Travis Unified School District (PERB 0917E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
TRAVIS 	UNIFIED TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION,
Charging 	Party,
v.
TRAVIS 	UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
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) 	Case No. 	SF-CE-1307
PERB Decision No. 	917
January 3, 	1992
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Appearances: 	California Teachers Association by Ramon E. 	Romero,
Attorney, 	for Travis 	Unified Teachers Association; 	Littler,
Mendelson, 	Fastiff & Tichy by Victor J. 	James, 	II, Attorney, 	for
Travis 	Unified 	School 	District.
Before Hesse, 	Chairperson; 	Shank and Camilli, 	Members.
DECISION
SHANK, 	Member: 	This 	case 	is before the Public 	Employment
Relations 	Board 	(PERB or Board) 	on appeal by the 	Travis 	Unified
School District 	(District) 	to a proposed decision 	(attached) 	of 	a
PERB administrative 	law judge 	(ALJ). 	The ALJ 	found that 	the
District violated section 3543.5(b), 	(c) 	and 	(e) 	of the
Educational 	Employment Relations Act 	(EERA)1 by 	insisting up 	to
JEERA 	is 	codified at Government Code 	section 	3540 	et 	seq.
Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory references 	herein 	are
to the Government Code. 	Section 3543.5 	states, 	in pertinent
part:
It 	shall 	be unlawful 	for a public 	school 	employer to do
any of 	the 	following:
(b) 	Deny to employee organizations 	rights
guaranteed 	to 	them by 	this 	chapter.
(c) 	Refuse or 	fail 	to meet and negotiate 	in
good 	faith with 	an 	exclusive 	representative.
________________ )

and 	through 	impasse 	on restrictions 	that would 	bar 	the 	Travis
Unified 	Teachers 	Association 	(Association) 	from 	filing 	grievances
in its own name.
The 	Board has 	reviewed the 	entire 	record 	in this 	case,
including the 	stipulated record, 	proposed decision, 	District's
exceptions 	and the Association's 	responses 	thereto. 	The Board
finds 	the ALJ's 	findings 	of 	fact 	and conclusions 	of 	law to be
free 	of prejudicial 	error and 	adopts 	them as 	the decision of 	the
Board 	itself.2
DISTRICT'S 	EXCEPTIONS
On appeal, 	the 	District 	filed exceptions 	to 	the proposed
decision, 	claiming that: 	(1) 	PERB erroneously concluded, 	as a
matter of 	law, 	that an exclusive representative has 	a 	statutory
right to 	file grievances 	in its own name, 	and that this 	is 	a
nonmandatory 	subject of bargaining; 	and 	(2) 	the ALJ 	erroneously
found 	that 	the 	District 	insisted 	to 	impasse 	on waiver 	of 	the
Association's right to grieve, 	as the Association did not, 	prior
to 	impasse, 	put the District on notice that 	it would not bargain
over the 	grievance proposal.
(e) 	Refuse to participate 	in good 	faith 	in the
impasse procedure 	set 	forth 	in Article 	9
(commencing with Section 3548).
2The 	Board 	finds 	that 	the ALJ properly granted 	the
Association's 	motion 	to 	amend 	the 	complaint 	and therefore 	finds
it 	unnecessary to discuss 	the basis 	for the ALJ's 	authority 	to
amend the 	complaint during the hearing process. 	Accordingly, 	the
Board declines 	to adopt 	this portion of 	the proposed decision.
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DISCUSSION
The 	District's 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	was 	filed prior 	to
the 	appellate 	court's 	rulings 	in South Bay Union 	School 	District
v. 	PERB/Southwest Teachers Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(1991) 	228
Cal.App.3d 	502 	(South Bay) and Mt. 	Diablo 	Unified 	School 	District
(1990) 	PERB Decision No. 	844, 	review den.3 In South Bay, 	the
court upheld 	PERB's 	ruling 	that 	an 	employee 	association has 	a
statutory right 	to 	file grievances 	in its 	own name, 	and that 	this
issue 	is 	not a mandatory 	subject of bargaining. 	PERB also
addressed this 	issue 	in Chula Vista 	City 	School 	District 	(1990)
PERB Decision No. 	834 	(Chula Vista). 	In Chula Vista, 	the Board
held 	the Association has 	a 	statutory right 	to present 	grievances
in its ow	4 	n name, 	and that this 	is 	a nonmandatory 	subject of
bargaining. 	Further, 	the Board held that 	once 	the Association
took a 	firm position that 	the 	District's 	proposal 	limiting 	its
right to 	file grievances 	not be included in the 	contract, 	the
District's 	continued 	insistence on the proposal was 	a per 	se
violation of 	the duty 	to 	bargain 	in good 	faith 	and 	the 	duty 	to
participate 	in good 	faith 	in the 	impasse procedures.
In 	its 	exceptions, 	the District argues 	that Chula Vista 	and
South 	Bay were 	incorrectly decided 	and 	urges 	the 	Board 	to
reconsider its 	rulings on this 	issue. 	As 	the ALJ's 	analysis
comports with the rulings 	of 	the Board and 	the 	appellate 	court 	on
the right of an association to 	file grievances 	in 	its 	own name,
3On July 	11, 	1991, 	the District's Petition for Writ of
Review with the 	California 	Supreme 	Court was 	denied.
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the 	Board declines 	to accept 	the District's 	invitation to hold
otherwise here.
The 	District 	also 	argues 	that 	the Association's 	failure 	to
inform the District, 	prior to 	impasse, 	that 	it refused to bargain
on this 	subject by removing it 	from the bargaining table, 	is
fatal 	to 	its 	claim. 	The District 	claims 	the Association
maintained 	its 	bargaining position 	(rather 	than withdrawing 	the
subject) 	up to 	impasse 	and until the 	final mediation 	session.
The 	District asserts 	that 	as 	long as 	a union continues 	to 	insist
on placing 	language 	in the contract, 	it 	cannot be 	found to have
withdrawn the 	subject 	from the 	table, 	citing Lake 	Elsinore 	School
District 	(1986) 	PERB Decision No. 	603. 	Thus, 	the District argues
that 	it did not 	insist 	to 	impasse 	that the Association waive 	its
statutory rights.
The 	facts 	of 	this 	case are very 	similar to those of
Chula Vista. 	In Chula Vista, 	the parties 	reached 	impasse with
the Association 	continuing 	to propose 	changes 	to 	the 	restrictive
grievance 	language, 	and 	the District 	insisting on maintenance 	of
the 	status 	quo. 	While the Association did not 	explicitly 	state
that 	the proposals 	in question were 	"outside the 	scope 	of
bargaining," 	the Association did make 	clear 	its 	contention that
it was 	improper 	for the District to 	insist 	on 	language which 	it
believed deprived 	it 	of 	its 	statutory rights. 	The 	Board 	found 	in
Chula Vista, 	that 	"the Association's 	statements 	[were] 	sufficient
to put 	the District 	on notice 	that 	the Association was 	unwilling
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to waive 	its 	statutory right to represent 	its 	members."
(Chula Vista, p. 	26.)
Similarly 	in this 	case, 	the District continued to 	insist 	on
maintenance 	of 	the 	status 	quo throughout negotiations 	and
impasse. 	The Association continued to refuse to waive 	its
statutory rights, 	while at the 	same time continuing to press 	for
inclusion of 	its proposal 	in the agreement. 	The District's
exceptions are, 	therefore, 	rejected.
ORDER
Based upon the 	foregoing and 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	this 	case
it 	is 	found that 	the Travis 	Unified School 	District violated
section 3543.5(b), 	(c) 	and 	(e) 	of the Educational Employment
Relations Act. 	Pursuant to Government Code section 3 541.5(c) 	it
is 	hereby ORDERED that the Travis 	Unified School 	District, 	its
officers 	and representatives 	shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Insisting to 	impasse and during 	impasse on
contractual 	language 	outside 	the 	scope 	of 	representation which
has 	the 	effect 	of 	restricting the Association's 	right 	to 	file
grievances 	on 	its 	own behalf.
2. 	Enforcing and giving effect to those portions 	of
the 	1988-90 	collective bargaining 	agreement which 	restrict 	the
Association's 	right 	to 	file 	and process 	grievances 	in 	its 	own
name.
3. 	Interfering with the Association's 	right to
represent its members.
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B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE 	THE 	POLICIES 	OF 	THE 	EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS ACT:
1. 	Accept and process 	grievances 	filed by the
Association on behalf 	of 	individual 	unit members 	as 	appropriate
under the 	time 	lines 	and 	subject matter requirements 	of 	the
contract 	between the parties.
2. 	Accept and process 	requests 	for arbitration
initiated by 	the Association on behalf 	of 	individual 	unit
members, 	without requiring that a written request be made by 	the
grievant(s) 	to the Association, 	as appropriate under the time
line 	and 	subject matter requirements 	of 	the 	contract.
3. 	Within thirty-five 	(35) 	days 	following the date
this 	Decision is 	no 	longer subject to reconsideration, 	post at
all 	work 	locations 	within 	the 	Travis 	Unified 	School 	District
where 	notices 	to 	certificated 	employees 	are 	customarily placed,
copies 	of the Notice attached hereto as 	an appendix. 	The Notice
must be 	signed by an authorized agent of 	the District, 	indicating
that 	it will 	comply with the terms 	of this 	Order. 	Such posting
shall 	be 	maintained 	for a period of 	thirty 	(30) 	consecutive work
days. 	Reasonable 	steps 	shall be taken to 	insure that the Notice
is 	not reduced 	in size, 	altered, 	defaced or covered by any other
material.
4. 	Written notification of 	the actions 	taken to 	comply
with this Order 	shall be made to the San Francisco Regional
Director 	of 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	in accord with
her 	instructions. 	Continue to report in writing to the Regional
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Director thereafter as 	directed. 	All 	reports 	to the Regional
Director 	shall 	be 	concurrently 	served 	on 	the 	charging party
herein.
Chairperson Hesse 	and Member 	Camilli 	joined 	in this 	Decision.
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APPENDIX
NOTICE 	TO 	EMPLOYEES
POSTED 	BY 	ORDER 	OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
An Agency 	of 	the 	State 	of 	California
After a hearing 	in Unfair Practice Case No. 	SF-CE-1307,
Travis 	Unified 	Teachers 	Association v. 	Travis 	Unified 	School
District, 	in which 	all parties 	had the 	right to participate, 	it
has 	been 	found 	that 	the 	Travis 	Unified 	School 	District 	violated
the Educational Employment Relations Act 	(Act), 	Government Code
section 3543.5(b), 	(c) and (e).
As 	a 	result of 	this 	conduct, 	we have 	been ordered 	to post
this 	notice 	and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND 	DESIST 	FROM:
1. 	Insisting 	to 	impasse 	and during 	impasse 	on
contractual 	language 	outside 	the 	scope 	of 	representation which
has 	the 	effect 	of 	restricting 	the Association's 	right 	to 	file
grievances 	on 	its 	own behalf.
2. 	Enforcing 	and giving 	effect 	to those portions 	of
the 	1988-90' collective bargaining agreement which restrict the
Association's 	right 	to 	file 	and process 	grievances 	in 	its 	own
name.
3. 	Interfering with the Association's 	right 	to
represent its members.
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED 	TO
EFFECTUATE 	THE 	POLICIES 	OF 	THE 	EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS ACT:
1. 	Accept 	and process 	grievances 	filed by 	the
Association on behalf 	of 	individual 	unit 	members 	as 	appropriate
under the 	time 	lines 	and 	subject 	matter 	requirements 	of 	the
contract 	between the parties.
2. 	Accept 	and process 	requests 	for arbitration
initiated 	by 	the Association on behalf 	of 	individual 	unit
members, 	without 	requiring that 	a written request be 	made by 	the
grievant(s) 	to the Association, 	as 	appropriate under the time
line 	and 	subject 	matter 	requirements 	of 	the 	contract.
Dated: 	TRAVIS 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL 	DISTRICT
By:.
Authorized 	Agent
THIS 	IS 	AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. 	IT MUST REMAIN POSTED 	FOR AT 	LEAST
THIRTY 	(30) 	CONSECUTIVE 	WORKDAYS 	FROM THE 	DATE 	OF 	POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE 	REDUCED 	IN SIZE, 	DEFACED, 	ALTERED OR COVERED BY ANY
MATERIAL.

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
TRAVIS 	UNIFIED 	TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION,
Charging 	Party,
v.
TRAVIS 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL 	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Unfair 	Practice
Case No. 	SF-CE-1307
PROPOSED 	DECISION
(9/21/90)
Appearances: 	Ramon E. 	Romero, 	Attorney, 	for Travis Unified
Teachers Association; 	Littler, 	Mendelson, 	Fastiff & Tichy by
Victor J. 	James, 	II, Attorney, 	for Travis Unified School
District.
Before William P. 	Smith, 	Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL 	HISTORY
On or about March 30, 	1989, 	the Travis Unified Teachers
Association, 	(hereafter Association) 	filed an unfair practice
charge 	against 	the 	Travis 	Unified 	School 	District 	(hereafter
District) 	alleging that the 	District had 	insisted up 	to 	and
through 	impasse 	on restrictions 	that would 	bar 	the Association
from filing grievances 	in 	its 	own name on behalf 	of 	District
employees.
On July 	12, 	1989, 	the General Counsel of the Public
Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(hereafter PERB 	or Board) 	issued a
complaint 	alleging that 	the 	District's 	conduct 	constituted 	a
This proposed decision has been appealed to the
Board itself and may not be cited as precedent
unless the decision and its rationale have been
adopted by the Board.
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violation of 	sections 	3543.5(a) 	and 	(b)1 of the Educational
Employment Relations Act 	(hereafter EERA or Act).
On or about July 27, 	1989, 	the District filed an answer to
the 	unfair practice 	complaint 	alleging 	as 	affirmative 	defenses
that 	the 	District's 	actions 	conformed 	to past practice 	and 	that
the 	District's 	actions did not violate any rights 	under the EERA.
On October 	11, 	1989, 	pursuant to PERB Rule 32207 	(Cal.
Admin. 	Code, 	tit. 	8, 	section 32207), 	the parties submitted a
stipulated 	statement of 	facts 	in 	lieu of 	a hearing 	in this
matter.
The parties 	submitted briefs on November 	14, 	1989.
On November 26 and December 	7, 	1989, 	the administrative 	law
judge 	issued 	amendments 	to 	the 	complaint 	alleging that 	the
2
1All 	section references, 	unless otherwise noted, 	are to the
Government Code. 	EERA is 	codified at Government Code 	section
3540 	et 	seq. 	Section 3543.5 	reads 	in relevant part:
It 	shall be unlawful 	for a public 	school
employer to:
(a) 	Impose or threaten to 	impose reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate 	against 	employees 	or 	otherwise
to 	interfere with, 	restrain or coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise of 	rights
guaranteed by this 	chapter.
(b) 	Deny to employee organizations 	rights
guaranteed 	to 	them by this 	chapter.
(c) 	Refuse or 	fail 	to meet and negotiate 	in
good 	faith with 	an 	exclusive 	representative.
2
(e) 	Refuse to participate 	in good 	faith 	in
the 	impasse procedure 	set 	forth in Article 	9
(commencing with Section 3548).

District's 	conduct 	constituted 	a 	violation of 	sections 	3543.5(c)
and 	(e) 	of the EERA.
The parties were given until January 	18, 	1990, 	to file
briefs 	in response to the amendments. 	On January 	16, 	1990,
Respondent moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	second 	amended 	complaint.
Charging Party had until February 	12, 	1990, 	to 	file 	its 	response
to the motion. 	On February 	13, 	1990, 	Charging Party requested to
reopen the 	record 	and 	to 	amend 	the 	complaint by 	alleging
violation of 	3543.5(c) 	and 3543.5(e). 	Respondent was given until
February 	16, 	1990, 	to request an opportunity to present
additional 	evidence by hearing to the record 	in the 	case. 	On
February 	16 	the 	parties 	requested 	and were 	granted an 	extension
until February 23, 	1990, 	to file the responses due on February
16, 	1990. 	On March 21, 	1990, 	the Motion to Dismiss the second
amended complaint was 	denied, 	the Complaint as 	amended thus
alleged violation of sections 3543.5(a), 	(b), 	(c) and (e), and
the 	record was 	declared open to 	receive 	additional 	evidence 	from
the parties 	in response to the 	amended 	complaint. 	A hearing was
set 	for May 	3, 	1990. 	The parties 	submitted an amendment to the
stipulation of 	facts 	in lieu of the hearing. 	The proposed
amendment 	to 	the 	stipulation of 	facts 	is 	hereby admitted to 	the
record as 	joint 	exhibit H. 	The parties were given until May 	18
to 	file additional briefs. 	Briefs were 	filed and the matter was
submitted on May 	18, 	1990.
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STATEMENT OF 	FACTS
The Association 	is 	an employee 	organization and 	an 	exclusive
representative 	of 	an appropriate unit of 	the 	District's
certificated employees as 	defined by the Act. 	The District 	is 	a
public 	school 	employer as 	defined by the Act.
The Association and the District have been parties 	to 	a
series 	of 	collective bargaining agreements 	(hereafter MOU). 	One
of those agreements was effective by its 	terms 	from July 	1, 	1985,
through June 30, 	1988.
Article 	6 	of the 	1985-88 	collective bargaining agreement 	is
entitled 	"Grievance Procedure" 	and defines 	a 	"grievance" 	as
follows:
Grievance 	shall 	mean a 	complaint by an
employee 	or group 	of 	employees 	that there has
been to him/her 	(or them) 	a violation of
inequitable 	application of 	any provisions 	of
the Agreement.
During 	negotiations 	for the 	1985-88 	bargaining 	agreement 	the
Association 	submitted 	a proposal 	to 	include 	the Association's
right 	to 	grieve 	and binding arbitration. 	The parties 	did 	not
agree 	to 	include 	either of 	the provisions 	in the 	1985-88
bargaining 	agreement.
During the 	spring of 	1988, 	the Association and the District
commenced 	negotiations 	to 	reach 	agreement 	upon a 	collective
bargaining agreement 	to 	succeed 	the 	1985-88 	agreement. 	The
Association made 	its 	initial proposal 	on or about 	February 	9,
1988, 	and the District made its 	initial proposal on or about
March 8, 	1988.
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In its 	initial proposal, 	the Association proposed that a
"grievance" 	under 	the 	successor 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement
be redefined as 	follows:
Grievance 	shall 	mean a 	complaint by one or
more 	teachers 	or the Association that 	there
has been to him/her 	(or them) 	a violation of
inequitable 	application of 	any provisions 	of
the Agreement.
In its 	initial proposal, 	the District proposed that there be
no 	change 	in the definition of 	a 	"grievance" 	from the 	1985-88
agreement 	to 	the 	successor agreement.
The parties' 	face-to-face 	successor contract negotiations
continued 	through 	the 	spring 	and 	summer of 	1988 	with 	the parties
meeting on approximately 	fifteen different 	dates. 	The 	sessions
alternated between 	"full day" 	and 	"half day" 	sessions. 	When
negotiations 	occurred on the 	full day 	schedule, 	the 	sessions
would 	start between 	7:00 	a.m. 	and 	8:30 	a.m., 	and would 	stop
approximately 	4:30 	p.m. 	When negotiations 	occurred 	on the 	half
day 	schedule, 	the parties would 	start at 	12:00 	noon and 	stop at
approximately 	5:00 	p.m. 	The Association 	insisted on 	starting 	and
stopping 	the 	negotiation 	sessions 	as 	indicated above.
The 	question whether 	the Association would have 	the 	right
to 	grieve was 	discussed at 	approximately 	five of 	those
negotiations 	sessions. 	Throughout 	those negotiations 	the parties
maintained their 	respective positions 	as 	described 	in the
paragraphs 	above. 	The Association 	steadfastly maintained 	in both
its 	oral 	and written communications 	that 	it had a right 	to
enforce 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement by 	filing 	a 	grievance

in 	its 	own name with or without 	identifying a member of 	the
bargaining unit 	as 	the person whose 	contract 	rights were
involved. 	On the 	other hand, 	the 	District 	steadfastly maintained
in both 	its 	oral 	and written communications 	its 	right 	to maintain
the 	existing definition of 	a 	grievance and did not 	agree 	to 	the
Association's proposal which would allow it 	to 	file 	a 	grievance
in its 	own name.
During the negotiation session occurring on May 5, 	1988, 	the
District's 	team, 	in response 	to the Association's proposals 	to
include the right to 	initiate grievances, 	offered to 	include 	a
specific 	reference 	to Government Code 	section 	3543.22 in the
agreement with 	the proviso 	that 	the parties would 	agree 	that 	the
grievance process would be governed by 	it.
The 	parties 	currently dispute what 	the 	District 	explained 	as
further rationale 	for 	its 	verbal 	offer. 	The Association contends
that, 	upon inquiry by its 	negotiating representatives, 	the
District's 	team explained that, 	because 	administrative 	law 	judge
decisions 	were 	not precedential 	and the Association's 	right 	to
initiate 	grievances 	under 	section 	3543.2 	had 	not been decided by
the 	PERB, 	the effect of the District's proposal would be to
require 	the Association and the 	District to go to 	court 	to
enforce 	the 	collective bargaining agreement. 	The 	District
contends 	that, 	upon inquiry by the Association's 	negotiating
representatives, 	the 	District explained that because ALJ
decisions 	were 	not precedential 	and the Association's 	right 	to
2See fn.6, infra, p.14.
6

initiate 	grievances 	under 	section 	3543.2 	had not been decided by
the 	PERB, 	the effect of 	the District's proposal would be to
require 	the Association and the 	District 	to 	abide by 	the 	court's
decision once made.3
The parties 	agree 	that 	the Association rejected 	the
District's proposal 	and 	continued to 	insist 	on 	its 	own proposal.
On or about October 3, 	1988, 	the parties 	filed with the
PERB's 	San Francisco Regional Office a 	joint 	request 	for 	impasse
determination and appointment of 	a 	mediator.
In the request, 	the parties 	certified that:
The parties have met 	in good faith. 	We have
exchanged proposals 	and 	counter-proposals 	on
all issues.
In addition to the formal negotiations, 	the
parties have met 	in private 	sessions 	and
fully discussed 	"settlement potential" 	in
each article. 	We have to date been unable to
fashion any 	settlement.
During 	the 	negotiation 	session occurring on October 	20,
1988, 	the District agreed, 	in principle, 	to that part of the
Association's 	proposal which asked 	for binding 	arbitration. 	On
that day, 	the parties 	agreed that the Association would draft 	the
language of the provision. 	Thereafter, 	the Association drafted
the 	language 	of 	the provision and tentative 	agreement was 	reached
on December 	13, 	1988, 	with the understanding that the District
refused to 	agree that 	the Association could 	file a 	grievance 	in
its 	own name 	to 	enforce the 	collective bargaining agreement.
3It 	is 	unnecessary to 	resolve this 	difference 	as 	to 	alleged
facts because 	it 	is 	irrelevant to the decision here.
7

On October 26, 	1988, 	the PERB declared that the parties'
successor contract negotiations were 	in 	fact 	at 	an 	impasse 	and
appointed a mediator to assist 	the parties 	in reaching agreement.
The 	parties 	maintained 	their 	respective 	positions 	described 	in
preceding paragraphs 	through the PERB's 	declaration of 	impasse.
During 	the 	time period 	from October 	through 	December 	of
1988, 	the parties 	met with the PERB-appointed mediator on one
occasion 	in an attempt to 	reach 	agreement 	upon a 	complete
successor 	contract.
During 	both 	face-to-face 	negotiations 	and 	the 	mediation
session, 	the parties 	maintained 	their positions 	regarding the
Association's 	proposal 	to grieve 	as 	described above. 	During 	the
face-to-face 	negotiations 	session held on or about May 	5, 	1988,
and the mediation 	session held on or about November 	3, 	1988,
Association 	representative 	Ben Ridlon 	stated 	that 	the Association
wanted the 	right 	to be a 	named 	grievant 	under the 	successor
collective bargaining 	agreement 	because 	it wanted 	to 	be 	able 	to
file 	a 	grievance to 	enforce the 	successor agreement 	in two 	kinds
of 	situations 	it had encountered in the past: 	(1) 	when a
bargaining unit 	member refused to 	file 	a 	grievance 	to 	enforce 	the
contract as 	it was being applied to him or her; 	and 	(2) 	when a
bargaining unit member was 	afraid to be 	named as 	a 	grievant 	for
fear of reprisals 	for filing a grievance. 	On both occasions, 	the
District's 	representative 	Todd 	De Mitchell 	asked 	for 	examples 	of
affected 	employees 	and 	the Association provided none. 	On both
occasions, 	Ben Ridlon refused to waive the Association's 	demand
8

to be 	a 	grievant and 	stated that 	the 	District's 	refusal 	to agree
to 	the Association's 	definition of 	a 	grievant under the 	successor
contract was 	a violation of 	the 	Educational 	Employment 	Relations
Act. 	Dr. 	De Mitchell 	responded to the Association by explaining
that 	the PERB decisions 	on this 	issue were ALJ decisions 	and 	thus
not precedential.
On or about November 3, 	1988, 	Association President Patty
Chavez 	delivered to 	the District 	a 	letter 	stating the
Association's 	refusal 	to waive 	its 	demand to 	file 	a 	grievance 	in
its 	own name.4
On or about December 12 or 	13, 	1988, 	the parties reached
agreement 	on all 	other parts 	of 	their 	successor 	collective
bargaining 	agreement 	including 	the provision 	allowing 	for binding
4The 	letter 	stated:
To Management:
As 	verbally 	stated 	in Negotiations 	on 	several
occasions including November 2, 	1988, 	the
Association has 	proposed 	and will 	not
relinquish 	its 	demand to have 	the right under
the 	Educational 	Employment 	Relations Act 	to
enforce 	any 	agreement 	made 	between the
employees 	in our Collective 	Bargaining 	Unit
and 	the Travis 	Unified 	School 	District.
Since the 	employer refuses 	to 	grant this
right 	and has 	insisted 	to 	impasse 	language
which would deny 	the Association 	its 	right 	to
enforce 	its 	contract 	through 	the 	grievance
process, 	the Association is notifying the
District 	that we will 	settle 	the 	rest 	of 	our
Contract 	issues 	and 	file 	the 	appropriate
Unfair 	Labor Practice 	charge with 	the 	Public
Employee 	[sic] 	Relations 	Board on this
matter.
9

arbitration. 	The 	grievance 	and 	arbitration provisions 	of 	the
successor 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	state 	in relevant part:
6.11 	Grievance
Grievance 	shall 	mean a 	complaint by an
employee 	or group 	of 	employees 	that there 	has
been to him/her 	(or them) 	a violation of
inequitable 	application of 	any provisions 	of
the Agreement.
6.12 	Aggrieved 	Person
An Aggrieved Person 	is 	the person making 	the
claim.
6.13 	A 	Party 	in 	Interest
A Party 	in Interest 	is 	the person making the
claim 	and 	any person who might 	be 	required 	to
take 	action or 	against whom action might be
taken 	in order to resolve 	the 	claim.
6.35 	Level 	3 	- 	Binding Arbitration
(a) 	If the aggrieved person is 	not satisfied
with disposition of 	grievance at 	Level 	2
. 	. 	. the grievant may . 	. 	. request in
writing to 	the Association that 	the 	grievance
be 	submitted to binding arbitration. 	The
Association 	shall 	retain the 	right 	to
determine which 	grievances 	may proceed 	to
arbitration. . . .
(c) 	The arbitrator . 	. 	. 	shall issue an
award 	. . . 	on 	issues 	are 	[sic] 	submitted to
him. 	The 	arbitrator's 	recommendation 	shall
set forth his 	findings of fact, 	reasoning,
and 	conclusions 	on 	issues 	submitted.
6.3 6 	Award of 	the Arbitrator
The award of 	the 	arbitrator 	shall 	be binding
upon the Association and the Board. 	. 	. 	.
10

LEGAL 	ISSUES
1. 	Did the District 	fail 	to meet and negotiate 	in good
faith by 	insisting 	to 	impasse 	that 	the Association agree 	to
contractual 	provision 	limiting 	the Association's 	right 	to 	file
and process 	grievances 	on behalf 	of 	individual 	unit members?
2. 	Did the District 	fail 	to participate 	in the 	impasse
procedures 	in 	good 	faith 	by 	insisting during mediation that 	the
Association 	agree 	to 	contractual 	provision 	limiting 	the
Association's 	right 	to 	file and process 	grievances 	on behalf 	of
individual 	union members?
3. 	Did the District, 	by the 	conduct described 	in
paragraphs one and two, 	interfere with employees' 	rights
guaranteed by 	the 	EERA?
4. 	Did the District's 	conduct, 	as described in paragraphs
one and two, 	constitute a denial of the rights 	of the
Association?
Amendment 	to 	Complaint
Charging 	Party's 	motion to 	amend the 	complaint 	to 	allege
Respondent's violation of 	sections 	3543.5(c) 	and 	(e) 	of the Act,
while arguably unnecessary, 	is 	granted.5 It 	is 	arguably
unnecessary, 	therefore, 	to decide whether, 	as the Respondent
urges, 	the administrative 	law judge 	lacks 	authority to 	initiate
such an amendment 	in the 	course 	of processing the 	case.
5This 	is 	in accord with the Order to Amend the Complaint
previously 	issued 	sua 	sponte 	by 	this ALJ 	on November 	26 	and
December 7, 	1989.
11

The administrative law judge, 	as Board agent, 	is responsible
for processing 	the 	complaint 	through hearing 	to 	a proposed
decision. 	The ALJ has 	the responsibility to provide 	an
evidentiary hearing 	to 	the parties 	and apply 	the 	appropriate 	law
to the facts.
The 	regulations 	directing the ALJ's 	conduct of 	the hearing
process 	are appropriately 	sparse. 	In the absence of 	specific
directions 	on a 	subject, 	the regulations 	necessarily contemplate
wise 	application by 	analogy 	of 	due process 	principles 	established
by the California Civil Code of Procedure and the courts. 	A
judge, 	in trying a 	civil 	complaint 	concerning a transportation
rate 	case, 	has 	authority to order an amendment to the 	complaint
sua 	sponte appropriate to the evidence before him, 	in the public
interest. 	See R.E. 	Tharp. 	Inc. 	v. 	Miller Hay Co. 	(1968) 	261
Cal.App. 2d 81, 	86 	[67 Cal.Rptr. 	854]. 	The court found that the
enforcement 	of 	the 	rate 	structures 	set by the California Public
Utilities 	Commission was 	sufficient public 	interest 	to 	justify 	a
special case exception to the general rule 	(i.e., 	that a 	judge
has 	no 	obligation to 	amend the pleadings 	absent 	a party's
motion).
. 	. 	. 	The opinion concludes that the public
policy 	supporting 	the 	rate 	regulations 	and
the 	orders 	of 	the Commission 	"overshadows 	the
purpose 	for adhering to 	strict 	rules 	of
pleading and imposed on the trial 	judge, 	in
the 	instant case, 	the duty to order an
appropriate 	amendment 	to plaintiff's
pleadings 	after 	he 	sustained defendant's
objections." 	(261 	C.A.2d 	86.)
5 Whitkin, 	California Procedure 	(3d ed.
1985), Court's Duty to Order Amendment, 	sec.
1141, p. 557.
12

A 	similar public 	interest applies 	to this 	case by analogy.
All parties were given opportunity to add to 	the 	record
additional 	facts 	in 	support and/or defense of the 	complaint 	as
amended and to 	submit additional briefs. 	Therefore, 	no prejudice
to 	either party results 	from the 	amendment.
DISCUSSION
The 	District's 	Conduct as 	a Violation of 	Section 	3543.5(c)
Failure 	to Negotiate
Public 	school 	employers 	have a duty under 	section 	3543.3 	to
"meet and negotiate with 	. 	. 	. 	representatives of employee
organizations 	selected as 	exclusive 	representatives 	of
appropriate units 	. 	. 	. 	." 	Failure to meet and negotiate in good
faith with 	an exclusive 	representative 	is 	an unfair practice 	and
a violation of EERA section 3543.5(c). 	The obligation to
negotiate 	is bilateral. 	Section 3543.6(c) 	places 	the reciprocal
duty on the exclusive representatives. 	The obligation is 	not
unlimited, 	however, 	and extends only to 	"matters 	relating to
wages, 	hours of employment, 	and other terms and conditions of
13

employment."6 Subjects within the 	scope of 	section 	3543.2 	are
commonly 	referred 	to 	as 	mandatory 	subjects 	of 	negotiation.
Subjects 	outside the 	scope of 	section 3543.2 	are not
mandatory 	(nonmandatory) 	subjects of negotiations.
The 	District has 	attempted to 	limit 	the Association's 	right
to 	file grievances 	in its 	own name by 	insisting to 	impasse 	as
well 	as 	throughout 	impasse that 	the Association agree 	to 	a
provision that would deny 	it 	this 	right without 	the 	employer's
consent. 	This 	subject is a nonmandatory subject of negotiations.
Chula Vista City School District 	(1990) 	PERB Decision No. 	834 	and
South Bay Union School District 	(1990) 	PERB Decision No. 	791.
See also Marine and Shipbuilding Workers v. 	NLRB 	(3 Cir. 	1963)
320 	F.2d 615 	[53 	LRRM 2878] 	and NLRB v. 	Wooster Div, 	of Borg-
Warner Corp. 	(1958) 	356 U.S. 	342 	[42 LRRM 2034].
When a party refuses 	to 	negotiate 	about 	a 	nonmandatory
subject, 	it 	is 	an unfair practice per se 	for the other party to
6The 	scope of 	representation under the EERA is 	set 	forth 	at
section 3543.2 which, 	in relevant part, 	provides as 	follows:
(a) 	The 	scope of representation shall be
limited to matters 	relating to wages, 	hours
of 	employment, 	and other terms 	and 	conditions
of 	employment. 	"Terms 	and conditions 	of
employment" 	mean health and welfare benefits
as defined by Section 53200, 	leave, 	transfer
and reassignment policies, 	safety conditions
of employment, 	class size, 	procedures to be
issued 	for the evaluation of 	employees,
organizational 	security pursuant 	to 	Section
3546, 	procedures 	for processing grievances
pursuant to Sections 3548.5, 	3548.6, 	3548.7,
and 3 548.8, 	and the layoff of probationary
certificated 	school 	district 	employees,
pursuant to Section 44959.5 	of 	the 	Education
Code. . . .
14

insist 	to 	impasse upon inclusion of 	that 	subject 	in the
agreement. 	The 	Board has 	held that 	insistence to 	impasse 	on a
nonmandatory 	subject of 	negotiations 	is 	a per 	se violation of 	the
Act. 	Lake Elsinore School District 	(1986) 	PERB Decision No. 	603.
There 	is 	no dispute between the parties 	that proposals
containing 	limitations 	on the Association's 	right 	to 	file
grievances 	in 	its 	own name or to 	initiate 	an arbitration
procedure 	are 	a 	nonmandatory 	subject 	of bargaining. 	The 	Board
recognized 	the 	distinction between a permissive 	subject 	of
bargaining and a 	nonmandatory 	subject. 	See Chula Vista 	City
School 	District, 	supra and South Bay Union School 	District 	(1990)
PERB Decision No. 	791. 7
The District argues 	that the Association, 	not the District,
proposed the 	subject 	of a modification to 	the 	existing
contractual 	grievance procedure 	to 	expressly recognize 	the
Association's 	rights 	to 	initiate 	the processing of 	a 	grievance
and proceed to 	arbitration without 	an 	employee's written 	consent.
The Association did initiate the proposal, 	but the
District's 	response was maintenance of the 	"status 	quo." 	This
was, 	in fact, 	a counter proposal that proposed that 	such
restrictions 	continue 	in a 	successor contract. 	The 	fact that 	the
parties 	reached an agreement as 	to 	a previous 	contract that
contained 	such 	restrictions 	indicates 	nothing more 	than the
permissive nature of the provisions 	as 	a 	subject of bargaining.
7See 	also South Bay Union School 	District 	(1990) 	PERB
Decision No. 	791(a).
15

But, 	the facts before us have established that the
Association was 	no 	longer agreeable 	to 	the maintenance 	of 	such
limitations 	in the contract. 	Its proposal on the 	subject, 	while
the 	first proposal 	on the 	subject between the parties 	during
these negotiations, 	was 	an appropriate means 	of 	indicating to the
District 	that 	it no 	longer wished to 	continue with the
maintenance of the previous 	limitations. 	Both parties were 	free
to deal with the 	subject 	on a proposal 	and 	counter-proposal basis
as 	long as both were willing. 	However, 	once the parties 	reached
an 	impasse 	in the negotiations 	the 	District's proposal 	on the
subject 	still 	on the 	table became one of 	the 	impediments 	to 	the
parties 	reaching 	an agreement.
It was 	no 	less 	an attempt by the 	District 	to 	coerce
agreement 	to a 	limitation on a 	nonmandatory 	subject because 	it
was 	phrased 	in the 	collective bargaining 	short hand 	of 	the
bargaining table as 	"maintenance of the 	status 	quo", 	or because
the Association had 	first broached 	the 	subject by 	initiation of 	a
proposal 	on the 	nonmandatory 	subject.
The Association 	correctly 	claims 	the 	EERA 	specifically
grants 	it the right to represent its members.8 Moreover, 	it also
8 In relevant part, 	section 3543.1(a) 	provides as 	follows:
(a) 	Employee organizations 	shall have the
right to 	represent their members 	in their
employment 	relations 	with public 	school
employers, 	except that once an employee
organization 	is 	recognized 	or 	certified 	as
the 	exclusive representative of 	an
appropriate 	unit pursuant 	to 	Section 	3544.1
or 3544.7, 	respectively, 	only that employee
organization may represent 	that 	unit 	in their
16
'

possesses 	as 	a 	significant 	aspect of 	its 	status 	as 	exclusive
representative 	the right 	to 	file 	grievances 	on behalf 	of 	all 	unit
members. 	This 	right, 	which the Association finds 	in several
federal cases, 	is 	in addition to the 	statutory right to represent
its members. 	(See section 3543.l(a) 	fn. 	8, 	supraf p. 	16.)
The 	District 	continued 	its 	insistence 	on the 	disputed
grievance 	language during the mediation process. 	Thus, 	the
Association, 	in order to reach an agreement, 	was 	forced to accept
the 	District's 	limitation on the 	nonmandatory 	subject.
Before the parties 	reached agreement, 	the Association gave
notice by its 	letter of November 	3, 	1989, 	to the District that 	it
intended 	to pursue 	the dispute 	through an unfair practice 	charge.
The District, 	was 	clearly aware of 	the Association's position on
this 	as 	a 	nonmandatory 	subject 	from the discussions 	between the
parties 	during 	the 	negotiations 	on their 	respective proposals 	and
from the Association's 	letter. 	Thus, 	the dispute was 	kept alive
despite 	the parties 	subsequently 	reaching 	agreement 	on a 	new MOU
containing the previous 	limitations 	on the Association's 	rights.
The Association 	is 	found to have 	executed the 	agreement
under the 	duress 	of 	the District's 	maintenance of 	an unlawful
position during 	negotiations 	to 	impasse 	on a 	nonmandatory
subject.
The 	District's 	conduct here 	is 	not appreciably different
from 	that 	found unlawful 	in the 	Chula Vista 	and 	South 	Bay
employment 	relations 	with 	the public 	school
employer. . . .
17

Association cases. 	Here, 	as 	in South Bay, 	the Association
reluctantly accepted contract 	language 	limiting 	its 	right 	to 	file
grievances 	in its 	own name. 	From the beginning of 	the
negotiations process, 	the Association repeatedly maintained 	its
rights 	through proposals 	and through discussions. 	The District
continued to 	insist 	on the restrictions. 	That 	the Association
finally withdrew its 	language as 	one way to 	achieve 	an overall
contract does 	not 	change the 	fact that the Respondent persisted
with 	its 	proposal 	for 	limitation on the Association's 	rights 	to
represent 	employees 	on the 	language 	to the 	end. 	Consistent with
the Chula Vista and South Bay cases, 	this 	conduct by the
9
Association 	cannot be 	regarded 	as 	a waiver. 	It would 	also be
unreasonable 	to 	conclude 	from this 	record 	that 	the 	District
merely proposed, 	but did not 	insist upon, 	that nonmandatory
subject.
Both parties 	joined in a request on October 3, 	1988, 	to the
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	that 	it 	find 	the 	negotiations
had 	reached 	impasse which 	stated:
The 	parties 	have 	met 	in 	good 	faith 	. . . .
The 	Respondent urges 	that 	the wording of this 	jointly
certified request 	should be 	conclusive, 	or at 	least 	indicative,
. .
9The 	existence of the parties' 	agreement on a nonmandatory
subject 	in previous 	contracts 	does 	not amount to 	a waiver of 	the
Association's 	right 	to refuse 	to bargain away 	its 	right 	to 	file
grievances 	in the 	future. 	In South Bay Union School 	District
(1990) 	PERB Decision No. 	791a, 	at p. 	5, 	the Board rejected a
similar contention, 	stating that the parties' 	past bargaining
history 	- 	suggesting 	that 	similar 	restrictions were 	treated 	as
part 	of the grievance procedure 	- was 	irrelevant.
18

that 	the 	Respondent 	negotiated 	in good 	faith as 	required by
section 3543.5(c). 	This 	statement 	is a 	legal conclusion and as
such, 	is one for the ALJ to make. 	The parties' 	conclusion on the
subject 	is 	not binding on or useful 	to the Administrative 	Law
Judge. 	The 	fact that the Association 	joined in such a 	statement,
routinely 	it may be presumed, 	in order to move the negotiations
to 	the mediation stage is 	little or no useful 	evidence as 	to the
legal 	conclusion herein nor, 	since 	it was made 	for a different
administrative purpose, 	is 	there reason to 	find the Association
bound by 	it 	in this 	proceeding.
During the exchange of proposals 	on the 	subject, 	the
District on May 5, 	1988, 	offered to incorporate 	section 3543.2
into 	the 	contract 	and be 	bound by precedential decisions
dispositive of that 	section.10 This proposal, 	while 	it may have
been well 	intended by the District, 	does 	not change the 	fact that
a party's 	maintenance of 	a proposal 	on a 	nonmandatory 	subject 	of
bargaining over the other party's objection to the proposal, 	does
so 	at their peril. 	This 	is 	easily distinguished from the 	case
where 	both parties 	mutually 	agree to 	a provision bound 	by 	future
court 	or board precedent.
At the point of 	impasse, 	the grievance dispute was 	one,
although not the only, 	subject preventing the parties 	from
reaching agreement on a new contract.
10At the time the proposal was 	made, 	Chula Vista City 	School
District, 	supra and South Bay Union School District, 	supra, 	had
-
not 	been 	issued.
19

It was, 	however, 	significant because maintenance of the
position of the District to 	impasse was 	a per se violation of 	its
duty to negotiate. 	The District, 	by its 	insistence to impasse on
clauses 	which would 	restrict 	the Association's 	ability 	to 	file
and arbitrate grievances, 	a 	subject outside the 	scope of
representation, 	has 	failed to meet and negotiate 	in good 	faith 	in
violation of EERA section 3543.5(c).
The 3543.5(b) 	Charge
A 	failure 	to participate 	in good 	faith 	in the 	impasse
procedures, 	like a 	failure to negotiate 	in good faith, 	interferes
with 	an exclusive 	representative's 	right 	to represent 	its 	unit
members 	in the 	collective bargaining arena. 	Compton Community
College District 	(1989) 	PERB Decision No. 	720, 	at p. 	24; 	San
Francisco Community College 	District 	(1988) 	PERB Decision No.
703, 	at p. 	7. 	Accordingly, 	the District violated EERA section
3543.5(b) 	by its 	conduct during negotiations 	to 	impasse.
The 	3543.5(e) 	Charge
During the mediation process, 	the grievance dispute remained
one, 	although not the only, 	subject obstructing the parties 	from
reaching agreement on a contract. 	It 	is 	found that the District,
because 	it maintained 	in 	its proposal 	the 	clauses which would
restrict 	the Association's 	ability to 	file 	and to 	arbitrate
grievances 	throughout 	the 	statutory 	impasse procedure, 	failed to
participate 	in the 	impasse resolution procedure 	in good 	faith, 	a
violation of 	section 3543.5(e). 	See generally Moreno Valley
20

Unified School 	District v. 	PERB 	(1983) 	142 	Cal.App.3d 	191 	[191
Cal. Rptr. 60].
The 	3543.5(a) 	Charge
A 	failure 	to 	negotiate 	in good 	faith constitutes 	a
derivative violation of EERA section 3543.5(b) 	but 	it 	is not a
derivative violation of 	3543.5(a). 	While there is direct
evidence of a violation of 	3543.5(b),11 there is no evidence to
support 	a 	finding 	the 	District 	committed 	an 	independent violation
of 	3543(a).
For these reasons 	and on the basis 	of 	the 	entire record, 	the
contention that the 	District violated EERA 	section 	3543.5(a) 	by
insisting 	over 	the Association's 	objections 	on an MOU 	containing
a provision which purports 	to 	limit 	the Association's 	right to
initiate 	a grievance 	is dismissed.
REMEDY
The 	Charging 	Party 	seeks 	an order requiring the 	District 	to
cease 	and desist 	from 	its 	unlawful 	conduct 	and 	to 	delete 	from the
current 	bargaining 	agreement 	between 	the Association 	and 	the
District 	the offending provisions. 	The PERB 	in 	section 	3541.5(c)
is given:
. 	. 	. 	the power to issue a decision and order
directing 	an offending party to 	cease 	and
desist 	from the 	unfair practice 	and to 	take
such affirmative action, 	including but not
limited 	to 	the 	reinstatement 	of 	employees
with or without back pay, 	as will 	effectuate
the policies of this 	chapter.
11See pp. 	19-20, 	supra.
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A 	cease 	and desist 	order directing 	the 	District 	to 	stop 	its
unlawful 	conduct 	is 	appropriate 	in this 	case. 	It also 	is
appropriate 	to 	order the District 	to accept 	grievances 	filed by
the Association on behalf of 	individuals 	as well 	as 	grievances
designed to protect Association rights. 	It 	similarly 	is
appropriate 	to 	order 	that 	the Association be permitted 	to 	file
requests 	for 	arbitration without 	the 	specific 	authorization of
individual unit members. 	These remedies will achieve the
purposes 	sought by the Association without 	the 	additional 	order
that 	certain 	clauses 	be 	struck 	from the 	contract between the
parties. 	The purpose of 	the remedy 	is 	to 	insure that the 	clauses
are 	no 	longer enforced.
It 	also 	is 	appropriate 	that 	the 	District be directed 	to post
a notice 	incorporating the terms 	of 	the order. 	Posting of 	such a
notice, 	signed by an authorized representative of 	the 	District,
will provide 	employees with notice 	that 	the District has 	acted 	in
an unlawful manner, 	is being required to 	cease and desist 	from
this 	activity, 	and will 	comply with the order. 	It 	effectuates
the purposes 	of 	the 	EERA that 	employees 	be 	informed of 	the
resolution of 	the 	controversy and the 	District's 	readiness 	to
comply with the order remedy. 	Davis 	Unified School 	District, 	et
al. 	(1980) 	PERB Decision No. 	116. 	See also Placerville Union
School District 	(1978) 	PERB Decision No. 	69.
PROPOSED 	ORDER
Upon the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact and conclusions 	of 	law
and the entire record in this 	case, 	it 	is 	found that the Travis
22

Unified School District has violated sections 3543.5(b), 	(c) 	and
(e) 	of the Educational Employment Relations Act. 	Pursuant to
section 3541.5(c) 	and 	(e) 	of the Government Code, 	it hereby is
ORDERED that the Travis Unified School District, 	its 	officers 	and
representatives 	shall:
A. 	CEASE AND 	DESIST FROM:
1. 	Insisting to 	impasse 	and during 	impasse on
contractual 	language 	outside the 	scope 	of 	representation which
has 	the 	effect 	of 	restricting the Association's 	right 	to 	file
grievances 	on its 	own behalf.
2. 	Enforcing 	and giving 	effect 	to those portions 	of
the 	1988-90 	collective bargaining 	agreement which 	restrict 	the
Association's 	right 	to 	file 	and process 	grievances 	in 	its 	own
name.
3. 	Interfering with the Association's 	right 	to
represent its members.
B. 	TAKE 	THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE 	THE 	POLICIES 	OF 	THE 	EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS ACT:
1. 	Accept and process 	grievances 	filed by the
Association on behalf 	of 	individual unit members 	as 	appropriate
under the 	time 	lines 	and 	subject matter requirements 	of 	the
contract 	between the parties.
2. 	Accept and process 	requests 	for arbitration
initiated by 	the Association on behalf 	of 	individual 	unit
members, 	without requiring that a written request be made by the
23

grievant(s) 	to the Association, 	as appropriate under the time
line and 	subject matter requirements 	of 	the 	contract.
3. 	Within ten 	(10) 	workdays of the 	service of a 	final
decision in this 	matter, 	post at all work 	locations within the
Travis 	Unified 	School 	District where 	notices 	to 	certificated
employees 	customarily are posted, 	copies 	of 	the Notice attached
hereto 	as 	an appendix. 	The Notice must be 	signed by an
authorized agent of 	the District, 	indicating that the District
will 	comply with the 	terms 	of 	this 	Order. 	Such posting 	shall 	be
maintained for a period of thirty 	(30) 	consecutive workdays.
Reasonable 	steps 	shall be taken to 	insure 	that the Notice 	is 	not
reduced 	in size, 	altered, 	defaced or covered by any other
material.
4. 	Upon issuance of a final decision, 	make written
notification of 	the 	actions 	taken to 	comply with the Order to 	the
San Francisco 	Regional 	Director of 	the 	Public 	Employment
Relations 	Board 	and 	accord with 	the director's 	instructions.
All 	other 	allegations 	in Unfair Practice Charge
No. 	SF-CE-1307 	and companion complaint are hereby DISMISSED.
Pursuant to California Administrative Code, 	title 	8,
section 	32305, 	this 	Proposed Decision and Order 	shall become
final 	unless 	a party 	files 	a 	statement of 	exceptions with the
Board 	itself 	at 	the headquarters 	office 	in Sacramento within 20
days 	of 	service of 	this 	Decision. 	In accordance with PERB
Regulations, 	the 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	should 	identify by page
citation or exhibit number the portions 	of the record, 	if any,
24

relied upon 	for 	such exceptions. 	See California Administrative
Code, 	title 8, 	section 32300. 	A document is 	considered 	"filed"
when actually 	received before 	the 	close 	of 	business 	(5:00 	p.m.)
on the 	last day 	set 	for filing 	". 	. 	. o r when sent by telegraph
or 	certified or Express 	United 	States 	mail, 	postmarked not 	later
than the last day set for filing 	. 	. 	. 	." 	See California
Administrative Code, 	title 8, 	section 32135. 	Code of Civil
Procedure 	section 	1013 	shall 	apply. 	Any 	statement of 	exceptions
and 	supporting 	brief 	must 	be 	served 	concurrently with 	its 	filing
upon each party to 	this proceeding. 	Proof 	of 	service 	shall
accompany 	each 	copy 	served 	on a party 	or 	filed with 	the 	Board
itself. 	See California Administrative Code, 	title 8, 	sections
32300, 	32305 and 32140.
DATED: 	September 21, 	1990
William 	P. 	Smith
Administrative 	Law Judge )	
Judc./€7
25