In re J.M. CA2/8

CourtListener 9987319Calctapp01.07.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/1/24 In re J.M. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re J.M., a Person Coming B330629
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00279D)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

In re A.C., B335373

on Habeas Corpus. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19LJJP00279D)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Jennifer W. Baronoff, Commissioner.
Conditionally affirmed and remanded with directions. Petition
denied.
Anuradha Khemka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Children’s Law Center2 and Taylor Lindsley for minor J.M.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________

INTRODUCTION
A.C., the alleged father of minor J.M., appeals from the
order terminating his parental rights over J.M. under Welfare
and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. A.C. argues the juvenile
court erred in (1) failing to make a timely ruling on his request
for presumed father status, (2) terminating his parental rights
without a finding of unfitness, and (3) failing to comply with the
inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law. A.C.
also has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that
to the extent he forfeited any of his claims on direct appeal, such
forfeiture was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
As to the direct appeal, we conclude A.C. forfeited his claim
regarding the juvenile court’s failure to declare him a presumed
father. The court found that A.C. was an alleged father prior to
the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, and A.C. never filed
an appeal from the dispositional order to challenge the paternity
finding. We further conclude the juvenile court did not violate
due process in terminating A.C.’s parental rights because the
court made detriment findings against A.C. at the dispositional

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
hearing and interim review hearings. A.C. forfeited his right to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the prior
detriment findings because he did not timely seek appellate
review of any of them. As to the habeas petition, we conclude
A.C.’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails because it is
based on his attorney’s alleged errors in connection with the
dispositional and interim review hearings, and habeas corpus
cannot be used to collaterally attack antecedent final orders.
With respect to the ICWA claim, however, the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
concedes there was not an adequate inquiry into whether J.M.
may be an Indian child, and the matter should be remanded for
the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with ICWA’s inquiry
requirements. Given this concession, we conditionally affirm the
order terminating parental rights and remand solely for ICWA
compliance. We deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Section 300 petition
On April 25, 2019, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on
behalf of then eight-year-old J.M. and his three half-siblings.
The petition alleged that the children’s mother, K.C. (Mother),
allowed drug dealers and users to frequent the family’s home,
and left the children at home unattended. DCFS later amended
the petition to add counts alleging that Mother had unaddressed
mental health issues, and that J.M.’s father, A.C., had a history
of substance abuse and was a frequent user of marijuana.
The juvenile court detained the children, and DCFS placed them
in foster care. Prior to their detention, the children, along with
Mother, had been staying at a park and then a hotel.

3
On May 29, 2019, Mother made her first appearance in the
case. She submitted a parentage questionnaire in which she
identified Joshua M. as J.M.’s father, and indicated that
Joshua M. was present at the child’s birth, signed the birth
certificate, openly held himself out as the father, and provided
financial support. The court found that Joshua M. was J.M.’s
alleged father at that time.
II. A.C.’s request for presumed father status
On June 19, 2019, DCFS interviewed A.C. He asserted
that he was J.M.’s father, and was active in the child’s life. He
also reported that, in recent months, Mother stopped talking to
him and tried to keep him from seeing his son. When A.C. heard
that Mother and the children were sleeping in the park, he
brought J.M. to the home that he shared with the child’s paternal
grandmother. J.M. stayed with A.C. for about a week until
Mother demanded that A.C. return the child to her.
In his interview with DCFS, J.M. confirmed that he briefly
stayed with A.C. after Mother and the children became homeless.
J.M. also described A.C. in positive terms, stating, “My dad is a
good guy. He lets me play the games. He takes me places and he
buys me new clothes and shoes.”
On July 3, 2019, A.C. made his first appearance in the case
and was appointed counsel. A.C. also submitted a Statement
Regarding Parentage form in which he indicated that he openly
held himself out as J.M.’s father, engaged in activities with him,
and provided him with financial support. A.C.’s counsel
requested that the court find A.C. to be J.M.’s presumed father.
Mother’s counsel objected to A.C.’s request for presumed
father status. Mother claimed that A.C. had only seen J.M. twice
in the past eight years, and that Joshua M. provided care for the

4
child. Noting that Mother named Joshua M. as the child’s father
on her parentage questionnaire, the court initially stated that it
was deferring a paternity finding for J.M. until it received a copy
of the birth certificate. The court also granted A.C.’s request for
a paternity test. Mother’s counsel then showed the court a birth
certificate that identified Joshua M. as the child’s father.
After reviewing J.M.’s birth certificate, the court stated
that it was inclined to find both A.C. and Joshua M. to be alleged
fathers at that time, and to defer making further paternity
findings. In response, J.M.’s counsel asked that A.C. not be
allowed visitation with the child until the court received
additional information about their relationship. The court
agreed, stating, “Mr. [C.’s] alleged only, so there’s no visits until
we can look at him even further.”
On July 12, 2019, DCFS again interviewed A.C. According
to A.C., Mother initially denied he was J.M.’s father. However,
when he saw a picture of J.M. at nine months old, he knew the
child was his son. Since then, A.C. and his family had been
involved in J.M.’s life, and the child regularly visited his home.
A.C. stated, “He knows all of my family and my family knows
him. My mom, my stepfather, my sisters and brothers,
everyone.”
DCFS also reinterviewed J.M. about his relationship with
A.C. J.M. again identified A.C. as his father, and confirmed that
he spent weekends at A.C.’s home. He reported that he had a
good relationship with A.C., and that he never knew anyone else
to be his father. When DCFS spoke with Joshua M., however, he
claimed that he was the child’s father. Although Joshua M.
initially agreed to meet with DCFS, he did not show up for his
interview or respond to attempts to reach him.

5
At a hearing held on July 25, 2019, A.C.’s counsel requested
the court grant A.C. unmonitored visits with J.M. given DCFS’s
report that they had a parent-child relationship. The child’s
counsel joined in the request. Both Mother’s counsel and DCFS’s
counsel objected, arguing that A.C. was an alleged father and a
paternity test was still pending. While noting that A.C. was an
alleged father, the court granted him unmonitored visitation.
The court added, however, that it was not changing any paternity
findings at that time, and that there was no request that it do so.
On September 13, 2019, DCFS provided the court with the
results of A.C.’s paternity test, which showed that he was J.M.’s
biological father.
III. Jurisdictional and dispositional hearing
In September 2019, DCFS informed the court that it
recently discovered that A.C. had a July 2019 conviction for a
drug-related offense, and that he was ordered by the criminal
court to attend Narcotics Anonymous meetings. At DCFS’s
request, A.C. submitted to a drug test, which was negative.
Based on A.C.’s criminal record, DCFS also asked him to submit
to a live scan background check before having unmonitored
contact with J.M. As of October 2019, A.C. had not begun
visitation with J.M. because DCFS was still awaiting his live
scan results.
On December 4, 2019, the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. A.C. was represented by
counsel at the hearing, but did not appear. At the start of the
hearing, A.C.’s counsel confirmed that notice to A.C. was proper,
and that he was ready to proceed with adjudication of the
section 300 petition. The court sustained the count based on

6
Mother’s mental health issues, and dismissed all the other
counts, including the count alleged against A.C.
The court then proceeded to disposition. A.C.’s counsel
objected to an order for reunification services for A.C. given that
he was nonoffending in the sustained petition. His counsel also
requested that the court release J.M. to A.C. The court noted
that A.C. was not present at the hearing, and asked where he
was. His counsel responded that A.C. relied on public
transportation, and that he believed A.C. was having difficulty
getting to court due to the rain. He acknowledged, however, that
he had not had any contact with A.C. that day.
J.M.’s counsel joined in the request that the court release
J.M. to A.C., arguing that DCFS had not proven the child would
be at substantial risk of harm if placed in A.C.’s care. DCFS’s
counsel objected to placement with A.C. DCFS’s counsel noted
that A.C. was not present at the hearing despite being properly
noticed, had not submitted to a live scan as requested by DCFS,
and had not provided any proof of his compliance with the orders
in his criminal case. The court indicated that it would have been
inclined to release J.M. to A.C. if he had been present and able to
address the issues raised by DCFS’s counsel. The court stated
that it was not doing so, however, because it lacked sufficient
information about A.C.’s current situation and why he failed to
appear.
The court declared J.M. a dependent under section 300,
subdivision (b), and removed him from Mother’s custody. The
court then stated, “[A]s far as the father, Mr. [C.], the court would
indicate that pursuant to 361.2, although he is non-offending in
the petition, the court . . . does find placement with that father at
this time would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or

7
physical or emotional well-being of the child.” The court ordered
that A.C.’s visits with J.M. remain unmonitored, and granted
DCFS discretion to liberalize the visits and to release J.M. to A.C.
The court also ordered reunification services for A.C., which
required him to submit to five on-demand drug tests, abide by the
visitation orders, and remain cooperative with DCFS.
Although the court clerk served A.C. with written notice of
his appeal rights, he did not file an appeal from the jurisdictional
finding or dispositional order.
IV. Six-month review hearing
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the six-month review
hearing was continued to October 2020. During this period, A.C.
did not have any visits with J.M. A.C. reported that J.M.’s
caregiver cancelled certain visits, and that A.C. cancelled others
because he was in a car accident. A.C. also did not appear for any
of his on-demand drug tests, and with few exceptions, he failed to
respond to DCFS’s efforts to reach him.
On October 8, 2020, the juvenile court held the six-month
review hearing. Neither A.C. nor his counsel were present.
The court found that the parents had not substantially complied
with their respective case plans, and that continued jurisdiction
over J.M. was necessary. The court also found, by clear and
convincing evidence, that returning J.M. to the custody of the
parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child.
The court ordered continued reunification services for both
Mother and A.C., and set the matter for a 12-month review
hearing.
A.C. did not file an appeal from the findings and orders
made at the six-month review hearing.

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V. 12-month review hearing
Over the next six months, A.C. failed to comply with his
case plan. He did not visit J.M., or submit to any court-ordered
drug tests. Despite DCFS’s repeated attempts to contact him,
A.C. had only one telephone call with the department during this
period. When DCFS asked about his case plan, A.C. admitted he
had not complied with drug testing, and questioned why he had
to do so. DCFS recommended terminating reunification services
for both Mother and A.C.
On May 12, 2021, the juvenile court held the 12-month
review hearing. A.C. did not appear, but he was represented by
counsel at the hearing. Although A.C.’s counsel previously had
requested a contested hearing, he withdrew that request because
he had not received any direction from his client. A.C.’s counsel
nevertheless objected to the termination of reunification services.
The court found that neither Mother nor A.C. made
significant progress in resolving the problems that led to J.M.’s
removal. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence,
that returning J.M. to the custody of the parents would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the child. The court terminated
reunification services for both Mother and A.C., and set the
matter for a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.
The court clerk provided A.C. with written notice of his
right to seek writ review, but A.C. did not file a petition for
extraordinary writ from the order setting the section 366.26
hearing.
VI. Section 366.26 hearing
On September 18, 2021, J.M. was placed in the foster home
of Mr. and Mrs. Y., his prospective adoptive parents. Shortly
after his placement, J.M. voluntarily began referring to them as

9
“mom” and “dad,” and reported that he was comfortable and
happy in their home. Over the next year and a half, J.M. became
closely bonded with Mr. and Mrs. Y., and he continued to thrive
in their care. J.M. told DCFS that he felt he was part of their
family, and that he looked forward to being adopted by them.
Mr. and Mrs. Y. likewise were committed to adopting J.M., and
providing the child with a permanent and loving home.
The court originally set the section 366.26 hearing for
September 2021, but granted a number of continuances for good
cause. As a result, the section 366.26 hearing did not take place
until July 2023. DCFS reported that, during that one-and-a-half
year period, A.C. had only sporadic contact with J.M. A.C. visited
the child in person a total of four times. He also had occasional
telephone calls with J.M., but they tended to be short. Mr. and
Mrs. Y. observed that the calls often left J.M. disappointed
because A.C. made promises to the child, but failed to keep them.
On July 6, 2023, the juvenile court held the section 366.26
hearing. A.C.’s counsel called J.M. and A.C. to testify. According
to J.M.’s testimony, he had four in-person visits with A.C. since
his placement in foster care. He spoke with A.C. on the telephone
a couple of times a month, and their calls tended to last about
three minutes. He had not seen his mother in three years. J.M.
enjoyed visiting with A.C., and he would be sad if the visits ended
because it was important for him to know how his father was
doing. J.M. also liked living with Mr. and Mrs. Y., and wanted to
be adopted by them. If a legal guardianship allowed him to
continue visiting A.C., J.M. would prefer that arrangement over
adoption.
In his testimony, A.C. confirmed that he only visited J.M.
on four occasions. According to A.C., he initially had difficulty

10
arranging visits with DCFS. Once the visits began, A.C.
struggled with several medical issues that left him bedridden for
a year. A.C. also had telephone calls with J.M. two to three times
a month, and he did not call more often because of J.M.’s busy
schedule. A.C. opposed the termination of his parental rights
because he loved J.M. and wanted his son to remain in his life.
Counsel for DCFS and counsel for J.M. joined in requesting
the court terminate parental rights. J.M.’s counsel noted that the
child still wished to proceed with adoption. A.C.’s counsel asked
the court to consider legal guardianship rather than adoption as
the child’s permanent plan. After hearing the argument of
counsel, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that
J.M. was adoptable and no exception to the termination of
parental rights applied. The court noted that A.C. had not
consistently visited J.M., and that they did not have a beneficial
relationship such that the termination of parental rights would
be detrimental to the child. The court also noted that, for the
past year and a half, J.M. had been in the home of “caregivers
who love him and can provide him with the stability that he
deserves and needs.” The court terminated parental rights over
J.M., and ordered adoption as the child’s permanent plan.
VII. ICWA inquiry and findings
At their first appearances in the case, Mother and A.C.
each submitted a Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-
020) form in which they indicated that they had no known Indian
ancestry. On July 3, 2019, the juvenile court found that there
was no reason that J.M. was an Indian child, and that ICWA did
not apply.
At a permanency planning review hearing held on May 12,
2022, the court ordered DCFS to conduct new ICWA interviews

11
with known relatives for its next report. On June 16, 2022,
DCFS inquired of A.C., and he denied any Indian ancestry.
DCFS was unable to inquire of Mother because she did not make
herself available for an interview. At the July 6, 2023 section
366.26 hearing, the court again found that ICWA did not apply.
VIII. A.C.’s notice of appeal and habeas petition
On July 6, 2023, A.C. filed a notice of appeal from the order
terminating parental rights over J.M.
On February 26, 2024, after briefing was completed in his
appeal, A.C. filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. He alleged
he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with
the dispositional and interim review hearings, and asked this
court to reverse the order terminating his parental rights and
remand with directions to release J.M. to him. We issued an
order to show cause why habeas corpus relief should not be
granted. In response, DCFS filed a written return to the habeas
petition, and through his counsel, J.M. joined in DCFS’s
argument that A.C. was not entitled to relief.
In connection with the habeas petition, A.C. also filed a
motion to consolidate the petition with the pending appeal, and
DCFS filed a request for judicial notice of the record on appeal.
No party opposes these requests. We grant both the motion to
consolidate and the request for judicial notice, and consider the
habeas petition with this appeal for purposes of oral argument
and decision.
DISCUSSION
I. Appeal from the order terminating parental rights
A.C. raises three arguments in his appeal from the July 6,
2023 order terminating his parental rights over J.M. First, he
argues the juvenile court failed to make a timely ruling on his

12
request to be declared J.M.’s presumed father. Second, A.C.
contends that, because he met the requirements for presumed
father status, the court violated due process by terminating his
parental rights without a finding of unfitness. Third, he asserts
the court erred in failing to ensure an adequate ICWA inquiry.
A. A.C. forfeited his challenge to the juvenile
court’s paternity finding
A.C. argues the order terminating his parental rights must
be reversed because the juvenile court erred when it deferred
making a paternity finding at A.C.’s first appearance in the case,
and then failed to rule on his request for presumed father status
at any later point in the proceedings. DCFS asserts A.C. forfeited
his challenge to the paternity finding by failing to timely appeal
it or ask the juvenile court to revisit the issue. We conclude A.C.
forfeited this claim because he did not timely appeal the juvenile
court’s July 3, 2019 finding that he was an alleged father, and in
any event, he cannot show prejudicial error.
The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a prerequisite to
appellate jurisdiction. (In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 246
(A.R.).) In dependency proceedings, appeals are governed by
section 395, which states, in relevant part, that “[a] judgment in
a proceeding under [s]ection 300 may be appealed in the same
manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be
appealed as an order after judgment.” (§ 395, subd. (a)(1).)
The judgment and first appealable order in a dependency case is
the dispositional order. (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532;
In re A.O. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 145, 148.) “ ‘ “A consequence of
section 395 is that an unappealed disposition or postdisposition
order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal
from a later appealable order.” ’ ” (In re S.B., at p. 532.)

13
To be timely, the notice of appeal ordinarily must be filed
within 60 days of the appealable judgment or order. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).) It also must identify the particular
judgment or order being appealed. (Id., rule 8.405(a)(3).) “An
appeal from the most recent order in a dependency matter may
not challenge earlier orders for which the time for filing an
appeal has passed.” (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th
998, 1018.) Thus, “ ‘[o]nce the deadline [to appeal] expires, the
appellate court has no power to entertain the appeal.’ ” (In re
A.O., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.) Additionally, “when a
notice of appeal manifests a ‘ “clear and unmistakable” ’ intent to
appeal only from one order, we cannot liberally construe the
notice to apply to a different, omitted order.” (In re J.F. (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 70, 76.) “ ‘We have no jurisdiction over an order
not mentioned in the notice of appeal.’ ” (Id. at p. 75.)
In this case, A.C. seeks to challenge the juvenile court’s
alleged error in failing to make a timely paternity finding. The
record, however, reflects that the court made a paternity finding
on July 3, 2019, when A.C. made his first appearance in the case.
At that hearing, A.C. requested that the court find him to be
J.M.’s presumed father. The court instead found A.C. to be an
alleged father, and deferred making a further paternity finding
until it received additional information about A.C.’s relationship
with J.M. A few weeks later, on July 25, 2019, A.C. requested
unmonitored visits with J.M. in light of DCFS’s investigation
showing that they had a parent-child relationship. While the
court granted the request for unmonitored visits, it made clear
that A.C. was still an alleged father, and that it was not
reconsidering any paternity findings at that time because there
was no request that it do so. Although a DNA test later showed

14
A.C. was J.M.’s biological father, A.C. never renewed his request
for presumed father status, or asked the court to revisit its
earlier paternity finding. Hence, as of the December 4, 2019
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, A.C.’s paternity status
was that of an alleged father, and it remained that way through
the July 6, 2023 termination of his parental rights.
Because the juvenile court found A.C. was an alleged father
prior to disposition and never changed its paternity finding later
in the proceedings, the time to challenge that finding was in an
appeal from the dispositional order. (In re A.O., supra, 242
Cal.App.4th at p. 148; In re T.W. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 723,
729.) However, A.C. did not file an appeal from the December 4,
2019 dispositional order, and the time for doing so long ago
expired. The unappealed dispositional order is therefore final
and binding, and cannot be attacked four years later in an appeal
from the order terminating parental rights. Further, A.C.’s
notice of appeal makes no reference to the court’s paternity
finding. Instead, the notice plainly states that A.C. is appealing
from the termination order made at the July 6, 2023 section
366.26 hearing, where the issue of paternity was never raised.
A.C. accordingly forfeited his right to challenge the paternity
finding in the current appeal.
Even if A.C. had not forfeited this claim, he cannot show
the paternity finding resulted in prejudicial error. Generally,
“[a] father’s rights and the extent to which he may participate in
dependency proceedings hinge on his paternal status.” (In re
H.R. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1283.) Only a presumed
father is entitled to “appointed counsel, custody (assuming the
court has not made a detriment finding), and reunification
services.” (Ibid.) Here, although the court found A.C. to be an

15
alleged father when he made his first appearance on July 3, 2019,
it effectively treated him as a presumed father for the duration of
the case. For instance, the court appointed counsel for A.C. at
that initial hearing, and a few weeks later, it granted his request
for unmonitored visits with J.M. At the December 4, 2019
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court found it would
be detrimental to place J.M. with A.C., but maintained its order
for unmonitored visitation and granted A.C. reunification
services. The court also made detriment findings against A.C. at
the six-month and 12-month review hearings. Indeed, in his
briefing on appeal, A.C. concedes that “[t]he court treated [him]
as the presumed parent of [J.M.] at the disposition hearing and
continued to do so throughout the case.” Under these
circumstances, any purported error by the juvenile court in
failing to revisit its earlier paternity ruling was harmless.
B. The juvenile court did not violate due process
in terminating A.C.’s parental rights
A.C. next asserts that the juvenile court violated his due
process rights because it did not find that he was an unfit parent
prior to terminating his parental rights. DCFS argues the court
was not required to make a finding of unfitness because A.C. was
an alleged father, and in any event, the court made several
detriment findings prior to terminating A.C.’s parental rights.
Assuming for purposes of this claim that A.C. was a presumed
father, we conclude the juvenile court satisfied due process by
making detriment findings against A.C. at the dispositional and
interim review hearings. We further conclude that, to the extent
A.C. seeks to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
those detriment findings, he forfeited his challenge by failing to
timely seek review of the juvenile court’s earlier rulings.

16
To protect parents’ fundamental interest in the care,
companionship, and custody of their children, due process
requires that before a state may terminate parental rights,
a court must find parental unfitness by clear and convincing
evidence. (Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 747–748.)
California’s dependency system comports with this requirement
because before parental rights may be terminated at a section
366.26 hearing, the juvenile court must have made prior findings
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent was unfit.
(Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 256 (Cynthia
D.).) “California’s dependency scheme no longer uses the term
‘parental unfitness,’ but instead requires the juvenile court make
a finding that awarding custody of a dependent child to a parent
would be detrimental to the child.” (In re P.A. (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 1197, 1211.) Thus, “[a] finding of detriment to the
child is equivalent to a finding of parental unfitness.” (In re
Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 931, fn. 2.)
It is also well-established that the requisite finding of
detriment need not be made at the section 366.26 hearing.
(Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 253; In re D.H. (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 719, 730.) As our Supreme Court has explained,
“[b]y the time dependency proceedings have reached the stage of
a section 366.26 hearing, there have been multiple specific
findings of parental unfitness. Except for a temporary period, the
grounds for initial removal of the child from parental custody
have been established under a clear and convincing standard
[citation]; in addition, there have been a series of hearings
involving ongoing reunification efforts and, at each hearing, there
was a statutory presumption that the child should be returned to
the custody of the parent. [Citations.] Only if, over this entire

17
period of time, the state continually has established that a return
of custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child is the
section 366.26 stage even reached.” (Cynthia D., at p. 253.)
In this case, the juvenile court made multiple findings of
detriment against A.C. before terminating his parental rights.
At the December 4, 2019 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing,
A.C. asked the court to release J.M. to him as a nonoffending
parent. In denying A.C.’s request, the court found that “pursuant
to section 361.2, . . . placement with [A.C.] at this time would be
detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child.” While the court did not specify the
evidentiary standard that it was applying, a detriment finding
under section 361.2 must be made by clear and convincing
evidence. (In re Z.K. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 51, 70.) The court
made further detriment findings against A.C. at the October 8,
2020 six-month review hearing, and the May 12, 2021 12-month
review hearing. In its minute order for each hearing, the court
found “by clear and convincing evidence that return of the child
to the physical custody of the parent(s) . . . would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the child.” These findings of
detriment made prior to the termination of parental rights were
sufficient to satisfy A.C.’s due process rights. (In re A.S. (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 351, 363; In re P.A., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1212.)
A.C. argues the evidence did not support the findings of
detriment made at the dispositional and interim review hearings.
However, A.C. forfeited any challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s prior detriment findings
because he did not seek appellate or writ review of those findings,
and the time for doing so has passed. As discussed, A.C. never

18
filed an appeal from the dispositional order. He also did not
appeal the findings and orders made at the six-month review
hearing. Nor did he file a petition for writ relief from the findings
and orders made at the 12-month review hearing where the court
terminated reunification services and set the section 366.26
hearing. The purpose of the forfeiture rule is “to balance the
parents’ interest in the care and custody of their children with
the children’s interest in the expeditious resolution of their
custody status.” (In re T.G. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 976, 984.)
Here, A.C. had multiple opportunities to seek reversal of the
juvenile court’s detriment findings on the alleged ground that
they were not supported by substantial evidence. Because A.C.
did not file a timely appeal or writ petition from any of those
prior findings, he forfeited his right to do so in this appeal.
C. A limited remand is required for DCFS to
conduct an adequate ICWA inquiry
A.C. contends the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did
not apply because it failed to ensure compliance with the duty of
initial inquiry. DCFS concedes it did not conduct an adequate
initial inquiry because it never interviewed A.C.’s paternal
grandmother, and that remand for ICWA compliance is the
appropriate remedy. We agree.
ICWA mandates that “[i]n any involuntary proceeding in
a [s]tate court, where the court knows or has reason to know that
an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s
tribe” of the pending proceedings and the right to intervene.
(25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) Similarly, California law requires notice to
the child’s parent, Indian custodian, if any, and the child’s tribe if

19
there is “reason to know . . . that an Indian child is involved” in
the proceeding. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) Both juvenile courts and
child protective agencies “have an affirmative and continuing
duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section
300 . . . may be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 14.)
At the first appearance of each party, the juvenile court
must inquire whether that party “knows or has reason to know
that the child is an Indian child,” and must “instruct the parties
to inform the court if they subsequently receive information that
provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (c).) Additionally, when a child protective agency takes a
child into temporary custody, it must inquire of a nonexclusive
group that includes the child, the parents, and extended family
members “whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (Id.,
subd. (b)). Extended family members include adults who are the
child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-
law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)
“If the [juvenile] court makes a finding that proper and
adequate further inquiry and due diligence . . . have been
conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an
Indian child, the court may make a finding that [ICWA] does not
apply to the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency
of the evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) We generally review the
juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the substantial evidence
test. (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)
In this case, the record reflects that A.C. shared a home
with J.M.’s paternal grandmother during the dependency
proceedings. It is undisputed, however, that DCFS never asked

20
the paternal grandmother about the child’s possible Indian
status. Because DCFS did not inquire of this known and
available extended family member, as required by section 224.2,
subdivision (b), the juvenile court’s finding that there was no
reason to know J.M. was an Indian child was not supported by
substantial evidence. (See, e.g., In re Jayden G. (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 301, 311; In re J.W. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 384, 389;
In re M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61, 70, review granted Oct. 12,
2022, S276099.)
Appellate courts have adopted several divergent standards
for deciding whether an ICWA inquiry error is prejudicial. (See
In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 611–618.) Here, however,
we need not decide which standard of prejudice applies. DCFS
does not oppose a limited remand of the matter so that it can
conduct an ICWA inquiry of J.M.’s paternal grandmother, and if
required, proceed in accordance with ICWA’s notice provisions.
In light of this concession, we agree that remand for compliance
with ICWA and related California law is the proper remedy.
II. Petition for writ of habeas corpus
In his habeas petition, A.C. alleges he received ineffective
assistance of counsel in connection with the paternity findings
and detriment findings made at the dispositional, six-month
review, and 12-month review hearings. A.C. requests that we
reverse the order terminating his parental rights and remand
with directions that J.M. be immediately released to him. We
conclude A.C.’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails
because he did not timely seek appellate or writ review of the
juvenile court’s paternity or detriment findings, and he cannot
use habeas corpus to collaterally attack these now-final rulings.

21
Under California law, every parent facing termination of
parental rights has a statutory right to competent representation.
(A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 246; see §§ 317, subd. (b), 317.5,
subd (a).) As a general rule, a parent who has not received
competent representation in a dependency proceeding is entitled
to raise a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel by petition for
writ of habeas corpus. (A.R., at pp. 247–249.) But a “crucial[]
element of any successful claim to relief based on incompetent
representation is the claimant’s promptness and diligence in
pursuing an appeal.” (Id. at p. 253.) In dependency cases, “the
failure to promptly seek relief ‘may . . . preclude review of claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel,’ since ‘[n]owhere is timeliness
more important than in a dependency proceeding where a delay
of months may seem like “forever” to a young child.’ ” (Ibid.)
Appellate courts also have recognized that the right to
habeas corpus relief is limited by the dependency order to which
the claimed ineffective assistance of counsel relates and the
timing of the habeas petition. (In re Carrie M. (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 530, 533 (Carrie M.); In re Meranda P. (1997)
56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1161–1163 (Meranda P.).) As the Court of
Appeal in Carrie M. explained: “A petition for writ of habeas
corpus in a dependency matter raising a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel does not lie from a final order. [Citations.]
An order is final when the time for appeal has expired and no
timely appeal has been filed . . . . [Citations.] It is appropriate,
however, to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel by
petition for writ of habeas corpus filed concurrent with an appeal
from a final order. [Citation.] The claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel must relate to the order appealed from. [Citation.]
Habeas corpus may not be utilized to challenge antecedent final

22
orders. [Citation.] Thus, for example, a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel in connection with jurisdiction and
disposition orders may be raised in a petition for writ of habeas
corpus filed in connection with an appeal from the disposition
order. [Citation.] The same claims may not be raised by a
habeas corpus petition filed in connection with an appeal from an
order terminating parental rights.” (Carrie M., at pp. 533–534.)
In Carrie M., a mother appealed from the section 366.26
order terminating her parental rights. (Carrie M., supra,
90 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.) She also petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, seeking reversal of the termination order on the ground
that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection
with the section 366.26 hearing. (Carrie M., at p. 532.)
The Court of Appeal held that the mother was entitled to seek
habeas corpus relief. (Ibid.) The Court reasoned that “[b]ecause
the termination order is on appeal and not yet final, habeas
corpus review will not delay finality of the termination order.”
(Id. at p. 535.) The court further reasoned that, “[b]ecause the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim relates only to the
termination order, review of antecedent final orders is not
required.” (Ibid.)
In contrast, in Meranda P., a mother sought to challenge
prior dispositional and interim review orders by filing an appeal
from the termination order and a concurrent habeas petition.
(Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146.) She claimed that
when the juvenile court “made each of these prior orders she was
either wrongly denied counsel or was incompetently represented
by appointed counsel.” (Ibid.) She also argued that her failure to
timely appeal these orders “was itself the result of the lack or
inadequacy of counsel.” (Id. at p. 1151.) The Court of Appeal

23
held that the mother was barred from challenging any antecedent
final orders. (Id. at p. 1146.) The Court reasoned that “at some
point the interests of a parent, and therefore the correction of
purported error which operates to the detriment of the parent,
must give way to the interest of the child in a stable, secure, long-
term, continuous home environment.” (Id. at p. 1160.) The Court
concluded that, “if a parent, for whatever reason, has failed to
timely and appropriately raise a claim about the existence or
quality of counsel received at a proceeding antedating the .26
hearing, we will apply the waiver rule to foreclose the parent
from raising such an objection on appeal from the termination
order.” (Ibid.) The Court also concluded that the waiver rule
“applies equally to the mother’s habeas corpus petition” because
“[t]he now paramount interests of the child in a stable, secure,
long-term, continuous home environment . . . would be no less
subject to subversion by a habeas petition than they would be by
a direct appeal.” (Id. at p. 1163.)
In his habeas petition, A.C. asserts that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel because his appointed counsel
erred in failing (1) to request a presumed father finding at the
dispositional and interim review hearings, (2) to participate in
the six-month review hearing, (3) to advise A.C. of his right to file
an appeal from the detriment findings made at the dispositional
and six-month review hearings, and (4) to advise A.C. of his right
to file a writ petition to challenge the detriment finding made at
the 12-month review hearing. Each of his counsel’s alleged errors
thus occurred in connection with the dispositional or interim
review hearings. As discussed, however, A.C. never filed an
appeal from the orders made at the dispositional and six-month
review hearings, or a writ petition from the order made at the 12-

24
month review hearing where the section 366.26 hearing was set.
Because these unappealed antecedent orders are now final, A.C.
cannot use habeas corpus to collaterally attack them through a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
A.C. argues that application of the waiver rule in this case
would offend due process. The waiver rule, also known as the
forfeiture rule, is not absolute, and “must not be applied if ‘due
process forbids it.’ ” (In re T.G., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at
p. 985.) In most cases, however, the rule “does not infringe upon
a parent’s due process rights because of the numerous safeguards
built into the dependency system.” (Ibid.; see In re Janee J.
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 208 (Janee J.).) For the due process
exception to apply, the parent must show there was a defect in
the proceedings that “fundamentally undermined the statutory
scheme” so as to prevent the parent “from availing himself or
herself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole.”
(Janee J., at p. 208.) Moreover, the defect “must go beyond mere
errors that might have been held reversible had they been
properly and timely reviewed.” (Id. at p. 209.) “[R]esort to claims
of ineffective assistance as an avenue down which to parade
ordinary claims of reversible error is also not enough” to avoid
the waiver rule. (Ibid.) Therefore, “in the usual case, application
of the waiver rule will not offend due process.” (Id. at p. 208.)
A.C. cites In re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068 (S.D.) to
support his claim that the waiver rule should not apply, but that
case is distinguishable. In S.D., the Court of Appeal declined to
apply the rule because the ineffective representation was the
failure to recognize that jurisdiction was lacking. The juvenile
court asserted jurisdiction solely on the ground that the parents
were incarcerated and unable to arrange care for their child. (Id.

25
at pp. 1070–1071.) The mother’s counsel conceded that
jurisdiction was proper based on a patent misunderstanding of
the law, and the record compelled a conclusion that the mother
was able to arrange for child’s care. (Id. at pp. 1077–1078.)
The Court of Appeal characterized the matter as an “unusual
dependency case” that “never should have been one.” (Id. at
p. 1070.) It noted that “the error here was entirely legal, and
quite fundamental” (id. at p. 1080), and that “[n]one of the
‘safeguards’ built into the system could derail [the] case once
counsel’s initial error sent it down the dependency track” (id. at
p. 1081). Under those unique circumstances, the court permitted
the mother to raise a belated challenge to jurisdiction in an
appeal from the order terminating parental rights. (Id. at
pp. 1080–1081.)
Here, A.C. has not demonstrated there was a fundamental
defect in the proceedings that went beyond mere reversible error.
The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b), based on Mother’s mental health issues. In a
prior appeal, Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting jurisdiction over J.M., and in a nonpublished opinion,
this court affirmed. (In re K.C. (Dec. 18, 2020, B302935) [nonpub.
opn.].) While A.C. contends the juvenile court made erroneous
paternity and detriment findings that prevented him from
obtaining custody of J.M., he does not claim that jurisdiction was
improper as a matter of law. Instead, this case is similar to
Janee J., where the Court of Appeal applied the waiver rule to
preclude a parent’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in
an appeal from the order terminating parental rights. (Janee J.,
supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 210–212.) Like A.C., the mother in
Janee J. argued that the juvenile court failed to make adequate

26
detriment findings from disposition through the review hearings,
and that her counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
object or to seek appellate review. (Id. at pp. 210–211.) The
Court of Appeal concluded that the mother waived her right to
challenge those findings because she had not shown the alleged
errors “fundamentally prevented her from enjoying the multiple
protections provided by the dependency scheme.” (Id. at p. 211.)
We conclude the waiver rule applies in this case. The
totality of the record shows that A.C. was provided with notice
and an opportunity to appear before the juvenile court and to
assert a position on his paternity status and J.M.’s placement.
A.C. also was provided with notice of his right to file an appeal
from the dispositional order, and his right to file a writ petition
from the order setting the section 366.26 hearing. The record
further reflects that, at the time A.C. filed the current appeal to
challenge these earlier final orders, J.M. had been in the care of
his prospective adoptive parents for close to two years, had found
security and stability in their home, and wished to be adopted by
them. While A.C. claims his counsel’s inadequate representation
caused him to not timely seek appellate or writ review, he has not
established that the alleged errors “fundamentally undermined
the statutory scheme” so as to prevent him “from availing himself
. . . of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole.” (Janee
J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.) Under these circumstances,
A.C. is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on his claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. The
juvenile court’s section 366.26 order terminating parental rights
over J.M. is conditionally affirmed, and the matter is remanded

27
for compliance with ICWA and related California law. On
remand, the court must promptly direct DCFS to comply with its
duty of inquiry in accordance with section 224.2 by interviewing
J.M.’s paternal grandmother about ICWA. If that information
establishes a reason to know that an Indian child is involved,
notice must be provided in accordance with ICWA and section
224.3. The court must determine, on the record, whether the
ICWA inquiry and notice requirements have been satisfied and
whether J.M. is an Indian child. If the court determines J.M. is
an Indian child, it must vacate its order and conduct a new
section 366.26 hearing, as well as all further proceedings, in
accordance with ICWA and related California law. If not, the
court’s original section 366.26 order shall remain in effect.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

GRIMES, J.

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