CourtListener 9999112•People v. Jacaso CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/10/24 P. v. Jacaso CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082985
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN024923)
ANTHONY JACASO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David G. Brown, Judge. Affirmed.
Anthony Jacaso, in pro. per., and Richard Schwartzberg, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 1996, Anthony Jacaso pled guilty to one count of second degree
murder. (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a).) In 2023, Jacaso filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 on the ground that he “could not presently
be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes made to
Penal Code [sections] 188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019.” The court
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
appointed counsel for Jacaso, received briefing, and held a hearing. The trial
court found that Jacaso had not made a prima facie case for resentencing and
denied his petition.
Jacaso appealed. Appellate counsel subsequently filed a brief pursuant
to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), indicating he has
not been able to identify any potentially meritorious issues for reversal on
appeal. We notified Jacaso of his right to file his own brief on appeal, and he
has elected to do so.
We have reviewed the issues raised by Jacaso and have independently
reviewed relevant portions of the record. We agree with counsel that there
are no potentially meritorious arguments for appeal. We therefore affirm.
DISCUSSION
As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Delgadillo, and Jacaso has elected to file his own supplemental brief.
Although we are “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in
that brief,” we are not “compel[led to conduct] an independent review of the
entire record to identify unraised issues.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 232.) Jacaso does not raise any potentially meritorious issues in his
supplemental brief, in which he claims that (1) his diminished capacity
precluded him from knowingly and voluntarily accepting a plea, (2) the
evidence was insufficient to show that he killed his son with implied or
express malice, and (3) his youth at the time of the offense constituted a
mitigating factor. These arguments are outside the scope of this section
1172.6 petition as they cannot support his claim that he “could not presently
be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 . . . made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)
2
We nonetheless exercise our discretion to conduct an independent
review of the record. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) A generic
plea to second degree murder does not establish any particular theory of the
crime. (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 987.) However, the
factual basis for such plea may “conclusively establish[ ] as a matter of law
that [the defendant] is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.”
(People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 448.) Here, Jacaso through
his counsel stipulated to specific facts demonstrating that he was guilty of
murder under a still-valid theory as the actual perpetrator of implied malice
murder.
During Jacaso’s plea colloquy, the trial court asked the parties to
provide the factual basis for the plea.2 Defense counsel summarized the
factual basis as follows: “On June 24, 1995, my client shook his son knowing
that he shouldn’t have shaken his son, and that resulted in his son’s death.
The son was . . . 23 days old, and . . . my client[ ] was caring for him in the
absence of the child’s mother.” The court interjected: “It can’t be because of
accident, misfortune, that type of thing. It requires implied [malice].”
Defense counsel responded:
“It was in this case implied malice. The two-part test of implied
[malice], I believe, is satisfied in that my client knew that it was
wrong for him to shake a baby, and that he acted in conscious
disregard for the knowledge that he had that it was wrong. He
lost his temper because the baby was crying and not responding
well to his care.”
The court then asked defense counsel about specific facts supporting Jacaso’s
implied malice:
2 Jacaso separately stipulated to the transcript of the preliminary
hearing as the general factual basis for his plea.
3
“The Court: I read the moving papers from the people. There
were three things that seemed to assist the people
in showing this implied malice. One was that there
was no immediate call to 9-1-1.
“[Counsel]: Correct.
“The Court: Second, there was no immediate, according to the
mother, explanation to the mother of distress the
child was in. And third, the first rendition of events
to the police included a story that was not true: the
child had choked. Is that all accurate?
“[Counsel]: All of that is accurate from those facts. I believe a
jury could certainly infer and reach the conclusion
that there was implied malice.”
Defense counsel also agreed that the week before the death of the baby, the
child’s mother had instructed Jacaso how to “handle the child” and properly
support his head and neck.
The court then asked Jacaso, “Sir, how do you plead to a charge of
guilty of murder in the second degree, implied malice, death of a human
being, namely, your son, by age 23 days. Guilty or not guilty?” Jacaso
answered, “Guilty.”
“[C]onsistent with defense counsel’s broad authority to stipulate to
factual and procedural matters on his client’s behalf,” counsel has authority
to stipulate to the factual basis for a plea agreement. (People v. Palmer
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 118.) Jacaso, through counsel, specifically agreed that
the circumstances of his offense demonstrated implied malice, which is still a
viable ground for a murder conviction. (§ 188, subd. (a)(2) [“Malice is implied
when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances
attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.”].) He thus
was not convicted “under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
4
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Jacaso’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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