Valencia v. Mendoza

CourtListener 9987310Calctapp01.07.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 7/1/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

MIGUEL VALENCIA, JR., et B325803
al.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Super. Ct. No. BC723902)
Respondents,

v.

ARMANDO MENDOZA et al.,

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Affirmed.
Spierer, Woodward, Corbalis & Golberg, Stephen B.
Goldberg and Jeffrey Lewis for Defendants and Appellants.
Cohen & Cohen, Kerry A. Cohen and Barry L. Cohen for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.

___________________________
Armando Mendoza, Coastal Holdings, LLC, and Class A
Realty, Inc. (collectively, the Mendoza defendants) appeal from a
judgment entered after the trial court confirmed an arbitration
award in favor of Miguel Valencia, Jr., and Lizette Valencia on
the Valencias’ claims in connection with undisclosed defects in a
home they purchased from the Mendoza defendants. On appeal,
the Mendoza defendants contend the court erred in denying their
petition to vacate the arbitration award and granting the
Valencias’ petition to confirm the award after finding the petition
to vacate was untimely. The Mendoza defendants also contend
the arbitrator committed legal error—reviewable under the
parties’ arbitration agreement—when the arbitrator excluded key
evidence from the arbitration hearing.
The trial court correctly found that the Mendoza
defendants’ petition to vacate the arbitration award was untimely
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1290.6 1 because it was filed
more than 10 days after service of the Valencias’ petition to
confirm the arbitration award. The fact the petition to vacate
complied with the deadline under section 1288 to file the petition
within 100 days of service of a signed copy of the arbitration
award does not excuse the failure to meet the 10-day deadline to
respond to the petition to confirm the award—a response seeking
vacation of the arbitration award was required to comply with
both. Although the court had discretion to extend the deadline
under section 1290.6 for good cause, it did not abuse its discretion
in finding no good cause. We therefore consider whether the
Mendoza defendants met their burden to show the arbitrator

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.

2
erred in its rulings excluding evidence by reviewing the Mendoza
defendants’ initial opposition to the petition to confirm the
arbitration award, without considering the declarations they
later filed with their untimely petition to vacate. They did not
meet their burden, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Valencias’ Home Purchase 2
In August 2016 the Valencias purchased a house on South
Harbor View Drive in San Pedro (the home) from Coastal
Holdings, a company wholly owned and controlled by Mendoza.
Mendoza’s broker in the transaction was Class A Realty;
Mendoza owned 50 percent of Class A Realty, and his fiancée
owned the other 50 percent. The Valencias were attracted to the
home because it appeared to be in move-in condition.
Mendoza had purchased the home several months earlier
from Fillipo Tranni with the intention to “flip” 3 the home for
resale. Tranni had lived in the home for many years and started
a major renovation: Tranni had hired an architect, obtained
some permits, and begun demolition work when he realized the
renovation was too complicated, and he decided instead to sell the

2 Our recitation of the facts underlying the dispute is taken
from the arbitrator’s findings of fact in the arbitration award and,
except as noted, are undisputed for the purpose of the appeal.
3 Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “flip” in relevant
context as follows: “[T]o buy and usually renovate (real estate) so
as to quickly resell at a higher price.” (Merriam-Webster’s Online
Dict. (2024) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/flip>
[as of July 1, 2024].)

3
home. In selling the home to Mendoza, Tranni disclosed that
work had been done without necessary permits, and it was not in
compliance with building codes. Tranni also disclosed the home
had other issues, including water intrusion, stucco that was
chipping, and improperly installed windows.
Mendoza was an experienced house flipper, having flipped
50 to 60 houses in the past. Mendoza hired Pablo Rivas and
Carlos Navarro to perform construction work to finish Tranni’s
renovation and allow resale as soon as possible. Mendoza
identified himself as the “owner/builder” on applications for the
building permits he believed necessary for the job; his self-
identification as the owner/builder required that all work be done
by licensed contractors. Mendoza, Rivas, and Navarro were not
licensed contractors. Further, a significant amount of work was
completed before Mendoza obtained permits, so when the
building inspector came to the site for a code inspection, the
inspector could not see the prior work and whether it complied
with building codes. Other work was entirely unpermitted.
When Mendoza sold the home to the Valencias, he did not
disclose the issues previously disclosed by Tranni, nor did he
disclose that he did unpermitted work using unlicensed
contractors. When he listed the property for sale, he described it
as “‘completely remodeled’” with “‘no expense spared.’”
Shortly after the Valencias purchased the home and moved
in, problems arose. After the first rain, water poured in around
the windows installed by Mendoza. While unsuccessful attempts
to remedy the leak and repair the damage were underway,
numerous other defects became apparent. It was necessary for
the Valencias to move out of the home for several months while
extensive repairs were made.

4
B. The Arbitration and Award
On October 2, 2018 the Valencias filed this action against
the Mendoza defendants, asserting 10 causes of action based on
fraudulent concealment of defects in the home. 4 After the
Mendoza defendants moved to compel arbitration, the parties
agreed to a stipulation for binding arbitration and a stay of the
court action, which the trial court approved and entered on
January 25, 2019. Paragraph 8 of the parties’ stipulation
provided for enhanced judicial review of the arbitration award
pursuant to Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008)
44 Cal.4th 1334 (Cable Connection). The agreement stated,
“[T]he Arbitrator shall apply California substantive law to the
proceeding. The arbitrator shall not have the power to commit
errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award may be vacated or
corrected on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for any
such error. It is the explicit and unambiguous intent of the
parties that any error of law or legal reasoning shall be an act in
excess of the arbitrator’s powers that is reviewable on appeal.
Specifically, any party may seek to vacate any award that has
been made in excess of the Arbitrator’s powers, as provided for in
[§ 1286.2], with a concomitant right of appeal to a court of
competent jurisdiction.”
The Valencias asserted eight claims in the arbitration
against one or more of the Mendoza defendants: (1) violation of
state contractor licensing laws (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7028; Code
Civ. Proc., § 1029.8); (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of statutory

4 On our own motion we augment the record to include the
Valencias’ complaint filed on October 2, 2018 in the superior
court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

5
duty of disclosure (Civ. Code, § 1102); (4) fraud; (5) negligent
misrepresentation; (6) negligence; (7) violation of the common law
duty of disclosure; and (8) fraudulent concealment (Civ. Code,
§ 2079). There was extensive pre-hearing discovery, including
hundreds of written discovery requests and 17 depositions.
The arbitration hearing was held over five days in
June 2021 before Judith C. Chirlin, a retired superior court
judge. Twelve witnesses testified, including three engineers who
testified as retained experts on building code requirements and
damages: William McKee Nelson and David Stern (for the
Valencias) and Bryce Dean Richmond (for the Mendoza
defendants). At the conclusion of witness testimony, the parties
submitted closing briefs and separate briefing on damages.
On August 23, 2022 the arbitrator issued a 17-page final
arbitration award (award). 5 The arbitrator found the Valencias’
causes of action fell into two main categories, negligence and
failure to disclose, and multiple Mendoza defendants were liable
in each category. The arbitrator awarded $432,536 in monetary
damages, including $130,000 for repairs; $260,000 for
impairment to the fair market value of the home due to the
defects; and smaller amounts for loss of use, statutory penalties,
and inspection fees. 6 Finding by clear and convincing evidence

5 The arbitrator issued an interim award in February 2022
addressing liability, and she subsequently entered separate
rulings on punitive damages and attorneys’ fees and costs, which
were incorporated into the final award.
6 The arbitrator found the monetary damages sustained due
to the undisclosed defects exceeded $390,000 but reasoned that
awarding the full amount plus damages for the impairment in
the home’s value would “result in serious double counting”;

6
that Mendoza “made false representations and failed to disclose
known defects with knowledge of the falsity” and “intended to
defraud the Valencias,” the arbitrator awarded $438,800 in
punitive damages. The arbitrator also awarded $364,544 in
attorneys’ fees and $52,667 in costs, plus prejudgment interest.

C. Confirmation of the Award
1. The Valencias’ petition to confirm the award
On September 2, 2022 the Valencias filed a petition to
confirm the arbitration award, setting a September 28, 2022
hearing date. The petition attached the home purchase
agreement, the stipulation to arbitrate, and the arbitration
award. The Valencias did not file any declarations or additional
evidence.
On September 14 the Mendoza defendants filed a four-page
opposition. 7 In an introductory paragraph, the Mendoza
defendants stated they were “in the process of completing
drafting” a petition to vacate that would “likely be filed within
the next 10-15 days.” They had reserved a hearing date in April

accordingly, the arbitrator discounted the cost of repairs by
approximately $260,000.
7 On appeal, the parties do not dispute that the Mendoza
defendants’ September 14, 2022 opposition was timely under
section 1290.6 (providing that a response to a petition to confirm
an arbitration award shall be served and filed within 10 days
after service of the petition, unless extended by agreement of the
parties or a court order). The parties had agreed to a two-day
extension of the service deadline as part of their electronic service
agreement.

7
2023 and requested the court continue the Valencias’ petition to
confirm so that it would be heard with their petition to vacate.
The Mendoza defendants in their opposition argued the
arbitrator’s refusal to consider two items of critical evidence
constituted grounds to vacate the award. 8 First, the arbitrator
excluded a building inspection card that on its back “included a
statement by the inspector, “‘OK to close walls.’” As described in
the opposition, the building inspector testified at the hearing that
he was unable to see the work done by the Mendoza defendants
before the walls were closed, and the arbitrator made a finding in
the award that “[a] significant amount of the work done by [the
Mendoza defendants] was done before Mr. Mendoza pulled
permits so that when the City Building Inspector came to inspect,
he could not see the work and whether it had been done correctly
and in accordance with the Building Codes.” The Mendoza
defendants argued that had the arbitrator allowed the inspection
card into evidence, the annotation “‘OK to close walls’” would
have shown a “blatant lie” by the inspector (that he was not able
to see the work before the walls were closed up), which would
have discredited his testimony.
Second, the Mendoza defendants argued that although the
Valencias’ expert Nelson “relied heavily on Chapter 34 of the
2016 Building Code” 9 in testifying that repairing the home would

8 The Mendoza defendants did not address the judicial
standard of review of an arbitration award or note that the
parties agreed to expand judicial review under Cable Connection,
supra, 44 Cal.4th 1334.
9 It is unclear to what the experts (and parties) were
referring as “Chapter 34.” Chapter 34 of the 2016 California

8
require a complete code upgrade, including opening up walls and
constructing shear walls throughout the structure, the arbitrator
precluded the Mendoza defendants’ expert (Richmond) from
testifying that Chapter 34 did not apply to the subject repairs,
ruling that Richmond’s testimony “exceeded the scope of his
deposition testimony.” As a result, Nelson’s testimony about the
significant corrective work necessary for code compliance was left
unchallenged, inflating the damages award, which was
predicated on “the largest repair scenario, including the repairs
which were outlined by Mr. Nelson.”
The Mendoza defendants did not submit any declarations
or evidence in support of their opposition. In a concluding
paragraph, the Mendoza defendants stated their forthcoming
petition to vacate “will include a more detailed analysis of the
evidence excluded and its impact on the [a]ward,” and they
reiterated their request that the petition to confirm and the
petition to vacate be heard together “in the interest of judicial
economy and common sense.”
In their reply brief the Valencias argued the Mendoza
defendants’ opposition did not include any evidence to support
vacation of the award (nor did it explicitly request to vacate the
award), and there was no basis for a continuance because the

Building Code is a reserved chapter. However, the index for
Chapter 34 includes the following note: “Provisions of former
Chapter 34, Existing Structures, are now located in Part 10,
California Existing Building Code.” We assume the experts and
parties are referring to regulations governing existing structures
that were formerly located in Chapter 34 of the Building Code
but were moved to the “Existing Building Code.” For
convenience, we refer to Chapter 34, as do the parties, without
addressing the substantive building code requirements.

9
Mendoza defendants’ unfiled petition to vacate was already
untimely under section 1290.6 for failure to serve the petition
within 10 days after service of the Valencias’ petition to confirm.
The Valencias also argued the arbitrator properly excluded
the inspection card and Richmond’s testimony about Chapter 34.
The inspection card was “directly responsive to multiple
production requests,” and several witnesses had been deposed
about the inspection, yet the Mendoza defendants did not produce
the card in discovery or disclose it on their exhibit list. Moreover,
the Mendoza defendants represented they had no further
responsive records, then less than 24 hours before the arbitration
hearing they “miraculously found the inspection card.” At the
hearing, the Valencias’ lawyers objected to the admission of the
inspection card and other late-produced documents on the basis
of unfair surprise, and the arbitrator sustained the objection.
The Valencias’ lawyer, Kerry Cohen, submitted a
declaration that included excerpts of the discovery demands and
responses, deposition notices, and correspondence with counsel
regarding the inspection records. The correspondence showed
that the Sunday before the Monday hearing, the Mendoza
defendants’ lawyer, Christopher Delaplane, wrote to Cohen to say
Mendoza found the permit card that day. Delaplane explained
that although Mendoza had previously searched his storage unit
and produced his file relating to the home, the inspection card
was not in that file. He and his fiancée conducted “another
search” on the eve of the arbitration hearing and “found [the

10
inspection card] intermixed with other non-relevant
documents.” 10
With respect to the exclusion of Richmond’s testimony
about Chapter 34, the Valencias argued the arbitrator properly
restricted his testimony under the principles set forth in
Kennemur v. State of California (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 907
(Kennemur) for excluding undisclosed expert opinions. As
described in Cohen’s declaration, which attached excerpts of
Richmond’s deposition and correspondence between the lawyers,
Richmond testified in his March 2021 deposition that he had
been retained to opine only about structural issues relating to a
kitchen beam and whether exterior framing required 2x4 or 2x6
studs. Richmond confirmed he had not been asked to give any
other opinions, although he testified he had received Nelson’s
report and might opine about Nelson’s opinions “eventually.”
Shortly before the arbitration hearing, Delaplane stated in
response to a supplemental discovery demand that the Mendoza
defendants’ experts were “still in the process of formulating
additional responses to Plaintiff’s damage claims, all of which
will be raised at the trial of this matter.” Cohen demanded
Delaplane make the experts available for deposition on these
opinions, but Delaplane refused, stating “our experts are

10 The Valencias also argued that the handwritten annotation
on the back of the card stating “OK to close walls,” absent any
context or foundation, did not impeach the building inspector.
Further, they asserted, the inspector’s hearing testimony that the
walls were closed was consistent with his deposition testimony
and photographs taken at the time of the inspection. We cannot
evaluate this argument because the record on appeal does not
contain any photographs or the inspector’s testimony.

11
preparing for the arbitration and will be reviewing your experts’
deposition transcripts in order to assess their respective
opinions. . . . This does not make them subject to an additional
round of depositions.” As Cohen described in his declaration, at
the arbitration hearing Delaplane sought to elicit opinions from
Richmond regarding the applicability of the upgrade
requirements under Chapter 34, and Cohen objected under
Kennemur. After argument from counsel, the arbitrator
sustained the objection.

2. The Mendoza defendants’ petition to vacate the award
On September 27, 2022, the day before the hearing on the
Valencias’ petition to confirm the award, the Mendoza defendants
filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award, supported by an
eight-page memorandum and declarations from Mendoza,
Delaplane, and Richmond. The Mendoza defendants raised the
same two grounds for vacating the award they argued in their
opposition (and raise on appeal): the arbitrator’s exclusion of the
building inspection card and Richmond’s testimony about
Chapter 34.
With respect to the inspection card, the Mendoza
defendants’ factual account of the last-minute discovery of the
card was substantially consistent with the Valencias’ account.
Delaplane also stated in his declaration that the Mendoza
defendants had requested the permit file for the home from the
Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety, 11 and the

11 In 1909 the City of Los Angeles annexed San Pedro, where
the home is located. (See In re Miller (1910) 15 Cal.App. 43, 44.)

12
department failed to produce a copy of the back of the permit
card.
Delaplane explained as to Richmond’s testimony that
Nelson raised Chapter 34 for the first time in his deposition,
which was after Richmond’s deposition. Further, Richmond and
Delaplane repeatedly stated that Richmond would offer
additional opinions in response to the Valencias’ experts’
opinions, and Richmond’s opinions about Chapter 34 were
introduced only for rebuttal. Delaplane also attested that the
Mendoza defendants “were amenable to allowing [the Valencias]
to take Mr. Richmond’s deposition on his Chapter 34 opinions
and to allow Mr. Nelson to be able to respond to said opinions,”
but the need for a further deposition should have been addressed
in a motion prior to the arbitration and not by an evidentiary
exclusion. Richmond in his declaration stated he would have
testified that “Nelson wrongly applied Chapter 34 and incorrectly
opined that a code upgrade for non-altered elements of the
Property was necessary. Since the Property is considered
‘conventional light-frame construction’ and has a flexible
diaphragm, only the altered portion of the Property would need to
meet current codes.”

3. The trial court’s order confirming the award
The trial court heard the Valencias’ motion to confirm on
September 28, 2022. There was no court reporter present, and
the parties have not provided a settled statement of the
proceeding. As stated in its three-page minute order, the court
found that it was required to confirm the award under
section 1286.4 because the Valencias filed and served a petition
to confirm that complied with the statutory requirements, and

13
the Mendoza defendants did not file and serve a request to vacate
within 10 days of service of the petition to confirm as required by
section 1290.6. And the Mendoza defendants’ opposition did not
present facts or evidence demonstrating good cause to extend the
time for the Mendoza defendants to file a response or to continue
the hearing on the petition to vacate. 12
The trial court continued, “While Defendants contend the
arbitrator refused to admit critical evidence, the general rule in
California remains that the grounds for vacating an arbitration
award are exclusively statutory and there is no statutory
provision for vacating an award on mere grounds of a refusal to
hear evidence, without more.” Further, “Defendants fail[ed] to
provide any evidence to show that the evidentiary ruling
prejudiced them because the ruling ‘influenced the outcome of the
arbitration.’”
The trial court granted the Valencias’ petition to confirm
the award, and on its own motion, the court advanced the hearing
and vacated the Mendoza defendants’ petition to vacate the
award. The court entered a judgment in favor the Valencias for
$1,512,850, which included the arbitrator’s award and $224,303
in prejudgment interest. 13 On October 7, 2022 the Valencias filed

12 In an apparent typographical error, the minute order
stated the Mendoza defendants’ opposition “did present facts or
evidence” demonstrating good cause for vacating the award. The
parties do not dispute that the minute order should have stated
the Mendoza defendants “did not present facts or evidence.”
(Italics added.)
13 The trial court entered the $1,512,850 judgment against
Mendoza and Coastal Holdings. The court entered a separate

14
a notice of entry of the order confirming the award and a notice of
entry of judgment.
The Mendoza defendants timely appealed. 14

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review of
Arbitration Awards
“California law favors alternative dispute resolution as a
viable means of resolving legal conflicts. ‘Because the decision to
arbitrate grievances evinces the parties’ intent to bypass the

judgment for $1,148,306 against Class A Realty, omitting the
punitive damages award as to that defendant.
14 On October 20, 2022, after entry of judgment but before
they filed their notice of appeal, the Mendoza defendants filed a
motion in the trial court for mandatory relief from the judgment
under section 473, subdivision (b), due to attorney error. On
appeal, the Mendoza defendants request, as an alternative to
reversing the judgment, that we remand the matter to the trial
court with directions to rule on their motion for relief. On
September 26, 2023 the Mendoza defendants filed a request to
augment the appellate record to include the opposition and reply
briefs and the trial court’s May 4, 2023 order on the relief motion.
We deemed their request to augment the record as a request for
judicial notice and denied it on October 13, 2023.
An order denying a motion for relief from a judgment
pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b), is a separately
appealable postjudgment order. (Austin v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 927, fn. 6.) The merits
of the postjudgment motion under section 473, subdivision (b), is
outside the scope of this appeal, which was taken from the order
confirming the arbitration award and the judgment.

15
judicial system and thus avoid potential delays at the trial and
appellate levels, arbitral finality is a core component of the
parties’ agreement to submit to arbitration.’” (Richey v.
AutoNation Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 916 (Richey).) The
California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.; CAA)
provides “only limited grounds for judicial review of an
arbitration award”; under the statute, “courts are authorized to
vacate an award if it was (1) procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means; (2) issued by corrupt arbitrators; (3) affected by
prejudicial misconduct on the part of the arbitrators; or (4) in
excess of the arbitrators’ powers.” (Cable Connection, supra,
44 Cal.4th at p. 1344, citing § 1286.2, subd. (a); see Soni v.
SimpleLayers, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1085 [“The
exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award are provided
in [section] 1286.2.”].)
“Generally, courts cannot review arbitration awards for
errors of fact or law, even when those errors appear on the face of
the award or cause substantial injustice to the parties.” (Richey,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 916; accord, Law Finance Group, LLC v.
Key (2023) 14 Cal.5th 932, 957 (Law Finance); see Heimlich v.
Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 367 [“Most legal errors in arbitration
are not reviewable.”].) However, parties may “take themselves
out of the general rule that the merits of the award are not
subject to judicial review” if they “clearly agree that legal errors
are an excess of arbitral authority that is reviewable by the
courts.” (Cable Connection, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1361; accord,
Harshad & Nasir Corp. v. Global Sign Systems, Inc. (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 523, 535 (Harshad) [general rule limiting judicial
review “does not apply when the parties have agreed to ‘limit the

16
arbitrators’ authority by providing for review of the merits in the
arbitration agreement.’”].)
In Cable Connection, the parties’ arbitration agreement
stated, “‘The arbitrators shall not have the power to commit
errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award may be vacated or
corrected on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for any
such error.’” (Cable Connection, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1361,
fn. 20.) The Supreme Court held that such an agreement
providing for judicial review for legal error was enforceable,
reasoning that because the CAA authorizes review of an award
on the ground that it exceeds an arbitrator’s powers (§ 1286.2,
subd. (a)(4)), 15 and an arbitrator’s powers are circumscribed by
terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement, “[i]f the parties
constrain the arbitrators’ authority by requiring a dispute to be
decided according to the rule of law, and make plain their
intention that the award is reviewable for legal error, the general
rule of limited review has been displaced by the parties’
agreement.” (Cable Connection, at p. 1355; accord, Harshad,
supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 535.)
Here, the parties expressly invoked Cable Connection in
their stipulation to arbitrate by citing the case and including
judicial review language virtually identical to the language

15 Section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), states, “[T]he court shall
vacate the award if the court determines” that “[t]he arbitrators
exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without
affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy
submitted.”

17
approved by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the arbitration
award was reviewable for legal error. 16
Section 1285.4 prescribes the requirements for a petition to
confirm an arbitration award. “A petition to confirm need only
set forth (1) the names of the arbitrators, (2) the arbitration
agreement (by description or attached copy), and (3) the award
and written opinion of the arbitrators (by description or attached
copy).” (Eternity Investments, Inc. v. Brown (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 739, 745; see § 1285.4.) “If a petition . . . is duly
served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as made,
unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and
confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the
proceedings.” (§ 1286.) Accordingly, once a petition to confirm

16 The trial court appears not to have considered the parties’
stipulation to heightened judicial review of the arbitration award.
For example, the court cited the holdings in Richey, supra,
60 Cal.4th at page 916 in finding that “there is no statutory
provision for vacating an award on mere grounds of a refusal to
hear evidence, without more,” and Heimlich v. Shiji, supra,
7 Cal.5th at page 369 (with respect to the evidentiary exclusions)
that there was “absolutely no basis for even an inference that the
Arbitration hearing was not fair to both parties.”
The Valencias contend the Mendoza defendants forfeited
any claim the trial court applied the wrong standard of judicial
review by failing to raise the agreement for heightened review
under Cable Connection in either their opposition to the petition
to confirm the award or their petition to vacate. (See Quiles v.
Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013 [“‘Failure to raise
specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on
appeal.’”].) We decline to reach forfeiture because we review the
trial court’s order confirming the award de novo and
independently evaluate the arbitrator’s evidentiary rulings.

18
that meets the statutory requirements has been served, “‘the
burden is on the party attacking the award to affirmatively
establish the existence of error.’” (Rivera v. Shivers (2020)
54 Cal.App.5th 82, 94 (Rivera); accord, Lopes v. Millsap (1992)
6 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1685.)
We review de novo a trial court order confirming an
arbitration award, including its determination whether the
arbitrator exceeded her powers in granting relief. (Richey, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 918, fn. 1; Branches Neighborhood Corp. v.
CalAtlantic Group, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 743, 751.)
However, to the extent the trial court’s decision to grant a
petition to confirm or deny an arbitration award rests on its
determination of disputed factual issues, we review the court’s
orders for substantial evidence. (Branches Neighborhood Corp.,
at p. 750; Harshad, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 536 [“One
pertinent standard is our standard for reviewing factual findings
to determine whether they are supported by substantial
evidence.”].) “There is a presumption favoring the validity of the
award, and appellant bears the burden of establishing [its] claim
of invalidity.” (Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 919, 923.)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Disregarding the Mendoza
Defendants’ Untimely Petition To Vacate
The Mendoza defendants contend the trial court erred in
failing to consider the evidence they submitted with their petition
to vacate the arbitration award in ruling on the Valencias’
petition to confirm. They argue the court should instead have
continued the hearing on the petition to confirm and allowed full
briefing on the petition to vacate, in which the merits and
timeliness of the petition to vacate and supporting evidence could

19
have been addressed. However, it is undisputed that the
Mendoza defendants failed to submit any timely evidence
opposing the petition to confirm, and given the absence of any
showing of good cause for relief from the statutory deadline, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the award at
the September 28, 2022 hearing.
A losing party’s request to vacate an arbitration award may
be made by filing either a petition to vacate the award (§ 1285) or
a response to a petition to confirm the award that requests
vacation of the award (§ 1285.2). Section 1285 provides, “Any
party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may
petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award.”
Section 1285.2 provides, in turn, “A response to a petition under
this chapter may request the court to dismiss the petition or to
confirm, correct or vacate the award.” Further, “[t]he allegations
of a petition are deemed to be admitted by a respondent duly
served therewith unless a response is duly served and filed.”
(§ 1290.) “A petition to correct or vacate an award, or a response
requesting such relief, shall set forth the grounds on which the
request for such relief is based.” (§ 1285.8.)
Three statutory provisions address the timeliness of
pleadings that challenge confirmation of an arbitration award.
Section 1288 provides, “A petition to vacate an award or to
correct an award shall be served and filed not later than 100 days
after the date of the service of a signed copy of the award on the
petitioner.” Section 1288.2 likewise provides, “A response
requesting that an award be vacated or that an award be
corrected shall be served and filed not later than 100 days after
the date of service of a signed copy of the award. . . .”]. And
section 1290.6 provides, “A response shall be served and filed

20
within 10 days after service of the petition . . . .” However, “[t]he
time provided in [section 1290.6] for serving and filing a response
may be extended by an agreement in writing between the parties
to the court proceeding or, for good cause, by order of the court.”
(Ibid.)
For nearly half a century, the Courts of Appeal have
consistently held that once the prevailing party in an arbitration
files a petition to confirm an arbitration award, the 10-day
deadline in section 1290.6 controls when a losing party must
respond, not the 100-day deadline in section 1288.2. (Oaktree
Capital Management, L.P. v. Bernard (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 60,
66 [“The ‘well delineated statutory scheme’ giving a party who
opposes a petition to confirm only 10 days to file a response spans
several decades.”]; see Rivera, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 93
[“‘When the party petitions the court to confirm the award before
the expiration of the 100-day period, respondent may seek
vacation or correction of the award by way of response only if he
serves and files his response within 10 days after the service of
the petition (§ 1290.6).’”]; De Mello v. Souza (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d
79, 83 [same]; Coordinated Const., Inc. v. Canoga Big “A”, Inc.
(1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [“[T]he proper interpretation of
section 1288.2 is that the 100-day limit applies only when the
other party to the arbitration does not file a petition to confirm
the award. When such petition is filed a response must be filed
within the time limit set forth in section 1290.6.”].)
In Darby v. Sisyphian, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1100,
disapproved on another ground by Law Finance, supra,

21
14 Cal.5th at page 952, footnote 3 (Darby) , 17 our colleagues in
Division Two applied this longstanding principle in the situation
where, as here, a party filed a section 1288 petition to vacate
more than 10 days after service of a petition to confirm: “[A]
competing request to vacate or correct the award—whether styled
as a response to the petition to confirm or as a standalone
petition—must be filed and served within 10 days of service of
the petition to confirm, even if that due date is less than 100 days
after service of the award.” (Darby, at p. 1110, footnote omitted.)
The court rejected the argument that only filings “styled as
responses” were subject to section 1290.6’s 10-day deadline,
whereas filings “styled as standalone petitions” could ignore the
10-day deadline, reasoning that any such distinction “would
elevate form over substance, would effectively negate the 10-day
deadline since any party who missed the 10-day deadline could
simply restyle their untimely response as a standalone petition,
and would be inconsistent with the Act’s policy to decide
postarbitration petitions ‘expeditious[ly].’” (Darby, at p. 1110,
fn. 7.)
In Law Finance, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pages 946 to 947, the
Supreme Court recently considered the inverse issue—whether a
response to a petition to confirm an arbitration award filed
within 10 days of the petition to confirm but outside of the 100-
day deadline under sections 1288 and 1288.2 was timely. The
court held the response was not timely, observing, “[N]either

17 The Law Finance court disapproved of Darby v. Sisyphian,
LLC, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 1100 “to the extent that it
characterized section 1288.2’s 100-day limitations period as
‘jurisdictional’ in the fundamental sense.” (Law Finance, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 952, fn. 3.)

22
deadline supersedes the other. On the contrary, when a filing
both (1) responds to a petition to confirm, and (2) requests that
the arbitration award be vacated, both deadlines apply:
(1) Absent a written agreement or court order, the response must
be filed within 10 days after service of the petition to confirm and
(2) in any event, no later than 100 days after service of the
award.” (Ibid.) The court added, however, “We need not and do
not decide whether a party that fails to file a timely response
under section 1290.6 may nevertheless request vacatur in a
petition to vacate filed within the limitations period of
section 1288.” (Id. at p. 946, fn. 2, citing Darby, supra,
87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1110, fn. 7.)
The Mendoza defendants filed a timely opposition
(response) to the Valencias’ petition to confirm the award, but the
opposition was not supported by any evidence. Only on the eve of
the hearing on the petition to confirm, nearly four weeks after
they had been served with the Valencias’ petition to confirm (and
well after the 10 days), did they file the petition to vacate the
award that included supporting declarations and evidence. We
agree with the reasoning in Darby, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
page 1110 and footnote 7, that there is no material distinction
between a request to vacate filed as a response to a petition to
confirm under section 1288.2 and a standalone petition to vacate
under section 1288 with respect to whether the 10-day deadline
under section 1290.6 controls: It does. Accordingly, the trial
court was not required to consider the evidence attached to the
late-filed petition to vacate before ruling on the petition to
confirm. A contrary holding would vitiate a trial court’s ability to
act on a timely filed petition to confirm an award and require a
court to continue a hearing on an unopposed (or inadequately

23
opposed) petition to confirm for up to 100 days from the filing of
the award where, as here, the opposing party represents it plans
to seek to vacate the award.
Although the trial court was not required to excuse the
Mendoza defendants’ noncompliance with the 10-day
requirement under section 1290.6 or otherwise to adjust the
hearing schedule on the Valencias’ petition to confirm to allow
the Mendoza defendants’ late-filed evidence to be incorporated
into their opposition, the court had discretion to do so. As the
Law Finance court explained, “The extension mechanism in
[section 1290.6] permits the parties to agree to extend the
response deadline for any reason at all and permits the court to
extend the deadline for good cause. That exception gives the
parties and the court wide latitude to set a briefing schedule in
any arbitration-related proceeding—an exception that would
permit modifying the response deadline without necessarily
meeting the requirements for equitable tolling or estoppel.” (Law
Finance, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 955 [reversing holding that CAA
deadlines limited court’s fundamental jurisdiction and remanding
for consideration of equitable tolling and estoppel arguments for
extending the deadlines under sections 1288 and 1288.2].)
We review a trial court’s determination whether to extend a
statutory deadline based on a showing of good cause for an abuse
of discretion. (See Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 304, 327 [“a trial court’s finding of ‘good cause’ is
generally reviewed deferentially, solely for abuse of discretion”];
see Lucci v. United Credit & Collection Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 492,
495 [trial court’s decision pursuant to statute permitting “an
extension . . . ‘in furtherance of justice’ and ‘upon good cause
shown’” is reviewed for an “abuse of discretion”].)

24
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding there
was no good cause to continue the hearing on the petition to
confirm or to allow additional briefing. (See Robinson v. U-Haul
Co. of California, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 327 [explaining with
respect to extension to file motion for attorneys’ fees, “Where the
standard requires ‘good cause’ only, it has been ‘“‘equated to a
good reason for a party’s failure to perform that specific
requirement [of the statute] from which he seeks to be
excused.’”’”]; Katz v. Campbell Union High School Dist. (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1036 [applying same standard in assessing
good cause for relief from statutory requirements for summons].)
In their opposition to the petition to confirm, the Mendoza
defendants requested that the court consider at the same time
the petition to confirm and the petition to vacate—which the
Mendoza defendants represented would “likely be filed within the
next 10-15 days”—“in the interest of judicial economy and
common sense.” The Mendoza defendants did not argue, let alone
submit any evidence, why they were unable to submit evidence
and a more developed argument in support of their opposition.
Moreover, the Mendoza defendants failed to request an order
extending the deadline to file a response under section 1290.6 (or
request the Valencias stipulate to an extension), either before or
after the deadline passed. 18

18 Without a transcript or settled statement reflecting what
was said at the hearing on the petition to confirm, we have no
record of whether the Mendoza defendants presented evidence of
good cause at the hearing, nor do they argue they did. (See
Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935 [“[f]ailure to
provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be
resolved against appellant,” and “[w]ithout a record, either by

25
Because the Mendoza defendants did not submit evidence
in their opposition to the petition to confirm and did not
demonstrate good cause for relief from the 10-day deadline under
section 1290.6, we, like the trial court, do not consider their
untimely evidence in reviewing the award.

C. The Mendoza Defendants Have Not Shown Error by the
Arbitrator in Excluding Evidence
On appeal, the Mendoza defendants contend the arbitrator
erred in excluding from evidence at the arbitration hearing the
building inspection card with the handwritten annotation “‘OK to
close walls’” and Richmond’s proposed testimony that Chapter 34
did not require a complete code upgrade at the home as a result
of the repairs and alterations. 19 As discussed, because the

transcript or settled statement, a reviewing court must make all
presumptions in favor of the validity of the judgment”]; see also
Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141 [“‘Because [the
appellant] failed to furnish an adequate record of the attorney fee
proceedings, [the appellant’s] claim must be resolved against
[him].’”].)
19 In their opening brief the Mendoza defendants argue only
that they were “‘substantially prejudiced . . . by the refusal of the
arbitrator[] to hear evidence material to the controversy’” under
section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5). Vacation of an award under
section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), “must rest on more than a
simple error in applying the rules of evidence” and is not a “‘back
door . . . through which parties may routinely test the validity of
legal theories of arbitrators.’” (Heimlich v. Shivji, supra,
7 Cal.5th 350, 368.) As discussed, however, the parties stipulated
to enhanced judicial review for legal errors, and we therefore
review the award for error rather than the more deferential

26
Valencias filed a sufficient and timely petition to confirm the
arbitration award, the Mendoza defendants bore the burden “‘to
affirmatively establish the existence of error’” in order to vacate
the award. (Rivera, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 94; Lopes v.
Millsap, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1685.) The Mendoza
defendants failed to meet this burden.

1. Exclusion of the permit inspection card
Under section 2023.030, subdivision (c), “[t]he court may
impose an evidence sanction by an order prohibiting any party
engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing
designated matters in evidence.” “‘“Only two facts are absolutely
prerequisite to imposition of the sanction: (1) there must be a
failure to comply . . . and (2) the failure must be wilful.”’”
(Vallbona v. Springer (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1545; see
Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1214-
1215 [evidence and issue sanctions were properly imposed after
defendant engaged in a pattern of discovery abuse, including
failing to produce responsive documents, concealing evidence in a
document review room, and refusing to provide a witness for
deposition, which collectively had the result of making the
evidence unavailable to the plaintiff before the lapse of the
discovery cutoff]; Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Brown,
Leifer, Slatkin & Berns (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 27, 36 [trial court’s
determination that plaintiff’s noncompliance with discovery was
willful, warranting evidentiary sanctions, was “amply supported”

standard under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5). Although the
Mendoza defendants did not argue legal error until their reply
brief, we decline to find forfeiture because the Valencias
addressed legal error in their respondents’ brief.

27
by a record “replete with instances of plaintiffs’ attempts to . . .
withhold promised items of discovery”].) “‘The power to impose
discovery sanctions is a broad discretion subject to reversal only
for arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical action.’” (Do It Urself
Moving & Storage, at p. 36; accord, Osborne v. Todd Farm Service
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 43, 54 [“The question ‘is not whether the
trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction; rather the
question is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing the sanction it chose.’”]; Williams v. Russ (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1224 [“We review the trial court’s order
[under section 2023.030] under the abuse of discretion standard
and resolve all evidentiary conflicts most favorably to the trial
court’s ruling.”].)
The Valencias submitted with their reply brief in support of
the petition to confirm the arbitration award excerpts of
discovery demands and responses, as well as attorney
correspondence, showing that the permit inspection card was
responsive to their demands. Yet the Mendoza defendants did
not produce the annotated inspection card and averred they had
no further responsive documents. After the conclusion of
discovery, on the evening before the arbitration, Delaplane
produced the annotated inspection card, stating that Mendoza
and his fiancée conducted “another search” that day and “found
[the inspection card] intermixed with other non-relevant
documents.” On the first day of the hearing, the arbitrator
sustained the Valencias’ objection to the admission of the
inspection card.
Although the record does not reflect the grounds on which
the arbitrator excluded the inspection card, we imply a finding
from the order sustaining the objection that the arbitrator found

28
there was sufficient evidence the Mendoza defendants willfully
failed to comply with the discovery requests by withholding the
annotated inspection card that Mendoza previously averred was
not in his possession, warranting exclusion of the inspection card.
(See Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054,
1084 [in reviewing the imposition of a discovery sanction for
abuse of discretion, “‘[w]e view the entire record in the light most
favorable to the court’s ruling, and draw all reasonable inferences
in support of it’”]; see also Cable Connection, supra, 44 Cal.4th at
p. 1362 [“problems with the record” that might present an
obstacle to effective judicial review have “a ready solution in the
familiar rule that the decision under review is presumed correct
on matters where the record is silent”].) On this record, we
cannot say the arbitrator’s exclusion of the inspection card was
an “‘arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical action.’” (Do It Urself
Moving & Storage, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 36; see Vallbona v.
Springer, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1545-1546 [court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding evidence as a discovery sanction
where defendant failed to respond to requests for production,
testified a burglary precluded his compliance, and then produced
some purportedly stolen documents].) Because there was no
abuse of discretion, there was no error warranting vacation of the
award. 20

20 “[A]n abuse of discretion results in reversible error only if it
is prejudicial.” (York v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
1178, 1190.) Because we find no abuse of discretion or other legal
error, we do not reach prejudice.

29
2. Exclusion of Richmond’s testimony regarding
Chapter 34
When an appropriate demand is made for the exchange of
expert witness information, a party is required to disclose the
general substance of the testimony the expert is expected to give
at trial. (§ 2034.260, subd. (c)(2).) The disclosure allows the
opposing party, in taking the expert’s deposition, “to fully explore
the relevant subject area . . . and to select an expert who can
respond with a competing opinion on that subject area.” (Bonds
v. Roy (1999) 20 Cal.4th 140, 146-147; accord, Cottini v. Enloe
Medical Center (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 401, 416.) If a request is
made, a party must “‘“‘disclose the substance of the facts and the
opinions to which the expert will testify, either in his witness
exchange list, or in his deposition, or both.’”’” (Dozier v. Shapiro
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1518-1519; accord, Easterby v.
Clark (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 772, 778; Kennemur, supra,
133 Cal.App.3d at p. 919.) “‘“When an expert is permitted to
testify at trial on a wholly undisclosed subject area, opposing
parties . . . lack a fair opportunity to prepare for cross-
examination or rebuttal.”’” (Dozier, at p. 1519; see Easterby, at
p. 780.) An expert opinion at trial exceeding the scope of
deposition testimony may be excluded “‘if the opposing party has
no notice or expectation that the expert will offer the new
testimony, or if notice of the new testimony comes at a time when
deposing the expert is unreasonably difficult.’” (Dozier, at
pp. 1523-1524; accord, Easterby, at p. 780; see § 2034.300,
subd. (d) [on objection, trial court “shall exclude from evidence
the expert opinion of any witness that is offered by a party who
has unreasonably failed to do any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶]
[m]ake that expert available for deposition”].) “Except to the

30
extent the trial court bases its ruling on a conclusion of law
(which we review de novo), we review its ruling excluding or
admitting expert testimony for abuse of discretion.” (Sargon
Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012)
55 Cal.4th 747, 773; accord, People v. Rouston (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 997, 1010.)
The Valencias submitted excerpts of Richmond’s deposition
in which he testified he had not been asked to give any opinions
besides those topics on which he had been designated and
deposed, which did not include Chapter 34. 21 In response to a
supplemental discovery demand propounded prior to the
arbitration hearing, Delaplane advised Cohen that “our experts
. . . will be reviewing your experts’ deposition transcripts in order
to assess their respective opinions,” but he refused Cohen’s
demand to make Richmond available for further deposition.
Cohen objected under Kennemur, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d 907 after
Delaplane sought to elicit Richmond’s opinions about Chapter 34
at the arbitration hearing.
The parties have not provided a record of the arbitrator’s
findings in sustaining the Valencias’ objection to the testimony,
but, as discussed, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the arbitrator’s order. (Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil Corporation,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084.) In light of the evidence that
Richmond did not disclose that he would testify about the
application of Chapter 34, and the Mendoza defendants’ refusal

21 Although the record does not contain Richmond’s expert
designation, and includes only limited deposition excerpts, the
Mendoza defendants do not contend on appeal that the
application of Chapter 34 was encompassed in the scope of
Richmond’s designation or deposition testimony.

31
to make Richmond available to be deposed on the additional
opinions he intended to provide in response to Nelson’s opinions
(which had been disclosed), the arbitrator did not abuse her
discretion in excluding the testimony. (See Dozier v. Shapiro,
supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524 [trial court did not abuse its
discretion in limiting plaintiff’s expert’s testimony where
plaintiff’s counsel “never informed defendants about [expert’s]
postdeposition change of testimony, and therefore never gave
them the opportunity to request a renewed deposition on that
subject”].)

DISPOSITION

We affirm the September 28, 2022 order confirming the
arbitration award and the judgment. The Valencias are entitled
to recover their costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

32

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