United Teachers Los Angeles (Ragsdale) * * * CLARIFIED by National Union of Healthcare Workers (2012) PERB Decision No. 2249-M (PERB 0944E)

CLARIFIED 	by 	National 	Union 	of 	Healthcare
Workers 	(2012) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	2249-M
STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
FRANKLIN 	DELANO RAGSDALE,
Charging 	Party,
v.
UNITED 	TEACHERS-LOS 	ANGELES
Respondent.
Case No. 	LA-CO-587
PERB Decision No. 	944
June 23, 	1992
Appearance: 	Franklin Delano Ragsdale, 	on his own behalf.
Before Camilli, Caffrey, 	and Carlyle, 	Members.
DECISION AND 	ORDER
CARLYLE, 	Member: 	This 	case is before the Public 	Employment
Relations 	Board 	(Board) 	on appeal 	by Franklin Delano Ragsdale 	of
a 	Board agent's dismissal 	(attached hereto) 	of his 	charge
alleging 	that 	the 	United Teachers-Los 	Angeles 	violated 	section
3543.6(b) 	of the Educational Employment Relations Act 	(EERA)1 by
failing to 	represent him 	in his 	grievance 	against 	the 	Los Angeles
Unified 	School 	District.
1EERA 	is 	codified at Government 	Code 	section 	3540 	et 	seq.
Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory references 	herein are
to the Government Code. 	Section 3543.6 	states, 	in pertinent
part:
It 	shall 	be unlawful 	for an employee
organization to:
(b) 	Impose or threaten to 	impose reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, 	or otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their exercise of 	rights
guaranteed by this 	chapter.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
____________ )

The 	Board has 	reviewed 	the 	Board 	agent's warning 	and
dismissal 	letters, 	and 	finding them to be 	free of prejudicial
error, 	adopts 	them as 	the decision of 	the Board 	itself.
The unfair practice charge 	in Case No. 	LA-CO-587 	is hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT 	LEAVE 	TO AMEND.
Members 	Camilli 	and Caffrey 	joined 	in this 	Decision.
2
2

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	PETE WILSON, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Los Angeles Regional Office
3530 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 650
Los Angeles, CA 90010-2334
(213) 736-3127
PERS
March 31, 	1992
Franklin D. 	Ragsdale
Re: 	DISMISSAL OF 	CHARGE AND REFUSAL TO ISSUE COMPLAINT
Unfair Practice Charge No. 	LA-CO-587
Franklin Delano Ragsdale v. 	United Teachers 	- 	Los Angeles
Dear Mr. 	Ragsdale:
In the above-referenced charge, 	you allege that United Teachers 	-
Los 	Angeles 	(UTLA or union) 	failed as 	an exclusive representative
to 	fairly 	represent 	you 	in dealing with 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	Unified
School 	District 	(District) 	in alleged violation of Government
Code 	section 3543.6(b) 	of the EERA.
I 	indicated to you 	in my attached 	letter dated March 	20, 	1992
that 	the 	above-referenced 	charge did 	not 	state 	a prima 	facie
case. 	You were 	advised that 	if there were 	any 	factual
inaccuracies 	or additional 	facts 	that would 	correct 	the
deficiencies 	explained 	in that 	letter, 	you 	should 	amend 	the
charge 	accordingly. 	You were 	further advised that unless 	you
amended the charge to 	state 	a prima 	facie 	case, 	or withdrew it
prior to March 27, 	1992, 	the charge would be dismissed.
You advised me on March 27, 	1992, 	that you are not 	filing an
amended 	charge, 	but may 	subsequently appeal my dismissal.
Therefore, 	as 	I 	have not received either a request 	for withdrawal
or an amended charge, 	I 	am dismissing the charge based on the
facts 	and reasons 	contained 	in my March 20, 	1992 	letter.
Right 	to Appeal
Pursuant 	to Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board regulations, 	you
may 	obtain a 	review of 	this 	dismissal 	of 	the 	charge by 	filing 	an
appeal 	to 	the Board 	itself within twenty 	(20) 	calendar days after
service of this dismissal 	(California Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32635(a)). 	To be timely filed, 	the original and five copies
of 	such 	appeal 	must be 	actually 	received 	by the 	Board 	itself
before the 	close of business 	(5:00 p.m.) 	or sent by telegraph,
certified 	or 	Express 	United 	States 	mail 	postmarked 	no 	later 	than
the 	last date set for filing 	(California Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32135). 	Code of Civil Procedure section 	1013 	shall apply.
The Board's address 	is:
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board
1031 	18th Street
Sacramento, 	CA 95814

Dismissal
LA-CO-587
March 31, 	1992
Page 	2
If 	you 	file 	a 	timely appeal 	of 	the 	refusal 	to 	issue 	a 	complaint,
any 	other party 	may 	file with 	the 	Board 	an original 	and 	five
copies 	of 	a 	statement 	in opposition within 	twenty 	calendar 	days
following the date 	of 	service 	of 	the 	appeal 	(California 	Code 	of
Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32635(b)).
Service
All 	documents 	authorized 	to 	be 	filed 	herein must 	also 	be 	"served"
upon all parties 	to the proceeding, 	and a 	"proof of 	service" 	must
accompany 	each 	copy 	of 	a document 	served 	upon a party 	or 	filed
with the Board itself. 	(See California Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32140 	for the required contents 	and a 	sample 	form.) 	The
document will 	be 	considered properly 	"served" 	when personally
delivered 	or deposited 	in 	the 	first-class 	mail 	postage 	paid 	and
properly 	addressed.
Extension of 	Time
A request 	for an extension of 	time 	in which to 	file 	a document
with 	the 	Board 	itself must be 	in writing and 	filed with 	the 	Board
at 	the previously noted 	address. 	A request 	for an extension must
be 	filed 	at 	least 	three 	calendar days 	before 	the 	expiration of
the 	time 	required 	for 	filing 	the document. 	The 	request 	must
indicate good cause 	for and, 	if known, 	the position of 	each other
party 	regarding 	the 	extension, 	and 	shall 	be accompanied 	by proof
of 	service 	of 	the 	request 	upon 	each party 	(California Code 	of
Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32132).
Final 	Date
If 	no 	appeal 	is 	filed within the 	specified time 	limits, 	the
dismissal will 	become 	final when the 	time 	limits 	have 	expired.
Sincerely,
JOHN W. 	SPITTLER
General 	Counsel
By
Marc S. 	Hurwitz
Regional 	Attorney
Attachment
cc: 	Roger Segure, 	Director of Grievance Processing, 	UTLA
Jesus E. 	Quinonez, 	Esq., 	Taylor, 	Roth, 	Bush & Geffner

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	PETE WILSON, Governor
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 	BOARD
Los Angeles Regional Office
3530 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 650
Los Angeles, CA 90010-2334
(213) 736-3127	
PERD
March 20, 	1992
Franklin D. 	Ragsdale
Re: 	WARNING LETTER, 	Unfair Practice Charge
No. 	LA-CO-58 7, 	Franklin Delano Ragsdale v.
United Teachers 	- 	Los Angeles
Dear Mr. 	Ragsdale:
In the 	above-referenced 	charge, 	you allege that United Teachers 	-
Los 	Angeles 	(UTLA or union) 	failed as 	an 	exclusive 	representative
to 	fairly represent 	you 	in dealing with 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	Unified
School 	District 	(District) 	in alleged 	violation of 	Government
Code 	section 3543.6(b) 	of the EERA.
More 	specifically, 	you 	allege 	that 	UTLA 	failed to 	fairly
represent you 	in your grievance1 against 	the District. 	You
contend 	that 	there are 	no 	contractual 	bases 	for the 	imposition of
discipline 	(I 	assume you mean your dismissal 	in December 	1990)
against 	employees 	in 	contravention of 	the 	Collective 	Bargaining
Agreement 	(Agreement). 	You cite Article V, 	section 22.0 	(no
reprisals), 	Article X, 	section 	1.0 	(evaluation and discipline 	-
purpose), 	Article XIX, 	sections 	5.6b. 	and 5.7 	(standby lists 	for
substitute employees), 	and Appendix F, 	paragraphs 	1 and 3
(special 	settlement provisions 	re May 	1989 	strike).
My 	investigation and the 	charge 	reveals 	the 	following 	facts.
You were 	a provisional 	teacher and 	a 	substitute 	for the 	District
for 	approximately 	ten years. 	You have 	been a member of 	UTLA 	for
approximately eight years. 	At all 	times 	relevant to your charge,
you were 	an 	Incentive Substitute Teacher 	for the District. 	An
Inadequate Service Report 	(ISR) 	was 	issued to you on or about
October 24, 	1988. 	On or about October 28, 	1988, 	the District
issued 	a warning 	letter 	to you. 	The 	District 	issued an 	ISR
(encounter on a picket 	line) 	to you on or about May 30, 	1989 	and
a 	grievance was 	filed. 	On or about June 	16, 	1989, 	the District
issued you a warning letter. 	On or about September 	10, 	1990,
N2
1It 	is 	unclear which grievance you are referring to, 	but 	it
is 	likely 	you mean your 	grievance protesting your dismissal 	in
December 	1990.
2It 	appears 	that Ron Apperson, 	Legal Adviser 	for the
District, 	advised you by 	letter dated September 	11, 	1991 	that

Warning 	Letter
LA-CO-587
March 20, 	1992
Page 	2
you 	grieved over 	the District's 	not having used you as 	a
substitute during the 	summer. 	Thereafter, 	UTLA refused 	to proceed
to 	binding 	arbitration. 	The 	District 	issued you a 	third 	ISR on
or about October 	12, 	1990 	(for allegedly calling a parent 	a
derogatory name). 	A grievance was 	filed.3 By 	letter dated
December 	3, 	1990, 	the District dismissed you from substitute
status 	effective December 	3, 	1990. 	On or about December 	6, 	1990,
you 	filed 	a 	grievance protesting the 	discharge 	and 	requesting
reinstatement. 	On or about December 	13, 	1990, 	the grievance was
denied by the District. 	On or about January 25, 	1991, 	UTLA
indicated to you that 	it would not represent you, 	or that 	it
would 	not take your grievance 	to binding arbitration. 	On or
about April 	10, 	1991 	the 	UTLA Grievance 	Review Committee denied
your 	request 	to 	take your 	grievance 	to 	binding 	arbitration.
On June 	10, 	1991, 	you filed a lawsuit against the District, 	UTLA
and 	others 	in U.S. 	District Court 	for the Central 	District 	of
California, 	Case No. 	91-3119, 	for wrongful termination/civil
rights, 	breach of 	statute, 	breach of 	labor agreement and the duty
of fair representation 	(DFR).4 On August 23, 	1991, 	you wrote to
the 	District 	Board 	of 	Education 	asking 	that you be 	returned 	to
service. 	See footnote 2 	for a response dated September 	11, 	1991,
by the District's 	Legal Adviser, 	Ron Apperson. 	On September 20,
1991, 	you wrote to the District Board of Education, 	among others,
and 	requested your dismissal 	be 	rescinded. 	On September 	20,
1991, 	you wrote to UTLA indicating that 	two 	ISR's 	had been
defeated 	and 	they 	should 	"come 	to 	the 	aid 	of 	the 	substitute
membership." 	On October 4, 	1991, 	Jesus Quinonez, 	Esq. 	for UTLA,
wrote 	to you and 	indicated, 	in part, 	that based on California
Education Code 	44953, 	the 	District may dismiss 	substitute
employees 	at 	the 	"pleasure 	of 	the board." 	Therefore he believed
UTLA would be 	unsuccessful were 	it 	to 	attempt to 	challenge 	the
dismissal. 	Jesus 	indicated that this was 	UTLA'S 	response 	to your
pursuant 	to Appendix F, 	page 	251 	of 	the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between UTLA and the District, 	effective June 26, 	198 9
through June 30, 	1991, 	the ISR dated May 30, 	1989 	should not be
considered 	in your employment, 	thus 	removing it 	from
consideration. 	At the 	same 	time, 	he 	indicated that as 	you do 	not
hold tenure, 	there was 	enough 	information in your 	file 	to permit
the District not to hire you as 	a 	substitute employee.
3By letter dated March 21, 	1991, 	regarding this grievance,
the 	District decided not 	to proceed 	to 	arbitration, 	and 	that 	it
was 	rescinding/destroying the October 	12, 	1990 	ISR.
4In or about July 	1991, 	the 	lawsuit was dismissed 	as 	to all
defendants.

Warning 	Letter
LA-CO-587
March 20, 	1992
Page 3
request 	for reconsideration. 	You allege that 	this 	is 	the 	latest
instance 	of 	UTLA's 	failure 	to 	fairly represent you.
On March 	17, 	1992, 	I asked you what facts 	took place that 	lead
you to 	say that the Quinonez 	letter dated October 4, 	1991, 	was
written with 	an unlawful 	motive 	or was 	written 	arbitrarily,
discriminatorily, 	or in bad 	faith. 	Your response 	included the
following 	information. 	First, 	you 	contend UTLA acted 	arbitrarily
and 	in bad 	faith 	as 	you're 	being disciplined 	in 	this 	case was
inappropriate, 	and the union was 	doing nothing about 	it 	or was
not 	living up to the 	contract. 	Second, 	during the 	strike 	in
1989, 	you went to work and 	crossed the picket 	line 	at Crenshaw
High School. 	Jeff Horton, 	a UTLA striker, 	now on the LAUSD School
Board, 	threatened you then by 	saying 	"We'll 	get you. 	You'll
never work here 	at Crenshaw again." 	Vicki 	Roach, 	a UTLA 	striker,
claimed 	that you 	assaulted 	her 	or 	touched her with your 	hands.
Also, 	you were 	criticized at 	a 	UTLA rally on or about May 	20,
1989. 	In September 	1991, 	the District 	indicated the May 	1989 	ISR
should not be used, 	but would 	still 	not 	rehire/hire you 	as 	a
substitute employee 	(see footnote 2 ) . 	Thus, 	you contend this
indicates 	the October 	1991 	Quinonez 	letter was 	arbitrary/had 	a
bad motive. 	Third, 	you 	contend that UTLA's 	refusals 	to 	go 	to
binding 	arbitration 	in the 	above 	grievances were 	capricious 	and
done 	in bad 	faith. 	The 	union allowed your dismissal 	to 	stand.
Fourth, 	you contend that 	you're 	being a 	black male 	earning 	about
$175 	a day 	as 	an 	incentive 	substitute played a role 	in the
Quinonez 	October 	1991 	letter. 	You believe you were treated 	in a
disparate manner by 	UTLA as 	historically, 	black people were
excluded 	from good 	jobs. 	You 	then referred to 	race 	and
economics. 	You were high on the 	"sub 	list," 	being number one,
being 	called 	first 	based 	on your 	language 	skill, 	time 	and grade.
Therefore, 	by your being dismissed by the District, 	this 	allowed
another person a preference, 	namely a non-black, 	younger 	female.
On March 	18, 	1992 	you called me to provide additional
information. 	First, 	you contend that 	since you 	sued the 	union,
Mr. 	Quinonez acted with malice on October 4, 	1991 	in finding no
basis 	to 	challenge your 	1990 	dismissal 	as 	a 	substitute 	teacher.
Second, 	you 	contend you were displaced without 	cause 	and 	UTLA 	is
permitting this 	to happen and 	acting 	in bad 	faith. 	You 	believe
that your September 20, 	1991 	letter to Mr. 	Quinonez 	asked the
union 	to 	proceed 	on your behalf 	and 	also 	asked 	again 	that 	your
grievance 	challenging your dismissal 	as 	a 	substitute 	teacher be

Warning 	Letter
LA-CO-587
March 20, 	1992
Page 	4
taken to binding arbitration.5 I 	indicated 	in part that 	I 	would
be 	sending 	you 	this 	warning 	letter.
The 	allegations 	in your 	charge 	do not 	state a prima 	facie 	case
for 	several reasons. 	First, 	EERA does 	not allow a complaint to
issue 	regarding 	a 	charge 	based 	upon 	an 	alleged 	unfair practice
occurring more than 	six 	months 	prior to 	the 	filing of 	the 	charge.
It 	is 	the charging party's burden, 	as part of the prima 	facie
case to prove the charge was 	timely filed. 	Furthermore, 	there 	is
no 	longer any 	equitable 	tolling 	of 	the 	six 	month 	limitations
period. 	The Regents 	of 	the University of California 	(1990) 	PERB
Decision No. 	826-H. 	This 	charge was 	filed on February 25, 	1992.
Therefore, 	we may 	only 	consider alleged unlawful 	conduct 	of 	the
union occurring after on or about August 	25, 	1991. 	Thus 	all
allegations 	of 	unlawful 	conduct prior 	to 	this 	date 	are 	untimely,
and will 	be 	dismissed.6 Although 	the 	Quinonez 	letter 	to 	you
dated October 4, 	1991 	is within the 	six month 	statutory period,
it 	too 	is 	arguably time barred. 	In a 	case 	involving the duty of
fair representation, 	a claim accrues 	on the date when the
employee, 	in the exercise of reasonable diligence, 	knew, 	or
should 	have 	known 	that 	further 	assistance 	from 	the 	union was
unlikely. 	See 	International 	Union of 	Operating Engineers. 	Local
501 	(Reich) 	(1986) 	PERB Decision No. 	591-H. 	You knew in or about
April 	1991 	that 	UTLA would 	not 	take 	your 	grievance 	to 	binding
arbitration, 	and that 	it determined that 	there was 	no 	statutory
or 	contractual 	basis 	upon which to 	challenge your 	1990 	dismissal
as 	a 	substitute. 	Thus, 	you had until 	on or about October 	10,
1991 	to 	file a 	charge based upon the union's 	conduct. 7
5Although your September 	20, 	1991 	letter arguably did
request his 	aid, 	and that he 	advise 	UTLA of the progress 	you had
made, 	it did not 	specifically 	ask that 	your grievance be 	taken 	to
binding 	arbitration.
6This 	includes, 	in part, 	any acts 	or omissions by UTLA in
refusing to take the grievance 	(over your discharge) 	to binding
arbitration on April 	10, 	1991. 	As you have provided no date 	for
UTLA's 	refusing to take your September 	10, 	1990 	grievance 	(not
being used 	for 	summer school) 	to binding arbitration, 	we must
assume 	it 	is 	outside 	the 	six 	month 	statutory period.
7See Compton Community College 	District 	(1991) 	PERB 	Decision
No. 	915 	at pages 	4-6 	for the 	law on 	"continuing violations."
"Generally, 	a violation is 	a 	continuing one if 	the violation has
been 	revived by 	subsequent 	unlawful 	conduct within the 	six-month
statute of 	limitations." 	(citations 	omitted) 	Here, 	you were
arguably 	requesting 	reconsideration 	of 	a 	union decision 	not 	to 	go
to 	binding 	arbitration 	initially 	made 	by 	the union 	in 	January 	and

Warning 	Letter
LA-CO-587
March 20, 	1992
Page 5
Second, 	assuming your allegations are timely, 	there 	is 	no
evidence 	indicating violations 	of 	the union's 	duty 	of 	fair
representation 	(DFR). 	The 	following 	information describes what
is 	needed to allege 	a prima 	facie 	case 	involving 	the 	DFR
guaranteed under EERA. 	The 	duty of 	fair 	representation 	imposed
on the 	exclusive 	representative 	extends 	to 	negotiating 	and
grievance handling. 	Fremont Teachers Association 	(King) 	(1980)
PERB Decision No. 	125; 	United Teachers 	of Los Angeles 	(Collins)
(1983) 	PERB Decision No. 	258. 	In order to state a prima 	facie
violation of 	this 	section of 	the EERA, 	Charging Party must 	show
that the Association's 	conduct was 	arbitrary, 	discriminatory, 	or
in bad faith. 	In United Teachers of Los Angeles 	(Collins), 	Id. ,
the Public 	Employment Relations 	Board 	(PERB) 	stated:
Absent bad faith, 	discrimination, 	or
arbitrary conduct, 	mere negligence or poor
judgment 	in handling a 	grievance does 	not
constitute a breach of the union's duty.
A union may 	exercise 	its 	discretion 	to
determine how 	far 	to pursue 	a 	grievance 	on
the 	employee's behalf as 	long as 	it does 	not
arbitrarily 	ignore 	a 	meritorious 	grievance 	or
process 	a grievance 	in a perfunctory 	fashion.
A union 	is 	also 	not 	required 	to process 	an
employee's 	grievance 	if 	the 	chances 	for
success are minimal.
In order to 	state 	a prima 	facie 	case 	of 	arbitrary 	conduct
violating the duty of 	fair representation, 	a Charging Party:
. 	. 	. must, at a minimum, include an
assertion of 	sufficient 	facts 	from which 	it
becomes 	apparent how or 	in what manner the
exclusive 	representative's 	action or 	inaction
was without a 	rational basis 	or devoid of
honest 	judgment. 	Reed District 	Teachers
Association. 	CTA/NEA 	(Reyes) 	(1983) 	PERB
Decision No. 	332, 	citing Rocklin Teachers
April 	1991. 	See Oakland 	Education Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(Mingo)
(1984) 	PERB Decision No. 	447 where 	subsequent requests 	that the
union file grievances, 	and the union's 	refusal 	to 	file a
grievance, 	did not 	constitute a 	continuing violation.

Warning 	Letter
LA-CO-587
March 20, 	1992
Page 6
Professional Association 	(Romero) 	(1980) 	PERB
Decision No. 	124.
As 	I 	indicated to you on March 	18, 	1992, 	the present charge 	fails
to 	state a prima 	facie 	case 	as 	it does 	not allege 	facts 	or 	show
that the union's 	conduct on October 4, 	1991 was 	arbitrary,
discriminatory or 	in bad 	faith. 	As 	seen above, 	mere negligence
or poor 	judgment does 	not 	constitute 	a breach of 	the 	union's
duty. 	Pleading or 	raising 	a bare 	allegation without 	sufficient
supporting 	facts 	is 	insufficient 	for purposes 	of 	alleging 	a prima
facie case. 	California State University 	(Pomona) 	(1988) 	PERB
Decision No. 	710-H. 	Furthermore, 	PERB regulation 32615
(California Code of Regulations, 	title 8, 	section 32615) 	requires
that 	a 	charge 	contain 	"a 	clear 	and 	concise 	statement 	of 	the 	facts
and 	conduct 	alleged 	to 	constitute 	an unfair practice." 	(emphasis
added.) 	The Charging Party must 	allege with 	specificity who,
what, 	when, 	where and how the union's 	activities were arbitrary,
discriminatory, 	or in bad faith. 	Mere 	speculation, 	conjecture or
legal 	conclusions 	are 	insufficient.
You view your dismissal 	as 	the 	imposition of discipline 	in
contravention of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 	Thus, 	you
believe 	that 	the 	union 	should 	have proceeded 	in 	challenging 	your
dismissal/going to binding arbitration. 	The Agreement 	states 	at
Article V, 	section 	11.0, 	Request for Arbitration:
If the grievance is not 	settled in Step Two, 	UTLA, 	with
the 	concurrence of the 	grievant, 	may 	submit 	the matter
to 	arbitration by 	a written notice 	to 	the 	District's
office of Staff Relations within five 	(5) 	days 	after
termination of Step Two 	(emphasis added).
The Agreement 	appears 	to 	allow the union the discretion to 	submit
matters 	to arbitration with the 	concurrence of the 	grievant. 	It
does 	not 	say that 	the union must 	submit 	the matter to
arbitration. 	Your assertion above 	is 	insufficient to 	show that
the union's determination by Mr. 	Quinonez 	on October 4, 	1991 was
arbitrary, 	discriminatory or 	in bad faith. 	Next, 	the negative
comments 	or threats 	made to you 	in 	1989, 	after you crossed the
picket 	line, 	do 	not 	support a 	finding that union conduct 	on
October 4, 	1991 was without a rational basis, 	devoid of honest
judgment, 	discriminatory, 	or in bad faith. 	Likewise, 	your
general 	allegations of disparate treatment due to 	sexual, 	age,
race or economic 	discrimination do not 	show that Mr. 	Quinonez,
for UTLA, 	acted on October 	4, 	1991 with an unlawful motive or
without 	any rational basis. 	Also, 	there are insufficient 	facts
to 	show that Mr. 	Quinonez 	acted with malice due 	to your 	lawsuit
against 	the union. 	Therefore, 	there are no allegations

Warning 	Letter
LA-CO-587
March 20, 	1992
Page 7
indicating 	that 	in determining 	it 	could 	not 	successfully
challenge your dismissal, 	that 	UTLA acted 	in an arbitrary,
discriminatory, 	or bad 	faith manner.
For these reasons, 	the 	charge as presently written does 	not 	state
a prima 	facie 	case. 	If 	there 	are any 	factual 	inaccuracies 	in
this 	letter 	or 	any 	additional 	facts 	that would 	correct 	the
deficiencies 	explained above, 	please 	amend the 	charge
accordingly. 	The 	amended 	charge 	should be prepared on a 	standard
PERB 	unfair practice 	charge 	form 	clearly 	labeled 	First 	Amended
Charge, 	contain all 	the 	facts 	and allegations 	you wish to make,
and 	must 	be 	signed under penalty 	of 	perjury by 	the 	charging
party. 	The 	amended 	charge 	must be 	served on the 	respondent8 and
the 	original proof of 	service must be 	filed with PERB. 	If 	I 	do
not 	receive 	an 	amended 	charge 	or withdrawal 	from 	you before
March 27f 	1992. 	I 	shall dismiss your charge. 	If you have any
questions, 	please call me at 	(213) 	736-3127.
Sincerely,
Marc 	S. 	Hurwitz
Regional 	Attorney
8Roger Segure, 	Director of Grievance Processing, 	United
Teachers-Los Angeles, 	2511 W. 	Third Street, 	Los Angeles, 	Ca.
90057