Capistrano Unified School District (PERB A261E)

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF
	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
CAPISTR.Af.JO
	UNIFIED
	SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Employer,
and
CALIFORNIA
	SCHOOL 	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
	CHAPTER
	224,
Exclusive 	Representative,
and
GENERAL
	TRUCK
	DRIVERS, 	OFFICE,
FOOD 	AND
	WAREHOUSE 	LOCAL
	952,
INTERNATIONAL
	BROTHERHOOD 	OF
TEAMSTERS,
	AFL-CIO,
Petitioner.
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____________________ )
Case
	No. 	LA-D-293
Administrative
	Appeal
PERB
	Order
	No. 	Ad-261
October
	12,
	1994
Appearances: 	Rutan	
&	
Tucker
	by
	L.
	Ski
	Harrison, 	Attorney,
	for
Capistrano 	Unified
	School
	District;
	A.
	Alan
	Aldrich, 	Senior
	Labor
Relations 	Representative, 	for 	California
	School
	Employees
Association,
	Chapter
	224; 	Wohlner, 	Kaplon,
	Phillips,
	Young 	&
Barsh
	by
	John
	A.
	Siqueiros, 	Attorney,
	for
	General 	Truck
	Drivers,
Office,
	Food
	and
	Warehouse
	Local
	952,
	International
	Brotherhood
of 	Teamsters,
	AFL-CIO.
Before 	Caffrey, 	Garcia
	and 	Johnson,
	Members.
DECISION
CAFFREY, 	Member:
	This 	case
	is
	before 	the 	Public
	Employment
Relations
	Board
	(PERE
	or
	Board) 	on
	appeal
	filed	
by 	the 	California
School
	Employees
	Association, 	Chapter
	224 	(CSEA)
	of
	a 	PERB
regional 	director's 	administrative 	determination
	which 	concluded
that
	a
	decertification 	petition 	filed
	by
	the 	General 	Truck
Drivers, 	Office,
	Food 	and 	Warehouse, 	Local 	952,
	International
Brotherhood 	of 	Teamsters,
	AFL-CIO
	(Teamsters) 	was
	timely 	filed.

The
	Board
	has 	reviewed
	the
	entire
	record
	in
	this
	case,
including
	the
	administrative
	determination,
	CSEA's
	appeal, 	the
responses
	thereto
	and
	the 	statements
	filed
	with
	the
	regional
director.
	The
	Board
	hereby
	reverses
	the
	decision
	of
	the
	regional
director
	in
	accordance
	with 	the 	following
	discussion.
PROCEDURAL
	HISTORY
On
	January
	7, 	1994,
	the
	Teamsters
	filed
	a
	petition 	to
decertify
	CSEA
	as
	the 	exclusive
	representative
	of
	a
	unit
	of
transportation
	employees
	in 	the 	Capistrano 	Unified
	School
District
	(District).
	The
	petition 	stated 	that
	there
	was
	no
written
	agreement
	currently 	in 	existence
	between
	CSEA
	and
	the
District
	covering 	the
	unit.
CSEA
	and
	the
	District
	responded
	to 	the
	petition
	claiming
that
	the
	parties
	had 	an 	agreement
	which
	was
	effective
	from
July
	1,
	1992
	to
	June
	30,
	1995.
	Therefore, 	they
	asserted
	that
	the
agreement
	constituted
	a
	bar 	to 	the
	decertification 	petition
	and
the
	petition
	should
	be
	dismissed.
On
	February
	8,
	1994,
	PERB
	issued
	a
	determination
	that
	the
proof
	of 	support 	submitted
	by
	the
	Teamsters
	was
	sufficient.
	In
response 	to 	the
	contract 	bar 	dispute, 	the
	parties
	were
	asked 	to
submit
	to 	the 	regional
	director 	detailed 	statements 	of
	fact
	and
legal
	argument
	in 	support 	of
	their 	positions.
1
After
	review 	of 	the 	responses
	filed
	by
	the
	parties, 	the
regional 	director 	issued
	an
	administrative 	determination
	on
1
The
	regional 	director
	determined
	that
	a
	formal 	hearing 	in
this 	case
	was
	unnecessary 	since 	there
	were 	no
	material 	facts 	in
dispute. 
2

March
	31,
	1994
	in
	which
	she 	concluded
	that
	the
	unsigned
	agreement
between
	CSEA
	and
	the
	District
	did
	not
	bar 	the
	decertification
petition 	filed
	by
	the
	Teamsters, 	Accordingly,
	the 	regional
director
	ordered
	that
	an
	election
	be
	scheduled.
On
	April
	11, 	1994,
	CSEA
	filed
	an
	appeal 	of
	the
administrative
	determination
	and
	a
	request 	for
	stay
	of
	the
representation 	election.
	The
	Teamsters
	filed
	a
	response 	opposing
the
	stay
	and
	urging
	the
	Board
	to
	immediately
	order 	the
	conduct 	of
the
	election.
On May
	13, 	1994,
	the
	Board
	denied
	CSEA's
	request 	for
	a
	stay
of
	the
	election.
	The
	Board
	ordered
	that
	the
	election
	proceed but
further
	ordered
	that
	the
	ballots
	be
	impounded
	pending
	the 	Board's
decision
	on
	the 	merits
	of
	CSEA's
	appeal. 	(Capistrano 	Unified
School
	District
	(1994)
	PERB
	Order
	No.
	Ad-254.)
FACTUAL
	SUMMARY
CSEA
	is
	the 	exclusive 	representative
	of
	two
	classified
bargaining 	units 	in 	the
	District,
	a
	"general"
	unit
	(Unit
	I)
	and
	a
transportation 	unit
	(Unit
	II).
	Since
	1980,
	the
	practice
	has 	been
for 	Units
	I
	and
	II
	to 	negotiate
	one
	collective
	bargaining
agreement
	(CBA)
	applicable 	to
	both
	and
	to
	ratify
	the
	agreement 	as
an 	assembled
	membership.
The 	1991-92
	contract
	between
	the
	District
	and
	CSEA
	expired
on
	June
	30, 	1992.
	Negotiations 	over
	a
	successor 	agreement
commenced 	on
	October 	12, 	1992.
	As
	part
	of 	the 	negotiations,
	a
transportation
	subcommittee
	was 	formed
	to 	address 	issues 	in
3
1

Article
	18
	of
	the
	CEA
	which
	are
	specifically
	applicable
	to
	the
Unit
	II
	transportation
	employees.
On May
	24, 	1993,
	the
	parties
	reached
	tentative
	agreement
subject 	to
	ratification
	on
	a
	successor
	agreement
	for
	the
	period
of
	July
	1,
	1992
	through
	June
	30, 	1995.
	On
	June 	1,
	1993,
	CSEA
issued
	a 	memo
	to
	all
	classified
	bargaining
	unit
	members
	which
stated
	that 	tentative
	agreement 	had
	been
	reached
	by
	the
	parties
on
	a 	new
	contract
	and
	that
	a
	ratification
	vote
	was
	scheduled
	for
,June
	9, 	1993.
The
	tentative
	agreement,
	a
	10
	page
	"red-lined"
	document
entitled
	"Proposed
	Changes 	on
	CUSD/CSEA
	Contract
	Articles 	for
1992-1995,"
	contained
	all
	the
	changes
	in
	the
	language 	of
	the
expired 	contract
	recommended
	for
	ratification
	by
	both
	parties.
According
	to 	the
	District, 	this
	document
	was
	available 	for
	review
by
	CSEA
membership
	prior
	to 	the
	ratification
	vote.
The
	articles
	referred
	to 	in
	the
	tentative
	agreement 	were:
Article
	1 	-
	.Agreement;
	Article
	3 	-
	Hours
	of
	Employment
	and
Overtime;
	Article
	4 	-
	Grievance 	Procedure;
	Article
	5 	-
	Safety;
Article
	6 	-
	Evaluation 	Procedure;
	Article
	7 	-
	Transfers
	and
Promotions;
	Article
	8 	-
	Leaves;
	Article
	9 	-
	Vacations;
Article
	11 	Wages;
	Article
	12 	-
	Health
	and Welfare
	Benefits;
Article
	18
	·-
	Provision Applicable
	to 	Transportation
	Employees;
Article
	21
	-
	Non-Discrimination; 	and
	Article
	22 	-
	Completion 	of
Meet
	and 	Negotiate. 	Article
	22
	contains 	the 	duration 	dates 	of
the 	agreement, 	July
	1,
	1992
	through 	June 	30, 	1995.
4

The
	last
	page
	of
	the
	10
	page
	document
	includes 	the
	date
	the
agreement
	was
	reached,
	May
	24, 	1993, 	and
	two
	lists
	of
	typewritteu
names
	of
	the
	representatives
	of
	both
	parties.
	No
	space
	is
provided
	for 	signatures
	on
	this
	page 	and
	no
	signature
	or
	initials
appear
	anywhere
	on
	the
	document.
On
	June
	8 1
	1993,
	a
	separate
	election
	was
	held
	for 	the
Unit
	II
	transportation
	employees
	to
	vote
	on
	the
	proposed 	changes
to
	Article
	18.
	Article
	18
	applied
	only
	to 	the
	transportation
employees 	and
	contained
	terms
	concerning
	bus
	driver 	training,
hours
	and
	selection
	of
	bus
	routes.
	The
	transportation
	employees
rejected
	the
	proposed
	changes
	to 	Article
	18.
	CSEA
	indicated 	to
its
	members
	that
	negotiations
	over 	the
	provisions
	of
	Article
	18
would
	continue
	in
	an
	attempt
	to
	reach
	agreement.
	The
	following
day
	the 	tentative
	agreement,
	absent 	the
	proposed
	changes
	to
Article
	18,
	was
	ratified
	by
	the
	membership
	of 	both 	bargaining
unitso
	The
	District
	board 	of
	trustees
	ratified
	the
	agreement
	on
June 	28, 	1993.
The
	ratified
	agreement
	was
	submitted
	by
	the
	District
	to
CSEA's
	negotiators 	for 	signature 	in
	June 	1993.
	However,
	the
	CSEA
president
	was
	unavailable 	for
	an
	extended
	period 	of 	time
following
	ratification
	and
	eventually 	resigned
	from
	District
employment 	and
	as
	CSEA
	president
	on November
	12, 	1993.
	No
explanation
	was
	offered 	regarding 	the
	availability
	of
	other
a
	change
	members
	of 	the 	negotiating
	team.
	In 	addition, 	there
	was
in 	the
	CSEA
	staff 	representative 	assigned 	to 	the 	District 	after
tentative
	agreement 	was
	reached 	in
	May. 	As 	a
	result, 	the
5

District
	was
	unable
	to
	secure
	signatures
	from
	CSEA
	until
February 	1994.
Subsequent
	to
	the
	ratification
	votes, 	five
	memoranda
	of
understanding
	(MOU),
	three
	of
	which
	related 	directly
	to
	articles
in 	the 	contract,
	were
	signed
	by
	the
	District
	and
	CSEA:
(1)
	Article
	2 	-
	Recognition,
	which
	contained
	revisions 	to
	a
classification
	plan;
	( 2)
	Article	
3 	-	
Hours
	of
	Employment
	and
Overtime,
	which
	set
	forth
	a
	pilot
	program
	for
	a
	"9/80"
	work
schedule;
	(3)
	Article
	13
	-
	Association
	Rights,
	which
	provided
released
	time
	for
	the
	CSEA
	president;
	(4)
	an 	agreement 	which
	set
up
	a
	subcommittee
	to
	develop
	recommendations
	for
	a
	bilingual
stipend;
	and
	(5)
	an 	3greement
	regarding
	national
	days 	of
thanksgiving. 	All
	of
	these
	MOUs
	were
	signed
	by
	the
	District
	on
June
	30,
	1993 	and
	by
	r.:he 	CSEA
	president
	on
	Novernber
	4,
	1993, 	with
the 	exception
	of
	the
	MOU
	regarding
	Article
	13,
	which
	was
	signed
by
	the
	CSEA
	president
	on
	November
	3, 	1993.
A
	copy
	of 	the
	complete 	1992-95
	agreement 	stamped
	11
DRAFT
11
	was
submitted 	to
	the
	regionaJ.
	director
	by
	both
	CSEA
	and
	the
	District.
The
	Associate 	Superintendent
	stated 	in
	her 	declaration 	that
	while
the
	agreement
	was
	not
	actually
	signed
	until
	February
	1994,
	the
parties
	dated
	their 	signatures
	May
	24, 	1993,
	indicating 	that
	they
considered 	the 	contract 	to
	be
	effective
	as 	of
	that 	date.
	The
signature
	page
	of 	the
	11
DRAFTii
	agreement
	differs
	from
	the
	last
page
	of 	the
	10
	page
	"red-lined" 	tentative
	agreement
	in 	that,
	on
the 	former,
	lines
	were 	provided 	for 	signatures
	above
	the
typewritten
	names, 	and 	the 	signatures
	were
	written 	thereon.
6

REGIONAL 	DIRECTOR'S 	DETERMINATION
In
	considering
	whether
	the
	parties'
	unsigned
	written
agreement
	constituted
	a
	bar 	to
	the
	decertification
	petition 	filed
by
	the
	Teamsters,
	the 	regional
	director 	relied
	on
	Appalachian
Shale 	Products
	Company
	(1958)
	121
	NLRB
	1160
	[42
	LRRM
	1506]
(Appalachian
	Shale),
	a
	decision
	of
	the 	National
	Labor
	Relations
Board
	(NLRB),
	which
	refined
	the
	NLRB's
	contract 	bar
	rules.
	In
that
	case, 	the
	NLRB
	found
	that
	to
	constitute
	a
	bar,
	a
	contract
must
	be
	in 	writing,
	signed
	by
	the
	parties,
	and
	contain
11
substantial
	terms
	and
	conditions 	of
	employment 	deemed
	sufficient
to
	stabilize
	the 	bargaining
	relationship
	...
	tt
	In
	Gaylord
Broadcasting
	Co.
	(1980) 	250
	NLRB
	198
	[104
	LRRM
	1360],
	the
	NLRB
determined
	that
	initials
	are
	sufficient
	to
	fulfill
	the
requirement
	that
	a
	contract
	be
	signed
	to 	act
	as
	a
	bar.
The
	regional
	director
	found
	that
	the
	May
	24,
	1993
	tentative
agreement
	between
	CSEA
	and
	the
	District
	was
	neither
	signed 	nor
initialed
	by
	the
	parties.
	Further, 	the
	final
	agreement
	was
	not
signed
	by
	the
	parties 	until
	February
	1994,
	after
	the
decertification 	petition
	was
	filed.
	Therefore, 	the 	regional
director
	concluded
	that
	the
	parties'
	unsigned 	agreement
	did 	not
bar 	the 	decertification 	petition 	filed
	by
	the
	Teamsters 	and
	the
petition
	was
	timely
	filed.
	In 	reaching
	this
	conclusion, 	the
regional 	director
	found
	it
	unnecessary 	to
	determine 	the 	impact 	of
the 	rejection
	of
	Article
	18
	by
	the 	transportation
	employees 	on
the
	status
	of 	the
	parties'
	agreement.
7

CSEA' S APPEAL
CSEA
	contends
	the
	regional
	director
	erred 	in 	relying
	on
decisions
	of
	the
	NLRB. 	CSEA
	argues
	that
	the 	Educational
Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(EERA) 2	
does
	not
	require
	that
	a
	written
agreement
	be
	signed
	to
	be
	a
	valid
	contract 	bar. 	Citing
	Downey
Unified
	School
	District
	(1980)
	PERB
	Order
	No.
	Ad-97 	(Downey),
CSEA
	asserts
	that
	ratification 	is
	sufficient
	to
	establish
	a
contract
	bar.
The
	District
	joins
	CSEA's
	position, 	asserting 	that
	the
regional
	director
	erred.
	The
	District
	argues
	that
	ratification
of 	an 	agreement
	by
	the
	parties
	should
	carry
	more
	weight
	than
signatures
	on
	a
	tentative
	agreement 	and,
	therefore,
	constitute
	a
contract 	bar.
	The
	District
	contends
	that
	finding 	the
decertification 	petition
	timely
	disrupts
	the
	stability
	of
	the
parties'
	bargaining
	relationships
	long
	after
	the
	employees 	and
the
	District
	have
	ratified
	the
	agreement.
3
TEAMSTERS' 	RESPONSE
The
	Teamsters
	essentially
	agree 	with 	the 	conclusions 	of 	the
regional 	director
	and
	her
	reliance
	on
	decisions
	of 	the
	NLRB
	which
hold
	that
	a
	decertification 	petition
	may
	be
	barred
	only by
	a
signed, 	written
	agreement.
	Assuming,
	arguendo,
	that
	the
	Board
reverses 	the 	regional 	director,
	the 	Teamsters 	contend
	that
	the
2EERA
	is 	codified 	at
	Government 	Code
	section
	3540
	et
	seq.Unless 	otherwise 	indicated,
	all 	statutory 	references 	herein 	areto 	the
	Government 	Code.
3
The
	District
	provided 	additional 	alternative 	theories
	which
the 	Board 	finds 	unnecessary 	to 	address.
8

matter
	must
	be
	remanded
	to
	allow
	the 	regional
	director
	to
determine
	whether
	CSEA
	and
	the
	District
	"ever 	agreed
	to
	a
	binding
CBA.
"4
DISCUSSION
EERA
	section
	3544.7(b)
(1)
	requires
	that
	a
	decertification
petition
	be
	dismissed
	whenever:
There
	is
	currently 	in
	effect
	a
	lawful
	written
agreement
	negotiated
	by
	the 	public
	school
employer 	and
	another
	employee
	organization
covering
	any 	employees
	included
	in
	the
	unit
described
	in
	the 	request 	for
recognition
	...
In
	deciding
	contract 	bar 	disputes,
	the
	Board 	has 	found
	that
federal
	precedent
	under
	the 	National
	Labor
	Relations
	Act
	(NLRA)
provides
	significant
	guidance.
	(Downey);
	State
	of
	California
(1983)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	348-S.)
	CSEA
	argues,
	however,
	that
decisions
	of
	the
	NLRB
	are 	inapplicable 	to 	contract 	bar
	issues
arising
	under
	the
	EERA
	since 	the 	federal 	contract 	bar
	policies
are 	not
	based
	in
	statute.
The
	Board 	has
	previously 	addressed
	this
	issue 	in 	other
contract 	bar 	decisions.
5
In
	Downey
	the
	Board
	stated:
4
The
	Teamsters 	contend
	that
	the
	District's 	brief 	constitutes
an
	appeal 	of 	the 	administrative 	determination
	which
	was
	filed
well
	beyond
	the
	10
	day
	appeal 	deadline,
	and 	must 	be
	rejected
	by
the
	Board 	as
	an
	untimely
	filed
	appeal.
	The
	Board
	finds 	the
District's 	brief
	does 	not
	constitute
	an
	original,
	independent
appeal 	of 	the 	regional
	director's 	administrative 	determination.
Accordingly, 	the
	District's
	response
	was
	timely
	filed 	pursuant 	to
PERB
	Regulation
	32375.
	(PERB
	regs. 	are 	codified 	at
	Cal.
	Code
Regs.,
	tit.
	8,
	sec.
	31001
	et
	seq.)
5
Downey;
	State 	of 	California
	(1983) 	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	348-8;
State 	of 	California
	(Department 	of 	Personnel 	Administration)
(1989) 	PERB
	Order
	No.
	Ad-191-S. 
9

Although
	there
	is
	no
	parallel
	language 	under
the
	NLRA
	establishing
	a
	"contract
	bar"
	the
California
	Supreme
	Court 	has
	stated 	that
where
	the
	NLRA
	does
	not
	contain
	specific
wording 	comparable
	to
	the
	state
	act,
	if
	the
rationale 	that
	generated 	the
	language
	"lies
imbedded
	in
	the
	federal
	precedents
	under
	the
NLRA"
	and
	11
the
	federal 	decisions
	effectively
reflect
	the
	same
	interests
	as 	those
	that
prompted
	the
	inclusion
	of
	the
	[language
	in
the
	EERA],
	[then]
	federal
	precedents 	provide
reliable
	if
	analogous
	authority
	on
	the
	issue.
The
	statutory
	11
contract
	bar" 	language
contained
	in
	section
	3544.
7 (b) (1)
	is
	quite
similar 	to
	the
	contract
	bar
	doctrine
developed
	by
	the
	NLRB. 	. 	.
	Consequently,
	it
is
	appropriate 	to 	consider 	federal
	precedent
in
	determining
	whether
	a
	contract 	bar
	exists.
(Fn.
	omitted.)
In
	State
	of
	California,
	supra,
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	348-S,
	the
Board
	reaffirmed
	this
	principle, 	stating:
.
	it
	is
	manifestly 	apparent
	that
	the
contract-bar 	doctrine
	developed 	over
	many
years	
by	
the
	NLRB
	served 	as 	the
	model
	for 	the
parallel
	provisions 	in 	the
	acts
	administered
by
	this
	Board. 	There
	is
	nothing 	expressed
	in
our
	contract-bar 	provisions
	which
	is
	not
	a
feature
	of
	the 	federal 	doctrine.
Therefore, 	while 	the
	Board 	has
	not 	adopted 	the
	NLRB's
contract
	bar 	rules 	in
	total,
6	
the
	Board
	has 	determined
	that
	it
	is
appropriate 	to 	consider 	federal 	precedent
	and
	policy 	in
interpreting 	contract 	bar
	statutes
	and
	regulations
	under
	the 	acts
administered
	by
	PERE.
	Accordingly,
	CSEA's
	argument
	that
	NLRB
decisions 	are 	inapplicable 	here
	is
	rejected.
In 	adopting 	"bright 	line" 	rules, 	establishing 	objective
criteria
	to 	determine 	the 	existence 	of
	a
	contract 	bar, 	the
	NLRB
has 	sought 	to 	expedite 	the 	disposition 	of 	representation 	cases
6
See 	Downey,
	supra. 
10

and
	achieve
	"a
	finer
	balance
	between
	the
	statutory 	policies
	of
stability
	in 	labor
	relations
	and
	the
	exercise
	of
	free
	choice
	in
the
	selection
	or
	change
	of
	bargaining
	representatives."
(Appalachian
	Shale.)
	The
	Board
	has
	also
	acknowledged
	the
	benefit
of
	bright 	line
	rules 	in
	providing
	guidance
	to
	the
	parties
	and
minimizing
	disputes 	in 	representation matters.
	(Apple
	Valley
Unified
	School
	District
	(1990)
	PERB
	Order
	No.
	Ad-209
	(Apple
Valley);
	State
	of
	California,
	supra,
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	348-S.)
In
	Apple
	Valley, 	the
	Board
	stated:
Representation 	matters 	involving
	competing
unions
	are 	usually 	hotly 	contested.
	Any
ambiguity
	or
	uncertainty 	in
	the
	applicable
rules 	will 	inevitably
	become
	the
	subject
	of
dispute
	and,
	consequently, 	cause
	the 	delay
inherent 	in
	the
	conduct 	of
	evidentiary
hearings
	and
	subsequent 	appeals
	to 	the
	Board.
Such
	delay
	can
	seriously
	interfere
	with 	the
employees' 	fundamental
	statutory 	right
	to
freely
	choose 	an
	exclusive 	representative
	and
severely 	disrupt 	labor
	relations 	in 	general.
In
	light
	of
	this
	sound
	policy 	objective,
	it
	is
	incumbent
upon
	the
	Board
	to 	establish 	clear
	standards 	to
	assist
	the
	parties
and 	Board
	staff
	in 	resolving 	questions
	of
	representation
involving 	contract 	bar 	disputes.
In
	Appalachian 	Shale, 	the
	NLRB
	reexamined and
	refined
	its
contract 	bar 	rules,
	holding
	that
	an 	agreement 	must
	satisfy
certain
	formal 	requirements
	in 	order 	to 	serve 	as
	a
	contract 	bar.
The
	NLRB
	determined
	that 	to 	constitute
	a
	bar,
	a
	contract
	must 	be
in 	writing, 	signed
	by
	the
	parties
	and
	contain 	"substantial
	terms
and
	conditions 	of
	employment 	deemed
	sufficient 	to 	stabilize
	the
bargaining 	relationship
	. 	" 	The
	NLRB
	in 	Appalachian 	Shale
11

also
	addressed 	circumstances
	in
	which
	ratification
	of
	the
agreement
	is
	a
	condition
	precedent
	to
	its
	validity
	and
effectiveness,
	stating:
Where
	ratification 	is
	a
	condition
	precedent
to 	contractual
	validity
	by
	express
contractual 	provision,
	the 	contact
	will
	be
ineffectual
	as
	a
	bar 	unless
	it
	is 	ratified
prior
	to
	the
	filing
	of
	a
	petition
..
In
	Downey,
	the
	Board
	applied
	this
	federal
	precedent
	and
focused
	on
	the
	requirement
	contained
	in
	the
	parties
1
	bargaining
ground
	rules 	that
	the
	agreement 	be
	ratified
	before
	it
	would
become
	operative.
7
In
	Downey,
	the
	employees'
	ratification
	of
	the
agreement
	was
	rescinded
	by
	the
	association.
	Before
	a
	second
ratification
	vote
	could
	be
	completed,
	a
	decertification 	petition
was
	filed,
	In 	finding 	the
	petition
	timely
	filed,
	the
	Board
concluded
	that
	the
	association
	did
	not
	intend
	that
	the
	first
ratification
	be
	effective.
	Consequently,
	the
	Board
	determined
that
	the
	failure
	to
	ratify
	the
	agreement
	prior
	to 	the
	filing
	of
the
	decertification 	petition,
	where
	ratification
	was
	required,
established 	that 	there
	was
	no
	agreement
	in 	effect
	between
	the
parties 	at
	the
	time
	the
	petition
	was
	filed.
	Therefore,
	the
	Board
concluded
	that
	the
	agreement
	did 	not 	bar 	the
	filing
	of
	the
decertification 	petition.
	Furthermore,
	in
	Downey,
	the
	Board
concluded
	that
	the
	validity
	of 	the 	contract 	turned
	on
	whether
	it
had 	been
	ratified,
	and
	specifically
	found
	it
	unnecessary
	to
7
The 	Board
	expressly 	declined 	to 	adopt 	the
	NLRB's
	rule
	which
provides 	that 	the 	requirement 	for 	ratification
	must 	be 	containedonly 	within 	the 	negotiated 	contract.
	(Appalachian 	Shale.) 	In
Downey,
	the 	Board 	determined
	that
	such
	a
	requirement
	may
	also
	be
included 	in 	the
	parties' 	written
	ground
	rules.
12

decide
	whether
	a
	series
	of
	contract 	provisions
	which 	had
	been
"signed-off
11
	by
	the
	parties
	constituted
	a
	lawful
	written
agreement.
The
	instant
	case
	presents 	the 	issue
	of 	whether
	a
	contract
constitutes
	a
	bar
	if
	it
	is
	written,
	contains 	provisions 	covering
substantial
	terms
	and
	conditions
	of
	employment,
	and
	is
	ratified
by
	the
	parties
	in
	accordance 	with
	an
	express
	provision
	of
	the
contract
	making
	ratification
	a
	condition
	precedent
	to 	contractual
validity,
	even
	if
	the
	parties 	failed
	to 	"sign-off"
	on
	the
agreement.
	The
	Board
	finds
	that
	such
	a
	contract,
	ratified
	under
these
	circumstances,
	constitutes
	a
	bar
	in
	accordance
	with
	EERA
section
	3544.?(b).
In
	developing
	its
	contract 	bar
	rules,
	the
	Board,
	like
	the
NLRB,
	seeks
	a
	balance
	between
	the 	goal 	of
	fostering 	labor
relations
	stability
	and
	the
	right
	of
	employees
	to 	freely
	choose
their
	representative.
	By
	ratifying
	a 	CBA,
	the
	parties
	are
choosing
	to
	stabilize 	their
	labor
	relationship
	by
	binding
themselves
	to 	the
	terms 	of
	a
	contract
	which
	they
	have
	negotiated.
Contract
	ratification
	represents
	a
	noticeable, 	objective
milestone
	at
	which
	point 	the
	parties
	have
	clearly 	indicated
	their
decision 	to 	give 	effectiveness
	and
	validity
	to 	the
	contract's
provisions.
	This
	is 	particularly 	true
	when
	a
	specific 	provision
of
	the 	contract 	addresses 	the 	requirement 	of
	ratification 	in
order 	to 	effectuate 	the 	provisions 	of 	the 	agreement.
Accordingly, 	where
	the 	parties
	have
	made
	ratification
	a
	condition
precedent 	the 	effectiveness 	of 	the 	contract
	and
	ratification
to
13

occurs,
	that
	ratification
	activates
	a
	contract
	bar
	to 	the
	filing
of
	a
	decertification 	petition,
	regardless
	of 	whether
	the
agreement
	had
	been
	signed
	by
	the
	parties 	prior
	to
	ratification.
8
In 	the
	present
	case,
	it
	is
	undisputed
	that 	tentative
agreement
	on
	a
	new
	contract
	between
	CSEA
	and
	the
	District
	was
reached
	on
	May
	24,
	1993. 	Included
	in 	the
	tentative
	agreement
	was
a
	provision
	which
	expressly 	required
	ratification
	before
	the
contract
	could
	become
	effective.
	Section 	1.3
	stated:
Except
	as 	noted
	in
	Section 	1.4
	all 	articles
shall
	remain
	in
	full
	force
	and
	effect
	from
the 	date
	of
	ratification
	of
	this
	contract
until
	June
	30,
	1995,
	when
	it
	shall
terminate.
[9 ]
CSEA
	ratified
	the
	tentative
	agreement
	on
	June
	9,
	19930
	The
District
	board 	of
	trustees
	ratified
	the
	agreement
	on
	June 	28,
1993, 	and 	by
	its
	express
	terms
	it
	was
	"in
	full
	force
	and
	effect
from
	the 	date 	of
	ratification."
Not
	only
	must 	an 	agreement
	be
	ratified,
	where
	required
	by
express 	contra.ctual 	provision, 	to 	serve 	as
	a
	contract 	bar, 	but
	a
contract.
	must
	also 	contain 	"substantial
	terms 	and
	conditions 	of
employment 	deemed
	sufficient
	to
	stabilize
	the 	bargaining
relationship;
	it
	will
	not
	constitute
	a
	bar
	if 	it
	is
	limited 	to
wages
	only,
	or 	to
	one
	o~
	several 	provisions 	not
	deemed
substantial.
11
	(,ru;m_alachian
	Shale;
	See
	also
	Downey;
	State 	of
8
By
	this 	rule,
	the
	Board 	does 	not
	alter 	its
	prior
	adoptionof
	the 	signature 	requirement
	in
	cases
	where
	ratification 	is
	not
	a
condition 	precedent 	to 	the 	effectiveness 	of
	a
	contract
	by
	express
contractual 	provision.
9
Section 	1.4 	provides 	for 	limited 	reopeners 	for 	the 	term 	ofthe 	current 	agreement.
14

California
	(Department
	of 	Personnel
	Administration)
	(1989)
	PERE
Order
	No.
	Ad-191-S.)
	In
	evaluating
	whether
	a
	contract 	contains
substantial
	terms,
	the
	NLRB
	has
	held:
.
	real
	stability
	in
	industrial 	relations
can
	only
	be
	achieved
	where
	the
	contract
undertakes
	to 	chart
	with 	adequate
	precision
the 	course
	of
	the 	bargaining
	relationship,
and
	the
	parties
	can
	look
	to
	the
	actual
	terms
and
	conditions
	of
	their
	contract 	for
	guidance
in
	their
	day-to-day
	problems.
(Appalachian
	Shale.)
Finding
	that
	no
	contract
	bar
	existed,
	the 	regional
	director
determined
	that
	it
	was
	unnecessary
	to
	consider
	whether
	the
agreement
	ratified
	by
	the
	parties,
	which
	did
	not 	include
the 	proposed
	changes
	to 	Article
	18,
	nevertheless
	contained
substantial
	terms
	and
	conditions
	of
	employment
	for 	the
	members
	of
the
	transportation 	unit,
	Unit
	II.
	The
	Teamsters 	argue
	that
	the
case 	should
	be 	remanded
	to
	the 	regional
	director
	under
	these
circumstances
	to 	resolve 	the
	11
substantial 	factual 	issues
11
surrounding 	the 	issue
	of 	whether
	CSEA
	and
	the
	District
	ever
entered 	into
	a
	binding
	agreement
	covering 	Unit
	II
	employees.
The
	Board
	disagrees
	and
	finds
	that 	there
	is 	sufficient
evidence
	in 	the 	record 	to 	resolve
	this
	question.
In
	a
	special 	vote 	held
	on
	June
	8, 	1993,
	the
	members
	of
Unit
	II
	voted
	to 	reject
	the
	proposed 	changes
	to 	Article
	18.
	The
following
	day,
	the
	tentative
	agreement, 	absent 	the 	proposed
changes
	to 	Article
	18,
	was
	ratified
	by
	the
	combined membership
	of
Units
	I
	and
	II.
	The 	working
	conditions 	set
	out 	in Article
	18
apply 	only 	to 	the 	Unit
	II
	employees 	and 	concern 	the 	assignment
and
	training 	of 	transportation 	personnel. 	Pending 	the 	completion
15

of
	negotiations
	on
	the
	terms
	of
	Article
	18,
	the
	parties
	were
subject
	to
	the
	provisions
	contained
	in
	Article
	18
	from
	the
expired
	CBA.
The
	agreement
	ratified
	by
	the
	members
	of 	Units
	I
	and
	II
contained
	all
	the
	essential
	terms
	and
	conditions 	necessary
	to
guide
	the
	parties
	in 	administering
	their
	working
	relationship.
Among
	other
	things, 	the
	agreement
	addressed
	employee 	wages
	and
benefits,
	grievance 	handling,
	safety 	issues,
	and
	established
	an
evaluation
	procedure.
	Further, 	the
	issues
	affecting
	the
transportation
	employees 	were
	covered
	by
	the
	terms 	of
	the
previous
	agreement, 	pending
	any
	negotiated
	changes.
	Therefore,
the
	Board
	finds
	that
	the
	ratified
	agreement
	contained
	terms
sufficient
	to
	stabilize
	the 	bargaining
	relationship
	and
constitute
	a
	contract 	bar.
In
	summary,
	the
	Board
	finds
	that
	the
	agreement
	contained
substantial
	terms
	and
	conditions
	of
	employment, 	and
	was
	ratified
by
	the 	parties 	in
	accordance 	with
	an
	express 	provision
	of
	the
agreement
	prior
	to 	the
	filing
	of 	the
	decertification 	petition.
Under
	these 	circumstances, 	the
	Board
	finds
	that
	the
	ratified
agreement 	between
	CSEA
	and
	the
	District
	was
	effective 	to 	serve
	as
a
	contract
	bar 	to 	the 	representation 	petition.
	Accordingly, 	the
decertification 	petition
	must 	be
	dismissed.
16

ORDER
The
	decertification 	petition
	in
	Case
	No.
	LA-D-293
	is
	hereby
DISMISSED.
	The
	Board
	further
	orders
	that
	the
	ballots
	from
	the
representation 	election
	be
	destroyed.
Member
	Johnson
	joined
	in
	this
	Decision.
Member
	Garcia's
	concurrence 	begins
	on
	page
	18.
17

GARCIA,
	Member,
	concurring:
	I
	concur
	in
	the
	Public
Employment
	Relations
	Board
	(PERB
	or
	Board)
	majority's
	conclusion
that
	the
	ratified
	agreement 	between
	the
	California
	School
Employees
	Association,
	Chapter
	224
	(CSEA)
	and
	the 	Capistrano
Unified
	School
	District
	(District)
	was
	effective
	and
	served
	as
	a
contract
	bar 	to
	the
	decertification 	petition 	filed
	by
	the
	General
Truck
	Drivers, 	Office,
	Food
	and
	Warehouse
	Local
	952,
International
	Brotherhood
	of 	Teamsters,
	AFL-CIO
	(Teamsters)
However,
	I
	disagree
	with
	the 	following
	portions
	of 	the
	majority
opinion.
Effect
	of 	Signature
	on
	Validity
	of
	Contracts
At
	footnote
	8,
	the 	majority 	expressly
	clarifies
	that
	its
ruling
	in
	this
	opinion:
.
	does
	not
	alter
	[the 	Board's]
	prior
adoption 	of
	the
	signature
	requirement
	in
cases
	where
	ratification 	is
	not
	a
	conditionprecedent 	to 	the
	effectiveness
	of
	a
	contract
by
	express
	contractual 	provision.
Besides 	being 	unnecessary
	to
	the 	holding
	in
	this
	case, 	the
majority 	misstates 	California
	law
	on
	the
	necessity
	of
	a
signature.
	As 	I
	wrote
	in
	my
	dissent 	in
	Capistrano 	Unified
	School
District
	(1994)
	PERE
	Order
	No
..
Ad-254,
	the 	contract 	bar
	statute
that
	PERB
	operates
	under
	requires
	only
	that 	there
	be
	a
	11
lawful
written
	agreement"
	currently 	in 	effect
	between
	the 	public 	school
employer 	and
	another
	employee
	organization. 	(Educational
Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(EERA)
	section
	3544.
7 (b) . ) 1 	As
	the
1
Note
	that 	although 	the 	National 	Labor
	Relations
	Board
signature 	requirement 	discussed 	by 	the 	majority 	opinion 	has 	been
	modifed 	and
	diluted 	since
	1958, 	the 	California 	Legislature 	chose
18

majority
	now
	recognizes
	in
	this
	case,
	CSEA
	and
	the
	District
lawful
	agreement
	that
	became
	effective,
	under
	its
	entered
	into
	a
terms,
	when
	it
	was
	ratified
	by
	the
	parties.
	To
	imply
	in
	footnote
8
	that
	signatures 	are
	necessary 	for
	a
	contract 	to
	become
effective
	is
	contrary 	to
	law.
	It
	is
	a
	well-established
	principle
of
	contract
	law
	that
	a
	contract
	goes
	into
	effect
	when
	the
	parties
intend
	it
	to
	and
	signatures 	are
	just
	one
	form
	of 	evidence
	of 	the
intent
	of
	the
	parties.
2 	PERB
	does
	not
	have
	the
	authority 	to
restrict
	or 	condition 	the
	clear 	intent
	of
	the
	statute.
3
"Response
	Considered
	District's
	to
	Appeal" 	Should
	Not
	Have
	Been
Additionally,
	I
	disagree
	with 	the
	majority's
	treatment 	of
the
	document
	filed
	by
	the
	District
	on
	April
	21, 	1994.
	In
4	
the 	majority 	finds
	that
	the
	District's
	11
brief
11
	is
	a
	footnote
	1
timely
	filed
	response
	to
	CSEA's
	appeal,
	rather
	than
	an
	untimely-
filed
	appeal
	of
	the 	regional
	director's
	administrative
not
	to
	impose
	a
	signature
	requirement
	when
	it
	enacted
	this
sr.atute 	in
	1975.
2
See,
	e.g.,
	Angell 	v.
	Rowlands 	(1978)
	85
	Cal.App.3d
	536
Cal.Rptr.
	574]
	(contract
	is
	invalid
	if
	not 	signed
	by
	all
	[149
parties
	only
	when
	it
	is
	shown
	that
	the 	contract
	was
	not 	intended
complete
	until 	all
	parties
	signed) 	and
	Domarad
	v.
	Fisher	to
	be	
&
Burke,
	Inc.
	(1969) 	270
	Cal.App.2d
	543 	[76
	Cal.Rptr.
	529]
	(an
agreement
	is
	not
	invalid
	simply because
	it
	is
	couched
	in
	an
unsigned 	writing).
3
As
	the
	Board 	recognized
	in
	North 	Orange 	County Regional
Occupational 	Program 	(1990) 	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	857,
	PERB
	has 	only
such
	jurisdiction
	and powers
	as 	have 	been 	conferred
	on
	it
	by
statute;
	furthermore, 	an
	administrative
	agency
	is 	prohibited
	from
interpreting
	a
	statute
	so 	as 	to 	alter,
	amend
	or 	enlarge 	the
agency's 	statutory 	authority. 
19

determination.
4
We
	should
	avoid
	creating
	PERE
	precedent
	that
allows 	the
	label
	a
	party
	gives
	a
	document
	to
	control
	over
	its
substance
	(i.e.,
	an
	appeal
	or
	a
	response
	to
	an
	appeal).
	The
	PERB
regulation
	that
	governs
	responses
	to
	appeals
	of
	administrative
decisions
	does
	not
	define
	"response";
	however,
	Black's
	Law
Dictionary
	(4th 	ed.
	1951)
	p.
	1475
	defines 	the
	verb
	"to
	respond"
as
	"To
	make
	or
	file
	an 	answer
	to
	.
	[an]
	appeal,
	in 	the
character
	of
	a
	respondent."
	Black's
	further
	defines
	a
	respondent
in 	appellate 	practice
	as
	''
[a]
	party
	who
	contends
	against
	an
appeal." 	(Id.,
	p.
	1476.)
Thus,
	since
	the
	District's
	April
	21
	document
	takes 	the
	same
position 	stated
	by
	CSEA
	in
	its
	appeal,
	that
	document
	is
	not
	a
response;
	it
	is
	a
	late
	appeal,
	and
	it
	should 	not
	have
	been
considered.
	Merely
	labeling
	a
	document
	a
	"response"
	when
	its
substance
	is
	indistinguishable
	from 	an
	appeal
	does
	not
	ensure
fairness
	since
	it
	will
	reward
	parties
	who
	maneuver
	to 	avoid
deadlines
	or 	gain 	advantage.
	The
	timelines 	for
	a
	response
	must
be
	applied
	evenhandeqly
	to
	all
	parties,
	otherwise
	PERB
	encourages
the
	parties
	to
	employ
	tactics
	to 	the 	detriment 	of
	a
	fair
	process.
4
In 	substance, 	the
	District's
	document
	is 	that
	of 	an
	appeal.
It
	references 	the 	exact 	grounds 	on 	which
	it
	challenges 	the
regional 	director's 	administrative 	decision,
	and
	requests 	thatthe 	election
	be 	stayed pending 	the 	appeal,
	just
	as
	CSEA
	does
	in
its
	appeal. 	Furthermore, 	the 	District
	makes 	no 	mention 	of 	thearguments 	raised
	by
	CSEA
	in 	its
	appeal, 	which 	one 	would
	typicallyexpect 	in
	a 	document
	labeled
	a
	"response" 	to 	an
	earlier
	document.
20