FILED AGAINST: 	EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION""^ 	EMPLOYER
a. 	Full name: 	BURBANK TEACHERS 	ASSOCIATION
b. 	Mailing address: 	3220 West Magnolia Boulevard, 	Burbank, California 91505
c . 	Telephone number: 	( 2 1 3 ) 8 4 2 - 6 1 5 4
area code
d. 	Name, t i t l e and telephone number 	Walter Trexler, 	BTA Executive Director
of agent to contact:
T. 	NAME OF EMPLOYER 	(Complete this section only if the charge is f i l e d against
an employee organization)
a. 	Full name: 	BURBANK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
b. 	Mailing address: 	245 E. Magnolia Blvd, 	Burbank, C a l i f o r n i a 91502
4. 	APPOINTING POWER: 	(Complete this section only if the employer is the State
of C a l i f o r n i a . 	See Government Code Section 18524)
a. 	Full name:
b. 	Mailing address:
c. 	Agent:
5. 	GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
a. 	Has any grievance procedure been invoked in relation to the
subject matter of this charge? 	(circle answer) 	Yes 	No
b. 	If "yes," when? (date)
SEE REVERSE SIDE

6. 	STATEMENT OF CHARGE
The charging party hereby alleges that the above-named respondent has engaged in or is
engaging in an unfair practice within the meaning of: 	(check one)
X 	The Educational Employment Relations Act (Govt. Code sections 3543.5 or 3543.6)
The State Employer-Employee Relations Act (Govt. Code sections 3519 or 3519.5)
The Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (Govt. Code sections 3571 or 3571.1)
The specific section(s) (and subsection(s) where appropriate), of the above-cited sections,
alleged to have been violated i s / a r e : 	3543. 6 ( c ) 	(d)
c. 	The specific section(s) (and subsection(s) where appropriate), if any, other than the
above-cited sections, alleged to have been violated i s / a r e :
d. 	Provide a clear and concise statement of the conduct alleged to constitute
an unfair practice, 	including, where known, 	the time and place of each
instance of respondent's conduct, 	and the name and capacity of each person
involved. 	This must be a statement of the facts that support your claim
and not conclusions of law. 	(Use and attach additional sheets of paper
where necessary to adequately set 	forth the supporting factual allegations.)
SEE ATTACHMENT TO UNFAIR PRACTICE CHARGE
DECLARATION
I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read the above charge and that the statements
herein are true and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief and that this declaration
was executed on 	March 26. 1980 	at 	Burbank 	. California.
Tom D. Barkelew
(Type or P r i n t Name) 	(Signature)
T i t l e , 	i f any: 	S u p e r i n t e n d e n t
Mailing Address: 	245 E. Magnolia B l v d , Burbank, Ca 91502
Telephone Number: (213) 	846-7121
PERB-61 (6/79)

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ATTACHMENT 	TO 	UNFAIR PRACTICE 	CHARGE
1 	A. 	Respondent 	BURBANK TEACHERS' 	ASSOCIATION 	(hereinafter
"BTA") 	has 	refused 	to meet 	and 	negotiate 	in good 	faith with
Charging 	Party, 	BURBANK 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL DISTRICT 	(hereinafter,
"DISTRICT") 	and, has, 	in addition, 	refused to participate
in good 	faith 	in 	the 	impasse procedure 	as 	set 	forth 	in
Article 	9, 	commencing 	with 	Section 	3548 	of 	the Government
Code 	as 	evidenced 	by 	the 	following:
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8 	1. 	Collective 	bargaining 	between 	the 	parties 	began on 	or
about 	June 	1979 	for 	a 	successor agreement 	to 	the
contract which expired on 	September 	1, 	1979. 	Factfinding
hearings were 	held 	in January, 	1980 	after 	BTA declared
impasse on or 	about September 	14, 	1979 	and 	the 	District
formally requested 	factfinding 	on 	or 	about 	December 	21,
1979.
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2. 	On or about February 20, 1980, 	the 	collective 	bargaining
between 	the 	parties 	for 	a 	complete 	successor 	agreement
was 	continued 	through 	the 	process 	of 	post 	factfinding
mediation 	sessions. 	At 	least 	five 	of 	these 	sessions
have 	been held 	as 	of 	the 	time 	of 	filing 	of 	the 	instant
Unfair 	Practice 	Charge.
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21 	3. 	Throughout 	said 	negotiating 	process 	the 	parties 	have
come 	progressively closer 	to 	reaching 	agreement 	on 	a
complete 	contract 	and 	resolving 	the 	outstanding 	issues
which 	include 	Children's 	Center 	Instructors' 	work year
and 	split shift differential, 	eligibility dates 	for 	the
1979/80 	salary 	schedule 	and 	anniversary 	increments, 	and
the 	Support of Agreement 	article.
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WHITMORE & KAY
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

written 	request 	with 	BTA's 	chief 	negotiator 	for 	a
continuation 	of 	the 	negotiating 	process 	based 	upon 	the
progress 	evidenced 	in 	recent 	negotiating 	sessions.
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5. 	On March 21, 	1980, 	in the midst of 	said bargaining
process, 	the BTA membership was 	asked 	to vote on 	the
issue 	of whether 	or 	not 	to 	strike 	in 	support of 	the
Association's 	position 	at 	the 	bargaining 	table.
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8 	6. 	The 	District was 	not notified 	by BTA as 	to whether or
not 	the membership authorized 	said 	strike 	by a
majority vote. 	However, 	on March 22, 	1980 	it was
reported 	in 	the 	local 	newspaper, 	The 	Burbank Review,
that 	BTA had 	"voted 	to 	strike" 	and 	that 	the 	President
of 	BTA refused 	to divulge 	the 	date 	chosen 	for 	the
initial 	"walkout".
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15 	7. 	On March 24, 	1980, 	virtually the entire 	certificated
staff 	at 	Burbank and 	John 	Muir 	High 	Schools 	picketted
said 	respective 	school 	sites 	from 	7:30 	A.M. 	to 	8:00
A.M.
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19 	8. 	On March 27, 	1980, 	Respondent called a 	strike whereby
the 	certificated 	staff 	at 	selected 	schools 	in 	the
District 	refused 	to 	report 	to work 	as 	required.
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23 	B. 	The 	BTA has 	refused 	to meet 	and 	negotiate 	in good 	faith 	with
Charging 	Party, 	BURBANK 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL DISTRICT 	(hereinafter,
"DISTRICT") 	and, has, 	in addition, 	refused to participate
in good 	faith 	in 	the 	impasse 	procedure 	as 	set 	forth 	in
Article 	9, 	commencing 	with 	Section 	3548 	of 	the 	Government
Code 	as 	evidenced 	by 	the 	following:
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Since 	the 	beginning 	of 	the 	school 	year 	in 	September,
1979 	and continuing 	to 	the present, 	the BTA, 	its
officers, 	agents 	and 	members have 	engaged 	in 	the
partial 	withholding 	of 	services 	in 	the 	areas of
extra-curricular 	activities 	and 	adjunct duties 	in
support of 	the 	BTA's 	bargaining 	demands.
Since 	the 	beginning 	of 	the 	school 	year 	in 	September,
1979 and continuing 	to 	the present, 	the BTA, 	its
officers, 	agents 	and 	members 	have 	encouraged 	pupils
in 	the 	District 	to 	engage 	in disruptive 	activities
in 	support of 	the BTA's bargaining demands; 	and, 	in
addition, 	the 	aforementioned 	BTA officers 	and 	agents
have 	encouraged 	and 	continue 	to 	encourage 	the 	pupils
in 	the 	District 	to 	illegally 	absent 	themselves 	from
the 	schools, 	and 	to obstruct 	the 	attempts 	of 	District
officials 	to 	continue 	the 	normal 	educational 	process.
Beginning 	March 	24,.1980 	and 	continuing 	to 	the 	present
the BTA, 	its officers, 	agents 	and members 	have 	engaged
in 	an 	unprotected 	and 	illegal 	partial 	and 	intermittent
work 	stoppage, 	whereby 	selected 	groups 	of 	employees,
without notice 	to 	the 	employer, 	report 	to work on
one 	day 	and 	withhold 	their 	services 	on 	another.

WILLIAM F. 	KAY
SUSAN I. 	COVEY
WHITMORE & 	KAY
706 Cowper Street, 	2nd Floor
Palo Alto, 	California 94301
Telephone: 	(415) 327-2672
(714) 634-1382
Attorneys 	for 	Petitioner
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8 	STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD9
PUBLIC
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11 	BURBANK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner,
vs.
BURBANK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
Respondents.
)
12 	) 	NO. IA-C0-125
)
13 	) 	REQUEST 	FOR
INJUNCTIVE 	RELIEF	)
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17 	REQUEST 	IS HEREBY MADE on 	behalf of Petitioner, 	BURBANK
UNIFIED 	SCHOOL DISTRICT, 	(hereinafter 	referred 	to 	as 	Petitioner
or as District) 	for injunctive relief as follows:
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20 	I.
21 	1. 	That Respondents, 	and each of 	them, 	and 	their agents,
employee representatives, officers, organizers, committee-
persons, 	stewards and members and all corporations, 	unincor-
porated 	associations 	and 	natural 	persons 	acting 	in 	active
concert 	and 	participation with 	any of 	them 	be 	enjoined 	and
restrained 	from engaging 	in any 	and 	all 	of 	the 	acts 	set 	forth 	in
subsections 	(a) 	and 	(b) 	of Paragraph 	3 	below prior 	to completing
or 	exhausting 	collective 	bargaining 	procedures 	as 	required 	by
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the Educational Employment Relations Act 	(hereinafter, 	"EERA").
2. 	That 	Respondents 	should 	be 	so enjoined 	on 	the grounds
that 	said 	requisite 	procedures 	of 	the 	EERA provide 	for 	collective
bargaining 	between 	public 	school 	employers 	and 	employees 	and
include 	provisions 	requiring 	good 	faith 	completion 	of 	negotia-
tions 	and 	of 	specified 	impasse 	procedures 	as 	set 	forth 	in Govern-
ment Code 	Sections 	3548, 	et 	seq., 	and 	also 	require 	exhaustion
of 	the procedures 	set 	forth 	in Government Code 	Sections 	3543,
et 	seq. 	for 	resolving 	alleged 	unfair 	labor practices.
3. 	That 	for Respondents' 	failure 	to exhaust said procedures,
Petitioner prays 	for 	relief 	restraining 	Respondents:
(a) 	From calling, 	engaging 	in, 	continuing, 	sanction-
ing, 	inducing, aiding, 	encouraging, 	abetting or assisting
any strike, 	sympathetic or otherwise, 	walkout, 	slowdown
or work 	stoppage 	of 	any 	nature 	against 	Petitioner 	or 	inten-
tionally 	interfering 	with 	such 	District 	by 	agreeing 	in
concert with others not 	to work 	for 	the 	District;
(b) 	Prom permitting 	to continue 	in effect, 	or refusing
to rescind any strike, 	walkout, 	slowdown, 	or work stoppage,
notice, 	call, 	order or 	sanction heretofore 	issued 	by
Respondents with 	respect 	to 	the work 	stoppage, 	which
commenced on March 	27, 	1980.
4. 	That Respondents, 	and 	each of 	them, 	and 	their 	agents,
employees, representatives, officers, organizers, committeemen,
stewards, 	members and all corporations, 	unincorporated 	associ-
ations 	and 	natural 	persons 	acting 	in 	concert with 	them 	be
enjoined 	and 	restrained 	from doing 	or 	attempting 	to 	do, 	directly
or 	indirectly by means, 	method or 	device whatsoever, 	any of 	the
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acts 	enjoined 	in Paragraphs 	1 	and 	2 	hereof 	and 	each 	subdivision
thereof during 	the 	pendency of 	this 	action.
4. 	That Respondent Association, 	its officers, 	agents and
representatives, 	shall 	forthwith 	issue 	such notices, 	and 	take
such 	steps 	as 	shall 	be 	necessary 	and 	appropriate 	to 	direct 	the
subject 	employees 	to 	return 	to work at 	the 	District's 	schools
forthwith.
II.
1. 	That Respondent, 	and 	each of 	them, 	and their agents,
employee representatives, officers, organizers, committee-
persons, 	stewards and members and all 	corporations, 	unincor-
porated 	associations 	and 	natural 	persons 	acting 	in 	active
concert 	and 	participation 	with 	any 	of 	them 	be 	enjoined 	and
restrained 	from engaging 	in 	any and 	all 	of 	the 	specific 	acts
set 	forth 	in subsections 	(a) 	and 	(b) 	of Paragraph 	5 	below.
2. 	That 	Respondents 	should 	be 	so 	enjoined 	on 	the 	grounds
that 	said 	acts 	by public 	school 	employees 	in 	California 	have 	been
conclusively determined 	by 	the 	Courts 	to 	constitute 	unlawful
concerted 	activity 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	statutory 	authorization,
even 	under 	circumstances 	where 	an 	employer 	has 	committed 	a
corresponding 	unfair 	labor 	practice.
3. 	That 	the 	EERA not only contains 	no 	statutory authori-
zation 	for 	strikes by public 	school 	employees, 	but 	also pro-
vides 	in Government Code 	Section 	3549 	that 	Labor 	Code
Section 	923 	does not give 	public 	school 	employees 	the 	right
to strike.
4. 	That, 	in addition 	to being 	condemned 	by the 	Courts 	as
unlawful, 	Respondents' 	concerted activity must be deemed
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to 	constitute 	an unfair practice 	under 	the 	EERA 	insofar 	as
it 	is an attempt to pressure 	a public 	school 	employer 	to
accede 	to Respondents' 	position at 	the bargaining table.
5. 	And that, 	therefore, 	on the basis 	that Respondents'
concerted 	activities 	constitute 	an 	unlawful 	strike 	under 	Calif-
ornia 	law and 	an unfair practice 	under 	the 	EERA, 	Petitioner 	prays
for 	relief 	restraining 	Respondents:
(a) 	From calling, engaging in, 	continuing, 	sanction-
ing, 	inducing, aiding, encouraging, 	abetting or assisting
any strike, 	sympathetic or otherwise, walkout, 	slowdown
or work 	stoppage of 	any nature 	against 	Petitioner 	or 	inten-
tionally 	interfering with 	such 	District 	by 	agreeing 	in
concert with others 	not 	to work 	for 	the 	District;
(b) 	From permitting 	to continue 	in 	effect or 	refusing
to rescind any strike, 	walkout, 	slowdown, 	or work stoppage,
notice, 	call, 	order or sanction heretofore 	issued by
Respondents with respect 	to the work stoppage, 	which
commenced on March 27, 	1980.
6. 	That Respondents, 	and each of 	them, 	and 	their agents,
employees, representatives, officers, organizers, committeemen,
stewards, 	members and all corporations, 	unincorporated associ-
ations 	and 	natural 	persons 	acting 	in 	concert with 	them be
enjoined 	and 	restrained 	from doing 	or 	attempting 	to 	do, 	directly
or 	indirectly by means, 	method or device whatsoever, 	any of 	the
acts 	enjoined 	in Paragraphs 	1 	and 	2 	hereof 	and 	each 	subdivision
thereof during 	the 	pendency of 	this 	action.
7. 	That Respondent Association, 	its officers, 	agents and
representatives, 	shall 	forthwith 	issue such notices, 	and 	take
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such 	steps 	as 	shall 	be 	necessary 	and 	appropriate 	to 	direct 	the
subject employees 	to return 	to work 	at 	the 	District's 	schools
forthwith.
III
1. 	That Respondents, 	and each of them, 	and 	their agents,
employee representatives, officers, organizers, committee-
persons, 	stewards and members and all corporations, 	unincor-
porated 	associations 	and 	natural 	persons 	acting 	in 	active
concert 	and 	participation with 	any of 	them 	be 	enjoined 	and
restrained 	from engaging 	in 	any 	and 	all 	of 	the 	specific 	acts
set forth 	in subsections 	(a) 	and 	(b) 	of Paragraph 	3 	below.
2. 	That 	Respondents 	should 	be 	so enjoined on 	the 	grounds
that, 	under any circumstances, 	the means employed by Respondents'
in 	implementing 	the 	strike at 	issue, 	namely 	the 	intermittent and
partial 	work stoppages, 	and 	the 	utilization of public 	school
pupils 	as 	instrumentalities 	for 	furthering 	and 	implementing
Respondents' 	concerted activities, 	are unlawful 	and condemned by
both 	the 	Courts and public policy.
3. 	Wherefore, 	Petitioner prays 	for relief 	restraining
Respondents:
(a) 	Prom calling, 	engaging in, 	continuing, 	sanction-
ing, 	inducing, aiding, 	encouraging, 	abetting or assisting
any strike, 	sympathetic or otherwise, walkout, 	slowdown
or work 	stoppage 	of 	any 	nature 	against 	Petitioner 	or 	inten-
tionally 	interfering 	with 	such 	District 	by 	agreeing 	in
concert with 	others 	not 	to work 	for 	the District;
(b) 	From permitting 	to continue 	in effect or 	refusing
to rescind any strike, 	walkout, 	slowdown, 	or work stoppage,
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notice, 	call, 	order or sanction heretofore 	issued 	by
Respondents with 	respect 	to 	the work 	stoppage, 	which
commenced on March 26, 	1980.
4. 	That Respondents, 	and each of them, 	and 	their agents,
employees, representatives, officers, organizers, committeemen,
stewards, 	members and all corporations, 	unincorporated 	associ-
ations 	and 	natural 	persons 	acting 	in 	concert with 	them 	be
enjoined 	and 	restrained 	from doing 	or 	attempting 	to 	do, 	directly
or 	indirectly by means, 	method or device whatsoever, 	any of 	the
acts enjoined 	in Paragraphs 	1 	and 	2 	hereof 	and 	each 	subdivision
thereof during 	the 	pendency of 	this 	action.
5. 	That Respondent Association, 	its officers, 	agents and
representatives, 	shall 	forthwith 	issue 	such notices, 	and 	take
such steps 	as 	shall 	be 	necessary 	and 	appropriate 	to 	direct 	the
subject employees 	to 	return 	to work 	at 	the 	District's 	schools
forthwith.
IV
1. 	Petitioner 	files 	the 	instant 	Request 	for 	Injunctive
Relief 	in compliance with 	the provisions of 	8 	Cal.Admin. 	Code
Sections 	38100, 	et seq., 	pursuant to 	its duty to exhaust all
remedies 	available 	to 	it 	through 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations
Board 	(hereinafter, 	"PERB"). 	Said request 	is 	filed solely for
the purpose of preserving 	Petitioner's 	access 	to 	all 	available
legal 	remedies without 	thereby 	prejudicing 	its 	right 	to 	properly
pursue 	other 	alternative 	remedies; 	and without 	thereby 	admitting
by means of 	its 	actions, 	that PERB's 	assertion of exclusive
jurisdiction 	in 	this 	instance 	is 	in 	fact proper.
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2. 	In 	the event 	that PERB determines 	that 	the 	injunctive
relief 	requested may 	not 	be 	granted 	in 	conformity with 	the
above 	cited 	code 	sections, 	Petitioner 	contends 	that 	the 	instant
Request should be dismissed 	pursuant 	to 	8 	Cal.Admin. 	Code
Section 	32620(b)(3) 	so that Petitioner may, 	without delay,
pursue 	alternative 	channels 	of 	relief.
This 	application 	is 	based 	upon: 	the 	provisions of 	8
Cal. Admin. 	Code Section 38100, 	et seq; 	California Code of
Civil Procedure, 	Section 527; 	the Unfair Practice Charge; 	the
Declaration of 	Tom D. 	Barkelew 	in 	Support of 	Request 	for
Injunctive Relief, 	and 	the Declaration of Susan I. 	Covey 	in
Support of Notice 	For 	Request 	for 	Injunctive 	Relief, 	all 	of
which 	have 	been 	filed 	concurrently 	herewith.
DATED: 	March 	27, 	1980 	Respectfully 	submitted,
WHITMORE & 	KAY
By: Susan I. 	Covey,
Attorney 	for 	Petitioner
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WILLIAM 	F. 	KAY
SUSAN I. 	COVEY
WHITMORE & KAY
706 	Cowper Street, 	2nd 	Floor
Palo Alto, 	California 	94301
"Telephone: 	(415) 327-2672
(714) 634-1382
Attorneys 	for 	Petitioner
4!
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 	BOARD
BURBANK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner,
vs.
URBANK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
Respondents.
•
NO. 	LA-CO-125.
)
12!! )
)
13 ) MEMORANDUM OF 	POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES 	IN
SUPPORT OF 	REQUEST 	FOR
INJUNCTIVE 	RELIEF
14||B
15 	)
)
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17 	PRELIMINARY 	STATEMENT
18 	This request for 	injunctive 	relief by 	Petitioner, 	Burbank
Unified School District, 	(hereinafter, 	"Petitioner" or 	"District")
is filed pursuant to 8 Cal. Admin. Code, Sections 38100, et
seq., against Respondents, 	Burbank Teachers' Association
(hereinafter, 	"BTA"), along with the attached requisite Unfair
Labor Practice Charge 	alleging a violation by BTA of Government c
Code Sections 3543.6(c) 	and 	(d), 	and 	the attached requisite
declaration 	in support of Notice or 	Request 	for 	Injunctive
Relief.
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27 	The 	instant filing 	by 	the District of 	said 	Request 	for
Injunctive 	Relief 	is 	premised 	upon 	the declaration 	of 	Legislative	28

1 	intent 	contained 	in 	Government 	Code 	Section 	38100 	which 	states
in pertinent part that:	2
3 	"The 	EERA 	imposes 	a duty on employers 	and -the
exclusive 	representatives 	to participate 	in
good faith 	in 	the 	impasse 	procedure 	and 	treats
that duty 	so 	seriously 	that 	it 	specifically
makes 	it 	unlawful 	for 	either an employer or
exclusive 	representative 	to refuse 	to do so.
The 	Board 	considers 	those 	provisions 	as 	strong
evidence 	of 	legislative 	intent 	to 	head 	off
work 	stoppages 	and 	lockouts 	until 	completion
of 	the 	impasse procedure and will, 	therefore,
in each case before 	it, 	determine whether
injunctive 	relief 	will 	further 	the 	purposes
of 	the 	EERA by 	fostering 	constructive 	employ-
ment 	relations 	by 	facilitating 	the 	collective
negotiations 	process 	and 	by protecting 	the
public 	interest 	in maintaining 	the 	continuity
and quality of 	educational 	services."
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13 	STATEMENT OF 	FACTS
14 	The 	District 	and 	BTA are 	currently 	in 	the 	process 	of
negotiating 	a 	successor 	agreement. 	Said 	negotiations 	began on
or about June, 	1979. 	The prior 	collective 	agreement between
the parties had expired 	on 	September 1, 	1979.
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18 	The parties have, 	prior 	to 	the 	filing of 	the 	instant
Request, 	participated 	in 	the mediation and 	factfinding 	process
as prescribed by Government Code 	Sections 	3548, 	et 	seq. 	On or
about September 14, 	1979, 	BTA declared 	impasse. 	Subsequently,
on or about December 21, 	1979, 	the District made a request
for factfinding, 	and accordingly, 	factfinding hearings 	took
place on January 11, 	23 and 29, 	1980.
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25 	• On or about February 20, 	1980, 	the collective bargaining
process between 	the parties was 	further 	continued 	by means of
the 	post 	fact-finding 	mediation 	process. 	During 	these 	recent
negotiating 	sessions, 	the 	parties 	have discussed 	several 	out-
2G
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW
standing 	issues 	including 	Children's 	Center 	Instructors' 	work
year and 	split shift differential, 	effective dates of eligi-
bility 	for 	the 	1979/80 	salary 	schedule 	and 	anniversary 	incre-
ments, 	and 	the contract article regarding 	Support of Agreement.
Throughout 	said 	negotiation 	process 	the 	parties 	have 	come
progressively 	closer 	to 	reaching 	agreement on 	a complete
collective agreement and accordingly, on March 21, 	1980, 	the
District's 	negotiator 	requested 	a 	continuation of 	the post
factfinding 	mediation 	process.
On March 	21, 	1980 	the membership of BTA voted on 	the
issue of whether or not 	to go out on 	strike 	in 	support of
the Association's position at 	the 	bargaining 	table. 	The
District was 	not notified of 	the 	result of 	said 	strike vote.
On March 22, 	1980 the local newspaper, 	the Burbank Review,
reported 	that 	the 	BTA membership had 	voted 	to 	strike 	and,
although 	said 	report did 	not 	indicate whether or 	not 	the
membership had 	actually 	authorized 	said 	strike 	by 	a majority
vote, 	it reported 	that the BTA President would not divulge
the 	specific date 	chosen 	for 	the 	initial 	walkout.
On March 24, 	1980, 	from 7:30 A.M. 	to 8:00 A.M. 	virtually
the 	entire 	certificated 	staff 	at 	John Muir 	and 	Burbank 	High
Schools picketted 	their 	respective 	school 	sites. 	On March 	25,
1980, 	negotiations continued between the parties.
On March 27, 1980 	BTA 	called 	a 	partial 	work 	stoppage 	at
selected 	school 	sites 	at 	approximately 	9:30 A.M. 	(See 	Declara-
tion of 	Tom D. 	Barkelew 	incorporated 	by reference 	and 	attached
hereto, 	in which the details of said picketting, 	negotiations,
and strike activity is more 	full set forth).
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I.
IF PERB DECIDES NOT TO 	ISSUE 	INJUNCTIVE 	RELIEF, 	IT
MUST DISMISS 	THE 	ACTION 	SO THAT PETITIONER MAY 	PUR-
SUE 	ITS 	RIGHT TO ALTERNATIVE 	RELIEF WITHOUT DELAY
The California Supreme Court 	in San Diego Teachers' 	Assoc-
iation v. 	Superior Court 	(1974) 	24 Cal.3d 	1, 	154 Cal.Rptr. 	893
declared 	that 	the 	Public 	Employment Relations 	Board 	(hereinafter,
"PERB") 	has been granted 	by 	the 	Legislature 	initial 	jurisdiction
over 	strikes 	which 	can properly be 	found 	to 	constitute 	an
"unlawful" 	act 	under 	the 	Educational 	Employment 	Relations Act
(hereinafter, 	"EERA") 	24 Cal.3d at page 13, 	154 Cal.Rptr, at
page 	901. 	Along 	these 	lines 	the 	Court 	further declared 	that 	a
prerequisite 	to 	such 	assertion of 	jurisdiction was 	the 	ability
of 	PERB to 	furnish 	"relief 	equivalent 	to 	that which would 	be
provided 	by a 	trial 	court." 	24 	Cal.3d 	at page 	7, 	154 	Cal.Rptr,
at page 897.
Under 	the 	terms 	of 	Government Code 	Section 	3541.3(j)
PERB's power 	to petition 	the 	Courts 	for 	injunctive 	relief 	is
premised 	upon 	the 	"issuance of 	a complaint" 	by PERB. 	Clearly,
in 	the absence of 	a basis 	for 	issuing such complaint, 	namely
the existence of an act which 	is 	unlawful 	under 	the 	EERA,
PERB would 	be 	unable 	to 	furnish 	a petitioning party with
"relief 	equivalent 	to 	that which would 	be 	provided 	by a
trial 	court." 	Therefore 	under 	the 	rule 	announced 	in San
Diego 	PERB would 	be 	precluded 	in 	such 	case 	from asserting
exclusive 	initial 	jurisdiction over 	such 	case.
Accordingly, 	following 	this mandate 	in 	the 	instant case,
PERB may 	properly assert 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	strike 	at
issue 	only 	if 	it 	first determines 	that 	said 	strike 	constitutes
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WHITMORE & KAY
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
a 	violation of 	the 	EERA and 	can 	therefore 	support 	a petition
for 	injunctive relief. 	In 	the absence of such finding, 	PERB
must dismiss 	the 	instant action pursuant 	to 	its 	regular pro-
cedure embodied 	in Government Code Section 	32620(b)(3) 	in
order 	that 	Petitioner may 	immediately 	and 	without 	delay
pursue 	its 	right 	to 	seek 	injunctive 	relief 	from the 	Courts.
II.
AN 	ILLEGAL STRIKE 	BY PUBLIC 	SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
SHOULD BE DEEMED TO CONSTITUTE AN 	UNFAIR
PRACTICE 	UNDER THE 	EERA
It 	is well 	established rule that 	in the absence of
statutory authorization, 	there 	is no 	fundamental or constitu-
tional right 	to 	strike. 	United Federation of Postal 	Clerks
v. Blount (D.C. Fir 1971) 	325 F.Supp. 	879, Los Angeles Metro-
politan Transit Authority v. 	Brotherhood 	of 	Railroad 	Trainmen
(1960) 54 Cal.2d 684, 687, 355 P.2d 905, 906, 8 Cal.Rptr. 1, 2.
Every appellate 	court 	in 	the 	State of 	California which
has 	ruled on 	the 	issue 	has 	held 	that public employees do
not have 	the 	right 	to strike.
In Los Angeles Unified School 	District v. 	Unified
Teachers, Los Angeles, et al., 	(1972) 24 Cal.App. 3d. 142,
100, 	Cal.Rptr. 	806, 	the Court affirmed the issuance of a pre-
liminary 	injunction 	restraining 	the 	teachers 	of 	Los Angeles
Unified 	School 	District 	from striking. 	In reviewing 	Calif-
ornia 	law concerning 	public employee 	strikes, 	the 	Court
noted 	that 	in 	the 	three California 	appellate districts 	where
the 	issue had been considered, 	the courts of appeal 	had
consistently held 	public 	employee 	strikes 	illegal 	in 	the
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absence 	of 	statutory 	authorization 	and 	the 	California 	Supreme
Court had 	denied hearings 	in each 	instance. 	24 	Cal.App.3d 	142,
145; Almond v. 	County of Sacramento, 	(1969) 	276 Cal.App.2d. 	32,
80 Cal.Rptr. 	518; 	City of San Diego v. 	American Federation of
State, 	County and Municipal Employees Local 127, 	(1970) 	8 Cal.
App.3d. 	308, 	87 Cal.Rptr. 	258; Trustees of the California
State Colleges v. 	Local 	1352, 	San Francisco State College
Federation of Teachers 	(1970) 	13 Cal.App.3d. 	863, 	92 Cal. 	Rptr.
134.
Trustees of California State Colleges v. 	Local 	1352,
San Francisco State College 	Federation of Teachers, 	supra,
held 	that 	California 	follows 	and 	applies 	the 	common 	law rule
that public employees do not have 	the 	right 	to strike 	in
the absence of 	statutory authorization, 	that 	no 	such 	authori-
zation exists, 	that 	a strike 	by academic employees 	at 	San
Francisco State College was 	unlawful, 	and 	that 	the 	lower
court 	properly enjoined 	the 	strike 	and 	physical 	interference
by pickets.
City of 	San Diego v. 	American 	Federation of 	State,
County and Municipal Employees Local 	127, 	et al., 	(1970)
8 Cal.App.3d. 	308, 	87 Cal.Rptr. 	258, 	reversed a trial court
order denying 	the 	city's 	petition 	for 	a 	temporary 	restraining
order 	to 	enjoin a 	strike 	by employees of 	the 	City 	Utilities
and 	Public Work 	Departments. 	The 	appellate 	court 	found 	that
the 	trial 	Judge's opinion was 	based 	on 	the 	erroneous 	conclusion
that public employees have 	a right 	to 	strike.
In City and County of 	San 	Francisco v. 	Evankovich 	(1977)
69 Cal.App.3d. 41, 137 Cal.Rptr. 883, hrg. den., the Court
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affirmed 	the 	issuance of 	an 	injunction 	restraining 	a 	strike
against 	the 	city as well 	as 	the advocacy of 	a 	strike 	and
picketing 	in 	support of 	that 	strike. 	The 	Court concluded
that 	a 	strike 	against 	the 	City constituted 	an unlawful
objective 	under public policy of 	the 	State 	of 	California 	and
that 	advocacy and picketing 	in 	support of 	same 	could 	be
restrained.
Under 	the 	EERA governing 	public 	school 	employer-employee
relations 	there 	is 	no 	statutory 	provision 	granting 	public
school employees the right to strike. 	In 	fact, 	the Calif-
ornia 	State 	Legislature 	has 	specifically 	provided 	in Govern-
ment Code 	Section 	3549 	that Labor Code 	923, 	which gives 	certain
individual 	public employees 	the 	right 	to 	strike, 	is not
applicable 	to public 	school 	employees. 	See 	also Almond 	v.
County of 	Sacramento, 	and 	City and 	County of 	San 	Francisco
v. Evakovich, supra.
In California, 	a simple 	showing 	that a strike 	is unlawful
is 	sufficient to warrant 	a court's 	issuance of 	injunctive
relief, 	even 	though peaceful means 	are 	used 	to 	implement 	said
strike. 	The 	rule 	is 	that 	the 	unlawful object 	renders 	illegal
even otherwise 	lawful means 	illegal. 	See City of 	Los Angeles v.
Los Angeles Bldg & Constr. 	Trades Council 	(194 9) 	94 Cal.App.
2d. 	36, 210 P.2d. 305.
In 	the 	Los Angeles Unified 	School 	District v. 	United
Teachers of Los Angeles 	(1972) 	24 Cal.App.3d 142, 	100 Cal.
Rptr. 	806, 	a 	temporary restraining order prohibiting 	a public
school 	teacher 	strike was 	granted 	based 	upon 	a 	single
showing 	that 	the 	strike would 	result 	in a loss of 	state 	and
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federal 	funds 	to the district.
Applying 	the controlling 	rules 	to the 	instant 	case, 	the
Court 	should grant PERB's 	request 	for 	injunctive 	relief 	to
restrain 	the 	unlawful 	strike 	by 	the 	District's 	public 	school
teachers 	because 	said 	strike 	is prohibited 	in California as
illegal 	per se 	and has 	been 	shown by 	the District 	to have
seriously 	compromised 	its 	financial 	and 	practical 	ability 	to
provide 	educational 	services 	to 	the 	surrounding 	community.
Since 	it 	is 	the avowed policy of PERB under 8 	Cal.Admin.
Code 	Section 	38000 	to:
"...in each case before 	it, 	determine whether
injunctive 	relief will 	further 	the 	purposes
of 	the 	EERA by 	fostering 	constructive 	employ-
ment relations, 	by facilitating 	the collective
negotiations 	process 	and 	by protecting 	the
public 	interest 	in maintaining 	the 	continuity
and quality of 	educational 	services."
it must evaluate 	the 	instant strike 	in light of 	the goal 	of
protecting 	the 	negotiating 	process 	and 	the 	public 	interest.
Given 	the 	clear 	fact 	that 	strikes 	by public 	school
teachers 	in California 	are 	illegal 	not only 	for 	lack of 	a
statutory basis, 	but also on 	the basis of 	the 	specific
exemption 	expressed 	in Government 	Code 	Section 	3549 	which
makes 	the 	right 	to 	strike granted 	in 	Labor Code 	Section 	923
inapplicable 	to public school employees, 	the 	instant strike,
which has 	been 	instigated 	in 	support of 	BTA's position 	at
the 	bargaining 	table, 	should 	be deemed by PERB 	to constitute
an 	unfair 	labor practice.
The 	simple 	logic behind 	this 	proposition 	is 	that any
otherwise 	unlawful 	act 	such 	as 	the 	instant 	strike 	by BTA
which 	is 	furthermore 	and 	in addition 	used 	to frustrate 	and
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impede 	collective 	bargaining 	between 	the parties 	contrary 	to
the 	clear 	thrust and 	spirit of 	the 	EERA, 	should 	clearly and
properly be 	relegatd 	to 	the 	category of 	unfair practices pro-
hibited by the Act, 	so that 	it can be effectively dealt with
by 	affording 	injunctive 	relief 	to parties 	adversely affected.
III. ,
EVEN 	THOUGH 	STRIKES 	UNDER CERTAIN 	CIRCUM-
STANCES MAY CONSTITUTE 	PROTECTED ACTIVITY,
PARTIAL 	STRIKES ARE 	ILLEGAL 	PER SE
An otherwise protected 	strike, 	namely one 	based upon
a 	legal 	objective, 	may nevertheless 	be 	rendered 	unlawful
by resort to unlawful means. 	See generally, Morris, 	The
Developing Labor Law, 	1971, 	Chapter 19, 	Part III.
One example of 	such unlawful means 	is 	a partial 	strike
which 	is 	a concerted 	attempt by employees 	to pressure 	an
employer 	into 	succumbing 	to 	their 	bargaining 	demand 	while
remaining 	at work. 	This 	type of 	strike 	is 	illustrated 	by
situation 	such 	as 	employees 	refusing 	to work overtime 	or
to perform selected tasks. 	See, 	e.g., 	Scott Paper Box Co.
(1949) 	81 NLRB 535, 	23 LRRM 1380, Montgomery Ward & Co.
(1946) 	64 NLRB 432, 17 LRRM 11.
Another example of a partial 	strike which 	applies 	to 	the
instant case 	is 	that of 	intermittent or 	sporadic work stoppages
by employees. 	The National 	Labor Relations 	Board 	has declared
that such strikes 	are devoid of protection 	under Section 	7 	of
the 	Labor Management Relations Act, 	however lawful 	the 	initial
objective may have been. 	Pacific Telephone 	& 	Telegraph Co.
(1954) 	107 NLRB 1547, 	33 LRRM 1433.
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By analogy to 	federal 	precedent, 	the 	instant 	strike which
intermittently occurs 	at 	selective 	school 	sites 	is 	unlawful per
se 	regardless of whether or not 	its 	objective 	is determined
to be protected or prohibited, 	because 	the means by which 	said
strike 	is 	being 	executed 	are 	unlawful 	in and of 	themselves.
Therefore, 	said 	strike 	not only does 	not warrant protection
under 	the 	EERA, 	but must be 	found 	to be 	unlawful per se 	and
upon 	that basis enjoinable by the 	Courts.
IV
A STRIKE 	CALLED 	FOR THE 	PURPOSE OF 	PRESSURING
A PUBLIC 	SCHOOL 	EMPLOYER AT THE 	BARGAINING
TABLE 	CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF THE 	EERA
The mandatory 	statutory 	impasse 	procedures 	defined 	in
Government Code 	Sections 	3548-3548.3 	are 	a 	natural 	extension
of 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	process. 	Oakdale 	Elementary
School District 	(1978) 	PERB Decision No. 	AD-46 	at page 	4,
2 	PERC 	2182 	cited 	in Moreno Valley Unified 	School 	District
(1980), LA-CE=398 78/79, 4 PERC 1022.
Recently in Modesto City Schools 	(March 	12, 	1980) 	PERB
Decision No. 	1R-12, 	PERB 	implicitly acknowledged 	this principle
when 	it 	premised 	its 	petition 	for 	injunctive 	relief 	against 	the
Association's 	strike on 	the 	fact 	that:
"The 	Association 	has 	invoked 	the 	processes
of 	PERB to 	compel 	a 	resumption of negot-
iations. 	It has demonstrated a desire 	to
resolve differences 	at 	the 	negotiating
table 	by making 	numerous 	proposals
and 	counterproposals 	on 	significant
issues 	following 	factfinding. 	While
apparently believing 	it 	had 	no duty 	to
enter 	into further negotiations, 	the
District 	has 	nonetheless met with 	the
Association 	to 	hear MTA 	ideas 	and 	thus 	a
basis 	for 	resumption of negotiations does
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The 	EERA 	is 	a 	collective 	negotiations
statute. 	An 	ultimate purpose of 	the Act
is 	to promote 	stability 	in employer-employee
relations 	in 	the public schools. 	This 	is
best 	served when 	the 	parties 	resolve 	their
disputes 	at 	the 	negotiating 	table.
Id. 	at page 5.
The California Supreme Court 	in the San Diego case, 	supra,
declared 	that:
"The 	impasse 	procedures 	almost 	certainly
were 	included 	in 	the 	EERA for 	the 	purposes
of 	heading off 	strikes. 	Since 	they assume
deferment of 	a 	strike 	at 	least until 	their
completion, 	strikes before 	then can properly
be 	found 	to be a refusal 	to participate 	in
the 	impasse procedures 	in good 	faith 	and
thus 	an 	unfair practice 	under 	section 	3543.6,
subdivision 	(d)." 	24 Cal.3d at pages 8-9, 	154
Cal.Rptr, 	at page 	890 	(emphasis 	added,
citations omitted).
The 	Court 	further 	noted 	that 	the 	"question 	of 	negotiation
in good 	faith 	is 	resolved 	by determining whether 	there was 	a
genuine desire 	to reach agreement", 	and observed 	that 	if 	a
particular 	strike were 	found 	to 	be 	an 	"illegal 	pressure 	tactic"
the 	strike 	"could 	support 	a 	finding 	that good 	faith was 	lacking."
Id.
In 	the 	instant case, 	BTA declared 	a strike 	in 	the midst
of 	progressive 	collective 	bargaining 	between 	the 	parties 	which
was 	being 	facilitated 	by means 	of 	the 	post 	fact-finding
mediation process. 	Several 	significant 	issues were 	in 	the
process 	of 	being 	discussed 	in 	an 	attempt 	to 	reach 	complete
agreement. 	Neither 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	nor 	the 	impasse
process 	had 	been 	completed prior 	to 	said 	strike 	on 	the 	part
of BTA. 	The 	strike 	has 	been 	called 	to pressure 	the District
into 	accepting 	BTA's 	position 	at 	the 	table 	in 	circumvention of
the 	clearly enunciated 	policy of 	PERB 	and 	the 	Courts 	to 	resolve
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disputes 	through 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	process.
Consequently, 	BTA has violated 	the 	letter and 	spirit of
the 	EERA and 	its 	primary purpose of 	promoting 	collective
bargaining 	between 	public 	school 	employers 	and 	employees 	is
implemented by 	the Act's 	impasse procedures. 	Specifically,
BTA's 	engagement 	in a strike 	activity prior 	to completion
of 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	and 	impasse 	process 	specified
by 	the 	EERA indicates 	that good 	faith 	is 	lacking on 	its 	part
and 	therefore 	constitutes 	a violation of 	Sections 	3543.6 	(c)
and 	(d) 	of the Act.
V.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, 	PERB should assert jurisdiction over 	the
instant 	strike 	by BTA on 	the 	basis 	that 	such 	concerted 	activity
constitutes 	a violation of 	the duty of 	BTA to participate 	in
good 	faith 	in 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	process 	as 	specified
in 	the 	EERA and 	as 	implemented by the 	impasse procedures 	under
the Act, 	because the complained of 	strike activity was 	insti-
gated 	prior 	to 	the 	completion of 	said 	process 	between 	the
parties and 	in the midst of progressive negotiations.
Given 	the 	fact 	that 	said 	strike 	activity constitutes
an unfair practice 	under 	the Act, 	PERB 	should 	file 	a Complaint
for 	Injunctive 	Relief with 	the 	Superior Court of 	the 	State of
California pursuant to 	its powers 	under Section 3541.3(j) 	of
the EERA.
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1 	DATED: 	March 27, 1980 	Respectfully 	submitted,
2 	WHITMORE & KAY
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4 	By
Susan I. 	Covey,
Attorney 	for 	Petitioner	5
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'WILLIAM F. 	KAY
SUSAN I. 	COVEY
WHITMORE & KAY
706 Cowper Street, 	2nd Floor
Palo Alto, 	California 94301
Telephone: 	(415) 327-2672
(714) 634-1382
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5 	Attorneys 	for 	Petitioner
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8 	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
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11 	BURBANK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner,
vs.
BURBANK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
Respondents.
NO. 	LA-CO-125
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12 )
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13 	) DECLARATION 	OF 	SUSAN
I. 	COVEY IN SUPPORT
OF NOTICE 	FOR REQUEST
FOR 	INJUNCTIVE 	RELIEF
)
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15 )
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1G )
17 	I, SUSAN I. COVEY, declare as follows:
18 	1. 	I 	am one of 	the attorneys 	for Burbank Unified 	School
District, 	in the above entitled action, 	and I am licensed to
practice 	in all 	the courts of 	the 	State of California.
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21 	2. 	Pursuant to 8 Cal.Admin. 	Code, 	Section 38105(b) 	and
(c), 	Petitioner reasonably attempted to, 	and actually did notify
Respondents 	herein of 	its 	intention 	to 	seek 	injunctive
relief. 	Said notification was made on March 27, 1980 at about
11:20 	A.M. 	by telephone to Mr. Walt Trexler, 	chief negotiator
and 	spokesperson 	for Respondents.
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27 	3. 	I declare 	under penalty of perjury 	that 	the 	foregoing
is 	true and correct.	28

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•1 	Executed 	this 27th day of March, 	1980, 	at Palo Alto,
California.	2
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Susan I. 	Covey
Attorney 	for 	Petitioner
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WILLIAM 	F. KAY
SUSAN I. 	COVEY
WHITMORE 	& KAY
706 Cowper Street, 	2nd Floor
Palo Alto, 	California 94301
Telephone: 	(415) 327-2672
(714) 	634-1382
Attorneys for Petitioner
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8 	STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
10
-11 	BURBANK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner,
vs.
BURBANK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
Respondents.
NO. 	LA-CO-125
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DECLARATION 	OF
TOM D. 	BARKELEW
IN 	SUPPORT OF
REQUEST 	FOR
INJUNCTIVE 	RELIEF
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17 	I, 	TOM D. 	BARKELEW, 	declare 	as 	follows:
18 	1. 	I 	am the 	Superintendent of 	the 	Burbank 	Unified 	School
District, 	and 	as such 	serve 	in 	the 	capacity as chief 	adminis-
trative 	officer of 	the 	District.
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21 	2. 	The 	District 	and 	Burbank 	Teachers Association 	(herein-
after, 	"BTA"), 	are currently in the process of negotiating a
successor agreement. 	Said 	negotiations 	began on 	or 	about
June, 	1979 	prior 	to 	the 	expiration of 	the 	former 	collective
agreement on September 1, 	1979. 	On or about September 	14, 	1979,
BTA declared 	impasse. 	Subsequently, 	on or about December 21,
1979, 	the District made a request for 	factfinding, 	and 	accord-
ingly, 	factfinding hearings 	took place on January 11, 	23 and
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and 29, 1980.
3. 	On or about February 20, 	1980, 	the collective bargain-
ing 	process 	between 	the 	parties 	continued 	through 	post 	fact-
finding mediation 	sessions. 	During 	these most recent negotiating
sessions, 	the parties 	have discussed 	several 	outstanding 	issues
including 	Children's Center 	Instructors' 	work year 	and 	split
shift differential, 	effective dates of eligibility 	for 	the 	1979/80
salary 	schedule 	and 	anniversary 	increments, 	and 	the 	contract
article regarding 	"Support of Agreement" 	(No Strike clause).
4. 	Throughout said negotiation process 	the 	parties have
come 	progressively closer 	to reaching 	agreement on 	a 	complete
collective agreement and accordingly, 	on March 	21, 	1980,
the 	District's 	negotiator 	requested 	a continuation of 	the
post 	factfinding 	mediation process.
5. 	On March 21, 	1980 	the membership of BTA voted on the
issue of whether or not 	to go out on 	strike 	in 	support of
the Association's position at 	the bargaining 	table. 	The
District was 	not notified of 	the 	result of 	said 	strike vote.
6. 	On March 22, 	1980 	I read an account 	in the 	local
newspaper, 	the Burbank Review, 	regarding 	the BTA membership
strike vote. 	Although said 	report did not 	indicate whether or
not 	the membership had 	actually 	authorized 	said 	strike 	by a
majority vote, 	it reported 	that the BTA President would 	not
divulge 	the 	specific date 	chosen 	for 	the 	initial 	walkout.
7. 	On March 24, 	1980, 	from 7:30 A.M. 	to 8:00 A.M. 	I observed
that virtually 	the entire 	certificated 	staff 	at John Muir and
Burbank High 	Schools 	picketted 	their 	respective 	school
sites.
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8. 	On March 	25, 	1980, 	negotiations continued between
the parties on the 	issues 	listed 	in paragraph 	"3" 	herein.
The District made 	concessions with regard 	to 	its previous
proposals on a no-strike 	clause 	and 	certain wage 	items. 	BTA
adhered 	to 	its previously announced 	position on 	said 	items.
'9. 	On March 27, 	1980, 	the strike was called by the BTA
in support of 	their positions 	taken 	in bargaining 	a 	successor
contract with 	the District. 	Approximately 50-80% 	of 	the
District's 	certificated 	employee 	staff 	failed 	to 	report 	for
work on this date.
10. 	Since September, 	the District's certificated
employees 	have 	refused 	to 	perform 	regularly 	assigned 	job
duties 	such as participating 	in coaching 	and drama 	assign-
ments.
On March 27, 1980 at about 8:00 a.m., the strike began.
50% of 	the 	District's Elementary teachers 	failed 	to report 	to
work 	and approximately 80% of 	the District's 	secondary 	teachers
failed 	to report 	to work.
11. 	I have reason to believe that the strike, 	if allowed
to continue, 	would 	cause 	irreparable damage 	and 	harm not
only 	to 	the District but 	to 	the pupils of 	the District 	for
whom the 	District 	is 	required 	to provide 	a public education.
12. 	If the strike 	is unabated, 	the pupils of the District
will 	lose 	irreplaceable 	instruction 	time 	and 	services 	which
were 	caused 	by not only 	the 	disruptive 	atmosphere 	but 	also
by 	the 	instructional 	changes which were 	necessitated 	by 	the
loss of the regular instructional personnel. 	For example, 	the
District's 	historic 	chronic 	inability 	to 	procure 	an 	adequate
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1 	number 	of 	qualified 	or 	available 	substitute 	teachers 	under
normal 	circumstances 	is 	greatly magnified 	under 	the 	extreme
circumstances of 	the 	instant strike, 	resulting 	in a severe
compromise 	of 	the 	regular 	instructional 	program.
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5 	13. 	The District 	stands 	to 	lose 	substantial 	revenue 	by 	the
fact 	that 	a 	strike will 	discourage 	students 	from attendance 	at
school, 	thus reducing 	the per capita 	income 	to 	the District.
District, 	because of the strike, 	has 	incurred and will 	con-
tinue 	to 	incur 	substantial 	costs 	for procuring 	and 	payment
of 	replacement personnel, 	overtime 	for classified 	employees,
additional 	administrative 	and 	legal 	costs.
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12 	14. 	If 	the strike 	is unabated, 	the cafeterias 	serving 	the
various District 	school 	sites, 	which do not draw on 	the
District's general 	fund 	for 	financial 	support, 	will 	lose
income 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	the 	normally projected 	number
of 	students 	fail 	to purchase 	their meals 	through 	said
cafeterias, 	and will, 	in addition, 	be forced to waste 	food
prepared 	upon 	the 	basis 	of 	said 	normal 	attendance 	pro-
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20 	IB. 	Finally, 	if 	the strike 	continues unabated 	the
District will 	suffer 	an 	erosion of 	the public 	support 	necessary
for 	the 	continued well being 	of 	the 	educational 	process 	in
Burbank.
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24 I 	declare 	under penalty of 	perjury 	that 	the 	foregoing
is 	true 	and 	correct and 	if called 	as a witness 	I 	could 	com-
petently 	testify 	thereto.
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Executed this 	27th day of March, 	1980, 	at Burbank,
California.
Tom D. 	Barkelew
Superintendent
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