PERB Decision No. 0556E•Stanislaus County Department of Education (PERB 0556E)
Stanislaus County Department of Education (PERB 0556E)
PERB Decision No. 0556ECalperb31.12.1985
Gesamter Gesetzestext
STATE OF CALIFORNIA DECISION OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND ITS STANISLAUS COUNTY CHAPTER NO. 668, Charging Party, v. STANISLAUS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondent. · ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )__________________ ) . Case No. S-CE-742 PERE Decision No. 556 December 31, 1985 Appearances: Harry J. Gibbons, Jr., for California School Employees Association and its Stanislaus County Chapter No. 668; Finkle & Stroup by Mary Beth de Goede and Leith B. Hansen for Stanislaus County Department of Education. Before Jaeger, Morgenstern and Porter, Members. DECISION MORGENSTERN, Member: The California School Employees Association and its Stanislaus County Chapter No. 668 (CSEA) excepts to the decision, attached hereto, by a Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) administrative law judge (ALJ) finding that the Stanislaus County Department of Education (County) did not violate section 3543.S(a), (b) or (c) of the 'Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA or Act). 1 Specifically, CSEA's charge contends that the County failed to lEERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 etseq. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references herein are to the Government Code. In relevant part, section 3543.5 provides:
negotiate its decision to cease operation of three child development centers for migrant children (centers) and to select an outside nonprofit corporation to perform that function. CSEA also claims that the County failed to negotiate the effects of that decision. FACTUAL SUMMARY We hnve reviewed the decision of the ALJ and, finding his factual findings free from prejudicial error, ·adopt them as the Board's factual summary. DISCUSSION We are in essential agreement with the conclusions of law reached by the ALJ. First, we agree that CSEA raised the issue of contracting out long before the District reached its final decision to cease operation of the centers. The parties engaged in various negotiating sessions, some of which involved the discussion of CSEA's proposals designed to head off the County's decision to end its direct involvement in the migrant child development program (program). It shall be unlawful for a public school employer to: (a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to discriminate or threaten·to discriminate against employees, or otherwise to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees because of their exercise of rights guaranteed by this chapter. (b) Deny to employee organizations rights guaranteed to them by this chapter. (c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with an exclusive representative. 2
The principle point of contention at issue in this case concerns the most appropriate characterization to be given the County's decision to cease direct operation of the centers. CSEA relies on Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB (1964) 379 U.S. 203 [57 LRRM 2609] and asserts that the employer 1 s decision involved the subcontracting out of bargaining unit work. The County, on the other hand, argues that the decision falls within its . managerial prerogative to change the nature and direction of its business. Relying on Otis Elevator Co. (1984) 269 NLRB 891 [116 LRRM 1984], the County asserts that its decision was not undertaken merely to save labor costs but because it wanted to cease direct operation of a program it found exceedingly troublesome and uncertain. Upon review, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the County's decision was not one appropriately relegated to the negotiating process. The decision to cease direct operation of the centers invariably meant that County employees lost their jobs. Clearly, it was a decision about which both management and the employees were concerned. However, for the reasons outlined by the ALJ, the duty to negotiate the decision would have significantly abridged the employer's freedom to exercise managerial prerogatives essential to its mission. 2 2under the Board's test enunciated in Anaheim Union High School District (1981) PERB Decision No. 177, a subject is negotiable if (1) it is logically and reasonably related to hours, wages or an enumerated term and condition of employment, (2) the subject is of such concern to both management and 3
As the ALJ noted, the migrant child education program is not mandated by the laws of this State but is, rather, a program created by the Federal Government. The County initially opted to provide direct educational services at the centers; however, the program exists despite County involvement. Unlike a school district that abandons its in-house transportation program and hires a private bus company to carry the students to and from its schools, here, the mig·rant child centers are not part of a County program which survives as such after the County decided it no longer wished to be in the business of directly providing the educational services. As the ALJ noted: ••• The present case does not present the situation where federal funds were used to finance what is essentially a local program, like the cleaning of classrooms. Here, federal funds were provided to a local employer to run a federal program. The migrant education program was initiated by the federal government and tightly controlled by it. Unlike the cleaning of classrooms, operation of the migrant program is an activity which did not exist before the arrival of tederal funds and might well cease should those funds ever be withdrawn. Thus, since the County's role in the migrant child program was that of a conduit for federal funds, we agree that whether a school employer continues to operate a program on behalf of the employees that conflict is likely to occur and the mediatory influence of collective bargaining is the appropriate means of resolving the conflict, and (3) the employer's obligation to negotiate would not significantly abridge the employer's freedom to exercise those managerial prerogatives (including matters of fundamental policy) essential to the achievement of the employer's mission. Also see section 3543.2. 4
Federal Government is a basic managerial prerogative about which negotiation is not required. ORDER Based on the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law and the entire record in this case, the attached decision of the Public Employment Relations Board administrative law judge is AFFIRMED and Case No. S-CE-742 is hereby DISMISSED. Member Porter joined in this Decision. Member Jaeger's concurrence begins on page 6. 5
Jaeger, Member, concurring: I join my colleagues in finding that the County Department of Education (County) was not obligated to negotiate its decision to discontinue its migrant, education activities. However, I do not share with them, or with the administrative law judge, some of the views they express. Charging Party's characterization of the County's decision as "contracting out 11 or "subcontracting" is inapropos. As I understand the evidence, the County acted as a 11 broker" or agent of the Federal Government in finding, and overseeing, organizations that provided a migrant-education service to the Federal Government. The County itself was not responsible for providing the service, except in the single instance subject to the dispute here; and did not subcontract when it selected the six other agencies which provided migrant education. When the County discontinued its own involvement as a direct supplier, it "brokered" a contract with a private, non-profit organization to furnish the educational service to the Federal Goverment, assuming the role it filled elsewhere as general administrator and funnel of federal funds. In sum, the County, for reasons which are not unlawful under EERA,. 1 changed the nature and direction of its operations by "dropping out 11 of the business of being a direct lFor example, discontinuing operations in order to destroy majority support for a union would presumably be unlawful. 6
supplier of migrant education. In the private sector, such entrepreneurial decisions have been held to be outside the scope of mandatory negotiations. See Otis Elevator Co (1984) 269 NLRB 891 [116 LRRM 1984]. In its precedential decision, Anaheim Union High School District (1981) PERE Decision No. 177, given approval by the California Supreme Court in San Mateo City School District, et al. v·. PERE (1983) 33 Cal.3d 850 [191 Cal.Rptr. 800], the Board established the test of negotiability. In part, that test provides that a subject is negotiable if: The employer's obligation to negotiate would not significantly abridge the employer's freedom to exercise those managerial prerogatives (including matters of fundamental policy) essential to the achievement of the employer's mission. (Emphasis added:) It is clear that sheltering an employer's right to make basic educational policy determinations was within the Board's contemplation when it included the underlined language. Here, as I see it, the District's decision was to discontinue the migrant program rather than to continue its operations through .a subcontractor. For these reasons, I join in dismissing the complaint. However, I cannot subscribe to the theory that the issue is not subject to negotiation because the program was federally ordained, not an "integral part of a County program," and not dependent on the County's voluntary involvement. I find no authority for the proposition that the identity of the customer or the nature of the work performed by bargaining unit 7
employees determine whether those employees may excerise their statutory right to negotiate their wages, hours or working conditions. Certainly, an employer's decision to take on work that is not typical, or that it is not legally required to perform, does not vest in him the privilege of avoiding his obligations under the Act. Nor can I agree that the federal origin of program funding bears· on the question of negotiability. Although the Board has not addressed this specific question, it has considered funding sources in unit determination cases in a manner demonstrating that employees performing work funded by external sources, including the Federal Government, are not to be deprived of their right to bargain with their employers. 2 In short, where the employer gets its money from does not exempt it from the obligation to negotiate how at least some of that money shall be distributed among the employees. 2see Oakland Unified School District (1977) EERB Decision No. 15; Peralta Community College District (1978) PERB Decision No. 77; Redondo Beach City Unified School District (1980) PERB Decision No. 114. 8
STATE
OF
CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS
BOARD 0
CALIFORNIA
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION
and
its
STANISLAUS
CHAPTER No.
668,
Charging
Party,
v.
STANISLAUS
COUNTY
DEPARTMENT
OF
EDUCATION,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Unfair
Practice
Case
No.
S-CE-742
PROPOSED DECISION
(10/23/84)
_____________________
)
Appearances:
Harry
J.
Gibbons,
Attorney
for
the
California
School
Employees
Association
and
its
Stanislaus
Chapter
No.
668;
Mary
Beth de
Goede
and
Leith
B.
Hansen,
Attorneys
{Finkle
&
Stroup)
for the
Stanislaus
County
Department
of
Education.
Before
Ronald
E.
Blubaugh, Hearing
Officer.
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
It
is
contended here
that
a
county
superintendent of
schools subcontracted
unit
work
when
he
turned
over
to
a
non-profit corporation the operation
of
a
federally
funded
migrant education
program.
The
county advances
several
defenses including
a
contention that
its
decision to cease
operation of the federal
program
was
outside the
scope
of
representation
and
therefore non-negotiable.
The
California
School Employees
Association
and
its
Stanislaus
Chapter
No. 668
(hereafter
CSEA)
filed the charge
at
issue
on March
19, 1984. The
charge alleges that the
This Board agent decision has been appealed to
the Board itself and is not final. Only to the
extent the Board itself adopts this decision and
rationale may it be cited as precedent.Stanislaus County Department of Education (hereafter County) 1 unilaterally subcontract~d bargaining unit work by laying off certain employees and transferring operation of three migrant child development centers to a nonprofit corporation. On May 18, 1984, the Sacramento Regional Attorney of the Public Employment Relations Board (hereafter PERB) issued a complaint alleging that by the transfer the County had violated Educational Employment Relations Act subsection 3543.5(c) and derivatively (a) and (b). 2 Specifically, it is alleged that the County failed to negotiate about the decision to cease 1Even though the charge and complaint list the respondeqt as the Stanislaus County Department of Education, the parties stipulated that actual employer and respondent in this action is the Stanislaus County Superintendent of Schools. See reporter's transcript at p. 3. 2unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the Government Code. The Educational Employment Relations Act (hereafter EERA) is found at section 3540 et. seq. In relevant part, section 3543.5 provides as follows: It shall be unlawful for a public school employer to: (a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to discriminate or threaten to discriminate against employees, or otherwise to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees because of their exercise of rights guaranteed by this chapter. (b) Deny to employee organizations rights guaranteed to them by this chapter. (c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with an exclusive representative. 2
operation of the centers and select another agency to perform the function and about the effects of the decision. On June 11, 1984, the County answered the complaint, denying any violation of the EERA and asserting affirmatively that it had satisfied all negotiating requirements. On June 11 the County also filed a motion to dismiss that portion of the complaint which alleges a failure to negotiate about the effects of the decision. The County argued that an allegation about failure to negotiate on the effects of the change was not included in CSEA's original charge and thus could not be the subject of a complaint. On July 18, 1984, the hearing officer then processing the case denied the motion on the ground that the charge included within it factual allegations sufficient to support the complaint as issued. A hearing on the complaint was conducted in Sacramento on August 16 and 17, 1984. The last of the briefs from the parties was received on October 16, 1984, and the case was submitted for decision as of that date. FINDINGS OF FACT The Stanislaus County Department of Education, a public school employer under the EERA, provides a variety of services to small school districts within Stanislaus County. It takes care of business operations for some districts, conducts teacher training programs and operates an instructional materials center. The County operates the John F. Kennedy 3
Center for Severely Handicapped Children and provides teachers for ~andicapped students in various school districts. For some years, the County also has served as the agent of the federal government in the administration and operation of Headstart and migrant child development programs. The programs are funded primarily by the federal Administration for Children, Youth and Families with the State Department of Education providing local matching funds. The programs are operated under strict federal guidelines. The County's role in Headstart has been as the administrator of the program in Stanislaus County and the direct operator of three Headstart centers. The County's role in the migr~nt program has been as the administrator in a seven-county region and the direct operator of the migrant program within Stanislaus County. It was the County's decision last year to step out of its role as the operator of the migrant program at three locations in Stanislaus County that led to the present case. The County has retained its role as administrator of Headstart in Stanislaus County and operator of three Headstart centers and its role as seven-county administrator of the migrant program. The County commenced its service as regional administrator of the federal migrant education program sometime in the early 1970's. It was' solicited for this task by federal authorities who found it too difficult to deal directly with individual counties. The region administered by the County comprises 4
Stanislaus, Madera, Merced, Tuolumne, Santa Clara, Contra Costa and Santa Cruz Counties. Federal funds to operate all migrant child development programs in the seven counties pass through the Stanislaus County Department of Education. In its role as regional administrator, the County chooses the organizations which will receive the federal migrant education funds, awards, the contracts, monitors the operation of the program and transmits the federal monies involved. In each county, one delegate organization is chosen to operate the migrant program throughout that county. During the time that the Stanislaus County Department of Education has been the regional administrator, the only migrant program operated by a governmental entity in any of the seven counties was the one which the Stanislaus County Department itself operated. The County began the direct operation of the migrant child development program within Stanislaus County sometime in the 1970's. In recent years, the Stanislaus migrant child development program has been operated at farm labor camps in Patterson, Westley and Ceres. This is a reduction from a higher number of centers which the County operated in the early days of its involvement. The Stanislaus County Housing Authority owns and manages the three labor camps where the child develpment program is offered. 5
The migrant child development program is in operation during the agricultural harvest season, approximately May 1 through November 15. The number of children in the three centers may vary widely according to crop conditions, the weather and labor unrest. The peak enrollment is approximately 440 children. The children range in age from 6 weeks to 5 years. The program is limited to children whose parents receive at least 50 percent of their income from agriculture and whose annual income is not greater than an amount set by the federal government. The program involves both instruction and child care. For some years, top administrators within the County have held an ongoing discussion about the proper role of a county department of education. One focus of that discussion was the operation of the migrant program. A number of factors made its continued operation undesirable from the County's point of view. One problem was a conflict between the calendar year orientation of the migrant program and the academic year orientation of all other County operations. This conflict carried over into the funding cycle with income and expenditures for the migrant program geared toward a calendar year while the remainder of the County's operations were funded on a fiscal year basis. In addition, federal rules for the migrant program were designed for operation by a community agency and the County found them cumbersome for a governmental entity. 6
The County's general dissatisfaction with the migrant program came into clear focus in the spring of 1983 when the County discovered that it was losing money on the program. After being self-supporting for years~ the migrant program was headed for a 1983 deficit of $139,166. The projection was that the progr~m could lose as much as $250,000 annually in 1984 and later years. When they received those gloomy numbers, County administrators began to think seriously about getting out of the migrant program. Shortly after the deficit was discovered in May of 1983, County personnel director Jack Francis contacted CSEA field representative Nancee Maya and told her of the problem. Since August of 1979, CSEA has been exclusive representative of an office-technical-business-services unit, a paraprofessional unit and an operations and support unit of the County's employees. Since August of 1980, CSEA also has been exclusive representative of a permit teacher unit of the County's employees. on July 12, 1983, Mr. Francis wrote to Ms. Maya advising her that the County might have to lay off "a considerable number of classified employees who are connected with our migrant/child development programs." He urged an early meeting between the parties to reach an understanding on the timing of layoff notices. CSEA and the County agreed to hold a meeting within three days of Mr. Francis' letter. 7
At the time the parties met on July 15 they were, to some degree, dealing with a hypothetical change. Although leaning toward removing itself from the migrant program, the County was still considering the idea and did not plan to make a final decision before September. Despite the uncertainty, the parties negotiated on July 15 and reached what they described as an "agreement in relation to the effect of layoff of classified and certificated employees in relation to the possible termination of the Child Development Program operated by the Department." The agreement set out eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits and provided for continuation pf health insurance coverage. Mr. Francis again met with Ms. Maya on August 5, 19B3, at a meeting she described as dealing with the design and content of the layoff notices. Mr. Francis testified that at the meeting the parties had discussed whether the County's proposed action was similar to the contracting out of bus services which previously had been undertaken in a nearby Oakdale school district. He testified that Ms. Maya had stated that she believed the County's impending action was not like the Oakdale situation. Ms. Maya testified that she did not recall making such a statement. On August 17, the County commenced sending layoff notices to employees in the migrant program. The notices were sent on a rolling basis with the date an individual employee received a 8
notice determined by when that employee finished his or her pre-determined period of employment. Ultimately, 107 employees received layoff notices. Not long after the first layoff notices were sent to employees, newspaper articles were published about the layoff. The articles led to consternation among parents and others about whether the migrant education centers would be closed. To ward off those fears, representatives of the County office met with interested parties to assure them that the centers would not be closed but that some other organization might take over their operation. Despite the apparent finality of wording in the layoff notices, the County was still undecided in early fall about whether it would continue to operate the migrant program in 1984. A negotiations ses5ion was held on September 14, 1983, to permit further discussions between the parties about the financial problem, estimated during the meeting to be a deficit of about 30 percent. At the meeting, Mr. Francis set out a timetable for a final decision about the County's role in the migrant program. Under the timetable, a final decision had to be made by October 14 in order to permit time for the selection of a replacement agency. The parties next met on October 26, 1983. Although the meeting was held after the deadline, Mr. Francis earlier had advanced, the County still had not reached a final decision on 9
the migrant program. Negotiations once more centered upon the question of whether or not the County should cease its direct involvement in the operation of the migrant program. In an effort to avoid the threatened layoff, CSEA offered to accept a pay reduction of 5 percent for all employees working in the migrant program. The County responded by giving CSEA a financial analysis the union earlier had requested. The analysis showed various ways that cuts of up to 30 percent would have to be taken from the program if it were to become self-sufficient. The County rejected the proposed 5 percent cut as completely inadequate. During the meeting, the County sought to allay Ms. Maya's earlier voiced concerns that transfer of the program to a delegate agency would constitute contracting out of unit work. The County reported to her information it had received from federal authorities that employees of organizations operating federal programs under County supervision could not be considered County employees. The parties met again, on November 1, 1983. The County still had not made a final decision about whether or not to terminate its direct involvement in the operation of the migrant program. Once more, the focus of the negotiations was on whether or not the County should take that step. CSEA proposed that the salaries of migrant child development center employees nbe reduced to the extent necessary for the program to remain within the limits of its funding." The County 10
rejected the proposal. Mr. Francis told the union that such pay reductions would create an impossible morale problem with employees in the migrant program receiving 30 percent less than other County workers performing comparable duties. He said the unequal pay also would have divided employees along racial lines because the majority of those affected would have been Hispanic. On November 7, 1983, the County reached a final decision to remove itself from direct operation of the migrant program. The decision was reached by consensus after a lengthy discussion between John Allard, the County superintendent, John Hendrickson, the assistant superintendent, and Mr. Francis. The three administrators reviewed the problems which the County had encountered with the migrant program. They concluded that while the CSEA proposal to accept a wage reduction would solve the immediate financial problem it would not solve the problem in future years. On the same day as it reached its final decision, the County sent a letter to all affected employees advising them that the.County would seek a private, non-profit organization to take over the migrant program. On November 16, the County notified employees that the effective date of their layoff would be changed to December 31, 1983. This action had the effect of extending the health benefits of all migrant center employees to January 31, 1984. Although CSEA apparently was 11
not consulted about the change in the effective date of the layoff, it raised no objection after it learned of the action. Ultimately, 94 unit members were laid off from their jobs in the migrant program. Of those, eight had been reemployed in other County programs as of the date of the hearing. The parties held no meetings-about the layoff during the remainder of 1983. On January 16, 1984, Ms. Maya wrote to Mr. Francis declaring that CSEA had reached the conclusion that the County's plan to get out of the migrant program actually was the subcontracting of bargaining unit work. In her letter, Ms. Maya asserted that the County's action was negotiable and she demanded that the County meet and negotiate on the subj~ct. She also demanded that the County rehire the affected employees and restore the status quo prior to the commencement of negotiations. In response to the CSEA demand, the parties met on February 10, 1984. CSEA offered two alternatives. The County should either rehire all of the laid off employees and continue its operation of the migrant program or it should. require the new operator to adhere to the terms of the contract between the County and CSEA. The County rejected the alternatives. Mr. Francis responded that th_e Cou-nty had not gone through all the difficulty of the layoff in order to simply rescind it. Regarding the proposed transfer of the contract to the new 12
operator, Mr. Francis took the position that the County had no legal authority to make such a requirement. On March 2, 1984, the County made a written proposal in a letter-from Mr. Francis to Ms. Maya. Under the proposal, the laid off County employees would have preferential hiring rights at the new delegate agency. The County would provide training to laid off employees to make them eligible for vacancies within remaining unit jobs as vacancies developed. Re-employment rights for laid off migrant program employees would be extended from 39 months to 45 months. The County would pay each laid off employee $100 as compensation for lost health benefits and CSEA would be given an opportunity to review and offer comments regarding the organi~ations under consideration to take over the program. CSEA did not respond to the proposal, prompting a follow-up letter from Mr. Francis to Ms. Maya. In that letter he accused CSEA of a lack of cooperation in trying to reach an agreement and said that Ms. Maya did not return his calls or make herself available for a meeting. Ms. Maya responded in writing on April 2 saying that she did not understand how further meetings would be useful because of the County's refusal to discuss the CSEA proposals of February 10. Despite their differences the parties did meet twice more. At a meeting on April 13, the County offered to pay some college costs for laid off employees and proposed to increase 13
compensation for lost health benefits from $100 to $150. The parties met again on April 18 and the County increased to $200 the amount it was willing to pay employees for lost health benefits. At both meetings, CSEA maintained its insistence that the County either rehire all of the laid off migrant employees or ensure that the new operator of the program adhere to the terms of the County-CSEA contract. No agreement was reached. The parties are in disagreement about when during these negotiations CSEA first demanded to bargain about the contracting out of unit work. The County asserts that the issue was not raised until Ms. Maya's January 16 letter. CSEA contends that the issue was raised considerably earlier. Regarding the August 5, 1983, negotiation session, Mr. Francis testified that the parties discussed the busing situation in nearby Oakdale "because Nancee had raised the issue of whether or not what we were doing was contracting out of services." 3 Because of CSEA's continued inquiries about the question of contracting out, the County on October 11, 1983, wrote to federal authorities requesting clarification about the status of persons employed by an organization which operates a migrant program. On November 14, 1983, the County sent to Ms. Maya the response it received from administrators in the Department of 3see reporter's transcript at pp. 120-121. 14
Health and Human Services. Ms. Maya believed that the response actually strengthened her position that the County's action was contracting out unit work and advised Mr. Francis of her belief. Mr. Francis acknowledged on cross-examination that prior to the County's November 7 decision to cease its participation in the migrant program he clearly knew of CSEA's opposition. In early 1984 the County placed a newspaper advertisement soliciting proposals from organizations seeking to administer the migrant child development program. The application deadline was set for March 7. The County's request for proposals offered an award of $1,070,000 to an agency or contractor which would provide services to some 440 children aged 6 weeks to S years from May 1, 1984, through November 15. Shortly after the application deadline the County awarded a contract ·to Stanislaus County Child and Infant Care, Inc., a private, nonprofit corporation. The migrant program opened on or about May 1, 1984, in the same three farm labor camps where the County formerly had operated it. However, in 1984 the County's relationship with the operator was the same as its relationship with the operators of migrant child development programs in the other six counties for which the Stanislaus County office is the regional administrator. The County awarded the contract, monitored the operation and funneled the monies to the 15
organization which actually provided the services, Stanislaus County Child and Infant Care, Inc. The County did not hire the employees, set their salaries or provide care to the children. The only County role was that of an agent for the federal government. LEGAL ISSUES 1. Did CSEA waive any rights it may have had to negotiate about the County's decision to cease its direct operation of the migrant child development program? 2. Was the County's decision to cease direct .operation of the migrant program a matter within the scope of representation and if so, did the County act unilaterally? 3. Did the County refuse to negotiate about the effects of its decision to cease direct operation of the migrant program? CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Waiver. The County argues that CSEA waived any right it may have had to negotiate about the decision to cease operation of the migrant program by failing to make a timely demand to negotiate. The County contends that while CSEA knew of the possibility of the change as early as May of 1983, it was not until January 16, 1984, that the CSEA field representative made a request to negotiate. Prior to that time, the County argues, the CSEA representative had questioned whether the County's 16
proposed decision was contracting out but had never made a demand to bargain about that subject. CSEA rejects the claim of waiver, noting that under PERB precedent a waiver will not be lightly inferred. CSEA argues that in order to show waiver the County must produce evidence of clear and unmistakable language or behavior indicating an intent to waive bargaining rights. No such language or demonstrative behavior has been shown, CSEA contends. To the contrary, CSEA asserts, the evidence shows that the CSEA field representative raised the issue of contracting out on numerous occasions. More significantly, the union argues, the parties actually negotiated the issue, although they did not reach agreement on it. The PERB has consistently held that the waiver of bargaining rights by a union will not be lightly inferred. Oakland Unified School District (8/31/82) PERB Decision No. 236. For an employer to show that a union waived its right to negotiate, the employer must produce evidence of: ••• either clear and unmistakable language, Amador Valley Joint Union High School District (10/2/78) PERB Decision No. 74, or demonstrative behavior waiving a reasonable opportunity to bargain over a decision not already firmly made by theemployer. San Mateo County Community College District (6/8/79) PERB Decision No. 94; Sutter Union High School District (10/7/81) PERB Decision No. 175. 17
Demonstrative behavior sufficient to waive the right to bargain has been found where a union failed to demand negotiations in a manner that adequately signified its desire to negotiate. Newman-Crows Landing Unified School District (6/30/82) PERB Decision No. 223. However, the determination about whether a particular communication constitutes a proper request to bargain "is a question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis." Delano Joint Union High School District (5/5/83) PERB Decision No. 307. To be effective,·"a request to negotiate need not be specific or made in a particular form." Gonzales Union High School District (9/28/84) PERB Decision No. 410. The significant determination is whether the union's request was sufficient to make its desire known. It is abundantly clear that CSEA raised the issue of contracting out long before the District's final decision to cease operation of the migrant child centers. The County's chief negotiator acknowledged that his CSEA counterpart had raised the issue of subcontracting as early as the August 5, 1983, negotiating session. In an attempt to dissuade the CSEA negotiator from her contention that the County was contracting out, the County wrote to federal authorities on October 11 to secure an opinion about the issue. At the negotiating session of October 26, the County again sought to convince Ms. Maya that it was not contracting out union work. County negotiator Francis testified that as of November 7, the 18
date the County reached its final decision, he knew of CSEA opposi~ion to the action. Moreover, as CSEA argues in its brief, there is uncontroverted evidence that the parties in fact negotiated about the County's decision to cease operation of the migrant child centers. The negotiating sessions of October 26 and November 1 involved CSEA proposals designed to head off a County decision to get out of the program. These are precisely the type of proposals which one might expect following a demand to bargain about a proposal to contract out unit work. It seems inconceivable that the County would have negotiated about the decision to cease operation of the migrant centers if CSEA had waived its claim to bargain by failing to make a comprehensible demand. It is true that CSEA made no written request to negotiate about contracting out until January 16, 1984. But the organization earlier had made oral demands to bargain and by January 16, the issue had been long raised and much discussed. To read the fall 1983 negotiations any other way would be, as CSEA argues, the exaltation of form over substance. For these reasons, the County's assertion that CSEA waived any rights it may have had to negotiate about contracting out is rejected. Scope of Representation. CSEA recites the familiar rule that absent a valid defense, it is a per se violation of the EERA for an employer to make a 19
unilateral change in a matter within the scope of representation. It is equally well settled, CSEA continues, that a decision to subcontract bargaining unit work is within the scope of representation and thus negotiable when that decision changes an_existing employment policy. Analogizing to Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB (1964) 379 U.S. 203 [57 LRRM 2609], CSEA argues that the "existing" policy of the County was to use its own workers to operate the migrant centers. Like the employer in Fibreboard, CSEA continues, the County then. unilaterally laid off its workers and subcontracted the work to an outside organization. CSEA argues that the action did not alter the b~$iC operation of the migrant program. CSEA contends that the County retains the ultimate responsibility for the migrant program and that it has merely replaced its own employees with those of another agency to do the same work under similar conditions. The County argues that its decision was a basic managerial prerogative not subject to bargaining. Citing Otis Elevator Co. (1984) 269 NLRB No. 162 [115 LRRM 1281, corr. at 116 LRRM 1075], the County contends that an employer may unilaterally elect to change the nature and direction of its business. Where the purpose of the action is to change the nature of the business and not merely to save labor costs, the County argues, there is no obligation to bargain about the decision itself. Here, the County continues, its decision to cease operation of 20
the migrant centers was predicated upon a fundamental change in its direction. It wanted to cease direct operation of a program it found "exceedingly troublesome ana uncertain." Thus, the County argues, federal precedent supports the unilateral nature of its decision to cease direct operation of the migrant centers. The County finds PERB precedent for deciding scope questions to be consistent with the federal rules and under either standard the County's action was lawful. Although CSEA portrays this case as a straight-forward matter of contracting out, the issue actually is somewhat more complicated. This case does not involve a school district which abandons its transportation program and hires a private bus company or lays off its custodians and employs a janitorial service. The program which the County has given up is not a regular function of a county superintendent of schools. The operation of the migrant education centers is a federal activity which the County had undertaken on behalf of the United States Government. Thus the question presented here is whether the decision of a public school employer to drop its operation of a federal program is a matter within scope of representation under the EERA. 4 4The scope of representation under the EERA is set forth at section 3543.2 which, in relevant part, provides as follows: (a) The scope of representation shall be limited to matters relating to wages, hours of employment, and other terms and 21
Under the EERA, a public school employer is obligated to negotiate about matters relating to wages, hours of employment and nine specifically enumerated terms and conditions of employment. The PERB will find a subject negotiable even though not specifically enumerated in section 3543.2 if: (1) it is logically and reasonably related to hours, wages or an enumerated term and condition of employment, (2) the subject is of such ~oncern to both management and employees that conflict is likely to occur and the mediatory influence of collective negotiation is the appropriate means of resolving the conflict, and (3) the employer's obligation to negotiate would not significantly abridge the employer's freedom to exercise those managerial prerogatives (including matters of fundamental policy) essential to the achievement of the employer's mission. Anaheim Union High School District (10/28/81) PERB Decision No. 177; test approved in conditions of employment. "Terms and conditions of employment" mean health and welfare benefits as defined by Section 53200, leave, transfer and reassignment policies, safety conditions of employment, class size, procedures to be used for the evaluation of employees, organizational security pursuant to Section 3546, procedures for processing grievances pursuant to sections 3548.5, 3548.6, 3548.7,and 3548,8, and the layoff of probationary certificated school district employees, pursuant to section 44959.5 of the EducationCode ••• 22
San Mateo City School District v. PERB (1983) 33 Cal.3d 850 [191 Cal.Rptr. 800]. The decision on whether the County should have ceased its direct operation of the migrant education centers unquestionably involved the employment relationship. It was a decision of such concern to both management and employees that conflict was likely to occur. Because of the nature of the decision, however, it is doubtful that the negotia~ions process was the appropriate vehicle for reaching a decision. The program in question is not a County program prescribed by the Education ·code as the responsibility of a county superintendent of schools. It is a program of the federal government created to meet a need discerned by federal authorities. The program operates under strict federal guidelines (see, Title. 45, Chapter XIII, of the Code of Federal Regulations) and its ultimate continuance or discontinuance has little to do with whether the County stayed in or stepped out. Even if the County ceased entirely to participate in the program and dropped its role as regional administrator, the program would continue if federal authorities elected to continue it. The federal government could select a new regional administrator to either operate the program or find an organization that would. That the County elected to continue its role as regional administrator of the migrant program does not change the essential nature of the 23
operation. In this role the county, as described in its brief, is merely a "pipeline" through which the funding flows. When it acts as administrator, the County is the agent of federal authorities. The County's role as agent does not somehow transform what is fundamentally a federal program.into a local one. The question before the County was whether it should continue to operate a federal program that presented it with both administrative and financial ·difficulties. The County wa~ uncomfortable with the operational calendar of the migrant program and with the regulations governing it, both of which in the County's view were geared more toward a nonprofit community . organization than a governmental agency. Moreover, the County was faced with a loss of $139,166 from operation of the program in 1984 and projected losses of nearly twice as much in subsequent years. The question before the County was a fundamental one. Whether a school employer continues to operate a program on behalf of the federal government is a basic managerial prerogative. Negotiation was not required. 5 5 The County's action is distinguishable from that of the school board in Arcohe Union School District (5/16/84) PERB Decision No. 360. In Arcohe, a school employer lost the federal CETA funding that it had used to pay its custodians. After the cut-off of federal funds, the district elected to maintain the same level of custodial services through subcontracting the unit work to a janitorial service. The PERB found the decision to contract out work to be negotiable and, because it was taken unilaterally, a violation of the EERA. The present case does not present the situation where federal funds were used to finance what is essentially a local program, 24
· Accordingly, it is concluded that the County's decision to cease operation of the migrant children centers was outside the scope of representation under the EERA. Even though the county did meet and discuss the decision with CSEA, it had no obligation to secure an agreement. Because the matter was outside the scope of representation, the County was enti~led to act unilaterally. Negotiations over Effects. It is alleged in the complaint that the County failed to negotiate about the effects of its decision to cease operation of the three migrant education centers. In its bri~f, CSEA does not specifically address the allegation that the County failed to negotiate about the effects of its decision, concentrating instead on the theory that the decision itself was negotiable. The County concedes the negotiability of the effects of its decision but argues that CSEA never requested to negotiate about that subject. The County notes that it negotiated the effects of the layoff and reached agreement with CSEA on like the cleaning of classrooms. Here, federal funds were provided to a local employer to run a federal program. The migrant education program was initiated by the federal government and tightly controlled by it. Unlike the cleaningof classrooms, operation of the migrant program is an activity which did not exist before the arrival of federal funds and might well cease should those funds ever be withdrawn. 25
July 15; The County argues that it was further willing to negotiate about the effects of its decision to turn operation of the migrant centers over to another organization. However, the County argues, CSEA steadfastly refused to negotiate about such effects despite specific·County proposals on that subject. Accordingly, the County concludes, it met its obligation to negotiate about the effects of its decision. In accord with the County's argument, any contention that the County refused to negotiate about the ~ffects of its decision is easily overcome by the record. The parties negotiated on July 15, 1983, and entered into what they described as an "agreement in relation to the effect . of layoff of classified and certificated employees in relation to the possible termination of the Child Development Program operated by the Department." The agreement set out eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits and provided for continuation of heal th insura.nce coverage. It seems probable that once the July 15 agreement was reached, the County had met its obligation to negotiate about the effects of its decision. Even if it be assumed, however, that the July 15 agreement did not discharge the County's obligation, the record also is clear that after July 15 CSEA never requested to negotiate about the effects of the County's decision. As in Newman-Crows Landing, supra, PERB Decision No. 223, CSEA demanded only to negotiate about the underlying 26
decision itself and not about its effects. A succession of County proposals dealing with the effects of the decision were steadfastly ignored by CSEA. Each County proposal on effects was met on by a counterproposal about the underlying decision. CSEA's persistent failure after July 15 to request negotiation about the effects of the decision td cease operation of the federal program was sufficient to constitute a waiver of any right to bargain about that subject. For these reasons, the allegation in the complaint that the County failed to negotiate about the effects of its decision to cease operation of the migrant centers must be rejected. PROPOSED ORDER Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in this matter, unfair practice charge S-CE-742, California School Employees Association and its Stanislaus Chapter No. 668 v. Stanislaus County Department of Education, and the companion PERB complaint is hereby DISMISSED. Pursuant to California Administrative Code, title 8, part III, section 32305, this Proposed Decision and Order shall become final on November 13, 1984, unless a party files a timely statement of exceptions. -In accordance with the rules, the statement of exceptions should identify by page citation or exhibit number the portions of the record relied upon for such exceptions. See California Administrative Code, title 8, 27
part III, section 32300. Such statement of exceptions and supporting brief must be actually received by the Public Employment Relations Board itself at the headquarters office in Sacramento before the close of business (5:00 p.m.) on November 13, 1984, or sent by telegraph or certified United States mail, postmarked not later than the last day for filing in order to be timely filed. See California Administrative Code, title 8, part III, section 32135. Any statement of exceptions and supporting brief must be served concurrently with its filing upon each party to this proceeding. Proof of service shall be filed with the Board itself. see California Administrative Code, title 8, part III, section 32300 and 32305. Dated: October 23, 1984 l Ronald E. Blubaugh Hearing Officer 28
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL C.C.P. 1013a I declare that I am employed in ttle County of ___S_a_c_r_a_rn_e_n_t_o__ , California. I am over the age of 1 8 years and not a party to the within entitled cause: my business address is 1031 18th Street, Suite 200 Sacramento, California 95814 On December 31, 1985 . I served the enclosed ___________ _ (Oatet • PERB Decision No. 556 Stanislaus County Department of Education Case No. S-CE-742 (Describe Document) on the parties to this cas,e by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States Mail, ____S.;;;a.;;:;c;.;;r_a;;.;;rn:;.;:e:;.;n..;.t;;:..o___ _ (City or Townt California, addressed as follows: Jack Francis, Admin. Assist. Stanislaus County Dept. of Education 801 County Center Three Court Modesto, CA 95355 Nancee Maya California School Employees Assoc. 701 Ward Avenue Patterson, CA 95363 California School Employees Assoc. 5301 Madison Ave., Suite 102 Sacramento, CA 95841 Mary Beth deGoede, Attorney Leith B. Hansen, Esq. Finkle & Stroup P.O. Box 1752 Fresno, CA 93717-1752 Harry J. Gibbons, Esq. California School Employees Association P.O. Box 640 San Jose, CA 95106 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on ___D_e_c__e__m_b;;;..,;.e__r__,.;;3....1____ . T9 .§2_ at ___S_a_c_r_a_m_e_n_t_o___ . California. (Oatet (City or Townf Teresa Stewart (Type or print namet (Signaturet ---- .... t"'\ /,,..,.Jr'\r"'\
1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.
OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION AND ITS STANISLAUS
COUNTY CHAPTER NO. 668,
Charging Party, Case No. S-CE-742
ve PERB Decision No. 556
STANISLAUS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
* EDUCATION,
December 31, 1985
Respondent.
eet Sacer Stl Mel eet Ne i Senet St Niet et Sere
Appearances: Harry J. Gibbons, Jr., for California School
Employees Association and its Stanislaus County Chapter No. 668;
Finkle & Stroup by Mary Beth de Goede and Leith B. Hansen for
Stanislaus County Department of Education.
Before Jaeger, Morgenstern and Porter, Members.
DECISION
MORGENSTERN, Member: The California School Employees
Association and its Stanislaus County Chapter No. 668 (CSEA)
excepts to the decision, attached hereto, by a Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB or Board) administrative law judge (ALJ)
finding that the Stanislaus County Department of Education
(County) did not violate section 3543.5(a), (b) or (c) of the
‘Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA or Act).?
Specifically, CSEA's charge contends that the County failed to
LEERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et
seq. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references
herein are to the Government Code.
In relevant part, section 3543.5 provides:
negotiate its decision to cease operation of three child
development centers for migrant children (centers) and to select
an outside nonprofit corporation to perform that function. CSEA
also claims that the County failed to negotiate the effects of
that decision.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
We hnve reviewed the decision of the ALJ and, finding his
factual findings free from prejudicial error, ·adopt them as the
Board's factual summary.
DISCUSSION
We are in essential agreement with the conclusions of law
reached by the ALJ. First, we agree that CSEA raised the issue
of contracting out long before the District reached its final
decision to cease operation of the centers. The parties engaged
in various negotiating sessions, some of which involved the
discussion of CSEA's proposals designed to head off the County's
decision to end its direct involvement in the migrant child
development program (program).
It shall be unlawful for a public school
employer to:
(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
on employees, to discriminate or threaten·to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees because of their exercise of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
(b) Deny to employee organizations rights
guaranteed to them by this chapter.
(c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in
good faith with an exclusive representative.
2
The principle point of contention at issue in this case
concerns the most appropriate characterization to be given the
County's decision to cease direct operation of the centers.
CSEA relies on Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB (1964)
379 U.S. 203 [57 LRRM 2609] and asserts that the employer 1 s
decision involved the subcontracting out of bargaining unit
work. The County, on the other hand, argues that the decision
falls within its
. managerial prerogative to change the nature and
direction of its business. Relying on Otis Elevator Co. (1984)
269 NLRB 891 [116 LRRM 1984], the County asserts that its
decision was not undertaken merely to save labor costs but
because it wanted to cease direct operation of a program it
found exceedingly troublesome and uncertain.
Upon review, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the
County's decision was not one appropriately relegated to the
negotiating process. The decision to cease direct operation of
the centers invariably meant that County employees lost their
jobs. Clearly, it was a decision about which both management
and the employees were concerned. However, for the reasons
outlined by the ALJ, the duty to negotiate the decision would
have significantly abridged the employer's freedom to exercise
managerial prerogatives essential to its mission. 2
2under the Board's test enunciated in Anaheim Union High
School District (1981) PERB Decision No. 177, a subject is
negotiable if (1) it is logically and reasonably related to
hours, wages or an enumerated term and condition of employment,
(2) the subject is of such concern to both management and
3
As the ALJ noted, the migrant child education program is not
mandated by the laws of this State but is, rather, a program
created by the Federal Government. The County initially opted
to provide direct educational services at the centers; however,
the program exists despite County involvement. Unlike a school
district that abandons its in-house transportation program and
hires a private bus company to carry the students to and from
its schools, here, the mig·rant child centers are not part of a
County program which survives as such after the County decided
it no longer wished to be in the business of directly providing
the educational services. As the ALJ noted:
••• The present case does not present the
situation where federal funds were used to
finance what is essentially a local program,
like the cleaning of classrooms. Here,
federal funds were provided to a local
employer to run a federal program. The
migrant education program was initiated by
the federal government and tightly
controlled by it. Unlike the cleaning of
classrooms, operation of the migrant program
is an activity which did not exist before
the arrival of tederal funds and might well
cease should those funds ever be withdrawn.
Thus, since the County's role in the migrant child program was
that of a conduit for federal funds, we agree that whether a
school employer continues to operate a program on behalf of the
employees that conflict is likely to occur and the mediatory
influence of collective bargaining is the appropriate means of
resolving the conflict, and (3) the employer's obligation to
negotiate would not significantly abridge the employer's
freedom to exercise those managerial prerogatives (including
matters of fundamental policy) essential to the achievement of
the employer's mission. Also see section 3543.2.
4
Federal
Government
is
a
basic
managerial
prerogative
about
which
negotiation
is
not
required.
ORDER
Based
on
the
foregoing
findings of
fact,
conclusions
of
law
and
the
entire
record
in
this
case, the attached decision of
the Public
Employment
Relations
Board
administrative
law
judge
is
AFFIRMED
and Case
No.
S-CE-742
is
hereby
DISMISSED.
Member
Porter joined
in
this
Decision.
Member
Jaeger's
concurrence begins
on
page
6.
5
Jaeger,
Member,
concurring:
I
join
my
colleagues
in
finding
that
the
County
Department
of
Education
(County)
was
not
obligated to negotiate
its
decision to
discontinue
its
migrant,
education
activities.
However,
I
do
not
share with
them,
or
with
the
administrative
law
judge,
some
of the
views
they
express.
Charging
Party's characterization
of
the
County's
decision
as
"contracting
out
11
or "subcontracting"
is
inapropos.
As I
understand the
evidence, the
County
acted
as
a
11
broker"
or
agent
of
the Federal
Government
in
finding,
and
overseeing,
organizations
that
provided
a
migrant-education
service
to
the
Federal
Government.
The
County
itself
was
not
responsible for
providing the
service,
except
in
the
single
instance
subject to
the
dispute
here;
and
did not subcontract
when
it
selected the
six other
agencies
which
provided migrant education.
When
the
County
discontinued
its
own
involvement as
a
direct
supplier,
it
"brokered"
a
contract
with
a
private,
non-profit organization to furnish the educational service to
the Federal
Goverment, assuming
the role
it
filled
elsewhere as
general administrator
and
funnel of federal
funds.
In
sum,
the
County,
for reasons
which
are not unlawful
under
EERA,. 1
changed
the nature
and
direction of
its
operations
by "dropping out
11
of the business of being
a
direct
lFor
example, discontinuing operations in order to
destroy majority support for
a
union would presumably be
unlawful.
6
supplier
of
migrant
education. In
the
private sector,
such
entrepreneurial
decisions
have been
held
to
be
outside the
scope
of
mandatory
negotiations.
See
Otis Elevator
Co
(1984)
269
NLRB
891
[116
LRRM
1984].
In
its
precedential decision,
Anaheim Union High
School
District
(1981)
PERE
Decision
No.
177,
given approval
by
the
California
Supreme
Court
in
San Mateo
City
School
District, et
al.
v·. PERE
(1983)
33
Cal.3d
850
[191
Cal.Rptr.
800],
the
Board
established
the
test
of
negotiability.
In
part, that
test
provides
that
a
subject
is
negotiable
if:
The
employer's
obligation to negotiate
would
not
significantly
abridge the employer's
freedom
to exercise
those managerial
prerogatives (including matters of
fundamental
policy)
essential to
the
achievement
of the employer's mission.
(Emphasis
added:)
It
is clear that sheltering
an
employer's
right to
make
basic educational policy
determinations
was
within the Board's
contemplation
when
it
included the underlined language. Here,
as
I
see
it,
the
District's
decision
was
to
discontinue the
migrant
program
rather
than
to
continue
its
operations through
.a subcontractor.
For these reasons,
I
join in dismissing the complaint.
However,
I
cannot subscribe to the theory
that the issue is
not subject to negotiation because the
program
was
federally
ordained, not an
"integral part of
a
County program," and
not
dependent on
the County's voluntary involvement.
I
find
no
authority for the proposition that the identity of the customer
or the nature of the
work performed by bargaining unit
7
employees
determine
whether
those
employees
may
excerise
their
statutory right to
negotiate
their
wages,
hours
or
working
conditions. Certainly,
an
employer's
decision
to
take
on
work
that
is
not
typical,
or
that
it
is
not
legally
required to
perform,
does
not
vest in
him
the
privilege
of
avoiding
his
obligations
under
the
Act.
Nor
can
I
agree
that
the federal
origin
of
program
funding
bears·
on
the question of
negotiability.
Although
the
Board
has
not addressed
this specific
question,
it
has
considered
funding
sources
in unit
determination cases
in
a
manner
demonstrating
that
employees
performing
work
funded by
external sources,
including
the Federal
Government,
are
not to
be
deprived
of
their right to
bargain
with
their
employers.
2
In
short,
where
the
employer
gets
its
money
from
does
not
exempt
it
from
the
obligation to negotiate
how
at least
some
of
that
money
shall
be
distributed
among
the
employees.
2see Oakland Unified School
District
(1977)
EERB
Decision
No.
15; Peralta
Community
College
District
(1978)
PERB
Decision
No.
77; Redondo Beach
City Unified School
District
(1980)
PERB
Decision
No.
114.
8
STATE
OF
CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS
BOARD 0
CALIFORNIA
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION
and
its
STANISLAUS
CHAPTER No.
668,
Charging
Party,
v.
STANISLAUS
COUNTY
DEPARTMENT
OF
EDUCATION,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Unfair
Practice
Case
No.
S-CE-742
PROPOSED DECISION
(10/23/84)
_____________________
)
Appearances:
Harry
J.
Gibbons,
Attorney
for
the
California
School
Employees
Association
and
its
Stanislaus
Chapter
No.
668;
Mary
Beth de
Goede
and
Leith
B.
Hansen,
Attorneys
{Finkle
&
Stroup)
for the
Stanislaus
County
Department
of
Education.
Before
Ronald
E.
Blubaugh, Hearing
Officer.
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
It
is
contended here
that
a
county
superintendent of
schools subcontracted
unit
work
when
he
turned
over
to
a
non-profit corporation the operation
of
a
federally
funded
migrant education
program.
The
county advances
several
defenses including
a
contention that
its
decision to cease
operation of the federal
program
was
outside the
scope
of
representation
and
therefore non-negotiable.
The
California
School Employees
Association
and
its
Stanislaus
Chapter
No. 668
(hereafter
CSEA)
filed the charge
at
issue
on March
19, 1984. The
charge alleges that the
This Board agent decision has been appealed to
the Board itself and is not final. Only to the
extent the Board itself adopts this decision and
rationale may it be cited as precedent.
Stanislaus County Department of Education (hereafter County) 1
unilaterally subcontract~d bargaining unit work by laying off
certain employees and transferring operation of three migrant
child development centers to a nonprofit corporation. On
May 18, 1984, the Sacramento Regional Attorney of the Public
Employment Relations Board (hereafter PERB) issued a complaint
alleging that by the transfer the County had violated
Educational Employment Relations Act subsection 3543.5(c) and
derivatively (a) and (b). 2 Specifically, it is alleged that
the County failed to negotiate about the decision to cease
1Even though the charge and complaint list the respondeqt
as the Stanislaus County Department of Education, the parties
stipulated that actual employer and respondent in this action
is the Stanislaus County Superintendent of Schools. See
reporter's transcript at p. 3.
2unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the
Government Code. The Educational Employment Relations Act
(hereafter EERA) is found at section 3540 et. seq. In relevant
part, section 3543.5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for a public school
employer to:
(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
on employees, to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees because of their exercise of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
(b) Deny to employee organizations rights
guaranteed to them by this chapter.
(c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in
good faith with an exclusive representative.
2
operation of the centers and select another agency to perform
the function and about the effects of the decision. On
June 11, 1984, the County answered the complaint, denying any
violation of the EERA and asserting affirmatively that it had
satisfied all negotiating requirements.
On June 11 the County also filed a motion to dismiss that
portion of the complaint which alleges a failure to negotiate
about the effects of the decision. The County argued that an
allegation about failure to negotiate on the effects of the
change was not included in CSEA's original charge and thus
could not be the subject of a complaint. On July 18, 1984, the
hearing officer then processing the case denied the motion on
the ground that the charge included within it factual
allegations sufficient to support the complaint as issued.
A hearing on the complaint was conducted in Sacramento on
August 16 and 17, 1984. The last of the briefs from the
parties was received on October 16, 1984, and the case was
submitted for decision as of that date.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Stanislaus County Department of Education, a public
school employer under the EERA, provides a variety of services
to small school districts within Stanislaus County. It takes
care of business operations for some districts, conducts
teacher training programs and operates an instructional
materials center. The County operates the John F. Kennedy
3
Center for Severely Handicapped Children and provides teachers
for ~andicapped students in various school districts.
For some years, the County also has served as the agent of
the federal government in the administration and operation of
Headstart and migrant child development programs. The programs
are funded primarily by the federal Administration for
Children, Youth and Families with the State Department of
Education providing local matching funds. The programs are
operated under strict federal guidelines. The County's role in
Headstart has been as the administrator of the program in
Stanislaus County and the direct operator of three Headstart
centers. The County's role in the migr~nt program has been as
the administrator in a seven-county region and the direct
operator of the migrant program within Stanislaus County. It
was the County's decision last year to step out of its role as
the operator of the migrant program at three locations in
Stanislaus County that led to the present case. The County has
retained its role as administrator of Headstart in Stanislaus
County and operator of three Headstart centers and its role as
seven-county administrator of the migrant program.
The County commenced its service as regional administrator
of the federal migrant education program sometime in the early
1970's. It was' solicited for this task by federal authorities
who found it too difficult to deal directly with individual
counties. The region administered by the County comprises
4
Stanislaus,
Madera, Merced, Tuolumne,
Santa
Clara,
Contra
Costa
and
Santa
Cruz
Counties. Federal
funds
to operate
all
migrant
child
development programs
in
the
seven
counties
pass through
the Stanislaus
County
Department
of
Education.
In
its
role
as
regional administrator,
the
County
chooses
the
organizations
which
will
receive the
federal
migrant
education funds,
awards,
the
contracts,
monitors the
operation
of
the
program and
transmits
the
federal
monies
involved.
In each
county,
one
delegate organization
is
chosen
to operate the
migrant
program
throughout
that
county.
During
the
time
that
the
Stanislaus
County Department
of Education has
been
the regional
administrator,
the
only migrant
program
operated
by a
governmental
entity
in
any
of the
seven
counties
was
the
one
which
the Stanislaus
County
Department
itself
operated.
The County began
the
direct
operation
of the migrant
child
development program
within
Stanislaus
County sometime
in the
1970's.
In
recent years, the Stanislaus
migrant
child
development program has been
operated
at
farm
labor
camps
in
Patterson,
Westley
and
Ceres. This
is
a
reduction
from a
higher
number
of
centers
which
the
County
operated in the early
days of
its
involvement.
The
Stanislaus
County Housing
Authority
owns and manages
the three labor
camps where
the
child
develpment program
is offered.
5
The migrant child development program is in operation
during the agricultural harvest season, approximately May 1
through November 15. The number of children in the three
centers may vary widely according to crop conditions, the
weather and labor unrest. The peak enrollment is approximately
440 children. The children range in age from 6 weeks to
5 years. The program is limited to children whose parents
receive at least 50 percent of their income from agriculture
and whose annual income is not greater than an amount set by
the federal government. The program involves both instruction
and child care.
For some years, top administrators within the County have
held an ongoing discussion about the proper role of a county
department of education. One focus of that discussion was the
operation of the migrant program. A number of factors made its
continued operation undesirable from the County's point of
view. One problem was a conflict between the calendar year
orientation of the migrant program and the academic year
orientation of all other County operations. This conflict
carried over into the funding cycle with income and
expenditures for the migrant program geared toward a calendar
year while the remainder of the County's operations were funded
on a fiscal year basis. In addition, federal rules for the
migrant program were designed for operation by a community
agency and the County found them cumbersome for a governmental
entity.
6
The
County's
general
dissatisfaction
with
the migrant
program
came
into clear
focus
in the spring
of
1983 when
the
County
discovered
that
it
was
losing
money on
the
program.
After
being
self-supporting for
years~
the
migrant
program
was
headed
for
a 1983
deficit
of $139,166.
The
projection
was
that
the
progr~m
could
lose
as
much
as
$250,000
annually in
1984
and
later
years.
When
they
received those
gloomy
numbers, County
administrators
began
to think
seriously
about
getting
out
of
the
migrant
program.
Shortly
after
the
deficit
was
discovered in
May
of 1983,
County
personnel
director
Jack
Francis contacted
CSEA
field
representative
Nancee Maya and
told
her of
the
problem.
Since
August
of
1979,
CSEA
has been
exclusive
representative
of
an
office-technical-business-services unit,
a
paraprofessional
unit
and an
operations
and
support
unit
of
the County's
employees. Since
August
of
1980,
CSEA
also
has been
exclusive
representative
of
a
permit teacher unit
of the County's
employees.
on
July 12,
1983,
Mr.
Francis
wrote
to
Ms. Maya
advising
her
that
the
County might have
to lay off
"a
considerable
number
of
classified
employees
who
are connected with our
migrant/child
development programs."
He
urged an
early
meeting
between the
parties
to reach
an
understanding
on
the timing of
layoff notices.
CSEA
and
the
County
agreed to hold a
meeting
within three
days of Mr.
Francis'
letter.
7
At
the
time
the
parties
met on
July
15
they
were,
to
some
degree, dealing
with
a
hypothetical
change.
Although
leaning
toward
removing
itself
from
the migrant
program,
the
County
was
still
considering
the idea
and
did
not
plan
to
make a
final
decision
before
September.
Despite the
uncertainty, the
parties
negotiated
on
July
15 and
reached
what
they
described
as
an
"agreement in
relation to
the
effect
of
layoff
of
classified
and
certificated
employees
in
relation
to the
possible
termination
of
the
Child
Development Program
operated
by
the
Department."
The
agreement
set
out
eligibility
for
unemployment
insurance
benefits
and
provided for
continuation
pf
health
insurance coverage.
Mr.
Francis
again
met
with
Ms. Maya on
August
5,
19B3,
at
a
meeting she
described as
dealing
with
the design
and
content
of
the layoff notices.
Mr.
Francis
testified
that at
the
meeting
the
parties
had
discussed
whether
the County's proposed
action
was
similar to the contracting
out of
bus
services
which
previously
had
been
undertaken in
a
nearby Oakdale
school
district.
He
testified
that
Ms. Maya had
stated that
she
believed the County's
impending
action
was
not
like
the
Oakdale
situation.
Ms. Maya
testified that
she did not
recall
making
such
a
statement.
On
August
17, the
County commenced
sending layoff notices
to
employees
in the migrant program. The
notices
were
sent
on
a
rolling basis with the date
an
individual
employee
received
a
8
notice
determined
by when
that
employee
finished his
or her
pre-determined period
of
employment.
Ultimately,
107
employees
received
layoff notices.
Not
long
after
the
first
layoff notices
were
sent to
employees,
newspaper
articles
were
published
about
the
layoff.
The
articles
led to
consternation
among
parents
and
others
about
whether
the
migrant
education
centers
would
be
closed.
To ward
off
those
fears, representatives
of
the
County
office
met
with
interested parties
to assure
them
that
the
centers
would
not
be
closed but
that
some
other organization
might
take
over
their
operation.
Despite the apparent
finality
of
wording
in the
layoff
notices,
the
County was
still
undecided
in early
fall
about
whether
it
would
continue to operate the
migrant
program
in
1984.
A
negotiations
ses5ion
was
held
on
September
14,
1983,
to
permit
further discussions
between
the
parties
about
the
financial
problem,
estimated during the
meeting
to
be a
deficit
of about
30
percent.
At
the meeting,
Mr.
Francis
set
out
a
timetable for
a
final
decision
about
the County's
role in the
migrant
program.
Under
the timetable,
a
final
decision
had
to
be
made by
October
14
in order to permit time
for the
selection
of
a
replacement agency.
The
parties
next
met on
October 26, 1983. Although
the
meeting
was
held
after the deadline,
Mr.
Francis
earlier
had
advanced, the
County
still
had not reached a
final decision
on
9
the
migrant
program.
Negotiations
once
more
centered
upon
the
question
of
whether
or not
the
County
should cease
its
direct
involvement
in the operation
of
the
migrant
program.
In
an
effort
to
avoid
the
threatened
layoff,
CSEA
offered to
accept
a
pay
reduction
of
5
percent for
all
employees working
in
the
migrant
program.
The County
responded
by
giving
CSEA
a
financial
analysis
the
union
earlier
had
requested.
The
analysis
showed
various
ways
that
cuts
of
up
to
30
percent
would have
to
be
taken
from
the
program
if
it
were
to
become
self-sufficient.
The County
rejected
the
proposed
5
percent
cut
as completely
inadequate.
During
the
meeting,
the
County
sought
to
allay
Ms.
Maya's
earlier
voiced concerns
that
transfer
of
the
program
to
a
delegate
agency
would
constitute
contracting
out of
unit
work.
The County
reported to her
information
it
had
received
from
federal
authorities that
employees of
organizations operating federal
programs under
County
supervision
could not
be
considered
County
employees.
The
parties
met
again,
on November
1,
1983.
The
County
still
had
not
made a
final
decision
about whether or not to
terminate
its
direct
involvement
in the operation of
the
migrant
program. Once more,
the focus of the negotiations
was
on
whether or not the
County
should take that step.
CSEA
proposed
that the
salaries
of migrant child
development
center
employees nbe reduced to the extent necessary for the program
to remain within the limits
of
its
funding."
The County
10
rejected the proposal. Mr. Francis told the union that such
pay reductions would create an impossible morale problem with
employees in the migrant program receiving 30 percent less than
other County workers performing comparable duties. He said the
unequal pay also would have divided employees along racial
lines because the majority of those affected would have been
Hispanic.
On November 7, 1983, the County reached a final decision to
remove itself from direct operation of the migrant program.
The decision was reached by consensus after a lengthy
discussion between John Allard, the County superintendent,
John Hendrickson, the assistant superintendent, and
Mr. Francis. The three administrators reviewed the problems
which the County had encountered with the migrant program.
They concluded that while the CSEA proposal to accept a wage
reduction would solve the immediate financial problem it would
not solve the problem in future years.
On the same day as it reached its final decision, the
County sent a letter to all affected employees advising them
that the.County would seek a private, non-profit organization
to take over the migrant program. On November 16, the County
notified employees that the effective date of their layoff
would be changed to December 31, 1983. This action had the
effect of extending the health benefits of all migrant center
employees to January 31, 1984. Although CSEA apparently was
11
not consulted about the change in the effective date of the
layoff, it raised no objection after it learned of the action.
Ultimately, 94 unit members were laid off from their jobs
in the migrant program. Of those, eight had been reemployed in
other County programs as of the date of the hearing.
The parties held no meetings-about the layoff during the
remainder of 1983. On January 16, 1984, Ms. Maya wrote to
Mr. Francis declaring that CSEA had reached the conclusion that
the County's plan to get out of the migrant program actually
was the subcontracting of bargaining unit work. In her letter,
Ms. Maya asserted that the County's action was negotiable and
she demanded that the County meet and negotiate on the
subj~ct. She also demanded that the County rehire the affected
employees and restore the status quo prior to the commencement
of negotiations.
In response to the CSEA demand, the parties met on
February 10, 1984. CSEA offered two alternatives. The County
should either rehire all of the laid off employees and continue
its operation of the migrant program or it should. require the
new operator to adhere to the terms of the contract between the
County and CSEA. The County rejected the alternatives.
Mr. Francis responded that th_e Cou-nty had not gone through all
the difficulty of the layoff in order to simply rescind it.
Regarding the proposed transfer of the contract to the new
12
operator, Mr. Francis took the position that the County had no
legal authority to make such a requirement.
On March 2, 1984, the County made a written proposal in a
letter-from Mr. Francis to Ms. Maya. Under the proposal, the
laid off County employees would have preferential hiring rights
at the new delegate agency. The County would provide training
to laid off employees to make them eligible for vacancies
within remaining unit jobs as vacancies developed.
Re-employment rights for laid off migrant program employees
would be extended from 39 months to 45 months. The County
would pay each laid off employee $100 as compensation for lost
health benefits and CSEA would be given an opportunity to
review and offer comments regarding the organi~ations under
consideration to take over the program.
CSEA did not respond to the proposal, prompting a follow-up
letter from Mr. Francis to Ms. Maya. In that letter he accused
CSEA of a lack of cooperation in trying to reach an agreement
and said that Ms. Maya did not return his calls or make herself
available for a meeting. Ms. Maya responded in writing on
April 2 saying that she did not understand how further meetings
would be useful because of the County's refusal to discuss the
CSEA proposals of February 10.
Despite their differences the parties did meet twice more.
At a meeting on April 13, the County offered to pay some
college costs for laid off employees and proposed to increase
13
compensation
for
lost
health
benefits
from
$100
to
$150.
The
parties
met
again
on
April
18
and
the
County
increased to
$200
the
amount
it
was
willing
to
pay employees
for
lost
health
benefits.
At
both
meetings,
CSEA
maintained
its
insistence
that
the
County
either rehire
all
of
the
laid
off
migrant
employees or
ensure
that
the
new
operator
of
the
program
adhere
to the
terms of
the
County-CSEA
contract.
No
agreement
was
reached.
The
parties
are in
disagreement about
when
during
these
negotiations
CSEA
first
demanded
to
bargain
about
the
contracting
out of
unit
work.
The
County
asserts that
the
issue
was
not
raised
until
Ms.
Maya's
January
16
letter.
CSEA
contends
that
the
issue
was
raised considerably
earlier.
Regarding
the
August 5, 1983,
negotiation session,
Mr.
Francis
testified
that
the
parties
discussed the busing
situation
in
nearby
Oakdale
"because
Nancee had
raised the issue
of whether
or not
what
we
were
doing
was
contracting
out of
services."
3
Because
of
CSEA's
continued
inquiries
about
the question
of
contracting out, the
County on
October 11, 1983, wrote
to
federal authorities
requesting
clarification
about the
status
of persons
employed by an
organization
which
operates
a
migrant
program.
On
November
14, 1983, the
County
sent to
Ms. Maya
the
response
it
received
from
administrators in the Department of
3see
reporter's transcript at
pp. 120-121.
14
Health and Human Services. Ms. Maya believed that the response
actually strengthened her position that the County's action was
contracting out unit work and advised Mr. Francis of her
belief. Mr. Francis acknowledged on cross-examination that
prior to the County's November 7 decision to cease its
participation in the migrant program he clearly knew of CSEA's
opposition.
In early 1984 the County placed a newspaper advertisement
soliciting proposals from organizations seeking to administer
the migrant child development program. The application
deadline was set for March 7. The County's request for
proposals offered an award of $1,070,000 to an agency or
contractor which would provide services to some 440 children
aged 6 weeks to S years from May 1, 1984, through November 15.
Shortly after the application deadline the County awarded a
contract ·to Stanislaus County Child and Infant Care, Inc., a
private, nonprofit corporation.
The migrant program opened on or about May 1, 1984, in the
same three farm labor camps where the County formerly had
operated it. However, in 1984 the County's relationship with
the operator was the same as its relationship with the
operators of migrant child development programs in the other
six counties for which the Stanislaus County office is the
regional administrator. The County awarded the contract,
monitored the operation and funneled the monies to the
15
organization
which
actually
provided
the
services, Stanislaus
County
Child
and
Infant
Care,
Inc.
The
County
did
not
hire
the
employees,
set their salaries
or provide
care to the
children.
The
only
County
role
was
that
of
an
agent
for
the
federal
government.
LEGAL
ISSUES
1.
Did
CSEA
waive any
rights
it
may
have had
to
negotiate
about the
County's
decision to
cease
its
direct
operation
of
the
migrant
child
development
program?
2.
Was
the County's
decision to
cease
direct
.operation
of
the
migrant
program
a
matter within the
scope of
representation
and
if
so, did the
County
act unilaterally?
3.
Did
the
County
refuse to negotiate
about
the
effects
of
its
decision to
cease
direct
operation
of the migrant
program?
CONCLUSIONS
OF
LAW
Waiver.
The County
argues
that
CSEA
waived any
right
it
may
have
had
to negotiate
about
the decision to cease operation of the
migrant
program by
failing
to
make a
timely
demand
to
negotiate.
The County
contends
that
while
CSEA
knew
of the
possibility
of the
change as
early
as
May
of 1983,
it
was
not
until
January 16, 1984,
that the
CSEA
field representative
made
a
request to negotiate. Prior to that time, the
County
argues,
the
CSEA
representative
had
questioned whether the County's
16
proposed
decision
was
contracting
out but
had
never
made a
demand
to
bargain
about
that
subject.
CSEA
rejects
the
claim of waiver, noting
that
under
PERB
precedent
a
waiver
will
not
be
lightly
inferred.
CSEA
argues
that
in order to
show
waiver
the
County must
produce
evidence
of
clear
and
unmistakable language or behavior
indicating
an
intent
to
waive
bargaining
rights.
No
such
language
or
demonstrative behavior
has
been
shown,
CSEA
contends.
To
the
contrary,
CSEA
asserts,
the
evidence
shows
that
the
CSEA
field
representative raised
the
issue
of
contracting
out
on numerous
occasions.
More
significantly,
the
union
argues, the
parties
actually
negotiated the
issue,
although they did not
reach
agreement
on
it.
The
PERB
has
consistently
held
that
the
waiver of
bargaining
rights
by a
union
will
not
be
lightly inferred.
Oakland
Unified
School
District
(8/31/82)
PERB
Decision
No. 236. For an employer
to
show
that
a
union
waived
its
right
to negotiate,
the
employer must
produce evidence
of:
•••
either clear
and
unmistakable
language,
Amador
Valley
Joint
Union High
School
District
(10/2/78)
PERB
Decision
No.
74, or demonstrative behavior waiving
a
reasonable opportunity to bargain over
a
decision not already firmly
made by
theemployer.
San Mateo County Community
College
District
(6/8/79)
PERB
Decision
No. 94;
Sutter
Union High
School
District
(10/7/81)
PERB
Decision
No.
175.
17
Demonstrative behavior sufficient to waive the right to
bargain has been found where a union failed to demand
negotiations in a manner that adequately signified its desire
to negotiate. Newman-Crows Landing Unified School District
(6/30/82) PERB Decision No. 223. However, the determination
about whether a particular communication constitutes a proper
request to bargain "is a question of fact to be determined on a
case-by-case basis." Delano Joint Union High School District
(5/5/83) PERB Decision No. 307. To be effective,·"a request to
negotiate need not be specific or made in a particular form."
Gonzales Union High School District (9/28/84) PERB Decision
No. 410. The significant determination is whether the union's
request was sufficient to make its desire known.
It is abundantly clear that CSEA raised the issue of
contracting out long before the District's final decision to
cease operation of the migrant child centers. The County's
chief negotiator acknowledged that his CSEA counterpart had
raised the issue of subcontracting as early as the
August 5, 1983, negotiating session. In an attempt to dissuade
the CSEA negotiator from her contention that the County was
contracting out, the County wrote to federal authorities on
October 11 to secure an opinion about the issue. At the
negotiating session of October 26, the County again sought to
convince Ms. Maya that it was not contracting out union work.
County negotiator Francis testified that as of November 7, the
18
date
the
County
reached
its
final
decision,
he knew
of
CSEA
opposi~ion
to the
action.
Moreover, as
CSEA
argues
in
its
brief,
there
is
uncontroverted
evidence
that
the
parties
in
fact negotiated
about the County's
decision to
cease
operation
of
the
migrant
child centers.
The
negotiating sessions
of
October
26
and
November 1
involved
CSEA
proposals
designed
to
head
off
a
County
decision to
get out of
the
program.
These
are
precisely
the
type of
proposals
which one
might
expect following
a demand
to
bargain
about
a
proposal to contract
out
unit
work.
It
seems
inconceivable
that
the
County would have
negotiated
about
the decision to
cease
operation
of the
migrant
centers
if
CSEA
had waived
its
claim
to bargain
by
failing
to
make a
comprehensible
demand.
It
is
true that
CSEA
made no
written
request to negotiate
about
contracting
out
until
January 16,
1984.
But
the organization
earlier
had made
oral
demands
to bargain
and by
January 16,
the issue
had
been long
raised
and much
discussed.
To
read the
fall
1983
negotiations
any
other
way would
be, as
CSEA
argues, the
exaltation of
form
over substance.
For
these reasons, the County's
assertion that
CSEA
waived
any
rights
it
may
have had
to negotiate
about
contracting out
is rejected.
Scope of Representation.
CSEA
recites the familiar rule that absent
a
valid defense,
it is
a per se violation of the
EERA
for
an employer to
make a
19
unilateral change in a matter within the scope of
representation. It is equally well settled, CSEA continues,
that a decision to subcontract bargaining unit work is within
the scope of representation and thus negotiable when that
decision changes an_existing employment policy. Analogizing to
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB (1964) 379 U.S. 203 [57
LRRM 2609], CSEA argues that the "existing" policy of the
County was to use its own workers to operate the migrant
centers. Like the employer in Fibreboard, CSEA continues, the
County then. unilaterally laid off its workers and subcontracted
the work to an outside organization. CSEA argues that the
action did not alter the b~$iC operation of the migrant
program. CSEA contends that the County retains the ultimate
responsibility for the migrant program and that it has merely
replaced its own employees with those of another agency to do
the same work under similar conditions.
The County argues that its decision was a basic managerial
prerogative not subject to bargaining. Citing Otis Elevator
Co. (1984) 269 NLRB No. 162 [115 LRRM 1281, corr. at 116 LRRM
1075], the County contends that an employer may unilaterally
elect to change the nature and direction of its business.
Where the purpose of the action is to change the nature of the
business and not merely to save labor costs, the County argues,
there is no obligation to bargain about the decision itself.
Here, the County continues, its decision to cease operation of
20
the migrant centers was predicated upon a fundamental change in
its direction. It wanted to cease direct operation of a
program it found "exceedingly troublesome ana uncertain."
Thus, the County argues, federal precedent supports the
unilateral nature of its decision to cease direct operation of
the migrant centers. The County finds PERB precedent for
deciding scope questions to be consistent with the federal
rules and under either standard the County's action was lawful.
Although CSEA portrays this case as a straight-forward
matter of contracting out, the issue actually is somewhat more
complicated. This case does not involve a school district
which abandons its transportation program and hires a private
bus company or lays off its custodians and employs a janitorial
service. The program which the County has given up is not a
regular function of a county superintendent of schools. The
operation of the migrant education centers is a federal
activity which the County had undertaken on behalf of the
United States Government. Thus the question presented here is
whether the decision of a public school employer to drop its
operation of a federal program is a matter within scope of
representation under the EERA. 4
4The scope of representation under the EERA is set forth
at section 3543.2 which, in relevant part, provides as follows:
(a) The scope of representation shall be
limited to matters relating to wages, hours
of employment, and other terms and
21
Under
the
EERA,
a
public
school
employer
is
obligated to
negotiate
about
matters
relating
to
wages,
hours
of
employment
and
nine
specifically
enumerated
terms
and
conditions of
employment.
The
PERB
will
find
a
subject negotiable
even
though
not
specifically
enumerated in
section
3543.2
if:
(1)
it
is
logically
and
reasonably
related
to
hours,
wages
or
an
enumerated term
and
condition
of
employment, (2)
the
subject
is
of
such ~oncern
to
both
management and
employees
that
conflict is likely
to
occur
and
the
mediatory
influence
of
collective
negotiation
is
the appropriate
means
of
resolving
the
conflict,
and (3)
the employer's
obligation to
negotiate
would
not
significantly
abridge the employer's
freedom
to
exercise
those managerial
prerogatives (including matters
of
fundamental
policy)
essential
to the
achievement of
the
employer's mission.
Anaheim Union High
School
District
(10/28/81)
PERB
Decision
No.
177;
test
approved
in
conditions
of
employment. "Terms and
conditions
of
employment" mean
health
and
welfare
benefits
as defined
by
Section
53200,
leave, transfer
and
reassignment
policies, safety conditions of
employment,
class size,
procedures to
be used
for the
evaluation of employees,
organizational
security pursuant to Section
3546,
procedures for processing grievances
pursuant to sections 3548.5, 3548.6, 3548.7,and 3548,8, and
the layoff of probationary
certificated
school
district
employees,
pursuant to section
44959.5 of the EducationCode
•••
22
San
Mateo
City
School
District
v.
PERB
(1983)
33
Cal.3d
850
[191
Cal.Rptr.
800].
The
decision
on
whether
the
County
should
have
ceased
its
direct
operation
of
the
migrant education
centers
unquestionably
involved
the
employment
relationship.
It
was a
decision
of
such
concern
to
both
management and
employees
that
conflict
was
likely
to
occur.
Because
of
the nature
of
the
decision,
however,
it
is
doubtful
that
the negotia~ions process
was
the appropriate vehicle for reaching
a
decision.
The
program
in question
is
not
a County
program
prescribed
by
the
Education
·code
as
the
responsibility
of
a
county
superintendent
of
schools.
It
is
a
program
of
the
federal
government
created to
meet a
need
discerned
by
federal
authorities.
The
program
operates
under
strict
federal
guidelines (see,
Title.
45,
Chapter
XIII,
of
the
Code
of
Federal Regulations)
and
its
ultimate
continuance or
discontinuance
has
little
to
do
with whether
the
County
stayed
in or stepped
out.
Even
if
the
County
ceased
entirely to
participate
in the
program and dropped
its
role
as
regional
administrator, the
program would
continue
if
federal
authorities elected to continue
it.
The
federal
government
could
select
a new
regional administrator to either operate the
program or find
an
organization that
would. That the
County
elected to continue
its
role as regional administrator of the
migrant program does not change the essential nature of the
23
operation. In this role the county, as described in its brief,
is merely a "pipeline" through which the funding flows. When
it acts as administrator, the County is the agent of federal
authorities. The County's role as agent does not somehow
transform what is fundamentally a federal program.into a local
one.
The question before the County was whether it should
continue to operate a federal program that presented it with
both administrative and financial ·difficulties. The County wa~
uncomfortable with the operational calendar of the migrant
program and with the regulations governing it, both of which in
the County's view were geared more toward a nonprofit community
.
organization than a governmental agency. Moreover, the County
was faced with a loss of $139,166 from operation of the program
in 1984 and projected losses of nearly twice as much in
subsequent years. The question before the County was a
fundamental one. Whether a school employer continues to
operate a program on behalf of the federal government is a
basic managerial prerogative. Negotiation was not required. 5
5 The County's action is distinguishable from that of the
school board in Arcohe Union School District (5/16/84) PERB
Decision No. 360. In Arcohe, a school employer lost the
federal CETA funding that it had used to pay its custodians.
After the cut-off of federal funds, the district elected to
maintain the same level of custodial services through
subcontracting the unit work to a janitorial service. The PERB
found the decision to contract out work to be negotiable and,
because it was taken unilaterally, a violation of the EERA.
The present case does not present the situation where federal
funds were used to finance what is essentially a local program,
24
·
Accordingly,
it
is
concluded
that
the County's
decision
to
cease operation
of
the
migrant
children centers
was
outside
the
scope of
representation
under
the
EERA.
Even
though
the
county
did
meet
and
discuss the decision
with
CSEA,
it
had no
obligation
to secure
an
agreement.
Because
the matter
was
outside
the
scope
of
representation,
the
County
was
enti~led
to
act
unilaterally.
Negotiations
over
Effects.
It
is
alleged in the
complaint
that
the
County
failed
to
negotiate
about
the
effects
of
its
decision to
cease
operation
of
the three
migrant education
centers.
In
its
bri~f,
CSEA
does not
specifically
address the
allegation that
the
County
failed
to negotiate
about
the
effects
of
its
decision,
concentrating instead
on
the theory
that
the decision
itself
was
negotiable.
The
County
concedes
the
negotiability
of the
effects
of
its
decision
but argues
that
CSEA
never requested to negotiate
about
that subject.
The
County
notes
that
it
negotiated the
effects
of
the layoff
and
reached agreement with
CSEA
on
like
the cleaning of classrooms. Here,
federal
funds were
provided to
a
local
employer
to
run
a
federal
program.
The
migrant education
program was
initiated
by
the federal
government and
tightly controlled
by
it.
Unlike the cleaningof classrooms, operation of the migrant program
is
an
activity
which did not
exist before the
arrival
of
federal
funds and
might well cease should those funds ever be withdrawn.
25
July
15;
The
County
argues
that
it
was
further willing to
negotiate
about
the
effects
of
its
decision to
turn operation
of
the
migrant
centers
over
to
another
organization.
However,
the
County
argues,
CSEA
steadfastly
refused
to negotiate
about
such
effects
despite specific·County proposals
on
that
subject.
Accordingly, the
County
concludes,
it
met
its
obligation
to negotiate
about
the
effects
of
its
decision.
In accord with
the
County's
argument,
any
contention
that
the
County
refused to negotiate
about
the
~ffects
of
its
decision
is
easily
overcome by
the
record.
The
parties
negotiated
on
July
15, 1983,
and
entered
into
what
they
described
as
an
"agreement
in
relation to
the
effect
.
of
layoff
of
classified
and
certificated
employees
in
relation
to the
possible termination
of the
Child
Development Program
operated
by
the
Department."
The
agreement
set
out
eligibility
for
unemployment
insurance
benefits
and
provided
for continuation
of heal th
insura.nce coverage.
It
seems
probable
that
once
the July
15
agreement
was
reached, the
County had met
its
obligation to negotiate
about
the
effects
of
its
decision.
Even
if
it
be assumed, however,
that
the July
15
agreement
did not discharge the County's
obligation, the record also
is clear that after
July
15 CSEA
never requested to negotiate
about the
effects
of the County's
decision.
As
in
Newman-Crows
Landing, supra,
PERB
Decision
No. 223,
CSEA
demanded
only to negotiate about the underlying
26
decision
itself
and
not
about
its
effects.
A
succession
of
County
proposals dealing
with
the
effects
of
the
decision
were
steadfastly
ignored
by
CSEA.
Each
County
proposal
on
effects
was met on
by
a
counterproposal
about
the
underlying
decision.
CSEA's
persistent failure after
July
15
to request
negotiation
about the
effects
of
the decision
td
cease
operation
of
the
federal
program
was
sufficient
to
constitute
a
waiver
of
any
right
to bargain
about
that subject.
For
these reasons, the
allegation
in the
complaint
that
the
County
failed
to negotiate
about
the
effects
of
its
decision to
cease operation
of
the
migrant
centers
must be
rejected.
PROPOSED
ORDER
Based
upon
the
foregoing
findings
of
fact
and
conclusions
of
law
and
the
entire
record in
this
matter, unfair
practice
charge
S-CE-742,
California
School
Employees
Association
and
its
Stanislaus
Chapter
No. 668
v.
Stanislaus
County
Department
of
Education,
and
the
companion
PERB
complaint
is
hereby
DISMISSED.
Pursuant to California Administrative
Code,
title
8,
part
III,
section
32305,
this
Proposed Decision
and
Order
shall
become
final
on November
13, 1984,
unless
a
party
files
a
timely statement of exceptions.
-In accordance with the
rules,
the statement of exceptions should
identify
by page
citation
or
exhibit
number
the portions of the record relied
upon
for
such
exceptions.
See
California Administrative
Code,
title
8,
27
part
III,
section
32300.
Such
statement
of
exceptions
and
supporting
brief
must be
actually
received
by
the
Public
Employment
Relations
Board
itself
at
the headquarters
office
in
Sacramento
before the
close
of
business
(5:00
p.m.)
on
November
13,
1984,
or
sent
by
telegraph
or
certified
United
States
mail,
postmarked
not
later
than
the
last
day
for
filing
in
order to
be
timely
filed.
See
California
Administrative
Code,
title
8,
part
III,
section
32135.
Any
statement of
exceptions
and
supporting
brief
must be
served
concurrently
with
its
filing
upon
each
party to
this
proceeding. Proof of
service shall
be
filed
with
the
Board
itself.
see
California
Administrative
Code,
title
8,
part
III,
section
32300
and 32305.
Dated: October
23,
1984 l
Ronald
E.
Blubaugh
Hearing
Officer
28
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL
C.C.P. 1013a
I declare that I am employed in ttle County of ___S_a_c_r_a_rn_e_n_t_o__ , California.
I am over the age of 1 8 years and not a party to the within entitled cause: my business address is
1031 18th Street, Suite 200 Sacramento, California 95814
On December 31, 1985 . I served the enclosed ___________ _
(Oatet
•
PERB Decision No. 556
Stanislaus County Department of Education
Case No. S-CE-742 (Describe Document)
on the parties to this cas,e by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with
postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States Mail, ____S.;;;a.;;:;c;.;;r_a;;.;;rn:;.;:e:;.;n..;.t;;:..o___ _
(City or Townt
California, addressed as follows:
Jack Francis, Admin. Assist.
Stanislaus County Dept. of
Education
801 County Center Three Court
Modesto, CA 95355
Nancee Maya
California School Employees Assoc.
701 Ward Avenue
Patterson, CA 95363
California School Employees Assoc.
5301 Madison Ave., Suite 102
Sacramento, CA 95841
Mary Beth deGoede, Attorney
Leith B. Hansen, Esq.
Finkle & Stroup
P.O. Box 1752
Fresno, CA 93717-1752
Harry J. Gibbons, Esq.
California School Employees
Association
P.O. Box 640
San Jose, CA 95106
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this
declaration was executed on
___D_e_c__e__m_b;;;..,;.e__r__,.;;3....1____ . T9 .§2_ at ___S_a_c_r_a_m_e_n_t_o___ . California.
(Oatet (City or Townf
Teresa Stewart
(Type or print namet (Signaturet
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