Both v. Liolios CA2/1

CourtListener 9998867Calctapp09.07.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/9/24 Both v. Liolios CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

RONALD ANDREW BOTH, B323935

Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, (Los Angeles County
Cross-complainant and Super. Ct. No. BC676901)
Respondent,

v.

JEFFREY SCOTT LIOLIOS,

Defendant, Cross-defendant
and Appellant;

GEOFFREY PLANK,

Cross-defendant, Cross-
complainant and Respondent;

GRANT STUDE,

Cross-defendant and
Respondent;
CAPITAL MARKET ACCESS, LLC,

Cross-defendant and
Respondent.

APPEALS from a judgment and an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Judgment
affirmed in part and reversed in part; order affirmed.
Snell & Wilmer, Michael B. Reynolds, Jeffrey M. Singletary
and Jing (Jenny) Hua for Defendant, Cross-defendant and
Appellant Jeffrey Scott Liolios and Defendant, Cross-
complainant, Cross-defendant and Appellant, Liolios Group,
Incorporated.
Law Office of Mark Mazda and Mark Mazda for Plaintiff,
Cross-defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent
Ronald Andrew Both; Cross-defendant, Cross-complainant and
Respondent Geoffrey Plank; Cross-defendant and Respondent
Grant Stude; and Cross-defendant and Respondent Capital
Market Access, LLC.
____________________________

This is an appeal from a judgment following a jury award of
compensatory damages, waiting-time penalties, and punitive
damages to respondent Ronald Andrew Both and against
appellants Jeffrey Scott Liolios and Liolios Group, Incorporated.1
The judgment was also in favor of respondents Both, Geoffrey

1 We hereafter refer to Liolios Group, Incorporated
individually as “LGI,” and we refer to Liolios and LGI collectively
as “appellants.”

2
Plank, Grant Stude, and Capital Market Access, LLC2 in
accordance with the trial court’s order granting respondents’
motion for a directed verdict on LGI’s cross-claims against them.
Additionally, appellants seek review of the trial court’s order
denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Although we affirm the order denying appellants’ motion, we
reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
First, appellants fail to demonstrate the trial court erred in
granting a directed verdict in favor of Both, Plank, and CMA on
LGI’s cross-claims for breach of contract, misappropriation of
trade secrets, intentional interference with contract, and
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
either because appellants fail to direct us to evidence supporting
LGI’s claims or appellants forfeited their contentions by not
raising them below.
Second, appellants fail to show the trial court erred in
rejecting their waiver defense to Both’s recovery of unpaid wages
and waiting-time penalties. Liolios repeatedly lied to Both when
he claimed to have diverted Both’s compensation to make capital
contributions covering losses that LGI did not in fact incur.
Given that appellants do not dispute this evidence of Liolios’s
fraud, Both’s consent to the diversion of his compensation was
not voluntary.
Third, appellants have forfeited their argument that
portions of Both’s damages award are time-barred because they
do not contest the trial court’s ruling that the continuing

2 We employ “CMA” as an abbreviation for Capital Market
Access, LLC, and we refer to Both, Plank, Stude, and CMA
collectively as “respondents.”

3
violation doctrine applied to Both’s claims. It is appellants’
burden to show error on appeal and they failed to show error as
to the trial court’s application of that doctrine.
Fourth, appellants do not show the trial court erred in
ruling that because Liolios failed to comply with a trial subpoena
for his tax returns, he was estopped from contesting the
sufficiency of the evidence concerning his ability to pay the
$2 million punitive damages award.
Lastly, we hold the $2 million punitive damages award
against LGI is excessive because that figure constitutes
approximately 71 percent of the value of LGI’s equity.
In sum, we reverse the portion of the judgment that awards
Both $2 million in punitive damages against LGI. We remand
the matter for a new trial on the amount of punitive damages to
be awarded against that entity. We affirm all other aspects of
the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

We summarize only those facts pertinent to the instant
appeals. In our Discussion, post, we describe additional facts
relevant to the issues before us.

3 In describing the procedural history and the evidence
presented at trial or in connection with appellants’ posttrial
motions, we rely in part on undisputed aspects of the trial court’s
rulings, admissions made by the parties in their appellate
briefing, and assertions respondents make that appellants do not
contest in their reply. (See Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement
System (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 340, 349, fn. 2 [utilizing the
summary of facts provided in the trial court’s ruling]; Discussion,
part B.1, post [noting that the trial court’s rulings are presumed

4
Liolios founded LGI, which is an investor relations firm
that advises companies on their capital markets communications
strategy and on implementation of that strategy. Liolios has an
80 percent ownership stake in the company, and since 2002, Both
has owned the remaining 20 percent of the company’s equity.
LGI charges its clients flat monthly fees, and certain clients also
compensate LGI with stocks, options, and/or warrants.
Both worked for LGI from 2000 or 2001 until
December 2016. Both managed certain clients for LGI during his
tenure. Both testified that when he began his employment, he
was paid a base salary along with a bonus that was tied to LGI’s
sale of stock and its exercise of stock options and warrants. Both
testified LGI later changed his compensation package from a
base salary and bonus to a 30 percent fee for LGI clients he
directly managed and a 10 percent fee for the firm’s other clients
(the latter Both referred to as the 10 percent “override”). During
the proceedings below, Both claimed that on several occasions,
Liolios told Both he had to reduce Both’s pay to help cover LGI’s
losses, even though, in fact, LGI never had any such losses. Both
further contended below that from 2002 through the end of 2016,
Liolios and LGI concealed from Both that LGI was profitable and
that LGI had made distributions to Liolios.

correct]; Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2
[“ ‘[A] reviewing court may make use of statements [in briefs and
argument] . . . as admissions against the party [advancing
them].’ ”]; Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of
Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 773–774 (Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs) [concluding that the appellants
“tacitly concede[d]” a point raised in the respondents’ brief by
“failing to dispute it in their reply”].)

5
LGI employed Plank from September 2005 to March 2016.
Stude worked for LGI from July 2010 to December 2016.
In July 2015, during Plank’s tenure at LGI, Plank
incorporated CMA. Plank testified CMA is an investor relations
firm that directly competes with LGI. Respondents claim CMA
did not conduct any business until after Plank resigned from LGI.
Plank testified that several weeks after his resignation from LGI,
he started CMA’s business operations.
In December 2016, Both and Stude began working for
CMA. The following five clients thereafter left LGI and hired
CMA: RGS Energy, Optimize RX, Global Water Resources,
TSO3, and Global Self Storage. Liolios testified RGS Energy,
Optimize RX, and Global Water Resources terminated their
relationship with LGI within approximately one month of Both’s
resignation in December 2016, and Both’s testimony indicates
that all three of those former LGI clients hired CMA at around
the same time they ceased retaining LGI. Both testified TSO3
became a CMA client approximately five months after he ended
his employment with LGI, and Global Self Storage hired CMA in
2019.
Liolios’s trial testimony indicates that upon expiration of
the initial term of LGI’s contract with each of its clients, the
parties have an automatically renewing “month to month”
contract, at which point the client must notify LGI prior to
terminating the contract. On appeal, respondents represent, “For
all five of the clients that left LGI and came to CMA, they all
finished out their LGI contracts, fulfilled their contractual
obligations, paid what they owed, and did not come on board as
CMA clients prior to finishing out their contracts with LGI.”

6
On September 21, 2017, Both commenced the instant
action by filing a complaint against Liolios and LGI, alleging
causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, oppression of
minority member, unjust enrichment, violation of Business and
Professions Code section 17200 et seq., and accounting. LGI later
filed a cross-complaint against Both, Plank, Stude, and CMA,
averring claims for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade
secrets, intentional interference with contract, and intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage. Subsequently,
Both, Plank, and Stude filed a cross-complaint against Liolios
and LGI, setting forth claims for breach of contract, quantum
meruit, unpaid wages in violation of Labor Code sections 200 and
201, waiting-time penalties pursuant to Labor Code section 203,
and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200
et seq. Stude voluntarily dismissed his cross-claims before trial.
The case was tried before a jury in two phases: (1) liability
on the parties’ respective claims, the amount of actual damages
and waiting-time penalties to be awarded against Liolios and
LGI, and Liolios’s and LGI’s liability for punitive damages were
tried in phase I; and (2) the amount of punitive damages to be
awarded against Liolios and LGI was tried in phase II. At the
conclusion of phase I of the trial, the trial court granted
respondents’ motion for a directed verdict on LGI’s cross-
complaint. The jury thereafter returned a special verdict
(1) awarding Both $2,716,303.40 in actual damages on his causes
of action for breach of fiduciary duty, intentional
misrepresentation, concealment, and failure to pay wages,
and $33,566.70 for waiting-time penalties; (2) awarding Plank
$169,041.90 on his unpaid wages and waiting-time penalties
claims; and (3) finding that LGI and Liolios acted with malice,

7
oppression, or fraud, thereby giving rise to liability for punitive
damages. Regarding the award of $2,716,303.40 in actual
damages to Both, the jury found that $1,009,279.40 was
attributable to damages Both “suffered as a result of . . . Liolios’s
breach of fiduciary duty,” and that $1,707,024 constituted the
amount of unpaid wages owed to Both. The jury also found that
Both suffered $2,716,303.40 in damages on his intentional
misrepresentation and concealment claims, thereby indicating
that the damages on those two causes of action was the sum of
the damages on Both’s breach of fiduciary duty and unpaid wage
claims.
At the end of phase II, the jury returned a special verdict
finding Liolios and LGI liable for punitive damages in the
amount of $2 million.
On July 6, 2022, in accordance with the jury’s special
verdicts and the trial court’s ruling on respondents’ motion for a
directed verdict, the court entered judgment: (1) awarding Both
$4,749,870.10 against LGI and Liolios, jointly and severally,
which figure includes the $2 million award of punitive damages;
(2) awarding Plank $169,041.90 against LGI and Liolios, jointly
and severally; and (3) in favor of Both, Plank, Stude, and CMA
and against LGI on its cross-complaint.4
Appellants moved for a new trial and a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. On September 8, 2022, the trial
court denied appellants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding

4 On appeal, appellants do not contest the portion of the
judgment that awarded damages to Plank. They also do not
challenge the judgment in favor of Stude on LGI’s cross-
complaint. (Fn. 7, post.)

8
the verdict and denied in part their new trial motion.5 On
September 29, 2022, the court denied the remainder of
appellants’ new trial motion. On October 3, 2022, appellants
appealed the judgment and the September 8, 2022 order denying
their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.6

5 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the trial court’s
September 8, 2022 minute order that denied appellants’ motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denied in part
their new trial motion. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
6 In their notice of appeal, appellants also sought review of
the trial court’s orders denying their new trial motion. Although
a party “ ‘may appeal from the judgment [and] from the order
denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict’ ”
(see Brown v. City of Sacramento (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 587,
598), “[a]n order denying a motion for new trial is not
independently appealable, but may be reviewed on appeal from
the underlying judgment” (People v. Ashford University, LLC
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485, 502, fn. 4).
Additionally, we note the appeals of the judgment and of
the September 8, 2022 order denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict are timely because appellants filed
their notice of appeal a mere 28 days after issuance of the latter
ruling. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.108(d)(1) [“If any party
serves and files a valid motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and the motion is denied, the time to appeal from the
judgment is extended for all parties until the earliest of: [¶]
(A) 30 days after the superior court clerk or a party serves an
order denying the motion or a notice of entry of that order; [¶]
(B) 30 days after denial of the motion by operation of law; [¶] or
(C) 180 days after entry of judgment.”]; id., rule 8.104(a)(1) & (e)
[providing that an appealable order must be appealed within
60 days of service or 180 days of entry of the order, whichever is
earlier].)

9
DISCUSSION

A. We Exercise Our Discretion To Reach the Merits of
These Appeals Notwithstanding Respondents’ Claim
Appellants Waived Their Right To Appeal by Making
Misrepresentations, Misstatements, and Omissions of
Relevant Facts in Their Briefing
Respondents request we “find Appellants’ entire appeal
waived” because “Appellants [allegedly] make numerous
misstatements, misrepresentations, and omissions of relevant
facts” in their briefing.
Respondents rely upon decisions holding that an appellant
may waive an insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim by ignoring
evidence unfavorable to the appellant’s position. (See Schmidlin
v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738 [“Where a
party presents only facts and inferences favorable to his or her
position, ‘the contention that the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence may be deemed waived.’ ”]; Nwosu v. Uba
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 [“[A]ppellants who challenge
the decision of the trial court based upon the absence of
substantial evidence to support it ‘ “are required to set forth in
their brief all the material evidence on the point and not merely
their own evidence. Unless this is done the error is deemed
waived.” ’ ”]; Brockey v. Moore (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 86, 96
[“Failure to set forth the material evidence on an issue waives a
claim of insufficiency of the evidence.”].)
These cases are not apt. First, to prevail on their challenge
to the directed verdict, appellants are not required to show the
absence of substantial evidence supporting that ruling. Rather,
reversal is proper if appellants have shown that, upon
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to appellants,

10
a reasonable jury could have rendered a verdict in appellants’
favor. (See Discussion, part B.1, post [discussing the applicable
standard of review].) Respondents have not directed us to any
authority that the alleged misstatements, misrepresentations, or
omissions give rise to a waiver of appellants’ challenge to the
directed verdict.
Aside from respondents’ allegations vis-à-vis appellants’
briefing on the directed verdict, respondents identify the
following purported misrepresentations, misstatements, and
omissions, none of which bears on our resolution of this appeal:
(1) appellants falsely claim that Both’s economic expert “did not
have a basis to state that Liolios made $5 million off the Aspen
Bio warrants,” (2) appellants “attempt to mislead this Court into
thinking” the trial court did not order “LGI to respond to
interrogatories . . . ask[ing] for Liolios’s and his wife’s annual LGI
salary from 2002–2021,” and (3) appellants fail to disclose certain
material facts relating to Liolios’s bankruptcy.
An appellate court ordinarily has the discretion to excuse
an appellant’s waiver. (See In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569,
587, fn. 23.) Indeed, by arguing that we “can” and “should” find
appellants’ arguments to be waived, respondents tacitly
acknowledge that our authority to do so is discretionary. Because
none of the purported misstatements, misrepresentations, and
omissions identified in the immediately preceding paragraph has
any bearing on our resolution of this appeal, we exercise our
discretion to reach the merits. (See Discussion, part C, post
[resolving appellants’ waiver issue without reference to
appellants’ alleged misstatements, misrepresentations, and
omissions]; Discussion, part D, post [same for appellants’
argument that certain claims are time-barred]; Discussion,

11
part E, post [declining to consider allegations concerning Liolios’s
bankruptcy and the order compelling further responses to
interrogatories; the Aspen Bio warrants are not discussed
therein]; Discussion, part F, post [affirming the order denying
appellants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
without addressing the issues delineated in the immediately
preceding paragraph].) We express no opinion on the merits of
respondents’ claims of misstatements, misrepresentations, or
omissions in appellants’ briefing.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Granting a Directed
Verdict on LGI’s Cross-Claims

1. Legal standards governing directed verdicts
“ ‘[A] motion for a directed verdict is in the nature of a
demurrer to the evidence. [Citations.] In determining such a
motion, the trial court has no power to weigh the evidence, and
may not consider the credibility of witnesses. It may not grant a
directed verdict where there is any substantial conflict in the
evidence. [Citation.] A directed verdict may be granted only
when, disregarding conflicting evidence, giving the evidence of
the party against whom the motion is directed all the value to
which it is legally entitled, and indulging every legitimate
inference from such evidence in favor of that party, the court
nonetheless determines there is no evidence of sufficient
substantiality to support the claim or defense of the party
opposing the motion, or a verdict in favor of that party.’
[Citation.]” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres
Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 509 (Los Angeles
Unified School Dist.).)

12
“A directed verdict is subject to de novo appellate review”
(Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 509),
meaning “we will reverse if there was substantial evidence
tending to prove appellants’ case and the state of the law
supports the claim.” (See North Counties Engineering, Inc. v.
State Farm General Ins. Co. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 902, 920.)
Even when our review on appeal is de novo, however, “ ‘it is
limited to issues which have been adequately raised and
supported in [the appellant’s opening] brief[,]’ ” given that
“ ‘ “[t]he most fundamental rule of appellate review is that an
appealed judgment or order is presumed to be correct.”
[Citation.] . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See Golden Door Properties, LLC v.
County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554–555 (Golden
Door Properties, LLC).) To overcome the presumption of
correctness, an appellant must “ ‘ “ ‘supply[ ] the reviewing court
with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
citation to the record.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 777.)

2. LGI’s cross-complaint, the confidentiality agreements,
principles of trade secret law, and the trial court’s
ruling on the directed verdict motion
In its cross-complaint, LGI alleged a breach of contract
claim against Both and Plank based upon certain confidentiality
agreements they executed with LGI, along with claims for
misappropriation of trade secrets, intentional interference with

13
contract, and intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage against Both, Plank, and CMA.7
The parties agree that Both’s and Plank’s confidentiality
agreements with LGI do not materially differ. Those agreements
provide: “During and after the Employment, [Both and Plank]
will not use, disclose or otherwise permit any person or entity
access to any of the Confidential Information other than as
required in the performance of [Both’s and Plank’s] duties with
[LGI,]” and that Both and Plank are “not allowed to sell, license
or otherwise exploit any products or services (including software
in any form) which embody in whole or in part any of the
Confidential Information.” “Confidential Information” is
“information and materials [that] . . . are proprietary to [LGI]
and . . . highly sensitive in nature.” Encompassed within the
definition of “Confidential Information” are, inter alia:
“Customer, Contact, client and marketing information and
materials, including, but not limited to, . . . customer, contact and
client data, including customer, contact and client lists, names of
customers, contacts and clients and their representatives, data
provided by or about prospective, existing or past customers,
contacts and clients, customer, contact and client service
materials, . . . and . . . financial data, including price and cost
objectives, price lists, pricing policies and procedures, and
quoting policies and procedures.” On the other hand, the
agreements provide, “The general skills and experience gained by
[Both and Plank] during the[ir] Employment, and information

7 Although LGI leveled all four causes of action against
Stude as well, LGI does not challenge the trial court’s order
granting Stude’s motion for a directed verdict as to all cross-
claims against him.

14
publicly available or generally known within the industries or
trades in which [LGI] competes, is [sic] not considered a part of
the Confidential Information.”
“[M]isappropriation of a trade secret under the California
U[niform Trade Secrets Act] consists of only two elements:
(1) existence of a trade secret, and (2) improper acquisition, use,
or disclosure of that trade secret.” (Applied Medical Distribution
Corp. v. Jarrells (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 556, 568–570.) “A ‘trade
secret’ is ‘information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process that: [¶]
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to the public or to other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and [¶] (2) Is
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy[,]’ ” e.g., a confidentiality agreement. (See
Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1452.) In
turn, a defendant’s use of a trade secret that he or she “[a]cquired
under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy
or limit its use” satisfies the second element of trade secret
misappropriation. (See Civ. Code, § 3426.1, subd. (b)(2)(B)(ii)
[defining misappropriation].)
In their opening brief, appellants describe what they claim
to have been the trial court’s reasoning in directing a verdict on
LGI’s cross-claims: “(1) there was no confidential information
and (2) there was no trade secret.” Appellants argue the court
did not decide whether there was substantial evidence showing
Both and Plank used LGI’s confidential information or
misappropriated its trade secrets. Appellants misinterpret the
record.

15
In addressing the motion for a directed verdict on LGI’s
breach of contract cross-claim, the trial court remarked that
appellants’ counsel had not “compared” the manner in which LGI
structures its transactions (e.g., LGI’s tying its compensation to
certain “performance metrics”) “to anything” CMA “ha[d] done,”
and stated that “no evidence was presented that CMA does that
same type of thing.” The court further indicated that much of its
analysis concerning whether Both and Plank breached their
confidentiality agreements with LGI “merge[d] with” the court’s
assessment of LGI’s misappropriation of trade secrets cross-
claim. In addressing LGI’s trade secret claim, the court stated, “I
really don’t know what was used.” The court further elaborated,
“[Appellants] failed to isolate [the trade secret] during the case.
It’s been very amorph[o]us out there.” The trial court’s remarks
thus demonstrate it had ruled that the contract and trade secret
cross-claims failed because LGI had not shown Both, Plank, and
CMA had used any of LGI’s confidential information and trade
secrets.8 (See Concerned Citizens Coalition of Stockton v. City of
Stockton (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 70, 77 [“ ‘The true measure of an
order . . . is not an isolated phrase appearing therein, but its
effect when considered as a whole.’ ”].)
Additionally, based on its decision to enter a directed
verdict on LGI’s breach of contract and trade secret cross-claims,
the court ruled LGI failed to show Both, Plank, and CMA
engaged in an independently wrongful act, which is a necessary
element of claims for intentional interference with an at-will

8 The trial court indicated it had treated CMA’s liability on
LGI’s cross-claims as being premised solely on Both’s and Plank’s
conduct. On appeal, appellants do not argue that CMA’s liability
is predicated on the misconduct of other CMA personnel.

16
contract and intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage. (See Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 1130, 1142 [“[I]ntentionally interfering with prospective
economic advantage requires pleading that the defendant
committed an independently wrongful act [citation]. ‘[A]n act is
independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed
by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or
other determinable legal standard.’ ”]; id. at p. 1148 [“[T]o state a
claim for interference with an at-will contract by a third party,
the plaintiff must allege that the defendant engaged in an
independently wrongful act.”].)
We next turn to whether the trial court erred in granting a
directed verdict based on LGI’s failure to introduce substantial
evidence that Both, Plank, and CMA had used LGI’s confidential
information and trade secrets.

3. Appellants failed to preserve for appeal several of
their challenges to the directed verdict and they
otherwise fail to demonstrate there is substantial
evidence that Both and Plank used LGI’s confidential
information and trade secrets
In their opening brief, appellants seem to argue that the
following constitute (1) LGI trade secrets and (2) “Confidential
Information” for the purpose of Both’s and Plank’s confidentiality
agreements: “LGI’s customer and client lists”; “contact
information . . . for clients[ and] for potential investors[,] . . .
investors’ preferences, their other investments, . . . whether each
had met with certain other clients,” and “personal information on
the investors”; “LGI’s methodology in structuring prices” (e.g.,
utilizing “certain performance metrics, such as coverage in media
outlets, trade volume, or stock price”); and LGI’s “exact pricing

17
information per client.” Appellants further argue, “Even if [Both
and Plank] had not breached any agreement or misappropriated
any trade secrets, the act of competing [with LGI while still
employed by that entity] breaches their common law duty of
loyalty to LGI,” meaning we should “reverse as to the
interference claims” “even if [we] do[ ] not reverse the directed
verdict” on the other two cross-claims.9
Appellants do not claim to have presented any evidence at
trial that Both or Plank had utilized any investor information
belonging to LGI. Further, although appellants assert “Both and
Plank accessed and used Confidential Information that included
how LGI developed its clients and structured its pricing” (italics
added), the record citation they provide to support that
proposition shows only that Plank admitted he continued to have

9 Appellants also contend that in denying respondents’
summary adjudication motion, the trial court “noted that Both
had admitted to having and using LGI’s confidential customer
contact information to contact LGI’s clients to convince them to
hire CMA and that there was ‘a clear triable issue of material
fact as to whether or not Both relied on LGI’s confidential pricing
information to attract new clients.’ [Citation.]” Appellants do not
claim this evidence referenced in the summary adjudication order
was introduced at trial or otherwise explain what bearing this
aspect of the court’s pretrial ruling should have on our review of
the order granting a directed verdict on LGI’s cross-complaint.
Accordingly, we decline to address this argument further. (See
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 (United Grand Corp.) [“We may and do
‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by
pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by
which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to
adopt.’ ”].)

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access to LGI’s database containing client information after he
formed CMA. Appellants thus fail to demonstrate there was
substantial evidence that Both and Plank used LGI’s investor
information or the company’s pricing structure.
Regarding LGI’s client list and contact information,
appellants argue, “Plank conceded at trial that he had LGI client
information on his electronic devices when he left LGI and used
that information to contact LGI’s clients.” Although appellants
acknowledge respondents offered evidence that “the identities of
some LGI clients were public [and] that their contact information
could be found through online searches or through ‘data
aggregators[,]’ ” appellants do not argue Plank had contacted any
LGI clients whose identities and contact information were not
publicly available. In fact, appellants do not even identify which
LGI clients Plank contacted using information on his electronic
devices after he left LGI. Because “ ‘ “all intendments and
presumptions are indulged in favor of [the] correctness” ’ ” of the
trial court’s ruling even on de novo review (see Association for Los
Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 776–777),
appellants’ intimation that Plank may have utilized nonpublic
information to make entreaties to LGI’s clients falls short of
demonstrating error.
Concerning LGI’s “exact pricing information per client,”
appellants maintain there was substantial evidence Both
breached his confidentiality agreement by deploying his
knowledge of the rates LGI charged TSO3, Optimize RX, and
RGS Energy to persuade them to hire CMA. Specifically,
appellants argue CMA charged TSO3 a monthly rate that was
$600 less than the rate TSO3 had previously owed to LGI; CMA
charged Optimize RX a monthly rate $100 less than the rate

19
Optimize RX had previously owed to LGI; and “[a] week after
Both left LGI, Plank ‘ghostwrote’ an email for Both to send [RGS
Energy], which was then an LGI client, offering [CMA’s] services
at the same rate charged by LGI.”10 Appellants claim this
alleged breach of Both’s confidentiality agreement also “supports
a finding that Respondents misappropriated LGI’s trade secrets.”
Furthermore, appellants seem to support their argument
that Both and Plank breached their duty of loyalty to LGI with
the assertion that “a jury could reasonably infer [Both and
Plank] . . . were not credible in testifying they did not do any
work for CMA until after they left LGI.” For instance, appellants
claim, “Plank sent emails to clients referencing Both as a ‘silent
partner’ months before Both left LGI.”
Respondents counter that appellants failed to raise below,
and thereby waived or forfeited, their arguments that (1) Both’s
knowledge of “what LGI charged clients that followed him to
CMA . . . is evidence that he breached” the confidentiality
agreement, and (2) “Both/Plank breached a duty of loyalty by
competing against LGI while they still worked for LGI.” In their
reply, appellants do not dispute that they failed to make these
arguments during the trial court proceedings. Instead, they
contend that raising these arguments “would have been futile
upon the [trial] court’s finding there were no trade secrets to
misappropriate and no confidential information to use.”
We disagree. As we explained in Discussion, part B.2, ante,
the court analyzed whether there was evidence Both and Plank

10 Appellants do not clarify whether they are asserting
that CMA ultimately charged RGS Energy the same rate as LGI
had done. In any event, this ambiguity has no impact on our
resolution of the instant appeals.

20
used LGI’s confidential information or trade secrets. Had
appellants raised the argument that Both used his knowledge of
the rates LGI charged TSO3, Optimize RX, and RGS Energy to
persuade those clients to hire CMA, the trial court could have
considered that contention as the court was searching in its
analysis for a trade secret or otherwise confidential information
Both and Plank had used. In addition, even if one accepted
appellants’ futility premise, that premise would not apply to their
new breach of duty of loyalty theory because, as they
acknowledge, that theory would not have required appellants to
show Both and Plank had “breached any agreement or
misappropriated any trade secrets . . . .” In sum, because
advancing these two arguments below would not have been an
exercise in futility, appellants forfeited these contentions by
raising them for the first time on appeal. (See Meridian
Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 698
(Meridian Financial Services, Inc.) [“ ‘Ordinarily the failure to
preserve a point below constitutes a [forfeiture] of the point.’ ”];
id. at p. 700 [“We ‘are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds
that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and
the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.’ ”].)

C. Appellants Fail To Establish the Trial Court Erred In
Rejecting Their Waiver Defense as to Both’s Claims
for Unpaid Wages and Waiting-Time Penalties
Appellants argue we should strike “[t]he jury’s award of
$1,707,024 as to Both’s claim for unpaid wages and $33,566.70 in
waiting-time penalties” because “undisputed evidence”
“establishes that [Both] waived his right to pursue unpaid wages”
by “continu[ing] to work for LGI” upon being “given notice of the
changes to his wages.” In particular, appellants assert Both

21
admitted he “knew about his reduced compensation in 2007 and
2011[11] and that Liolios informed Both in May of 2014” that “LGI
would be reducing . . . Both’s compensation from gross billings to
clients he did not manage” to wit, the “10% override.” They
further contend that “because an employer in an at-will
relationship has the right to unilaterally terminate an employee,
that employer inherently retains the right to reduce
compensation.” In addition, appellants claim their waiver
defense applies to the waiting-time penalties Both recovered
because they “are derivative of Both’s claims for unpaid wages.”
The trial court rejected appellants’ waiver theory in the
court’s September 8, 2022 ruling on their posttrial motions. The
court explained, “Both submitted evidence at trial that . . .
‘whenever Liolios told Both that he was cutting his pay, he told
Both the reason for it was because Both was a shareholder of
LGI, LGI had losses, and Both, as an LGI 20% shareholder,
needed to contribute his share of capital contributions to cover
those losses.’ ” The court also noted the evidence showed “ ‘LGI
never had losses.’ ” Because appellants “did not submit any
caselaw wherein a modified employment contract was found to be
enforceable where the employee accepted new conditions based
on fraudulent misrepresentations[,] . . . the Court [was] not

11 Appellants appear to be referring to the following
testimony Both provided at trial, which was summarized by the
trial court in its September 8, 2022 minute order: “Both testified
that he was aware when his wages were allegedly cut back,
including in 2007 when he received 20% rather than 30% of the
income from the sale of Aspen Bio Pharma warrants [citation],
and in 2011 when he received 20% rather than 30% of the profits
on an option exercise involving Que Pasa.”

22
persuaded that Both was barred from claiming unpaid wages and
waiting time-penalties as a matter of law.”
Appellants bear the burden of overcoming the presumption
of correctness of the trial court’s posttrial order disposing of
appellants’ waiver defense.12 Appellants do not contest the trial
court’s characterization of the trial evidence concerning Liolios’s
fraudulent misrepresentations. Instead, they insist, “There is
nothing in the case law requiring the employee to know the
reason for the reduced salary,” and that the employee “simply
[needs to be aware of] the ‘terms and conditions’ of the new
employment agreement.” Appellants thus seem to contend that
because Liolios purportedly had no obligation to inform Both of
the reasons LGI needed to reduce his pay, the fact he lied to Both
concerning the justifications for those reductions is of no
consequence. We assess this claim of error de novo. (See Lynch
v. California Costal Com. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 470, 476 [“ ‘ “When . . .
the facts are undisputed and only one inference may reasonably
be drawn, the issue [of waiver] is one of law and the reviewing
court is not bound by the trial court’s ruling.” ’ ”].)
Appellants’ argument misses the mark. Appellants’ waiver
defense does not turn on whether an employer is obligated to
notify an employee of the justification for the reduced pay. Here,
Liolios falsely represented to Both that his wages were being
diverted to LGI to make capital contributions covering losses that
LGI did not actually incur. We also note that at oral argument,
appellants’ counsel conceded there is no evidence in the record

12 (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 776–777 [“ ‘ “A judgment or order of a lower
court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments
and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” ’ ’’].)

23
that the reductions in Both’s wages were even credited toward
his LGI shareholder capital account. (See Consumer Cause, Inc.
v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 475 [noting that
“counsel’s concessions and admissions at oral argument are
binding”].) Indeed, the jury awarded Both wages as damages on
his claims of intentional misrepresentation and concealment
against Liolios and LGI. (See Factual & Procedural Background,
ante.)
Under these circumstances, Liolios’s fraud vitiated the
voluntariness of Both’s consent to forgo certain wages, thereby
precluding a finding of waiver on his part. (See Mathews v.
Happy Valley Conference Center, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 236,
257 [“Waiver is ‘the voluntary relinquishment of a known right,’ ”
italics added]; cf. 3 Cal. Affirmative Def. (2d ed. 2023) § 47:8 &
fn. 7 [“A waiver of [a contractual right to] notice that is the
product of fraud is ineffective to harm the rights of the defrauded
person. . . . This result is implicit in the requirement that waiver
be intentional and voluntary.”].) Accordingly, appellants’ waiver
defense fails.

D. Appellants Forfeited Their Contention That Portions
of Both’s Damages Award Are Time-Barred
Appellants maintain that “significant portions of Both’s
compensatory and statutory damages are barred by the statute of
limitations.” (Boldface & some capitalization omitted.) They
argue, “Both was not entitled to recover damages based on
actions that occurred before September 21, 2013, for his fiduciary
duty claim, September 21, 2014, for his intentional
misrepresentation claim and unpaid wages claim, and
September 21, 2015, for his claim for negligent misrepresentation
and concealment.” Appellants further contend that, in order to

24
reflect the time-barred aspects of Both’s claims, “the
compensatory award in favor of Both should be reduced from
$2,716,303.40 to $814,623.80,” which they assert “reflects a
reduction of the damages for breach of fiduciary duty from
$1,009,279.40 to $203,645.80, . . . and a reduction of the damages
for unpaid wages from $1,707,024 to $610,978 . . . .”
In its September 8, 2022 order, the trial court rejected
appellants’ argument that portions of Both’s claims for relief are
time-barred. The court found, “Under the continuing-violation
doctrine, a plaintiff can recover not only for actions that took
place during the statute of limitations period, but also for
misconduct that occurred outside the period provided it is
‘sufficiently linked’ to the conduct within the limitations period.”
(Quoting Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 812.)
The court further stated, “Here, a jury could have reasonably
concluded that Both was entitled to claim all of his compensatory
damages based on Both’s evidence that throughout the entirety of
his employment at LGI, ‘Liolios and LGI affirmatively and
continuously lied to Both that LGI had no profits and made no
distributions, when it always was profitable and made
distributions to Liolios; concealed from Both that Liolios was
taking distributions; lied to Both that Liolios had not taken any
distributions; concealed from Both that Liolios was paying his
wife . . . $1,538,942 in phantom distributions to Liolios; told Both
that he was cutting Both’s pay because LGI had losses, which it
did not, and Both, as a shareholder of LGI, needed to contribute
his share of capital contributions to cover these losses via this cut
in Both’s wages, when LGI never needed any such capital
contributions.’ ”

25
Appellants’ briefing does not address the continuing
violation doctrine at all, let alone argue the trial court erred in
applying it here. Rather, appellants contend the delayed
discovery rule and the fraudulent concealment doctrine do not
salvage Both’s claims. The continuing violation doctrine,
however, is distinct from the delayed discovery rule and the
fraudulent concealment doctrine. (See Aryeh v. Canon Business
Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1192 [indicating that all
three are among the various “equitable exceptions to and
modifications of the usual rules governing limitations periods”].)
“It is not this court’s role to construct arguments that
would undermine the lower court’s judgment and defeat the
presumption of correctness. Rather, an appellant is required to
present a cognizable legal argument in support of reversal of the
judgment and when the appellant fails to support an issue with
pertinent or cognizable argument, ‘it may be deemed abandoned
and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary.’ [Citation.]
Issues not supported by argument or citation to authority
are forfeited.” (Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 750, 762.) In accordance with these
fundamental appellate principles, we conclude appellants have
forfeited their statute-of-limitations argument by failing to rebut
the presumption of correctness of the trial court’s reliance on the
continuing violation doctrine.
We also agree with respondents that appellants fail to
articulate cogently the evidentiary basis for their assertion that if
they prevail on their statute-of-limitations argument, then Both’s
recovery on his breach of fiduciary duty claim should be reduced
to “$203,645.80, which represents 20% of LGI’s distributions from
September 21, 2013, to the present . . . .” Appellants’ first record

26
citation in support of this assertion refers to a one-page excerpt of
a document that the index to the appellants’ appendix identifies
as “Trial Exhibit 410: MGO Analysis of Schedule 1 Summary of
Damages.” This record excerpt does not refer explicitly to “LGI’s
distributions from September 21, 2013, to the present,” and
appellants do not explain why we should infer from that
document that $203,645.80 corresponds to 20 percent of LGI’s
distributions during that period. Appellants’ other two record
citations correspond to excerpts of the judgment that do not
disclose LGI’s distributions from September 21, 2013 to the
present. For this additional and independent reason, we
conclude appellants have forfeited their request to modify the
award of damages on Both’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. (See
United Grand Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.)

E. We Affirm on Estoppel Grounds the Award of
Punitive Damages as to Liolios But We Reverse the
Award as to LGI as Excessive

1. We do not consider evidence concerning Liolios’s
bankruptcy
As a preliminary matter, we address the parties’ request
we consider evidence relating to Liolios’s bankruptcy. Several
days after the trial court denied appellants’ new trial motion on
September 29, 2022, Liolios filed a voluntary petition for
chapter 11 bankruptcy.13 On appeal, each side relies upon filings

13 Although we initially stayed this appeal because of the
pending bankruptcy proceedings, we later allowed the appeal to
proceed after respondents’ counsel informed us that the
bankruptcy court had granted relief from the automatic
bankruptcy stay.

27
from the bankruptcy proceedings. For instance, appellants argue
the award of punitive damages against Liolios was excessive
because “it immediately plunged [him] into bankruptcy.”
Conversely, respondents argue, “Liolios’s bankruptcy supports
affirming” the award of punitive damages because, inter alia,
“Liolios submitted a reorganization plan” showing Liolios is
capable of “pay[ing] the entirety of the judgment over
5 years . . . .” (Boldface & some capitalization omitted from first
quotation; italics omitted from third quotation.)
“ ‘It has long been the general rule and understanding that
“an appeal reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the time of
its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial
court for its consideration.” [Citation.] This rule reflects an
“essential distinction between the trial and the appellate
court . . . that it is the province of the trial court to decide
questions of fact and of the appellate court to decide questions of
law . . . .” [Citation.]’ . . . . [Citation.]” (MMM Holdings, Inc. v.
Reich (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 167, 187 (MMM Holdings, Inc.),
italics added.) We acknowledge that notwithstanding this
general rule, there are “exceptional circumstances” under which
we may make factual findings on appeal. (See ibid., italics
omitted.)
Appellants do not argue this case warrants a departure
from the general rule. Nor do they claim that during the trial
court proceedings, Liolios was unable to present evidence that the
punitive damages award would deplete his assets such that he
could not pay his debts or the award would otherwise force him
into bankruptcy. Respondents argue in a conclusory fashion that
considering the bankruptcy filings would not “usurp the trial

28
court’s fact-finding” and would “lead to a prompt determination[
and] avoid repetitive litigation . . . .”
Because the parties have not demonstrated there exist
“exceptional circumstances” rendering it appropriate for us to
make factual findings in the first instance (see MMM Holdings,
Inc., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 187), we decline to consider
evidence concerning Liolios’s post-judgment bankruptcy
proceedings.

2. Liolios is estopped from challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the award of punitive
damages against him
In its September 29, 2022 order, the trial court observed
appellants had argued that “Both did not meet his burden to
prove [Liolios’s] net worth” because “evidence of assets and
income, alone, is insufficient without evidence of corresponding
expenses and liabilities.” The court agreed with Both, however,
that Liolios had “failed to comply with a trial subpoena” that
sought his personal tax returns for “tax years 2003 to the
present[ ] and all 1099s issued to . . . Liolios for tax years 2003 to
the present.” The court found that “although these tax returns
show income, they also show liabilities,” and it agreed with Both
that the tax returns “ ‘could show debts the interest of which is
being deducted and/or they could show losses.’ ” The court
concluded that Liolios’s failure to comply with the trial subpoena
estopped him from contesting the sufficiency of the evidence of
his ability to pay the punitive damage award.
Appellants argue the trial court’s reliance on estoppel was
error. In particular, appellants argue (1) the trial subpoena was
untimely; (2) appellants moved to quash the subpoena, thereby
excusing Liolios’s compliance; (3) the tax returns Both sought

29
would not have provided sufficient information regarding his
“assets, liabilities, net worth and financial condition”; and
(4) because Both served the trial subpoena before Liolios’s
liability for punitive damages had been established, Civil Code
section 3295, subdivision (c) barred him from obtaining evidence
of Liolios’s financial condition. Although appellants do not
identify clearly the standard of review applicable to this claim of
error, we conclude their appellate claim would fail even under a
de novo standard.14
First, appellants cite Code of Civil Procedure section 1987,
subdivision (c) for the proposition that Both should have served
the trial subpoena “at least 20 days before the commencement of
trial.” (Italics omitted.) The 20-day deadline prescribed by this
provision, however, does not apply to a trial subpoena. Rather,
subdivision (c) governs a “notice specified in subdivision (b) . . .
[that] include[s] a request that the party or person bring with
him or her books, documents, electronically stored information, or
other things.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1987, subd. (c).) In turn,
subdivision (b) governs a “written notice requesting the witness
to attend before a court, or at a trial” that may be utilized in lieu
of a subpoena. (See id., subd. (b) [providing that “the service of a

14 In their opening brief, appellants assert in a conclusory
fashion: “Respondents also sought documents already requested,
objected to, and that were not the subject of a motion to compel,
among other things.” Appellants also note in passing for the first
time in their reply brief that they asserted in their motion to
quash that “the tax returns were privileged.” We do not address
these arguments. (See United Grand Corp., supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153; Golden Door Properties, LLC, supra,
50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 482, 518 [concluding that an appellant
“forfeited [a] point” “[b]y not raising [it] in [the] opening brief”].)

30
subpoena upon any such witness is not required if” this written
notice procedure is used].) Subdivision (c) in turn provides that
“[t]he procedure of this subdivision is alternative” to other
procedures and that “no subpoena duces tecum shall be
required.” (See id., subd. (c).) Appellants thus fail to show the
trial subpoena was untimely.
Second, appellants contend Liolios was “not obligated to
obey the trial subpoena” because they “moved to quash the trial
subpoena on May 18, 2022 . . . .” Appellants cite Garcia v.
Myllyla (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 990 (Garcia), for the proposition
that the filing of this motion “ ‘excus[ed Liolios’s] compliance
unless the serving party file[d] a noticed motion with a showing
of good cause.’ ” (Quoting Garcia, at p. 997.) Appellants further
argue, “Respondents failed to bring such a motion,” and that the
trial court “never ruled on” appellants’ motion to quash.
Garcia does not assist appellants. There, the Court of
Appeal analyzed a notice for production of documents authorized
by Code of Civil Procedure section 1987, subdivision (c). (See
Garcia, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996–998, citing Code Civ.
Proc., § 1987, subd. (c).) That provision states that if “the party
or person of whom the [written] request [provided under that
subdivision] is made . . . serve[s] written objections to the request
or any part thereof,” then the party serving the written request
must file a “noticed motion[,] . . . accompanied by a showing of
good cause and of materiality of the items to the issues” in order
to secure production of the items. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1987,
subd. (c).) As we explained above, Both’s trial subpoena is not a
written notice governed by this provision, meaning that Liolios’s
compliance was not excused by the mere service of objections.
Instead, the trial subpoena here was “equivalent to a court order”

31
“requiring the . . . production of documents at trial . . . .” (See
Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1338
(Corenbaum).)
Admittedly, Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1,
subdivision (a) authorized appellants to move for “an order
quashing the subpoena . . . .” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1,
subd. (a).) Nevertheless, the record shows appellants failed to
take the measures necessary to pursue that remedy.
Appellants ignore that at the final status conference held
on May 18, 2022 at 1:30 p.m., “[t]he Court and counsel . . .
confer[red] regarding [appellants’] recently submitted Motion to
Quash, which [was] pending filing in the clerk’s office,” and that
the court thereafter directed “[t]he clerk’s office [to] file and
accept the Motion.”15 The text adjacent to the caption on
appellants’ notice of motion to quash indicates they had noticed
the motion to be heard at the May 18, 2022 final status
conference at which the court had permitted them to file the
motion. Further, the first textual paragraph of the notice
indicates appellants contemplated having the trial court hear the
motion “on May 18, 2022, at 1:30 p.m. [(i.e., the date and time of
the final status conference at which the court permitted the
motion to be filed)], . . . prior to the commencement of trial on

15 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the minute order
from the May 18, 2022 final status conference. (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) The minute order indicates that after the
trial court called the matter for the final status conference and
addressed certain matters with counsel, the court continued the
final status conference to May 20, 2022 because the court was in
trial on another matter.

32
May 19, 2022,[16] or as soon thereafter as counsel may be
heard . . . .” Appellants do not contest—and therefore tacitly
agree with—respondents’ assertion that aside from filing the
motion, appellants took no further action to obtain a ruling, for
example, by reserving a specific date for the motion to be heard
after the court permitted its filing.17
It thus appears appellants blame the trial court for failing,
sua sponte, to set a hearing and briefing schedule on their motion
to quash.18 In our adversarial system, the onus was on
appellants to request a hearing and a decision on their motion.
(See Meridian Financial Services, Inc., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
p. 698 [“ ‘[T]he fundamental nature of our adversarial system[ is
that t]he parties must call the court’s attention to issues they
deem relevant. . . . “ ‘The law casts upon the party the duty of
looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention
to any infringement of them.’ ” ’ ”].) Because appellants have not
shown that Liolios was excused from complying with Both’s
subpoena for his financial records, the trial court correctly found
Liolios was estopped from challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence concerning his ability to pay the punitive damage

16Although appellants claim the trial was “later continued
to May 24, 2022,” the judgment indicates that trial actually
commenced on May 25, 2022.
17 (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 773–774 [holding that an appellant makes
an implicit concession under such circumstances].)
18 Appellants do not claim respondents filed an opposition
to the motion to quash, and the case summary included in the
appellants’ appendix does not indicate that respondents filed
such an opposition.

33
award. (See Corenbaum, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1337–
1338 [holding that a defendant who “fail[s] to comply with a
subpoena requiring him to produce at trial records of his financial
condition” “may be estopped from challenging a punitive damage
award based on lack of evidence of financial condition”].)
Third, appellants argue, “At most, Liolios’[s] personal tax
returns might identify his gross income and any deductions he
took,” such as “interest and business expense deductions . . . .”
Because his “personal tax returns [supposedly] would not identify
all of his liabilities or expenses,” appellants submit that “the
information [provided in Liolios’s tax returns] would have been
insufficient to show Liolios’[s] financial condition.” By failing to
support their assertions regarding the potential contents of
Liolios’s tax returns with any citation to the record or judicially
noticeable fact or material (e.g., Internal Revenue Service
publications), appellants have forfeited their contention that
“there is no causal link between Respondents’ inability to get
Liolios’[s] tax returns and their failure to show Liolios’[s]
financial condition . . . .” (See United Grand Corp., supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at p. 161 [holding that an appellant forfeits a
claim of error if it fails to support the argument with a
record citation]; Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 276, 281, fn. 5 [“[W]e are unable to accept
counsel’s argument on appeal as facts.”].)
Lastly, appellants’ resort to Civil Code section 3295,
subdivision (c) is unavailing.19 Appellants contend this provision

19 Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (c) provides in
pertinent part: “No pretrial discovery by the plaintiff shall be
permitted with respect to the evidence referred to in paragraphs

34
barred Both from discovering Liolios’s financial condition because
the subpoena was served on Liolios before the jury had found him
liable for punitive damages at the conclusion of phase I of the
trial. Respondents assert that discovery of Liolios’s tax returns
was not barred by Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (c)
because the documents were “relevant to Both’s compensatory
damages, as he was claiming unpaid shareholder
distributions . . . .” Indeed, in counsel’s declaration supporting
Both’s trial subpoena, the attorney attested the documents
sought “show how much in compensation . . . Liolios recieved [sic]
such that . . . Both’s 20 percent distributions of those amounts
can be calculated,” “[t]hese documents are the only way that . . .
Both can determine how much money was paid to . . . Liolios
for . . . warrants, stock options, and stock, 20% of which belong
to . . . Both,” and “Liolios was asked about these amounts both in

(1) and (2) of subdivision (a) [(e.g., evidence of defendant’s
financial condition)] unless the court enters an order permitting
such discovery pursuant to this subdivision. However, the
plaintiff may subpoena documents or witnesses to be available at
the trial for the purpose of establishing . . . financial condition . . .
and the defendant may be required to identify documents in the
defendant’s possession which are relevant and admissible for that
purpose and the witnesses employed by or related to the
defendant who would be most competent to testify to those facts.
Upon motion by the plaintiff supported by appropriate
affidavits[,] . . . the court may at any time enter an order
permitting the discovery otherwise prohibited by this subdivision
if the court finds . . . that the plaintiff has established that there
is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim pursuant to Section 3294.” (See Civ. Code, § 3295,
subds. (a)(2) & (c); see also id., § 3294, subd. (a) [indicating this
statute governs recovery of punitive damages].)

35
deposition and via interrogatories and he was either unable
and/or unwilling to provide the responsive information.”
Appellants do not contest counsel’s representations regarding the
materiality of this evidence to Both’s recovery of unpaid
distributions.
Based on counsel’s uncontested declaration supporting the
subpoena, we conclude that Civil Code section 3295,
subdivision (c) did not prevent Both from obtaining Liolios’s tax
returns. (See Rawnsley v. Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d
86, 91 [observing that Civ. Code, § 3295’s “safeguards were
designed to protect the defendant from a specific type of discovery
abuse: a situation in which the plaintiff puts forth an easily
alleged cause of action for punitive damages, thus requiring a
defendant to expend the time and money ‘necessary to the
compilation of a complex mass of information unrelated to the
substantive claim involved in the lawsuit and relevant only to the
subject matter of a measure of damages which may never be
awarded’ ”]; Edmon & Karnow, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civil Procedure
Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) Discovery, ¶ 8:339.12
[“Civ.C. § 3295(c) does not bar pretrial discovery where
defendant’s finances are directly related to the substantive claim
involved.”].) The tax returns would also have been admissible to
demonstrate Liolios’s ability to pay punitive damages after the
jury had found him liable for punitive damages. (See Civ. Code,
§ 3295, subd. (d) [indicating the statute does not bar the
admission of “[e]vidence of profit and financial condition . . . as to
the defendant or defendants found to be liable to the plaintiff and
to be guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud”]; Factual &
Procedural Background, ante [noting that the amount of punitive
damages was tried in phase II following the jury’s award of

36
actual damages to Both and its determination that Liolios was
guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud warranting imposition of
punitive damages].)
In sum, appellants have not shown the trial court erred in
ruling that Liolios’s failure to comply with the trial subpoena
estopped him from contesting the evidentiary sufficiency of the
punitive damages award. We thus do not decide whether LGI’s
alleged failure to comply with an order requiring it to provide
further responses to certain interrogatories also supported the
trial court’s estoppel ruling against Liolios. (See People v.
Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123 [“ ‘[I]f the [trial court’s] ruling
was correct on any ground, we affirm.’ ”].)

3. We reverse the $2 million punitive damages award
against LGI as excessive
“In reviewing punitive damages awards for excessiveness
under California law, we apply a substantial evidence standard.
[Citation.] We reverse ‘ “as excessive only those judgments which
the entire record, when viewed most favorably to the judgment,
indicates were rendered as the result of passion and prejudice.” ’
[Citations.]” (Doe v. Lee (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 612, 618 (Lee).)
Three factors are relevant to a reviewing court’s analysis of the
excessiveness of an award: (1) “the reprehensibility of a
defendant’s actions”; (2) “the relationship between the amount of
compensatory and punitive damages”; and (3) “ ‘the wealth of the
particular defendant[.]’ ” (See id. at pp. 618–619.) Regarding the
third factor, “a punitive damages award ‘must bear some
reasonable relationship to the net worth of the defendant, and
where the award is grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s
wealth, a presumption arises that it was the result of passion and
prejudice.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 619.) “We are allowed to

37
consider the reasonableness of the award on the basis of its
excessiveness alone: ‘[e]ven if an award is entirely reasonable in
light of the other two factors[,] . . . the award can be so
disproportionate to the defendant’s ability to pay that the award
is excessive for that reason alone.’ [Citations.]”20 (Lee, at p. 619.)
The parties agree Both’s expert witness estimated that the
value of LGI’s equity was $2,812,047.21 Appellants seem to argue
this figure should be deemed LGI’s gross—rather than net—
value because they claim it does “not account for the award of
compensatory and statutory damages against LGI.” We do not
resolve that question because even if the $2,812,047 figure were
LGI’s net value, the $2 million award of punitive damages
against it would still be excessive.
Appellate courts have reversed as excessive punitive
damage awards amounting to between 15 percent and 33 percent
of a defendant’s net worth, given that the purpose of punitive

20
For that reason, we do not address respondents’
arguments concerning the first two factors.
21 Admittedly, respondents assert, “The value of LGI was
conservatively estimated at $2,812,047.” (Italics added.) The
only support respondents provide for this proposition is a citation
to 19 pages of accounting schedules prepared by Both’s expert.
Respondents do not explain why these 19 pages establish that
$2,812,047 is a mere conservative estimate of LGI’s value or
identify a more appropriate figure to use for our analysis. (See
Inyo Citizens for Better Planning v. Inyo County Bd. of
Supervisors (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 (Inyo Citizens for Better
Planning) [“ ‘We are not required to search the record to
ascertain whether it contains support for [a party’s] contentions.’
[Citation.] We do not serve as ‘backup appellate counsel,’ or
make the parties’ arguments for them.”].)

38
damages “ ‘is to deter, not destroy’ ” a defendant financially. (See
Lee, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 619, 623 [discussing appellate
decisions reversing punitive damage awards].) Here, appellants
correctly contend the award of punitive damages “represents
over 71%” of the value Both’s expert had assigned to LGI’s equity.
If an award of 33 percent of a defendant’s net worth is considered
excessive, an award of more than double that percentage is, a
fortiori, excessive.
Respondents raise two counterarguments, neither of which
is persuasive.
First, respondents argue, “LGI is estopped from making
this argument” because “appellants interfered with Both’s
assessing their financial condition.” (Boldface & some
capitalization omitted from second quotation.) Yet, respondents
do not contend appellants’ purported efforts to conceal LGI’s
financial condition render unreliable the $2,812,047 estimate by
Both’s expert witness. (See also fn. 21, ante [noting that
respondents fail to explain why they believe Both’s expert’s
valuation of LGI was “conservative”].) Because respondents do
not explain why LGI should nonetheless be estopped from
contesting the excessiveness of the punitive damages award, we
do not address this issue further. (See Inyo Citizens for Better
Planning, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 14 [holding that a
reviewing court does not function as backup appellate counsel].)
Second, respondents argue, “Liolios and LGI are alter egos”
such that “LGI via Liolios has the ability to pay the full award.”
There is nothing in the trial court’s ruling rejecting appellants’
challenges to the punitive damages award to indicate the court
made any finding as to whether LGI was Liolios’s alter ego.
Notwithstanding the absence of trial court findings on this point,

39
respondents assert, “There was substantial evidence showing LGI
does not follow corporate formalities, Liolios dominates and
controls LGI, and [Liolios] takes all of LGI’s excess money in
distributions just to himself.” They further contend, “LGI is an
S-Corp with Liolios taking all its assets.” Because respondents
fail to cite any authority or provide further analysis to support
their alter ego contentions, we do not address them further.
(See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 802 [noting that an appellate court is not
“obligate[d to] . . . construct legal grounds in support of the
judgment”].)
Next, we turn to the proper disposition for this error.
Appellants assert, “If the punitive damages award is reversed,
this court should strike the punitive damages award from the
judgment” without instructing the trial court to hold a retrial on
the amount of the award. In requesting this appellate relief,
appellants acknowledge that “[r]etrial on the issue of punitive
damages ‘would be improper’ ” if it were “ ‘based solely on
insufficiency of the evidence.’ ” (Italics added.) With regard to
the punitive damage award against LGI, appellants disavow any
intention to challenge the award “for lack of evidence.” Rather,
appellants state, “LGI’s challenge to the punitive damages award
is on the grounds it is disproportionate to LGI’s value (and not on
the grounds of insufficient evidence of value) . . . .”22 (Italics

22 In their reply brief, appellants vaguely argue for the
first time that “Respondents failed to introduce sufficient
evidence of Appellants’ ability to pay . . . .” (Italics added.)
Insofar as appellants are suggesting Both failed to introduce
sufficient evidence of LGI’s ability to pay punitive damages, they
have forfeited that contention. (See United Grand Corp., supra,

40
added.) Accordingly, we reverse the award of $2 million against
LGI only, and remand the matter to the trial court for a new trial
on the amount of punitive damages against that defendant. (See
Notrica v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 911, 952,
954 [indicating that upon reversing an excessive punitive
damages award, the Court of Appeal may ordinarily remand the
matter for a new trial on punitive damages].)
Lastly, appellants argue, “[T]he overwhelming and
undisputed evidence demonstrates that any award of punitive
damages would exceed LGI’s ability to pay” because “the
compensatory and statutory damages alone swallow LGI’s entire
net value.” Inasmuch as appellants intimate that a retrial on the
amount of punitive damages would necessarily be futile, we
disagree because we cannot say on the basis of the record before
us that appellants’ hypothesis is true. After this case is
remanded, the factfinder will determine the proper measure of
punitive damages “based on evidence of [LGI’s] financial
condition at the time of re-trial.” (See Washington v. Farlice
(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 766, 777, italics added.)

F. We Affirm the Trial Court’s Order Denying
Appellants’ Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict
Appellants moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict as to Both’s (1) award of punitive damages and
(2) recovery of unpaid wages. We have reversed the judgment
insofar as it awarded Both $2 million in punitive damages
against LGI and remanded for a new trial on the amount of

36 Cal.App.5th at p. 161; Golden Door Properties, LLC, supra,
50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 482, 518.)

41
punitive damages to be awarded against that entity. (Discussion,
part E.3, ante; Disposition, post.) Further, the trial court did not
err in awarding punitive damages against Liolios. (Discussion,
part E.2.) Finally, we have already rejected appellants’
challenges to Both’s recovery of unpaid wages. (Discussion,
parts C–D, ante.) Consequently, appellants fail to show they are
entitled to the relief sought by a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, that is, a judgment in their favor, as
opposed to reversal of portions of the judgment paired with a
retrial of certain issues. (See Group XIII Properties LP v.
Stockman (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 10 [indicating that this
type of motion should be granted only if the movant is entitled to
judgment “as a matter of law”].)

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying appellants’ motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We reverse the
judgment insofar as it awarded respondent Ronald Andrew Both
punitive damages of $2 million against appellant Liolios Group,
Incorporated (LGI). Upon remand, the trial court shall (1) retry
the amount of punitive damages against LGI; and (2) conduct
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the
judgment in all other respects. The parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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