CourtListener 9997641•People v. Torres CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 7/3/24 P. v. Torres CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062441
v. (Super. Ct. No. M-19701)
CARMEL PEREZ TORRES, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Michael F. Murray, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Sharon
L. Rhodes and Matthew Mulford, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Carmel Perez Torres appeals from an order denying his petition
to terminate his sex offender registration pursuant to Penal Code section
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290.5. The trial court concluded that continued registration would
significantly enhance community safety. After reviewing the evidence, we
conclude the district attorney failed to carry his burden to produce evidence
proving denial of appellant’s petition would significantly enhance community
safety. The trial court therefore erred in denying the petition. Accordingly,
we reverse and remand with directions to grant the petition.
FACTS
I. Petition to Terminate Sex Offender Registration
On April 28, 2022, appellant filed a form petition to terminate his
sex offender registration. In his petition, he stated that he is not in custody
or on parole, probation, post-conviction release, or any other form of
supervised release. He further stated that he was designated as a Tier 2 -
Adult registrant and has been registered for at least 20 years. The petition
was served on the registering law enforcement agency, the Orange County
Sheriff’s Department, and on the Orange County District Attorney.
II. Law Enforcement Agency Certification
In accordance with section 290.5, the Orange County Sheriff’s
Department certified that (1) appellant was a Tier 2 - Adult registrant;
(2) there were no pending charges against him that would extend the time to
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless
otherwise stated.
2
complete the registration requirements; (3) appellant was not on parole,
probation or supervised release; and (4) appellant was not in custody. The
Sheriff’s Department also certified appellant has no failure-to-register
convictions, and even when his total incarceration time was excluded from
the relevant time period, he still completed the minimum mandated
registration period of 20 years from the date of his last registrable sex
offense. It determined appellant was eligible for termination from the sex
offender registration.
III. Objection to Petition
The district attorney objected to appellant’s petition to terminate
sex offender registration on the sole basis that community safety would be
significantly enhanced by the petitioner’s continued registration. In the
written opposition, respondent recounted the alleged facts underlying
appellant’s registrable sex offenses. Briefly, appellant was charged with four
sex crimes against his minor nephew. The amended complaint alleged four
counts of violating section 288(a) (Lewd Acts on a Child under 14), with a
section 1203.066(a)(9) enhancement for abuse of position of special trust. On
December 8, 1983, appellant entered a “no contest” plea to all four counts and
to the section 1203.066(a)(9) allegation. On count 1, he was sentenced to one
year in county jail, 5 years of formal supervised probation and registration.
The sentences on the remaining three counts were stayed.
Respondent argued the circumstances of his sex crimes
warranted denial of appellant’s petition, contending the victim’s allegations
of sex abuse showed his criminal conduct was akin to a “Tier 3” or “Lifetime”
registrable offense. Additionally, the victim was 11 years old at the time,
while appellant was 25 years old. Respondent acknowledged there was no
evidence of any relevant criminal or non-criminal behavior before or after the
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conviction that lead to registration. Respondent also was not aware whether
appellant completed any sex offender treatment program or participated in
any risk assessment evaluation.
In response, appellant argued respondent failed to show that
termination of registration was not appropriate. Respondent did not produce
evidence that the facts and circumstances of the registerable offenses are
“associated with an increased risk of recidivism,” or the victim’s age is
“predictive of unusual risk.” Appellant argued several statutory factors
supported terminating registration. First, the victim was not a stranger.
“Recidivism rates for offenses with known victims are significantly lower
than sex-offense recidivism rates generally.” Second, he is currently 65 years
old, and has not committed any sex offenses for over 39 years, while never
failing to maintain registration during that time. Third, he successfully
completed a year-long therapy program in 1986, and received a low risk
classification on his last probation report.
IV. Hearing and Ruling on Petition
At the hearing on appellant’s petition to terminate sex offender
registration, the court focused on the facts of the underlying case. It stated:
“A different fact pattern and the same clean record and substantial period of
time of staying out of trouble, then this is an easy call. [¶] It is not quite as
easy when it appears that the conduct went as far as it went and was the
nature of the conduct that it was. And that’s what is primarily troubling to
the Court, so because of those reasons and because I think the public safety is
protected by continuing registration for somebody who has exhibited this
kind of conduct.” The court denied the petition, but stated appellant could
reapply in a year.
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DISCUSSION
Section 290.5, subdivision (a)(1) provides that a “person who is
required to register pursuant to Section 290 and who is a tier one or tier two
offender may file a petition in the superior court in the county in which the
person is registered for termination from the sex offender registry . . . ,
following the expiration of the person's mandated minimum registration
period . . . .” Unless the district attorney objects by requesting a hearing, “the
petition for termination shall be granted if the court finds the required proof
of current registration is presented in the petition, provided that the
registering agency reported that the person met the requirement for
termination pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 290, there are no pending
charges against the person which could extend the time to complete the
registration requirements of the tier or change the person's tier status, and
the person is not in custody or on parole, probation, or supervised release.”
(§ 290.5, subd. (a)(2).)
If the district attorney objects, “the district attorney shall be
entitled to present evidence regarding whether community safety would be
significantly enhanced by requiring continued registration.” (§ 290, subd.
(a)(3).) Stated differently, “the prosecution must produce evidence
establishing that requiring continued registration appreciably increased
society's safety.” (People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 432 (Thai).)
Because section 290.5 does not specify the applicable standard of proof, the
prosecutor has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Evid.
Code, § 115 [“Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof
requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”].)
“In determining whether to order continued registration, the
court shall consider: [1] the nature and facts of the registerable offense; [2]
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the age and number of victims; [3] whether any victim was a stranger at the
time of the offense (known to the offender for less than 24 hours); [4] criminal
and relevant noncriminal behavior before and after conviction for the
registerable offense; [5] the time period during which the person has not
reoffended; [6] successful completion, if any, of a Sex Offender Management
Board-certified sex offender treatment program; and [7] the person’s current
risk of sexual or violent reoffense, including the person’s risk levels on
SARATSO static, dynamic, and violence risk assessment instruments, if
available. Any judicial determination made pursuant to this section may be
heard and determined upon declarations, affidavits, police reports, or any
other evidence submitted by the parties which is reliable, material, and
relevant.” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3).)2 “If termination from the registry is denied,
the court shall set the time period after which the person can repetition for
termination, which shall be at least one year from the date of the denial, but
not to exceed five years, based on facts presented at the hearing.” (§290.5,
subd. (a)(4).).
We review the trial court’s ruling on a petition for termination
from the sex offender registry for abuse of discretion. (Thai, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) “To establish an abuse of discretion, a defendant
must demonstrate the trial court's decision fell outside the bounds of reasons,
i.e., was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.” (Ibid.) “A trial court
2
Since January 1, 2007, the SARATSO for adult male sex
offenders has been the STATIC-99 risk assessment scale. (§ 290.04, subds.
(a), (b)(1).) “‘The Static-99R is a revised version of the Static-99 that takes
into account the age of a sexual offender based on statistics showing the risk
of sexual reoffense decreases as the offender ages.’” (People v. LaBlanc (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1067-1068, fn. 6.)
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abuses its discretion when its factual findings are not supported by the
evidence, or its decision is based on an incorrect legal standard.” (Ibid.)
Here, the district attorney failed his burden of establishing that
continued registration would appreciably increase community’s safety. As to
statutory factors 4 through 7, either the district attorney produced no
evidence or the evidence produced by the parties supported granting the
petition to terminating registration. For example, as to factors 4 (criminal
and relevant noncriminal history) and 5 (time since reoffending), the district
attorney acknowledged that appellant had no criminal history or relevant
noncriminal history in the more than 39 years since the underlying case
leading to registration.
The trial court’s denial of the petition was based solely on the
statutory factors relating to the facts of the registrable offenses, including
those relating to the victim. As the court stated, “A different fact pattern and
the same clean record and substantial period of time of staying out of trouble,
then this is an easy call. [¶] It is not quite as easy when it appears that the
conduct went as far as it went and was the nature of the conduct that it was.
And that’s what is primarily troubling to the Court, so because of those
reasons and because I think public safety is protected by continuing
registration for somebody who has exhibited this kind of conduct.” The trial
court, however, lacked the guidance of our decision in Thai, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th 427, which was issued the following month. Another panel of
this Court held that a petitioner’s sex offense is insufficient by itself to
demonstrate a petitioner presents a significant current risk to community
safety. (Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 434 [“Assuming for purposes of
argument the 1997 offense [a tier 2 registrable sex crime] was egregious,
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those facts alone do not demonstrate Thai was a risk to the community over
24 years later”].)
Respondent argues that the victim’s allegations of appellant’s
criminal conduct supports denial because the allegations show appellant’s
conduct was much more serious than other conduct punished under section
288, subdivision (a). Indeed, the alleged conduct, if found true, could have
resulted in a conviction requiring lifetime registration. However, the
argument that appellant was ineligible for relief because his conduct could
have resulted in lifetime registration recently was rejected in People v.
Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184. There, the appellate court explained:
“[a]lthough this argument is not without some logical gravity, we
nevertheless reject it because sections 290 and 290.5 did not adopt this
approach. These statutes hinge the designation of tiers (and hence the
minimum duration of registration as a sex offender) on whether the
defendant ‘was convicted’ of certain crimes (§ 290, subd. (d)(2), (3)(C), italics
added) —not on whether the defendant “could have been convicted” of other
crimes, including crimes that did not yet exist at the time the sex offense was
committed.” (Id. at p. 195.) We agree with that reasoning and adopt it here.
Appellant was convicted of lewd acts on a child under 14, and he satisfied all
of the statutory requirements for relief.
In summary, respondent failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that requiring appellant’s continued registration would
significantly enhance community safety. The trial court therefore erred in
denying the petition to terminate sex offender registration.
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed, and the matter is remanded with direction
to grant appellant’s petition.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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