California Correctional Peace Officers Association (Horspool) (PERB 1217S)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
WILLIAM F. HORSPOOL,
Charging Party, 	Case No. LA-CO-71-S
V . 	PERB Decision No. 1217-S
CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL PEACE
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, September 18, 1997
Respondent.
Appearances: William F. Horspool, on his own behalf; Christine
Albertine, Attorney, for California Correctional Peace Officers
Association.
Before Caffrey, Chairman; Amador and Jackson, Members.
DECISION
JACKSON, Member: 	This case comes before the Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) on William F.
Horspool's (Horspool) appeal from a Board agent's dismissal
(attached) of his unfair practice charge. 	As amended, the charge
alleged that the California Correctional Peace Officers
Association (Association) violated sections 3515.7(g) and
3519.5 (b) of the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act) when it settled
The Dills Act is codified at Government Code section 3512
et seq. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references
herein are to the Government Code. Section 3515.7 provides, in
relevant part:
) An employee who pays a fair share fee
shall be entitled to fair and impartial
representation by the recognized employee
organization. A breach of this duty shall be
deemed to have occurred if the employee
organization's conduct in representation is
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 	BOARD
WILLIAM 	F. 	HORSPOOL,
Charging 	Party,
v.
CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL 	PEACE
OFFICERS 	ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
Case 	No. 	LA-C0-71-S
PERB 	Decision No. 	1217-S
September 	18, 	1997
Appearances: 	William F. 	Horspool, 	on 	his 	own behalf; 	Christine
Albertine, 	Attorney, 	for 	California 	Correctional 	Peace 	Officers
Association.
Before 	Caffrey, 	Chairman; 	Amador 	and 	Jackson, 	Members.
DECISION
JACKSON, 	Member: 	This 	case 	comes 	before 	the 	Public
Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(PERB 	or Board) 	on William 	F.
Horspool's 	(Horspool) 	appeal 	from a 	Board 	agent's 	dismissal
(attached) 	of 	his 	unfair 	practice 	charge. 	As_ amended, 	the 	charge
alleged 	that 	the 	California 	Correctional 	Peace 	Officers
Association 	(Association) 	violated 	sections 	3515.?(g) 	and
3519.5 (b) 	of 	the 	Ralph C. 	Dills 	Act 	(Dills 	Act) 1 when 	it 	settled
1The 	Dills 	Act 	is 	codified 	at 	Government 	Code 	section'3512
et 	seq. 	Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory 	references
herein 	are 	to 	the 	Government 	Code. 	Section 	3515.7 	provides; 	in
relevant 	part:
(g) 	An 	employee 	who 	pays 	a 	fair 	share 	fee
shall 	be 	entitled 	to 	fair 	and 	impartial
representation 	by 	the 	recognized 	employee
organization. 	A breach 	of 	this 	duty 	shall 	be
deemed 	to 	have 	occurred 	if 	the 	employee
organization's 	conduct 	in 	representation 	is
arbitrary, 	discriminatory, 	or 	in 	bad 	faith.

group of grievances, including one filed by Horspool, against
the California Department of Corrections.
The Board has reviewed the entire record in this case,
including Horspool's original and amended unfair practice charge,
the warning and dismissal letters, Horspool's appeal, and the
Association's response thereto. 	The Board finds the warning and
dismissal letters to be free from prejudicial error and adopts
them as the decision of the Board itself.
HORSPOOL 'S APPEAL
On appeal, Horspool argues that the Board agent erred in
dismissing his charge. 	Horspool contends that the expired
1992-95 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the
Association and the state employer demonstrates that the
Association's settlement was without rational basis and
completely devoid of honest judgment.
ASSOCIATION'S RESPONSE
In its response, the Association contends that Horspool has
not identified any basis for granting his appeal. 	The
Association argues that the Board agent properly held that
Horspool failed to allege facts sufficient to support a prima
facie case for violation of the duty of fair representation.
Section 3519.5 provides, in relevant part:
(b) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
on employees, to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees because of their exercise of rights
guaranteed by this chapter.
2
~	
group
	of
	grievances, 	including
	one
	filed
	by
	Horspool,
	against
the
	California
	Department
	of 	Corrections.
Section
	3519.5
	provides, 	in 	relevant 	part:
(b)
	Impose
	or 	threaten 	to
	impose
	reprisals
on 	employees,
	to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against
	employees,
	or 	otherwise
to 	interfere 	with, 	restrain, 	or 	coerceemployees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of 	rightsguaranteed by
	this 	chapter.
The
	Board
	has 	reviewed
	the
	entire
	record
	in
	this
	case,
including 	Horspool's
	original
	and
	amended
	unfair practice
	charge,
the
	warning
	and
	dismissal
	letters,
	Horspool's 	appeal,
	and
	the
Association's
	response
	thereto.
	The
	Board
	finds 	the
	warning
	and
dismissal
	letters
	to
	be
	free
	from
	prejudicial 	error
	and
	adopts
them
	as 	the 	decision
	of
	the
	Board
	itself.
HORSPOOL'S 	APPEAL
On
	appeal,
	Horspool
	argues
	that
	the
	Board
	agent
	erred
	in
dismissing
	his
	charge.
	Horspool 	contends
	that
	the 	expired
1992-95
	collective
	bargaining
	agreement
	(CBA)
	between
	the
Association
	and
	the
	state
	employer
	demonstrates
	that
	the
Association's 	settlement
	was
	without
	rational 	basis
	and
completely 	devoid 	of 	honest
	judgment.
ASSOCIATION'S 	RESPONSE
In
	its
	response, 	the 	Association
	contends
	that
	Horspool 	has
not
	identified
	any
	basis 	for 	granting 	his 	appeal.
	The
Association 	argues
	that
	the
	Board
	agent 	properly held
	that
Horspool
	failed 	to 	allege 	facts 	sufficient 	to
	support
	a
	prima
facie
	case 	for 	violation
	of 	the 	duty 	of
	fair
	representation.
2

DISCUSSION
As the Board agent noted, the Board will find a violation of
the duty of fair representation only if the exclusive
representative's conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith. 	(Dills Act section 3515.7(g) ; California State Employees'
Association (Morrow) (1987) PERB Decision No. 614-S, proposed
decision at p. 11.) On appeal, Horspool renews his argument that
the CBA clearly and unequivocally supports his grievance.
Horspool asserts that the Association acted arbitrarily and
without rational basis when it settled his grievance in a manner
which was not favorable to him. We disagree.
Although Horspool arguably suffered some harm due to the
group settlement, the settlement has every appearance of an
attempt to reconcile CBA language and longstanding past practice.
As the Board agent noted, the Association has a responsibility to
represent all the members of the bargaining unit. 	(California
School Employees Association and its Chapter 107 (Marquez) (1995)
PERB Decision No. 1097, warning letter at p. 4.) Accordingly, a
good faith, rational, and nondiscriminatory settlement agreement
which benefits some unit members and not others does not violate
the duty of fair representation. (Sacramento City Teachers
Association (Fanning, et al. ) (1984) PERB Decision No. 428 at
p. 8.)
W
DISCUSSION
As
	the
	Board
	agent 	noted,
	the
	Board
	will
	find
	a
	violation
	of
the 	duty
	of
	fair
	representation
	only
	if
	the 	exclusive
representative's
	conduct
	is
	arbitrary,
	discriminatory, 	or
	in
	bad
faith.
	(Dills
	Act
	section
	3515.7(g);
	California 	State
	Employees'
Association
	(Morrow)
	(1987)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	614-S,
	proposed
decision
	at
	p. 	11.)
	On
	appeal,
	Horspool
	renews
	his
	argument
	that
the
	CBA
	clearly
	and
	unequivocally 	supports
	his
	grievance.
Horspool
	asserts 	that
	the 	Association 	acted
	arbitrarily
	and
without
	rational 	basis
	when
	it
	settled
	his
	grievance
	in
	a
	manner
which
	was
	not 	favorable
	to
	him.
	We
	disagree.
Although Horspool
	arguably
	suffered
	some
	harm due
	to
	the
group
	settlement, 	the 	settlement
	has 	every 	appearance
	of 	an
attempt 	to 	reconcile
	CBA
	language
	and
	longstanding
	past
	practice.
As
	the
	Board
	agent 	noted, 	the 	Association
	has
	a
	responsibility
	to
represent
	all
	the
	members
	of 	the 	bargaining
	unit. 	(California
School
	Employees
	Association
	and
	its
	Chapter
	107 	(Marquez)
	(1995)
PERB
	Decision
	No.
	1097, 	warning
	letter
	at
	p. 	4.) 	Accordingly,
	a
good
	faith, 	rational,
	and
	nondiscriminatory 	settlement
	agreement
which
	benefits
	some
	unit
	members
	and
	not 	others
	does
	not
	violate
the 	duty 	of
	fair
	representation.
	(Sacramento
	City Teachers
Association
	(Fanning,
	et 	al.)
	(1984)
	PERB
	Decision
	No. 	428
	at
p. 	8.)
3

ORDER
The unfair practice charge in Case No. LA-CO-71-S is hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Chairman Caffrey and Member Amador joined in this Decision.
ORDER
The
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	in
	Case
	No.
	LA-CO-71-S
	is
	hereby
DISMISSED
	WITHOUT 	LEAVE
	TO
	AMEND.
Chairman
	Caffrey
	and
	Member
	Amador
	joined
	in
	this
	Decision.
4

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	PETE WILSON, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Los Angeles Regional Office
3530 Wilshire Blud., Suite 650
PERB 	Los Angeles, CA 90010-2334
(213) 736-3127
June 27, 1997
William F. Horspool
Re: 	William F. Horspool v. California Correctional Peace
Officers Association
Unfair Practice Charge No. LA-CO-71-S
DISMISSAL AND REFUSAL TO ISSUE A COMPLAINT
Dear Mr. Horspool:
The above-referenced unfair practice charge, alleges the
California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA)
violated its duty of fair representation by settling your
grievance. This conduct is alleged to violate Government Code
section 3519.5 of the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act or Act) .
On June 10, 1997, I issued a warning letter advising you that the
above - referenced charge failed to state a prima facie case. On
June 13, 1997, we spoke on the telephone regarding the warning
letter. 	You amended the charge on June 17, 1997.
Your charge alleges that CCPOA violated its duty of fair
representation when it settled a number of grievances which
concerned the proper anniversary date for the granting of Merit
Salary Adjustments (MSA) .! 	The grievances alleged the
anniversary date should be one year from the date the officer
started at the Academy, rather than one year from the date the
officer began working at an Institution. In its settlement
agreement with the State of California, CCPOA stated:
The parties agree that the intent of 16.03 (d)
and Appendix 13 is to describe how employees
get moved from Range "A" to Range "C". 	Since
Range "C" was created on June 1, 1989, the
language of 16.03 (d) and Appendix 13 only
applies to employees hired between June 1,
1989 and October 1, 1992.
The amended charge alleges contrary to CCPOA's settlement, the
creation of Range C does not justify CCPOA's settlement agreement
with the State of California on the MSA issue. Attachment C to
Article 16.01 of the 1988-1991 MOU included the following example
of a salary movement:
On January 30, 1997, Victor X. Negrete filed Unfair
Practice Charge LA-CO-72-S based on nearly identical facts.
• STATE
OF
C"ALIFORNIA
/
iI
J
PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS BOARD
Los
Angeles
Regional
Office
3530
Wilshire
Blvd., Suite
650
Los
Angeles, CA
90010-2334
(213)
736-3127
June 	27,
	1997
William
	F.
	Horspool
Re:
	William
	F.
	Horspool
	v.
	California
	Correctional
	Peace
Officers
	Association
Unfair
	Practice
	Charge
	No. 	LA-CO-71-S
DISMISSAL
	AND
	REFUSAL
	TO
	ISSUE 	A COMPLAINT
Dear
	Mr.
	Horspool:
The
	above-referenced
	unfair 	practice
	charge,
	alleges
	the
California 	Correctional
	Peace
	Officers 	Association
	(CCPOA)
violated
	its
	duty 	of
	fair
	representation
	by
	settling
	your
grievance. 	This
	conduct
	is
	alleged 	to violate
	Government 	Code
section
	3519.5
	of
	the
	Ralph
	C.
	Dills
	Act
	(Dills
	Act
	or Act).
On
	June 	10, 	1997,
	I
	issued
	a
	warning
	letter
	advising
	you
	that
	the
above-referenced
	charge
	failed 	to 	state
	a
	prima
	facie
	case.
	On
June 	13, 	1997,
	we
	spoke 	on
	the
	telephone 	regarding 	the 	warning
letter.
	You
	amended
	the 	charge
	on
	June 	17, 	1997.
Your
	charge
	alleges 	that
	CCPOA
	violated
	its
	duty 	of
	fair
representation
	when
	it
	settled
	a
	number
	of 	grievances
	which
concerned
	the 	proper 	anniversary 	date 	for 	the 	granting
	of
	MeritSalary
	Adjustments
	(MSA)
. 1
The
	grievances
	alleged 	the
anniversary 	date
	should
	be 	one
	year
	from
	the 	date 	the
	officerstarted 	at
	the
	Academy,
	rather
	than
	one
	year
	from
	the 	date
	the
officer
	began working
	at
	an
	Institution.
	In
	its
	settlement
agreement
	with 	the 	State
	of
	California,
	CCPOA
	stated:
The
	parties
	agree
	that
	the
	intent
	of 	16.03(d)and Appendix
	13
	is 	to
	describe
	how
	employees
get
	moved
	from 	Range
	nAn
	to
	Range 	"C".
	Since
Range
	ncn
	was
	created
	on 	June 	1, 	1989,
	thelanguage 	of 	16.03(d) 	and Appendix
	13
	only
applies 	to
	employees
	hired
	between 	June 	1,
1989 	and 	October 	1, 	1992.
The 	amended
	charge 	alleges 	contrary 	to
	CCPOA's
	settlement, 	thecreation 	of
	Range
	C
does 	not
	justify
	CCPOA's
	settlement 	agreement
with 	the 	State 	of 	California
	on 	the
	MSA
	issue. 	Attachment
	C
	to
Article 	16.01 	of 	the 	1988-1991
	MOU
	included 	the 	following 	example
of
	a
	salary
	movement:
1On
	January 	30, 	1997, 	Victor
	X. 	Negrete 	filed 	Unfair
Practice 	Charge 	LA-CO-72-S 	based 	on 	nearly 	identical 	facts.
PETE
WILSON, Governor

LA-CO- 71 -S
Dismissal Letter
June 27, 1997
Page 2
Sample Salary Movement for New Hires:
Event 	Hired Before 	Hired After
6/1/89 	6/1/89
Hire 	1694 	1694
Com. Acad. 	2476 	2336
Yr. after hire 2600 	2600
You allege Attachment C demonstrates that employees hired both
before and after the creation of Range C on June 1, 1989, were
supposed to receive an increase a year after their hire date.
Thus, you argue, the contract clearly indicates the creation of
Range C is irrelevant to the determination of when MSAs should be
given.
However, the language of Attachment C to the 1988-1991 MOU, does
not demonstrate CCPOA acted arbitrarily. Although the sample
cited seems to indicate employees hired both before and after
June 1, 1989, would receive their MSA increase one year after
being hired, this was apparently not the parties' intention.
From 1982 to 1997, the proper date for awarding MSAs changed
several times, and resulted in numerous grievances. 	The proper
date to award MSAs was an ongoing issue. In fact, even the
parties' 1992-1995 MOU made further attempts to clarify the MSA
issue. 	Article 16.03 (d) of the 1992-1995 MOU indicates:
For employees hired prior to 10/1/92, MSA
dates for Correctional Officers, 	are
calculated from initial appointment dates at
the Academy and not when appointed to Range B
at the institution.
Despite this new contract language, the confusion regarding the
proper MSA dates continued until the parties signed the
settlement agreement at issue here. It appears the parties did
not intend for all employees hired prior to 10/1/92 to receive
the MSA increase on the anniversary of when they started the
Academy. Rather, the parties decided to incorporate the parties'
past practices, so that the proper MSA dates for employees would
be clearly defined. The settlement agreement delineates four
separate groups of employees based on their hire dates, and
reconciles the parties' concerns over the proper MSA dates of
employees hired over a period of over twenty years.
Moreover, as stated in the June 10, 1997, warning letter,
the exclusive representative is charged with representing the
bargaining unit as a whole. CCPOA, as the exclusive
representative has considerable discretion in the representation
LA-CO-71-S
June 	27,
	1997
Dismissal
	Letter
Page
	2
Sample
	Salary
Movement
	for
	New
	Hires:
Event 	Hired
	Before
6/1/89
Hired
	After
6/1/89
Hire	
1694 	1694
Com.
	Acad.	
2476 	2336
Yr.
	after
	hire	
2600 	2600
You
	allege
	Attachment
	C
demonstrates
	that
	employees
	hired 	both
before
	and
	after
	the
	creation
	of
	Range
	Con
	June
	1,
	1989,
	were
supposed
	to
	receive
	an
	increase
	a
	year
	after 	their
	hire 	date.
Thus,
	you
	argue, 	the
	contract
	clearly
	indicates 	the
	creation
	of
Range
	C
	is
	irrelevant
	to
	the 	determination
	of
	when
	MSAs
	should
	be
given.
However,
	the
	language 	of
	Attachment
	C
to
	the
	1988-1991
	MOU,
	does
not 	demonstrate
	CCPOA
acted
	arbitrarily.
	Although
	the
	sample
cited
	seems
	to 	indicate
	employees
	hired
	both 	before
	and
	after
June 	1,
	1989, 	would
	receive
	their
	MSA
	increase
	one
	year
	after
being
	hired,
	this
	was
	apparently 	not 	the
	parties' 	intention.
From
	1982
	to
	1997,
	the 	proper
	date 	for
	awarding
	MSAs
	changed
several
	times,
	and
	resulted 	in
	numerous
	grievances.
	The
	proper
date 	to
	award
	MSAs
	was
	an 	ongoing
	issue.
	In
	fact,
	even
	the
parties'
	1992-1995
	MOU
	made
	further
	attempts 	to
	clarify
	the
	MSA
issue. 	Article
	16.03(d) 	of
	the
	1992-1995
	MOU
	indicates:
For
	employees
	hired
	prior
	to 	10/1/92,
	MSA
dates 	for 	Correctional 	Officers,
	...
	are
calculated
	from
	initial
	appointment
	dates
	at
the
	Academy
	and
	not
	when
	appointed 	to
	Range
	B
at
	the
	institution.
Despite
	this
	new
	contract
	language, 	the 	confusion 	regarding 	the
proper
	MSA
	dates 	continued
	until
	the
	parties
	signed 	the
settlement
	agreement
	at
	issue 	here.
	It
	appears 	the
	parties
	did
not 	intend 	for
	all
	employees
	hired 	prior 	to 	10/1/92
	to 	receive
the
	MSA
	increase
	on
	the 	anniversary 	of
	when
	they
	started 	the
Academy.
	Rather, 	the
	parties
	decided 	to 	incorporate 	the
	parties'
past 	practices,
	so
	that 	the 	proper
	MSA
	dates 	for
	employees 	would
be
	clearly 	defined.
	The
	settlement
	agreement
	delineates 	four
separate 	groups 	of
	employees 	based
	on
	their 	hire 	dates, 	and
reconciles 	the 	parties'
	concerns 	over 	the 	proper
	MSA
	dates 	of
employees
	hired 	over
	a
	period 	of 	over 	twenty 	years.
Moreover, 	as 	stated 	in 	the 	June 	10, 	1997, 	warning
	letter,
the 	exclusive 	representative 	is
	charged with 	representing 	the
bargaining 	unit 	as
	a 	whole. 	CCPOA,
	as 	the 	exclusive
representative 	has 	considerable 	discretion 	in 	the 	representation
( (

LA-CO- 71 -S
Dismissal Letter
June 27, 1997
Page 3
of employees within the grievance procedure. 	(Los Rios College
Federation of Teachers (1996) PERB Decision No. 1133.) 	CCPOA is
not expected or required to satisfy all members of the unit it
represents . 	Nor is CCPOA barred from making agreements which may
have unfavorable effects on some members. 	(See California School
Employees Association and its Chapter 107 (1995) PERB Decision
No. 1097.) In the instant charge, 10 individual employees filed
grievances against the State. CCPOA's settlement agreement with
the State resulted in the compensation of six of those employees.
It has not been established that this settlement was the result
of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith behavior by CCPOA and
as such violative of the Act. 	Thus, the charge does not
demonstrate a prima facie violation and must be dismissed.
Right to Appeal
Pursuant to Public Employment Relations Board regulations, you
may obtain a review of this dismissal of the charge by filing
an appeal to the Board itself within twenty (20) calendar days
after service of this dismissal. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,
sec. 32635 (a) . ) Any document filed with the Board must contain
the case name and number. 	To be timely filed, the original and
five copies of such appeal must be actually received by the Board
itself before the close of business (5 p.m. ) or sent by
telegraph, certified or Express United States mail postmarked no
later than the last date set for filing. (Cal. Code Regs. ,
tit. 8, sec. 32135.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 shall
apply . 	The Board's address is:
Attention: Appeals Assistant
Public Employment Relations Board
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, 	95814
If you file a timely appeal of the refusal to issue a complaint,
any other party may file with the Board an original and five
copies of a statement in opposition within twenty (20) calendar
days following the date of service of the appeal. 	(Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32635 (b) . )
Service
All documents authorized to be filed herein must also be "served"
upon all parties to the proceeding, and a "proof of service"
must accompany each copy of a document served upon a party or
filed with the Board itself. 	(See Cal. Code Regs., tit.
sec. 32140 for the required contents and a sample form. ) 	The
document will be considered properly "served" when personally
LA-CO-71-S
Dismissal 	Letter
June 	27, 	1997
Page 	3
(
of 	employees 	within 	the 	grievance 	procedure. 	(Los 	Rios 	College
Federation 	of 	Teachers 	(1996) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	1133.) 	CCPOA 	is
not 	expected 	or 	required 	to·satisfy all 	members 	of 	the 	unit 	it
represents. 	Nor 	is 	CCPOA barred 	from making 	agreements 	which 	may
have 	unfavorable 	effects 	on 	some 	members. 	(See 	California 	School
Employees 	Association 	and 	its 	Chapter 	107 	(1995) 	PERB 	Decision
No. 	1097.) 	In 	the 	instant 	charge, 	10 	individual 	employees 	filed
grievances 	against 	the 	State. 	CCPOA's 	settlement 	agreement 	with
the 	State 	resulted 	in 	the 	compensation 	of 	six 	of 	those 	employees.
It 	has 	not 	been 	established 	that 	this 	settlement 	was 	the 	result
of 	arbitrary, 	discriminatory 	or 	bad 	faith 	behavior 	by 	CCPOA 	and
as 	such 	violative 	of 	the 	Act. 	Thus, 	the 	charge 	does 	not
demonstrate 	a 	prima 	facie 	violation 	and must 	be 	dismissed.
Right 	to 	Appeal
Pursuant 	to 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	regulations, 	you
may 	obtain 	a 	review 	of 	this 	dismissal 	of 	the 	charge 	by 	filing
an 	appeal 	to 	the 	Board 	itself 	within 	twenty 	(20) 	calendar 	days
after 	service 	of 	this 	dismissal. 	(Cal. 	Code 	Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32635(a) .) 	Any 	document 	filed 	with 	the 	Board must 	contain
the 	case 	name 	and 	number. 	To 	be 	timely 	filed, 	the 	original 	and
five 	copies 	of 	such 	appeal 	must 	be 	actually 	received 	by 	the 	Board
itself 	before 	the 	close 	of 	business 	(5 	p.m.) 	or 	sent 	by
telegraph, 	certified 	or 	Express 	United 	States 	mail 	postmarked 	no
later 	than 	the 	last 	date 	set 	for 	filing. 	(Cal. 	Code 	Regs.,
tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32135.) 	Code 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	section 	1013 	shall
apply. 	The 	Board's 	address 	is:
Attention: 	Appeals 	Assistant
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board
1031 	18th 	Street
Sacramento, 	CA 	95814
If 	you 	file 	a 	timely 	appeal 	of 	the 	refusal 	to 	issue 	a 	complaint,
any 	other 	party may 	file 	with 	the 	Board an 	original 	and 	five
copies 	of 	a 	statement 	in 	opposition 	within 	twenty 	(20) 	calendar
days 	following 	the 	date 	of 	service 	of 	the 	appeal. 	(Cal. 	Code
Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32635(b) .)
Service
All 	documents 	authorized 	to 	be 	filed 	herein must 	also 	be 	"served"
upon 	all 	parties 	to 	the 	proceeding, 	and 	a 	"proof 	of 	service"
must 	accompany 	each 	copy 	of 	a 	document 	served 	upon 	a 	party 	or
filed 	with 	the 	Board 	itself. 	(See 	Cal. 	Code 	Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32140 	for 	the 	required 	contents 	and 	a 	sample 	form.) 	The
document 	will 	be 	considered 	properly 	"served" 	when 	personally

LA- CO-71- S
Dismissal Letter
June 27, 1997
Page 4
delivered or deposited in the first- class mail, postage paid and
properly addressed.
Extension of Time
A request for an extension of time, in which to file a document
with the Board itself, must be in writing and filed with the
Board at the previously noted address. 	A request for an
extension must be filed at least three (3) calendar days before
the expiration of the time required for filing the document.
The request must indicate good cause for and, if known, the
position of each other party regarding the extension, and shall
be accompanied by proof of service of the request upon each
party. (Cal. Code Regs. , tit. 8, sec. 32132.)
Final Date
If no appeal is filed within the specified time limits, the
dismissal will become final when the time limits have expired.
Sincerely,
ROBERT THOMPSON
Deputy General Counsel
By Tammy L. Samsel
Regional Director
Attachment
: Christine Albertine
LA-CO-71-8
Dismissal
	Letter
June
	27,
	1997
Page
	4
delivered 	or 	deposited
	in
	the
	first-class
	mail, 	postage
	paid
	and
properly
	addressed.
Extension 	of
	Time
A
	request
	for
	an
	extension
	of 	time,
	in
	which
	to
	file
	a
	document
with
	the
	Board
	itself,
	must
	be
	in
	writing
	and
	filed
	with
	the
Board
	at
	the
	previously
	noted
	address.
	A
	request
	for
	an
extension
	must
	be
	filed 	at 	least
	three
	(3)
	calendar
	days
	before
the 	expiration
	of 	the
	time
	required 	for
	filing
	the
	document.
The
	request
	must
	indicate
	good
	cause
	for
	and,
	if
	known,
	the
position
	of 	each
	other 	party
	regarding 	the 	extension,
	and
	shall
be 	accompanied 	by
	proof 	of
	service
	of 	the 	request
	upon
	each
party.
	(Cal.
	Code
	Regs.,
	tit.
	8,
	sec.
	32132.)
Final
	Date
If
	no
	appeal
	is
	filed
	within 	the
	specified
	time
	limits, 	the
dismissal
	will
	become
	final
	when
	the
	time
	limits
	have
	expired.
Sincerely,
ROBERT
	THOMPSON
Deputy
	General 	Counsel
By Tammy L,. ·
Samsel
Regional
	Director
Attachment
cc: 	Christine 	Albertine

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	PETE WILSON, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Los Angeles Regional Office
3530 Wilshire Blud., Suite 650
Los Angeles, CA 90010-2334
(213) 736-3127
June 10, 1997
William F. Horspool
Re : 	William F. Horspool v. California Correctional Peace
Officers Association
Unfair Practice Charge No. LA-CO-71-S
WARNING LETTER
Dear Mr. Horspool :
The above-referenced unfair practice charge, alleges the
California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA)
violated its duty of fair representation by settling your
grievance. This conduct is alleged to violate Government Code
section 3519.5 of the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills Act or Act) .
My investigation revealed the following information.
Your charge alleges that CCPOA violated its duty of fair
representation when it settled a number of grievances which
concerned the proper anniversary date for the granting of Merit
Salary Adjustments (MSA) . The grievances alleged the anniversary
date should be one year from the date the officer started at the
Academy, rather than one year from the date the officer began
working at an Institution. Each officer typically spent six
weeks being trained at the Academy prior to being assigned to an
Institution.
You are employed as a Correctional Officer by the Department of
Corrections (Department) . You began training at the Academy on
January 23, 1989, and reported to your institution on March 6,
1989.
The Department and CCPOA have been parties to a number of
successive Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) , the last of which
expired on June 30, 1995. Article VII of the parties 1982-1983
MOU stated the following with regard to Merit Salary Adjustments
(MSA) :
The State employer will recommend including
sufficient funds in the 1982-1983 Budget to
enable employees, after completion of their
first year in a position, to receive annual
merit salary adjustments in accordance with
Government Code Section 19832 and applicable
STATE OF CALIFORNIA (
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Los Angeles Regional Office
3530 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 650
Los Angeles, CA 90010-2334
(213) 736-3127
June 	10, 	1997
William 	F. 	Horspool
Re: 	William 	F. 	Horspool 	v. 	California 	Correctional 	Peace
Officers 	Associacion
Unfair 	Practice 	Charge 	No. 	LA-CO-71-S
WARNING 	LETTER
Dear Mr. 	Horspool:
The 	above-referenced 	unfair 	practice 	charge, 	alleges 	the
California 	Correctional 	Peace 	Officers 	Association 	(CCPOA)
violated 	its 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation 	by 	settling 	your
grievance. 	This 	conduct 	is 	alleged 	to 	violate 	Government 	Code
section 	3519.5 	of 	the 	Ralph 	C. 	Dills 	Act 	(Dills 	Act 	or Act).
My 	investigation 	revealed 	the 	following 	information.
Your 	charge 	alleges 	that 	CCPOA violated 	its 	duty 	of 	fair
representation 	when 	it 	settled a 	number 	of 	grievances 	which
concerned 	the 	proper 	anniversary 	date 	for 	the 	granting 	of 	Merit
Salary Adjustments 	(MSA). 	The 	grievances 	alleged 	the 	anniversary
date 	should 	be 	one 	year 	from 	the 	date 	the 	officer 	started 	at 	the
Academy, 	rather 	than 	one 	year 	from 	the 	date 	the 	officer 	began
working 	at 	an 	Institution. 	Each 	officer 	typically 	spent 	six
weeks 	being 	trained 	at 	the 	Academy 	prior 	to 	being 	assigned 	to 	an
Institution.
You 	are 	employed 	as 	a 	Correctional 	Officer by 	the 	Department 	of
Corrections 	(Department). 	You 	began 	training 	at 	the 	Academy 	on
January 	23, 	1989, 	and 	reported 	to 	your 	institution 	on March 	6,
1989.
The 	Department 	and 	CCPOA have 	been parties 	to 	a 	number 	of
successive 	Memoranda 	of 	Understanding 	(MOUs), 	the 	last 	of 	which
expired 	on 	June 	30, 	1995. 	Article 	VII 	of 	the 	parties 	1982-1983
MOU 	stated 	the 	following 	with 	regard 	to 	Merit 	Salary Adjustments
(MSA) :
The 	State 	employer 	will 	recommend 	including
sufficient 	funds 	in 	the 	1982-1983 	Budget 	to
enable 	employees, 	after 	completion 	of 	their
first 	year 	in 	a 	position, 	to 	receive 	annual
merit 	salary 	adjustments 	in 	accordance 	with
Government 	Code 	Section 	19832 	and 	applicable
( PETE WILSON, Governor

LA-CO- 71 - S
Warning Letter
June 10, 1997
Page 2
Department of Personnel Administration's
rules .
Article VII, Section 40 of the parties 1983-1985 and 1987-1988
MOUs contained the exact language above with regard to the
granting of MSAs. None of these Agreements describe the
anniversary date for MSA calculations. It appears however that
from 1982 through May 31, 1989, MSAs were granted on the
anniversary of the date an employee began working at the
institution.
Article 16.01 and 16.03 of the parties July 1, 1988 thorough June
30, 1991, Agreement established a new Classification Range "C"
for Correctional Officers. Prior to this Agreement, Correctional
Officers could not advance beyond Range "B". 	However, the
Agreement remained silent with regard to description of the
anniversary date for MSAs .
During 1989, disputes arose regarding the proper anniversary date
for MSAs. 	That is, whether the anniversary date was one year
from the date the officer started at the Academy or one year from
the date he/she started at the Institution. The parties 1992-
1995 Agreement sought to resolve this dispute by noting in
Section 16. 03 (d) :
For employees hired prior to 10/1/92, MSA
dates for Correctional Officers, Group
Supervisors, and Youth Counselors are
calculated from initial appointment dates at
the Academy and not when appointed to Range B
at the institution.
This new contract language did not, alleviate all of the disputes
regarding MSA calculation. More specifically, between 1989 and
1996, at least ten (10) grievances were filed by CCPOA regarding
MSA anniversary dates. These grievances were filed, at least in
part, concerning officers such as yourself who were promoted to
Range C before the 1992-1995 agreement was settled. Due to the
number of grievances filed, CCPOA attempted a large-scale
settlement of the issue.
On October 18, 1995, you filed a grievance asserting the
Department failed to calculate your MSA properly. Specifically,
you allege the Department used your hire date at the institution
rather than your start date at the Academy, in calculating your
MSA anniversary date. You cited Article 16. 03 (d) above in
support of your allegation.
Department 	of
	Personnel
	Administration's
rules.
LA-CO-71-8
Warning
	Letter
June 	10,
	1997
Page
	2
Article
	VII,
	Section
	40
	of
	the
	parties
	1983-1985
	and
	1987-1988
MOUs
	contained 	the 	exact
	language
	above
	with 	regard
	to
	the
granting
	of
	MSAs. 	None
	of
	these
	Agreements
	describe 	the
anniversary 	date 	for
	MSA
	calculations.
	It
	appears
	however
	that
from
	1982
	through
	May
	31, 	1989,
	MSAs
	were
	granted
	on
	theanniversary 	of 	the 	date
	an
	employee
	began working
	at
	the
institution.
Article
	16.01 	and 	16.03
	of
	the
	parties
	July
	1,
	1988
	thorough
	June
30,
	1991, 	Agreement
	established
	a 	new
	Classification
	Range
	"C"
for
	Correctional
	Officers. 	Prior 	to
	this
	Agreement,
	Correctional
Officers
	could
	not
	advance 	beyond
	Range 	"B". 	However,
	the
Agreement
	remained
	silent
	with 	regard
	to 	description
	of
	the
anniversary 	date 	for
	MSAs.
During
	1989,
	disputes 	arose 	regarding 	the 	proper
	anniversary
	date
for
	MSAs.
	That
	is,
	whether
	the 	anniversary date
	was
	one
	year
from
	the 	date 	the
	officer 	started 	at
	the
	Academy
	or
	one
	year
	from
the 	date 	he/she
	started 	at
	the
	Institution.
	The
	parties
	1992-
1995 	Agreement
	sought
	to 	resolve
	this
	dispute
	by
	noting
	in
Section 	16.03(d):
For 	employees
	hired
	prior
	to
	10/1/92,
	MSA
dates 	for 	Correctional 	Officers,
	Group
Supervisors,
	and 	Youth
	Counselors
	are
calculated
	from
	initial
	appointment
	dates
	at
the
	Academy
	and
	not
	when
	appointed 	to
	Range
	B
at
	the
	institution.
This
	new
	contract
	language
	did 	not,
	alleviate 	all
	of 	the 	disputes
regarding
	MSA
	calculation.
	More
	specifically,
	between 	1989 	and
1996,
	at 	least
	ten
	(10)
	grievances
	were
	filed
	by
	CCPOA
	regarding
MSA
	anniversary 	dates.
	These
	grievances
	were
	filed, 	at 	least
	in
part,
	concerning
	officers
	such 	as 	yourself
	who
	were
	promoted
	to
Range
	C
before 	the
	1992-1995 	agreement
	was
	settled.
	Due
	to
	the
number
	of 	grievances
	filed,
	CCPOA
	attempted
	a
	large-scale
settlement 	of 	the 	issue.
On
	October 	18, 	1995, 	you
	filed
	a
	grievance 	asserting 	the
Department
	failed 	to 	calculate
	your
	MSA
	properly. 	Specifically,
you
	allege 	the 	Department 	used 	your
	hire 	date 	at 	the
	institution
rather 	than 	your
	start
	date
	at 	the
	Academy,
	in 	calculating 	your
MSA
	anniversary 	date.
	You
	cited Article 	16.03(d) 	above
	in
support 	of 	your 	allegation.

LA-CO- 71 - S
Warning Letter
June 10, 1997
Page 3
On July 16, 1996, CCPOA and the Department entered into a
settlement agreement regarding the ten MSA grievances. 	The
settlement provided in relevant part:
The parties agree that the intent of 16.03 (d)
and Appendix 13 is to describe how employees
get moved from Range "A" to Range "C". Since
Range "C" was created on June 1, 1989, the
language of 16.03 (d) and Appendix 13 only
applies to employees hired between June 1,
1989 and October 1, 1992.
Due to this settlement, six of the ten grievances resulted in
monies owed to bargaining unit members. 	You were one of the four
employees who did not receive an award, as you were hired prior
to June 1, 1989. 	CCPOA withdrew with prejudice your grievance as
part of the settlement agreement. CCPOA informed you of this
settlement by letter dated August 2, 1996. You are dissatisfied
with CCPOA's responses to date.
Based on the facts stated above, the charge as presently written
fails to state a prima facie violation of the duty of fair
representation, for the reasons stated below.
You assert CCPOA violated its duty of fair representation in
settling the MSA grievances. Specifically, you allege CCPOA
failed to resolve the grievances in a timely manner and failed to
give you a reasonable explanation as to their reasoning in
settling your grievance.
The duty of fair representation imposed on the exclusive
representative extends to grievance handling. 	(Fremont Teachers
Association (King) (1980) PERB Decision No. 125; United Teachers
of Los Angeles (Collins) (1982) PERB Decision No. 258.) 	In order
to state a prima facie violation of this section of EERA,
Charging Party must show that the Association's conduct was
arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. In United Teachers of
Los Angeles (Collins), the Public Employment Relations Board
stated :
Absent bad faith, discrimination, or
arbitrary conduct, mere negligence or poor
judgment in handling a grievance does not
constitute a breach of the union's duty.
[Citations. ]
A union may exercise its discretion to
determine how far to pursue a grievance in
the employee's behalf as long as it does not
LA-CO-71-8
Warning 	Letter
June 	10, 	1997
Page 	3
(
On 	July 	16, 	1996, 	CCPOA and 	the 	Department 	entered 	into 	a
settlement 	agreement 	regarding 	the 	ten MSA 	grievances. 	The
settlement 	provided 	in 	relevant 	part:
The 	parties 	agree 	that 	the 	intent 	of 	16.03(d)
and 	Appendix 	13 	is 	to 	describe 	how 	employees
get 	moved 	from 	Range 	"A" 	to 	Range 	"C". 	Since
Range 	11 C 11 	was 	created 	on June 	1, 	1989, 	the
language 	of 	16.03(d) 	and Appendix 	13 	only
applies 	to 	employees 	hired 	between 	June 	1,
1989 	and 	October 	1, 	1992.
Due 	to 	this 	settlement, 	six 	of 	the 	ten 	grievances 	resulted 	in
monies 	owed 	to 	bargaining 	unit 	members. 	You 	were 	one 	of 	the 	four
employees 	who 	did 	not 	receive 	an 	award, 	as 	you 	were 	hired 	prior
to 	June 	1, 	1989. 	CCPOA withdrew 	with 	prejudice 	your 	grievance 	as
part 	of 	the 	settlement 	agreement. 	CCPOA 	informed you 	of 	this
settlement 	by 	letter 	dated August 	2, 	1996. 	You 	are 	dissatisfied
with 	CCPOA's 	responses 	to 	date.
Based 	on 	the 	facts 	stated 	above, 	the 	charge 	as 	presently written
fails 	to 	state 	a 	prima 	facie 	violation 	of 	the 	duty 	of 	fair
representation, 	for 	the 	reasons 	stated 	below.
You 	assert 	CCPOA violated 	its 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation 	in
settling 	the 	MSA 	grievances. 	Specifically, 	you 	allege 	CCPOA
failed 	to 	resolve 	the 	grievances 	in 	a 	timely manner 	and 	failed 	to
give 	you 	a 	reasonable 	explanation 	as 	to 	their 	reasoning 	in
settling your 	grievance.
The 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation 	imposed 	on 	the 	exclusive
representative 	extends 	to 	grievance 	handling. 	(Fremont 	Teachers
Association 	(King) 	(1980) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	125; 	United 	Teachers
of 	Los 	Angeles 	(Collins) 	(1982) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	258.) 	In 	order
to 	state 	a 	prima 	facie 	violation 	of 	this 	section 	of 	EERA,
Charging 	Party must 	show 	that 	the 	Association's 	conduct 	was
arbitrary, 	discriminatory 	or 	in 	bad 	faith. 	In United 	Teachers 	of
Los 	Angeles 	(Collins), 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board
stated:
Absent 	bad 	faith, 	discrimination, 	or
arbitrary 	conduct, 	mere 	negligence 	or 	poor
judgment 	in 	handling 	a 	grievance 	does 	not
constitute 	a 	breach 	of 	the 	union's 	duty.
[Citations.]
A union 	may 	exercise 	its 	discretion 	to
determine 	how 	far 	to 	pursue 	a 	grievance 	in
the 	employee's 	behalf 	as 	long 	as 	it 	does 	not

LA- CO- 71 - S
Warning Letter
June 10, 1997
Page 4
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or
process a grievance in a perfunctory fashion.
A union is also not required to process an
employee's grievance if the chances for
success are minimal .
In order to state a prima facie case of arbitrary conduct
violating the duty of fair representation, a Charging Party:
. must at a minimum include an assertion
of sufficient facts from which it becomes
apparent how or in what manner the exclusive
representative's action or inaction was
without a rational basis or devoid of honest
judgment . (Emphasis added. ) " [Reed District
Teachers Association, CTA/NEA (Reyes) (1983)
PERB Decision No. 332, p. 9, citing Rocklin
Teachers Professional Association (Romero)
(1980) PERB Decision No. 124.]
You assert the settlement agreement is arbitrary and devoid of
any rational basis. However, facts presented fail to support
such a finding. Prior to the 1992-95 MOU, contractual language
failed to specify the anniversary date upon which an MSA was to
be calculated. Such an omission resulted in a dispute regarding
the appropriate anniversary date for Correctional Officers, who
are required to attend an Academy.
From 1982 through June 1, 1989, Correctional Officers could move
up the classification ladder to Range B. Range B was achieved
after one year at the institution. 	On June 1, 1989, the State
implemented a new salary range, Range C. With the implementation
of this new salary range, employees hired between June 1, 1989,
and October 1, 1992 elevate to Range B upon completion of the
Academy (six weeks after employment) , and then elevate to Range C
upon the one year anniversary of the date the employee began the
Academy . 	Employees hired after October 1, 1992, move to Range C
on the anniversary of the date they started the institution.
CCPOA's settlement agreement attempts to address the creation of
Range C, and the parties' intent in entering into the 1992-1995
MOU. Nothing in the facts presented demonstrates the parties
settlement was arbitrary, or devoid of rational basis. 	While an
employee may disagree with the exclusive representative's
characterization, such dissatisfaction does not result in a
violation of the duty of fair representation. 	The dates agreed
upon and the settlement language are not ambiguous given the
history of the MSA language, and the Article's failure to specify
the MSA anniversary date.
LA-CO-71-8
Warning 	Letter
June 	10, 	1997
Page 	4
arbitrarily 	ignore 	a 	meritorious 	grievance 	or
process 	a 	grievance 	in 	a 	perfunctory 	fashion.
A union 	is 	also 	not 	required 	to 	process 	an
employee's 	grievance 	if 	the 	chances 	for
success 	are 	minimal.
In 	order 	to 	state 	a 	prima 	facie 	case 	of 	arbitrary 	conduct
violating 	the 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation, 	a 	Charging 	Party:
11 	• 	must 	at 	a 	minimum 	include 	an 	assertion
of 	sufficient 	facts 	from 	which 	it 	becomes
apparent 	how 	or 	in 	what 	manner 	the 	exclusive
representative's 	action 	or 	inaction 	was
without 	a 	rational 	basis 	or 	devoid 	of 	honest
judgment. 	(Emphasis 	added.) 11 	[Reed District
Teachers 	Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(Reyes) 	(1983)
PERE 	Decision No. 	332, 	p. 	9, 	citing 	Rocklin
Teachers 	Professional 	Association 	(Romero)
(1980) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	124.]
You 	assert 	the 	settlement 	agreement 	is 	arbitrary and 	devoid 	of
any 	rational 	basis. 	However, 	facts 	presented 	fail 	to 	support
such 	a 	finding. 	Prior 	to 	the 	1992-95 	MOU, 	contractual 	language
failed 	to 	specify 	the 	anniversary 	date 	upon 	which 	an MSA was 	to
be 	calculated. 	Such 	an 	omission 	resulted 	in 	a 	dispute 	regarding
the 	appropriate 	anniversary 	date 	for 	Correctional 	Officers, 	who
are 	required 	to 	attend 	an 	Academy.
From 	1982 	through 	June 	1, 	1989, 	Correctional 	Officers 	could 	move
up 	the 	classification 	ladder 	to 	Range 	B. 	Range 	B was 	achieved
after 	one 	year 	at 	the 	institution. 	On 	June 	1, 	1989, 	the 	State
implemented 	a 	new 	salary 	range, 	Range 	C. 	With 	the 	implementation
of 	this 	new 	salary 	range, 	employees 	hired between 	June 	1, 	1989,
and October 	1, 	1992 	elevate 	to 	Range 	B upon 	completion 	of 	the
Academy 	(six weeks 	after 	employment), 	and 	then 	elevate 	to 	Range 	C
upon 	the 	one 	year 	anniversary 	of 	the 	date 	the 	employee 	began 	the
Academy. 	Employees 	hired 	after 	October 	1, 	1992, 	move 	to 	Range 	C
on 	the 	anniversary 	of 	the 	date 	they 	started 	the 	institution.
CCPOA's 	settlement 	agreement 	attempts 	to 	address 	the 	creation 	of
Range 	C, 	and 	the 	parties' 	intent 	in 	entering 	into 	the 	1992-1995
MOU. 	Nothing 	in 	the 	facts 	presented 	demonstrates 	the 	parties
settlement 	was 	arbitrary, 	or 	devoid 	of 	rational 	basis. 	While 	an
employee 	may 	disagree 	with 	the 	exclusive 	representative's
characterization, 	such 	dissatisfaction 	does 	not 	result 	in 	a
violation 	of 	the 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation. 	The 	dates 	agreed
upon 	and 	the 	settlement 	language 	are 	not 	ambiguous 	given 	the
history 	of 	the 	MSA 	language, 	and 	the 	Article's 	failure 	to 	specify
the MSA 	anniversary 	date.

LA-CO- 71 - S
Warning Letter
June 10, 1997
Page 5
In analyzing whether an "honest judgment" has been made, PERB
does not judge whether the union's assessment was "correct, " but
only whether that judgment had a rational basis. 	Sacramento
City Teachers Association (1984) PERB Decision No. 428.)
Moreover, the union is charged with representing the bargaining
unit as a whole. 	Thus, a grievance with arguable merit may be
rejected or settled by the union if the grievant's victory would
damage the terms and conditions for the bargaining unit as
whole. 	(Castro Valley Unified School District (1980) PERB
Decision No. 149.) As the charge fails to present any other
facts demonstrating CCPOA acted in an arbitrary manner in
settling the grievances, the charge as presently written fails to
state a prima facie case.
For these reasons the charge, as presently written, 	does not
state a prima facie case. 	If there are any factual inaccuracies
in this letter or additional facts which would correct the
deficiencies explained above, please amend the charge. 	The
amended charge should be prepared on a standard PERB unfair
practice charge form, clearly labeled First Amended Charge,
contain all the facts and allegations you wish to make, and
be signed under penalty of perjury by the charging party. 	The
amended charge must be served on the respondent and the original
proof of service must be filed with PERB. If I do not receive an
amended charge or withdrawal from you before June 17, 1997, I
shall dismiss your charge. If you have any questions, please
call me at (213) 736-3008.
Sincerely,
Tammy L. Samsel
Regional Director
LA-CO-71-S
Warning
	Letter
June 	10,
	1997
Page
	5
( 	(
In
	analyzing
	whether
	an
	11
honest
	judgment"
	has 	been
	made,
	PERB
does
	not
	judge 	whether
	the
	union's
	assessment
	was
	"correct,"
	but
only
	whether
	that
	judgment 	had
	a
	rational 	basis.
	(Sacramento
City
	Teachers
	Association
	(1984)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	428.)
Moreover,
	the
	union
	is
	charged
	with
	representing 	the
	bargaining
unit
	as
	a
	whole. 	Thus,
	a
	grievance 	with 	arguable
	merit
	may
	be
rejected
	or
	settled
	by
	the
	union
	if
	the
	grievant's 	victory
	would
damage
	the
	terms
	and
	conditions
	for
	the 	bargaining
	unit
	as
	a
whole.
	(Castro
	Valley 	Unified
	School
	District
	(1980)
	PERB
Decision
	No.
	149.)
	As
	the
	charge
	fails
	to 	present
	any
	otherfacts
	demonstrating
	CCPOA
	acted
	in
	an
	arbitrary
	manner
	in
settling
	the 	grievances, 	the
	charge
	as
	presently 	written
	fails
	to
state
	a
	prima
	facie
	case.
For
	these
	reasons
	the
	charge, 	as
	presently written,
	does
	not
state
	a
	prima
	facie
	case.
	If
	there 	are
	any
	factual 	inaccuracies
in 	this
	letter
	or 	additional 	facts
	which 	would
	correct 	the
deficiencies
	explained
	above,
	please
	amend
	the
	charge.
	Theamended
	charge
	should
	be
	prepared
	on
	a
	standard
	PERB
	unfairpractice
	charge
	form,
	clearly
	labeled
	First
	Amended
	Charge,
contain
	all
	the
	facts
	and
	allegations
	you
	wish
	to
	make,
	and
be 	signed under
	penalty
	of
	perjury
	by
	the
	charging
	party.
	Theamended
	charge
	must 	be
	served
	on
	the
	respondent
	and
	the
	original
proof 	of 	service
	must 	be
	filed
	with
	PERB.
	If
	I
	do
	not
	receive
	anamended
	charge
	or
	withdrawal
	from 	you
	before
	June 	17, 	1997,
	I
shall
	dismiss 	your 	charge.
	If
	you 	have 	any
	questions,
	please
call
	me
	at
	(213)
	736-3008.
Sincerely,
Tammy
	L. 	Samsel
Regional
	Director