Davis Teachers Association (Heffner) (PERB A270E)

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF
	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
PETER 	HEFFNER,
Charging
	Party,
v.
DAVIS 	TEACHERS 	ASSOCIATION, 	CTA/NEA
Respondent.
)
)
)	
Case
	No.
	S-CO-344
Administrative
	Appeal
PERB
	Order
	No.
	Ad-270
November 	7, 	1995
)
)
)
,))
)
)
Appearances: 	Greisen
	Law
	Corporation
	by
	Paul
	H.
	Greisen,
Attorney,
	for 	Peter
	Heffner;
	California
	Teachers
	Association
	by
A.
	Eugene 	Huguenin,
	Jr.,
	Attorney,
	for
	Davis 	Teachers
Association,
	CTA/NEA.
Before 	Garcia,
	Johnson 	and
	Caffrey,
	Members.
DECISION
	AND
	ORDER
CAFFREY,
	Member:
	This 	case
	is
	before 	the 	Public
	Employment
Relations
	Board
	(PERB
	or
	Board) 	on
	appeal 	of
	a 	PERB
administrative
	law
	judge's
	(ALJ)
	order 	granting
	motion
	to
	dismiss
complaint
	(attached). 	In
	his
	order, 	the
	ALJ
	dismissed
	the
complaint
	and
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	in
	which
	Peter 	Heffner
(Heffner)
	alleged 	that
	the
	Davis 	Te~chers
	Association,
	CTA/NEA
(Association) 	breached
	its
	duty 	of
	fair
	representation 	guaranteed
Act
	by
	section
	3544.9 	of 	the 	Educational
	Employment
	Relations
(EERA),
	thereby
	violating
	EERA
	section
	3543.6(b)
1
when
	it
	refused
1EERA
	is
	codified 	at
	Government 	Code
	section
	3540
	et
	seq.
Section
	3544.9
	states:
The 	employee
	organization 	recognized 	or
certified as 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	for
the 	purpose 	of 	meeting 	and 	negotiating 	shall
fairly 	represent 	each 	and 	every 	employee
	in
the 	appropriate 	unit.

to
	assist
	him
	in
	challenging
	his
	dismissal
	from 	employment.
Section
	3543.6
	states, 	in 	pertinent 	part:
It
	shall
	be 	unlawful
	for
	an 	employee
organization 	to:
(b)
	Impose
	or 	threaten 	to
	impose
	reprisals
on 	employees,
	to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against
	employees,
	or 	otherwise
to 	interfere 	with, 	restrain, 	or 	coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of 	rights
guaranteed 	by
	this 	chapter.
The
	Board
	has 	reviewed
	the
	entire
	record
	in
	this
	case,
including 	the
	ALJ's
	order,
	Heffner's
	appeal
	and
	the
	Association's
response
	thereto.
	The
	Board
	finds 	the
	ALJ's
	order
	to
	be
	free
	of
prejudicial 	error
	and
	adopts
	it
	as 	the 	decision
	of
	the
	Board
itself.
The
	complaint
	and
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	in
	Case
No.
	S-C0-344
	are
	hereby
	DISMISSED.
Members
	Garcia
	and 	Johnson
	joined
	in
	this
	Decision.
2

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
PETER 	HEFFNER,
Charging
	Party,
v.
DAVIS 	TEACH?RS 	ASSOCIATION, 	CTA/NEA,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
____________________
)
Unfair
	Practice
Case
	No.
	S-CO-344
ORDER
	GRANTING
	MOTION
	TO
	DISMISS 	COMPLAINT
NOTICE
	is
	given
	that
	the 	July
	27, 	1995, 	motion
	of
	the
Davis 	Teachers
	Association,
	CTA/NEA,
	(Union)
	to
	dismiss
	the
complaint
	and
	charge
	in
	the 	above-entitled matter
	is
	hereby
GRANTED.
	The
	dismissal
	is
	made
	because
	of 	untimeliness
	and
failure
	to
	state
	a
	prima
	facie
	case.
	(See
	Cal.
	Code
	of 	Regs.,
tit.
	8,
	sec.
	32646.)
	Unfair
	Practice
	Case
	No.
	S-CO-344
	is
	hereby
DISMISSED
	and
	the 	hearing 	previously
	scheduled
	for
	December
	19,
20
	and
	21, 	1995,
	is
	hereby
	CANCELLED.
The
	original
	charge
	in
	this
	matter
	was
	filed
	on 	March
	21,
1995.
	It
	set
	out
	a
	narrative
	of 	events
	that
	commenced
	with
Mr.
	Heffner's 	hiring 	as
	a
	teacher
	by
	the
	Davis
	Unified 	School
District 	(Diiirict).
	The
	narrative 	described 	the 	circumstances·
of
	his
	termination
	from 	employment
	with 	the
	District
	on 	March 	11,
1994, 	and
	efforts
	by him
	to 	secure
	Union
	representation.
	The
latest
	date 	mentioned
	in 	the 	original
	charge
	was
	June
	of 	1994.
There 	followed
	a
	first
	amended
	charge,
	filed
	on 	March 	29,
1995, 	which
	restated 	the 	allegations 	in 	the 	original 	charge 	and
added, 	in 	relevant 	part, 	the 	following:

The
	Association
	has
	denied
	my
	repeated
requests
	for 	negotiation
	with
	me
	of
	my
	future
with 	the
	District.
	The
	foregoing
requests
	were
	made
	to
	DTA's
	[Davis
	Teachers
Association]
	representative
	Robert
	Rodden,
	to
the 	President 	of 	the
	DTA,
	Michael
	Woodcock,
to 	California
	Teacher
	[sic]
	Association's
(CTA)
	regional
	representatives,
	Joan
	Stout
and
	Estelle
	Lemieux,
	to
	the
	Association'sattorney
	Carolyn
	Langenkarnp,
	and
	to
	Associate
Director/Chief
	Counsel
	of
	CTA,
	Beverly
	Tucker.
The
	charge
	is
	filed
	based
	on
	a
	final
	denialreceived
	in
	a
	letter
	from
	Associate
	Director,
	Beverly
Tucker,
	on March 	9,
	1995
	and
	dated
	February
	28.
On
	April
	28, 	1995,
	Mr.
	Heffner
	filed
	a
	second
	amended
	charge
which
	included
	a
	14-page
	narrative
	of
	his 	relationship
	with 	the
Union. 	This
	narrative 	traces
	events
	through
	his 	termination 	in
1994
	and
	his 	discussions 	with
	Union 	and
	District
	representatives.
It
	also
	describes 	conversations 	with
	an
	attorney 	hired
	by
	the
California
	Teachers
	Association
	(CTA)
	to 	represent
	him.
	It
concludes 	with 	the 	repeated
	assertion 	that
	the
	Union 	had
	failed
to 	represent
	him,
	culminating with:
.
	the
	Association's
	Associate 	Director
and
	Chief 	Counsel 	spending 	four
	months
	todecline
	my
	request 	for 	representation 	in
March
	of
	1995,
	exactly
	one
	year
	to
	the
	day
after
	the 	date 	of
	my
	final 	dismissal.
A
	compla~nt
	was
	issued
	by
	the 	general 	counsel 	of 	the 	Public
Employment
	Relations
	Board
	(PERB)
	on
	July
	20, 	1995.
	The
complaint, 	in 	relevant 	part, 	alleges 	that
	"through
	its
	agents"
the 	Davis 	Teachers 	Association 	took 	the 	jollowing 	actions:
a.	
On
	or
	about
	March
	3, 	1994, 	following 	Charging
Party's 	request 	for 	assistance, 	Respondent's
representative,
	Robb 	Rodden,
	declined 	to
	be
	present 	at
	a
meeting with 	Charging 	Party 	and
	a
	representative 	of 	the
employer, 	Davis 	Unified 	School
	District, 	regarding
Charging 	Party's 	continued 	employment 	with 	the 	District.
2

b.	
On
	or
	about
	March
	7, 	1994,
	site
representative,
	Kris
	King,
	advised
	Charging
	Party
	that
he,
	as
	representative
	of
	Respondent,
	would
	do
	nothing
to
	help
	him
	in
	regards
	to
	his
	employment
	status
	with
the
	Davis
	Unified
	School
	District.
c.	
On
	or
	about
	March,
	1994,
	Respondent's
agent,
	King,
	instigated
	a
	student
	protest 	at
Holmes
	Junior
	High
	School
	which
	was
	attributed 	to
Charging
	Party.
d.	
On
	or
	about
	March
	8, 	1994,
	following
	a
meeting
	with
	Charging
	Party,
	Respondent's
representative
	King
	presented
	a
	critical
	letter
	of
Charging
	Party's
	work
	performance
	to
	Charging
Party.
	King
	provided
	a
	copy
	of
	this
	letter
	to 	the
employer's
	representative, 	Principal
	Mark
	Hagemann.
e.	
Following
	the
	initial
	processing 	of
	a
grievance
	regarding
	Charging
	Party's
	termination
of
	employment,
	Respondent,
	in
	May,
	1994,
	declined
to
	pursue
	the 	grievance
	beyond
	Level
	II
	of 	thegrievance 	procedure.
	Charging
	Party
	was
	notadvised 	of
	the
	Respondent's
	decision
	not
	to
further
	pursue
	the 	grievance
	until
	it
	was
	too
	late
to
	appeal
	the 	decision
	through
	the
	internal
process
	available 	to
	members.
f.	
Respondent, 	through
	its
	parent
association, 	California
	Teachers
	Association,
	on
February
	28,
	1995,
	refused 	to 	further
	assist
Respondent,
	in
	the
	pursuit
	of
	his 	rights
	under
	the
Education
	Code
	and
	the 	written
	agreement 	between
Respondent 	and 	Davis
	Unified
	School
	District.
·
The
	complaint
	alleges 	that
	these 	actions
	demonstrate 	bad
faith
	by
	the
	Rnion 	and
	its
	agent, 	Kris
	King.
	The
	complaint
alleges 	that
	the 	Union's 	conduct
	was
	inconsistent 	with
	its
	duty
to
	fairly
	represent
	employees
	as 	required 	under 	Educational
Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(EERA) 1	
section
	3544.9 	and
	therefore 	in
violation
	of 	section 	3543.6(b).
1
The 	EERA
	is 	codified 	at
	Government 	Code
	section
	3540
et 	seq. 	Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory 	references 	are
to 	the
	Government 	Code.
3

The•union
	on
	July
	27,
	1995,
	filed
	a
	motion
	to
	dismiss
	the
complaint
	and
	underlying
	unfair 	practice
	charge.
	The
	motion
alleges 	that
	the
	allegations 	set
	out
	in
	paragraphs
	(a)
	through
(e),
	above,
	occurred
	more
	than
	six
	months
	prior
	to
	the
	filing
	of
the
	unfair
	practice
	charge.
	The
	motion
	alleges 	further
	that
	the
allegation
	~n
	paragraph
	(f) 	cannot
	revive 	the
	stale
	claims
because:
	1)
	neither
	the
	charge 	nor
	the
	complaint
	allege
	facts
	to
show
	that
	the
	conduct
	in
	paragraph
	(f)
	was
	undertaken
	by
	the
respondent,
	and
	(2)
	even
	if
	it
	were,
	the
	alleged
	conduct
	falls
outside
	the
	duty 	of
	fair
	representation.
The
	administrative
	law
	judge
	(ALJ)
	assigned
	to
	process 	the
case
	at
	the
	time
	of
	the
	filing
	of 	the
	motion
	to
	dismiss
	gave
	the
charging
	party
	14
	days
	to
	respond.
	Mr.
	Heffner 	wrote
	to 	the
	ALJ
on
	August
	3
	asking
	for
	an
	extension.
	In
	his
	letter,
	he
	made
certain
	responses
	to 	the
	motion
	to
	dismiss, 	including
	a
contention 	that
	the
	CTA
	agency
	relationship
	with 	the
	Union
	is
	a
matter
	of 	public 	record.
	The
	ALJ
	extended
	the
	time
	for
	a
response
	to
	August 	15.
	The
	charging
	party 	did 	not
	file
	a
further
	response
	to 	the
	motion.
Timeliness
The
	PERB
	is
	precluded 	under
	EERA
	section
3541.5(a)
2	
from
	issuing
	a
	complaint 	based
	on 	conduct
2
Section 	3541.S(a) 	provides 	that 	the
	Board
	shall 	not:
(1)
	Issue
	a
	complaint
	in 	respect 	of 	any
charge 	based upon 	an
	alleged 	unfair 	practiceoccurring
more
	than 	six
	months
	prior 	to 	the
filing 	of 	the 	charge;
4

that 	occurred 	more 	than 	six 	months 	prior 	to 	the 	filing 	of 	the
charge. 	Construing 	an 	identical 	provision 	of 	the 	Higher
Education 	Employer-Employee 	Relations 	Act 	(HEERA) , 3 	the 	PERE 	has
held 	that 	the 	six-month 	time 	period 	is 	jurisdictional.
(California 	State 	University 	(San 	Diego) 	(1989) 	PERB 	Decision No.
718-H:) 	Timeliness 	cannot 	be 	waived 	either 	by 	the 	parties 	or 	the
Board 	itself 	and 	need 	not 	be 	plead 	affirmatively. 	It 	is 	the
charging 	party's 	burden 	to 	show 	timeliness 	as 	part 	of 	its 	prima
facie 	case. 	(Regents 	of 	the 	University of 	California 	(1990) 	PERB
Decision 	No. 	826-H.)
(2) 	... 	The 	board 	shall, 	in
determining 	whether 	the 	charge 	was 	timely
filed, 	consider 	the 	six-month 	limitation 	set
forth 	in 	this 	subdivision 	to 	have 	been 	tolled
during 	the 	time 	it 	took 	the 	charging 	party 	to
exhaust 	the 	grievance 	machinery.
The 	limitations 	period 	"begins 	to 	run 	on 	the 	date 	the
charging 	party 	has 	actual 	or 	constructive 	notice 	of 	the
respondent's 	clear 	intent 	to 	[engage 	in 	the 	prohibited 	conduct],
providing 	that 	nothing 	subsequent 	to 	that 	date 	evinces 	a 	wavering
of 	that 	intent." 	(Regents 	of 	the 	University 	of 	California,
supra, 	PERE 	Decision 	No. 	826-H.) 	The 	six-month 	period 	is 	to be
computed 	by 	excluding 	the 	day 	the 	alleged misconduct 	took 	place
and 	including 	the 	last 	day, 	unless 	the 	last 	day 	is 	a 	holiday, 	and
then· it 	also 	is 	excluded. 	(Saddleback Valley Unified 	School
District 	(198~) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	558.)
3HEERA 	is 	found 	at 	section 	3560 	et 	seq. 	The 	provision
setting 	out 	filing 	deadlines 	for 	unfair practice 	charges 	is 	found
at 	section 	3563.2(a).
5

The
	question
	here,
	therefore,
	is
	when
	Mr.
	Heffner
	had
"actual 	or 	constructive 	notice"
	of 	the
	actions
	by
	the
	Union
	that
allegedly
	comprise
	a
	failure
	of 	the 	duty 	of
	fair
	representation.
That
	Mr.
	Heffner
	may
	not
	have
	understood
	the
	legal 	significance
of
	the 	actions
	until
	later
	will
	not
	excuse
	an
	otherwise 	untimely
filing.
	(California
	State
	Employees
	Association
	(Darzins)
	(1985)
PERB
	Decision
	No.
	546.)
Since
	the
	original
	charge
	was
	filed
	on 	March
	21,
	1995,
allegations
	concerning
	events
	prior
	to
	September 	21, 	1994,
	are
untimely.
	Paragraphs
	(a)
	through
	(d)
	involve 	events
	in
	March
	of
1994,
	a
	year
	and
	longer
	prior
	to
	the
	filing
	of 	the
	unfair
practice
	charge. 	Paragraph
	(e)
	involves
	an
	event
	that
	occurred
in
	May
	of
	1994,
	some
	four
	months
	prior
	to 	the
	September
	21
deadline.
	The
	allegations 	in
	paragraphs
	(a)
	through
	(e)
	are
plainly
	untimely 	unless 	they
	somehow
	are 	revived
	by
	the
allegation 	in
	paragraph
	(f).
Some
	types 	of
	acts 	are 	held
	to
	be
	"continuing
	violations."
In 	such 	cases,
	even
	if
	the
	first
	act 	in
	a
	series
	was
	outside
the -period 	of
	timeliness, 	the 	underlying
	unfair 	practice
	may
be
	revived
	by_a
	subsequent
	act
	within 	the
	statutory period.
Although 	the
	prior 	incidents
	may
	not
	be
	the 	basis 	for 	the 	finding
of
	a
	violation,
	the 	underlying unfair 	practice
	can 	be
	"re~ived"
by
	the
	new
	wrongful
	act 	that
	was
	timely 	raised.
	(Compton
Community
	College
	District
	(1991)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	915.) 	But
	it
is 	critical 	in 	allegations 	involving 	continuing 	violations 	that
the 	subsequent 	act 	itself 	set 	out
	a
	prima 	facie 	unfair 	practice.
6

The
	subsequent
	act
	here
	is
	that
	the
	Union,
	on
	or
	about
February
	28, 	1995,
	refused
	to 	further
	assist
	Mr~
	Heffner
	''in
	the
pursuit
	of
	his
	rights
	under
	the
	Education
	Code
	and
	the
	written
agreement
	between 	Respondent 	and
	Davis
	Unified
	School
	District."
The
	Union
	acted,
	according
	to
	the
	allegation,
	"through
	its
	parent
association~ 	California
	Teachers
	Association."
	This
	allegation,
the
	Union
	counters,
	fails
	to
	set
	out
	a
	prima
	facie
	violation
	of
the
	EERA.
	This
	is
	because
	there
	is
	no 	showing
	of
	agency 	between
the
	Union 	and
	the
	CTA
	and,
	in
	any
	event, 	the
	Union
	has
	no
obligation
	to
	help
	unit
	members
	in
	the
	pursuit
	of
	rights
	under
the
	Education
	Code.
The
	duty 	of
	fair
	representation
	is
	the
	obligation
	of
	an
exclusive 	representative.
	It
	is
	well
	settled
	in
	PERB
	case
	law
that
	the 	California
	Teachers
	Association
	does
	not
	become,
	through
affiliation
	with
	a
	local 	chapter,
	an
	exclusive
	representative.
(Washington
	Unified
	School
	District
	(1985)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	549;
Fresno 	Unified
	School
	District
	(1982)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	208.)
Thus,
	as 	the
	Union
	argues, 	the 	allegation 	in
	paragraph 	(f)
	of 	the
complaint 	does 	~ot
	set
	out
	a
	prima
	facie
	case 	unless 	there 	are
factual 	alleg~tions 	to
	support
	an 	agency
	relationship
	between
	the
CTA
	and
	the
	Union. 	There
	are
	no
	factual 	allegations 	in 	the
charge 	or
	any 	of
	its
	various
	amended
	versions
	from 	which
	it
	could
be
	alleged 	that 	the
	CTA
	was
	the 	agent 	of 	the
	Union
	when
	it
declined 	to 	further 	represent
	Mr.
	Heffner.
Even more
	fundamentally, 	however, 	the 	allegation 	that 	the
Union
	failed 	to 	assist
	Mr.
	Heffner 	"in 	the 	pursuit 	of 	his 	rights
7

under 	the 	Education 	Code" 	does 	not 	set 	out 	a 	prima 	facie 	case.
The 	PERB 	long 	has 	held 	that 	an 	exclusive 	representative 	does 	not
violate 	the 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation 	by 	refusing 	to 	represent
a 	unit 	member 	who 	seeks 	vindication 	of 	rights 	under 	the 	Education
Code. 	(San 	Francisco 	Classroom 	Teachers 	Association, 	CTA/NEA
(Chestangue). 	(1985) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	544.) 	This 	is 	because
the 	duty 	to 	fairly 	represent 	extends 	only 	to 	rights 	where 	the
exclusive 	representative 	has 	the 	sole 	right 	to 	seek 	a 	remedy.
Proceedings 	that 	may provide 	non-contractual 	administrative
or 	judicial 	relief 	are 	not 	controlled by 	the 	exclusive
representative 	and 	are 	not 	subject 	to 	the 	duty. 	(California
State 	Employees 	Association 	(Lemmons) 	(1985) 	PERB 	Decision
No. 	545-S 	and 	California 	State 	Employees 	Association 	(Darzins),
supra, 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	546-S.)
Finally, 	paragraph 	(f) 	of 	the 	complaint 	alleges 	that 	the
Union 	on 	February 	28, 	1995, 	also 	refused 	to 	assist 	Mr. 	Heffner 	in
the 	pursuit 	of 	his 	rights 	under 	the 	collective 	bargaining
agreement. 	As 	is 	set 	out 	in 	paragraph 	(e) 	of 	the 	complaint, 	the
underlying 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	places 	the 	date 	of 	the 	Union's
refusal 	to 	fur~her 	pursue 	the 	grievance 	in May 	of 	1994. 	There 	is
no 	allegation 	in 	the 	charge 	that 	the 	Union 	took 	any 	action
regarding 	Mr. 	Heffner's 	grievance 	in 	February of 	1995.
In 	his 	request 	for 	an 	extension 	of 	time 	to 	reply 	to 	the
motion 	to 	dismiss, 	Mr. 	Heffner 	asserts 	that 	CTA counsel 	Eugene
Huguenin 	"admits 	acceptance 	of 	the 	case 	and 	continuous 	processing
and 	inaction 	until 	February 	28." 	The 	declaration, 	however, 	makes
8

no
	admission 	regarding 	the 	grievance.
	On
	February
	28,
	CTA
	Chief
Counsel
	Beverly
	Tucker
	wrote
	a
	letter
	to
	Mr.
	Heffner
	reaffirming
her
	earlier
	decision
	not
	to 	authorize
	CTA
payment
	for
	a
	lawsuit
against
	the
	District
	on
	Mr.
	Heffner's 	behalf.
	Her
	letter
	makes
no
	mention
	of 	the 	grievance
	process.
	The
	allegation
	in
	paragraph
(f)
	regarding 	the
	pursuit
	of
	rights
	under
	the
	contract
	must
therefore
	be
	dismissed 	because
	there
	are
	not
	allegations 	to
support
	it
	in
	the 	charge.
For
	these
	reasons,
	I
	conclude
	that
	the
	complaint
	in
	unfair
practice
	case
	S-CO-344
	and
	underlying
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	must
be
	dismissed.
Right
	to
	Appeal
Pursuant
	to
	Public
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
	regulations,
you
	may
	obtain
	a
	review
	of
	this
	dismissal 	of 	the
	charge 	and
complaint
	by
	filing
	an
	appeal
	to
	the
	Board.itself
	within
	twenty
(20)
	calendar
	days
	after
	service 	of
	this
	dismissal.
	(Cal.
	Code
of 	Regs.,
	tit.
	8,
	sec.
	32635(a)
.)
	Any
	document
	filed
	with 	the
Board 	must
	contain 	the 	case
	name
	and 	number.
	To
	be
	timely
	filed,
the
	original
	and
	five 	copies 	of
	such 	appeal
	must 	be
	actually
received
	by 	tQe 	Board
	itself
	before 	the 	close 	of 	business
(5
	p.m.)
	or 	sent
	by
	telegraph,
	certified
	or
	Express 	United
	States
mail 	postmarked
	no
	later
	than 	the
	last
	date
	set 	for 	filing.
(Cal.
	Code
	of 	Regs.,
	tit.
	8,
	sec.
	32135).
	Code
	of 	Civil
Procedure 	section
	1013
	shall
	apply.
	The
	Board's 	address
	is:
Attention: 	Appeals 	Assistant
Public
	Employment
	Relations 	Board1031
	18th StreetSacramento,
	CA
	95814
9

If
	you
	file
	a
	timely 	appeal 	of 	the
	dismissal 	of 	the
	charge
and
	complaint,
	any
	other
	party
	may
	file
	with
	the
	Board
	an
original
	and
	five
	copies 	of
	a
	statement
	in
	opposition 	within
twenty
	(20)
	calendar
	days
	following 	the 	date 	of
	service
	of 	the
appeal.
	(Cal.
	Code
	of
	Regs.,
	tit.
	8,
	sec.
	32635(b)
.)
Service
All
	documents
	authorized
	to
	be
	filed
	herein
	must
	also
	be
"served''
	upon
	all
	parties
	to 	the
	proceeding,
	and
	a
	"proof 	of
service"
	must 	accompany
	each
	copy
	of
	a
	document
	served
	upon
	a
party 	or
	filed
	with 	the
	Board
	itself.
	(See
	Cal.
	Code
	of 	Regs.,
tit.
	8,
	sec.
	32140
	for 	the 	required 	contents
	and
	a
	sample 	form.)
The
	document
	will
	be
	considered 	properly
	"served''
	when
	personally
delivered 	or 	deposited
	in
	the
	first-class
	mail, 	postage
	paid
	and
properly 	addressed.
Extension 	of
	Time
A
request 	for
	an
	extension 	of
	time,
	in
	which
	to
	file
	a
document
	with 	the
	Board
	itself,
	must 	be
	in writing
	and
	filed
	with
the
	Board
	at
	the 	previously noted 	address.
	A
request 	for
	an
extension
	must 	be
	filed 	at 	least
	three
	(3)
	calendar
	days
	before
the
	expiratio~of
	the
	time
	required 	for
	filing
	the
	document.
The
	request
	must
	indicate
	good
	cause
	for
	and,
	if
	known,
	the
position 	of 	each
	other 	party 	regarding 	the 	extension,
	and
	shall
be 	accompanied 	by proof 	of 	service 	of 	the 	request
	upon
	each
party.
	(Cal.
	Code
	of 	Regs.,
	tit.
	8,
	sec.
	32132.)
10

Final 	Date
If 	no 	appeal 	is 	filed 	within 	the 	specified 	time 	limits, 	the
dismissal 	will 	become 	final 	when 	the 	time 	limits 	have 	expired.
August 	29, 	1995
11
Ronald 	E. 	Blubaugh 	,
Administrative 	Law Judge