Sorroza v. Express Services CA4/3

CourtListener 9986920Calctapp28.06.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/28/24 Sorroza v. Express Services CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

LUIS IGNACIO SORROZA,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062052

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-01237742)

EXPRESS SERVICES, INC., OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Peter J.
Wilson, Judge. Affirmed.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Morgan P. Forsey, Tyler J. Johnson
and Emily A. Papania; ArentFox Schiff, Morgan P. Forsey and Brett D. Young for
Defendant and Appellant.
Jackson, Armond M. Jackson, Andrea M. Fernandez-Jackson and Anthony
S. Filer for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Express Services, Inc. (Express) appeals from an order: (1)
overruling some of its hearsay objections to plaintiff Luis Ignacio Sorroza’s supplemental
declaration; and (2) denying a motion to compel arbitration of Sorroza’s claims under
Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA; Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.).
Express argues the trial court erred by allowing Sorroza to file a supplemental declaration
because the trial court was required to follow its initial finding in its tentative ruling. It
next challenges the trial court’s order overruling some of its hearsay objections. Lastly,
Express contends the trial court erred by finding Sorroza was a transportation worker
engaged in interstate commerce and was therefore exempt from the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; all undesignated statutory references are to this code).
We affirm. We hold the trial court properly allowed Sorroza to file a
supplemental declaration because it was not bound to its tentative ruling. We find the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling certain hearsay objections. We also
conclude Sorroza was a transportation worker within the ambit of section 1’s exemption
following Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022) 596 U.S. 450 (Saxon).
FACTS
In November 2019, Sorroza began working for Express, a franchisor of
full-service staffing firms, and signed a mutual arbitration agreement (Agreement). The
Agreement provided “all legal disputes and claims between [the parties] shall be
determined exclusively by final and binding arbitration . . . .” “[C]laims” included “all
claims pertaining to Individual’s employment or other relationship with [Express]
(including application for or termination of employment or other relationship) and all
claims for . . . wages, overtime, benefits, or other compensation . . . .” Actions to compel
arbitration were “governed by Section 2 of the [FAA], 9 U.S.C. § 2, and not any state
law.”
After Sorroza signed the Agreement, Express placed Sorroza to work at
Jellco Container, Inc. (Jellco), a manufacturer of corrugated boxes. Sorroza’s duties

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included operating a forklift in Jellco’s shipping and receiving department and the
loading and unloading of trucks that transported goods across state lines to and from
Arizona.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2021, Sorroza filed a putative class action against Express and
Jellco, alleging 10 causes of action for violating various sections of the Labor Code,
Industrial Welfare Commission wage orders, and the Business and Professions Code
section 17200 et seq. In March 2022, Sorroza amended his complaint to add a PAGA
cause of action.
In May 2022, the parties filed a stipulation and proposed order with the trial
court to dismiss the class claims, allow Sorroza to file a second amended complaint, and
stay the action pending the decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596
U.S. 639 (Viking River). The next day, the trial court entered the order.
In August 2022, Express moved to compel arbitration of Sorroza’s
individual PAGA claim and to dismiss Sorroza’s representative PAGA claims under
Viking River. Jellco joined the motion.
In September 2022, Sorroza filed his second amended complaint, alleging
only a single cause of action for violating PAGA. He alleged Express and Jellco were
joint employers. He alleged Express and Jellco failed to: (1) pay minimum wages; (2)
pay overtime wages; (3) provide meal breaks; (4) provide rest periods; (5) maintain
records and provide accurate itemized wage statements; (6) pay all wages following the
termination, resignation, or end of employment; and (7) pay for unreimbursed business
expenses.
Later in September 2022, Sorroza opposed the motion to compel arbitration
of the individual PAGA claim and to dismiss the representative PAGA claims. Of
relevance here, Sorroza argued he belonged to a “‘class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce’” under section 1, citing Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at page 455, and

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thus he was exempt from the FAA’s coverage. In support of his opposition, he supplied a
declaration.
In reply to the opposition, Express argued Sorroza relied on inadmissible
evidence to support his section 1 exemption argument and Sorroza was not a
transportation worker exempt from the FAA’s coverage. Express filed evidentiary
objections to Sorroza’s declaration.
In a tentative ruling, the trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration
of Sorroza’s individual PAGA claim and stayed the representative PAGA claims pending
the completion of the arbitration. It found Sorroza did not present “admissible evidence
that the class of workers of which he is a part was engaged in interstate commerce.”
But Sorroza contested the tentative ruling. In October 2022, the trial court
allowed Sorroza to file a supplemental declaration and continued the hearing on the
motion to compel arbitration.
Sorroza filed a supplemental declaration in support of his opposition to the
motion to compel arbitration. In his supplemental declaration, Sorroza stated in pertinent
part:
“4. I was assigned by [Express] to work inside of [Jellco’s] warehouse
located in Anaheim, California. From my training I learned that Jellco manufactured
corrugated products or ‘[p]ackaging’ for other manufacturers and distributors. My job
duties were to operate a forklift in Jellco’s shipping and receiving department.
“5. During my shifts, I was tasked with operating the forklift to offload
material from logistic trucks. That material was used to manufacture Jellco’s product. I
was also tasked with transferring product from the manufacturing line to the shipping
department, and I would either ‘stage’ the product at the dock to be loaded onto a
logistics truck or I would load the logistic truck myself.

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“6. My [s]hipping supervisor was named ‘Paul’ and my lead was named
‘Miguel.’ Both of these employees were employed at Jellco during my tenure and should
have knowledge of the assigned tasks given to me day to day.
“7. The main product that I recall[] offloading from logistic trucks was
corrugated fiberboard sheets and starch (used to make glue). . . . I have knowledge of this
because I specifically saw logistic trucks with Arizona business labels affixed to the side
of the truck and an Arizona license plate. . . . At times I was given the shipping receipt by
the driver of that truck, that needed to be signed by an authorized receiver, so I would
take it and hand it to personnel in the office. I would see that the slip would inform that
the load came from Phoenix, Arizona. Moreover, when a truck would arrive, I would be
summoned on the radio from my supervisor with a statement ‘Phoenix is here’ or
‘Arizona is here.’ Meaning I needed to stop what I was doing and report to the dock
because the logistic truck from Arizona arrived at the dock.
“8. When I ‘staged’ or loaded product onto logistic trucks I was often told
where the product was traveling to, because that is how we knew to complete and
prioritized our tasks. Some logistic trucks that I loaded were traveling locally to Los
Angeles and Orange County, and some trucks were traveling to customers in other states.
I specifically recall that some of the manufacture product I had personally loaded onto
logistic trucks were in route to customers located in Arizona.”
Express objected to various statements in Sorroza’s supplemental
declaration on several grounds, including hearsay. In response to Sorroza’s supplemental
declaration, Express filed a declaration of Ralph Ramirez. Ramirez stated he was a
“Corrugated Manager of Jellco,” and oversaw corrugated operations and shipping.
Ramirez explained in pertinent part:
“4. Jellco does not own or operate any flatbed trucks, logistics trucks, or
trucks that ship products, in or outside of California. Jellco does not own or operate any

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vehicles that transport any of the products Jellco manufactures to any destinations –
either within or outside of California.
“5. I was one of the individuals who oversaw the work of forklift drivers,
including . . . Sorroza. While Mr. Sorroza did perform forklift duties, his duties were not
limited to that. Rather, Mr. Sorroza also performed other duties around the warehouse,
including shrink wrapping pallets of product, cleaning, and other non-forklift duties. In
addition, in connection with his forklift duties, Mr. Sorroza was not limited to loading
and unloading product from trucks. Mr. Sorroza would have also moved product from
manufacturing machines to other locations within the warehouse, as needed.”
In a November 2022 minute order, the trial court denied the motion to
compel arbitration. It found, because Sorroza was “a person doing the work of loading or
unloading cargo onto or from ‘a vehicle carrying goods in interstate transit,’” he was
exempt from the FAA’s coverage. It also overruled certain hearsay objections to
Sorroza’s declaration. Express timely appealed the order denying the motion to compel
arbitration and overruling those hearsay objections.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT BOUND TO ITS TENTATIVE RULING
Express first argues the trial court erred by permitting Sorroza to file a
supplemental declaration because, in its tentative ruling, the trial court found Sorroza
presented no admissible evidence demonstrating he belonged to a class of workers
engaged in interstate commerce. Express asserts, because of this initial finding, the trial
court was required to grant Express’s motion to compel arbitration. In other words,
Express contends the trial court was required to adhere to its tentative ruling. We
disagree.
“Tentative rulings ‘indicate the way the judge is prepared to decide the
matter based on the information before him or her when the ruling was prepared.’”

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(Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 1245.)
“[A] trial court’s tentative ruling is not binding on the court; the court’s final order
supersedes the tentative ruling. [Citations.] A trial court’s final order on a motion is
‘made a matter of record in order to avoid any uncertainty as to what its action has been.
[Citation.] The record may be made by a written order signed by the judge and filed with
the court [citation] or it may be set forth in detail in the court’s minutes [citations].’”
(Silverado Modjeska Recreation & Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 282, 300.)
Here, the trial court issued a tentative ruling in October 2022. After
Sorroza contested the tentative ruling and the trial court held a hearing, the trial court
continued the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration and permitted Sorroza to file a
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supplemental declaration. Thus, this tentative ruling did not become the trial court’s
final order. The final order was entered in November 2022 following the continued
hearing. As the trial court was under no obligation to abide by its October 2022 tentative
ruling, it did not err by allowing Sorroza to file a supplemental declaration.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY OVERRULED EXPRESS’S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Express next argues the trial court erred by overruling Express’s hearsay
objections to certain statements in Sorroza’s supplemental declaration. Specifically,
Express challenges the following statements on appeal: “[7.] I would see that the slip
would inform that the load came from Phoenix, Arizona. Moreover, when a truck would

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According to the register of actions, the trial court issued a minute order
after the October 2022 hearing. That order is not in the record; the notice of ruling is.
The “notice of ruling is not an order.” (Shpiller v. Harry C’s Redlands (1993) 13
Cal.App.4th 1177, 1179.) “In event of any discrepancy between the two, the order is the
governing document.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before
Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 9:320.4a, p. 9(I)-152.) Because Express does not argue
the notice of ruling is distinguishable from the October 2022 minute order, we infer the
notice of ruling reflects the trial court’s October 2022 minute order.

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arrive, I would be summoned on the radio from my supervisor with a statement ‘Phoenix
is here’ or ‘Arizona is here.’ Meaning I needed to stop what I was doing and report to the
dock because the logistic truck from Arizona arrived at the dock. [¶] 8. When I ‘staged’
or loaded product onto logistic trucks I was often told where the product was traveling to,
because that is how we knew to complete and prioritized our tasks. Some logistic trucks
that I loaded were traveling locally to Los Angeles and Orange County, and some trucks
were traveling to customers in other states.”
Hearsay is “an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter” asserted. (Faigin v. Signature Group Holdings, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 726,
749, citing Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) “Hearsay is inadmissible, unless it comes
under a statutory exception. (E.g., Evid. Code, §§ 1220–1390.)” (Bowser v. Ford Motor
Co. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 587, 610 (Bowser).)
The applicable exception to the hearsay rule here is found in Evidence
Code section 1222, subdivision (a). It provides, “Evidence of a statement offered against
a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: (a) The statement was made by a
person authorized by the party to make a statement or statements for him concerning the
subject matter of the statement . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 1222, subd. (a).) “‘The rule is that
“‘“whatever is said by an agent, either in the making of a contract for his principal, or at
the time, and accompanying the performance of any act, within the scope of his authority,
. . . of the particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, is, in legal effect,
said by his principal, and admissible as evidence . . . . But declarations or admissions by
an agent, of his own authority, and not accompanying the making of a contract, or the
doing of an act, in behalf of his principal, . . . are not binding upon his principal . . . and
are not admissible . . .”’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’” (Bowser, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 612.)
The authorized admission rule “can apply to lower-ranking agents. (E.g.,
Consolidated Management Group, LLC v. Department of Corporations (2008) 162

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Cal.App.4th 598, 604, 614 [salesman was authorized to send out promotional materials];
W. T. Grant Co. v. Superior Court (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 284, 286–287 [manager of one
store in multistore chain was authorized to make statement to subordinate about company
policy]; see also Crawford v. County of Sacramento (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 791, 799–801
[declarant ‘was neither high in the hospital’s hierarchy and therefore its spokesman to
make admissions, nor did the alleged admission concern a matter within the scope of his
agency’ (italics added & omitted)].)” (Bowser, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 613.)
Generally, “‘the determination requires an examination of the nature of the
employee’s usual and customary authority, the nature of the statement in relation to that
authority, and the particular relevance or purpose of the statement.’ [Citation.] [¶] A
statement is ‘admissible as an authorized admission . . . only . . . where a proper
foundation has been laid as to the declarant’s authorization to speak on behalf of the party
against whom the statement is offered. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] The proponent of the
evidence must introduce ‘evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of such authority . . . .’
(Evid. Code, § 1222, subd. (b).)” (Bowser, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 613.)
“‘We review the trial court’s determination as to the admissibility of
evidence, including the application of exceptions to the hearsay rule, for an abuse of
discretion. [Citations.] Under this standard, the trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed,
and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion
in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’” (Bowser, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 610.)
In his supplemental declaration, Sorroza stated his shipping supervisor Paul
and his lead Miguel “should have knowledge of the assigned tasks given to [him] day to
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day.” Under this highly deferential standard of review, that statement—when combined
with Sorroza’s declarations that he was “summoned” by his supervisor to the dock with
2
Paul and Miguel’s last names are not in the record. No disrespect is
intended by using their first names.

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the announcement, “‘Arizona is here,’” and that Sorrozo was informed of the
geographical destinations of the trucks he was loading—was sufficient to show Sorroza’s
supervisor had the customary authority to speak on behalf of Jellco. Together, these
statements also showed the supervisor made the announcement within the scope of the
supervisor’s employment.
Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the statements under the party opponent exception (specifically, the authorized
admission exception). We need not consider Express’s other hearsay arguments,
particularly pertaining to Hart v. Keenan Properties, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 442, because
an appellate court “‘will affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it is correct on any
theory of law applicable to the case, even if for reasons different than those expressly
stated by the trial court.’” (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 369, fn. 9.)
III.
SORROZA WAS EXEMPT FROM THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT’S COVERAGE
We now consider the pivotal question on appeal: whether Sorroza was a
transportation worker engaged in interstate commerce and falls within section 1’s
exemption from the FAA’s coverage. Express argues Sorroza does not. It argues Sorroza
was not a transportation worker because he does not work for a transportation company.
Sorroza contends he was a transportation worker within the ambit of section 1’s
exemption. We agree with Sorroza.
A. Standard of Review
Express argues we should employ the de novo standard of review when
considering a trial court’s order denying a petition to compel arbitration. But “‘“[t]here is
no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order denying a motion to compel
arbitration.”’” (Franco v. Greystone Ridge Condominium (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 221,
227.) If the order rests solely on a decision of law, the de novo standard of review
applies. (Ibid.; Muller v. Roy Miller Freight Lines, LLC (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1056,

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1061 (Muller).) “‘Decisions on issues of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence.’”
(Muller, at p. 1061.)
B. The FAA and Section 1’s Exemption for Transportation Workers
The FAA was enacted in 1925 in “response to hostility of American courts
to the enforcement of arbitration agreements . . . .” (Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
(2001) 532 U.S. 105, 111 (Circuit City).) To effectuate this purpose, the FAA requires
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements. (Ibid.) Section 2, its coverage provision,
applies the FAA to contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . .” (9
U.S.C. § 2.)
Section 1 exempts from its coverage “contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.” (§ 1.) The exemption applies to “only contracts of employment of
transportation workers.” (Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 119.) It covers not only
contracts between employers and employees, but also contracts with independent
contractors. (New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira (2019) 586 U.S. 105, 108, 121.)
In determining whether a worker falls within the catchall category of
section 1’s exemption—“any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce”—we use a two-step analysis. First, we define “the relevant ‘class of workers’
to which” the worker belongs. (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 455.) Second, we consider
whether the class of workers is “actively ‘engaged in transportation’ of . . . goods across
borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.” (Id. at p. 458.)
C. Saxon
In Saxon, a ramp supervisor worked for Southwest Airlines. (Saxon, supra,
596 U.S. at p. 453.) Her work often required loading and unloading “baggage, airmail,
and commercial cargo on and off airplanes that travel across the country.” (Ibid.) The
ramp supervisor brought a putative class action against Southwest for failure to pay
overtime wages, despite having agreed to arbitrate wage disputes individually in her

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employment contract. (Id. at p. 454.) Southwest sought to enforce the arbitration
agreement and, in response, the ramp supervisor argued section 1 exempted her from the
FAA’s coverage. (Ibid.)
The United States Supreme Court held the ramp supervisor belonged “to a
‘class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce’ that is exempted [under
section 1] from the [FAA’s] coverage.” (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 453.) The court
first defined “the relevant ‘class of workers’ to which” the ramp supervisor belonged.
(Id. at p. 455.) Citing dictionaries contemporary with the FAA, the court explained the
focus of this inquiry is on the actual work performed by the class of workers: “[T]he
FAA speaks of ‘“workers,”’ not ‘“employees” or “servants.”’ [Citation.] The word
‘workers’ directs the interpreter’s attention to ‘the performance of work.’ [Citations].]
Further, the word ‘engaged’—meaning ‘[o]ccupied,’ ‘employed,’ or ‘[i]nvolved,’
[citations]—similarly emphasizes the actual work that the members of the class, as a
whole, typically carry out. [The ramp supervisor] is therefore a member of a ‘class of
workers’ based on what she does at Southwest, not what Southwest does generally.” (Id.
at p. 456.) The court found the ramp supervisor belonged “to a class of workers who
physically load and unload cargo on and off airplanes on a frequent basis.” (Ibid., fn.
omitted.)
Saxon next examined whether the “class of airplane cargo loaders is
‘engaged in foreign or interstate commerce’” pursuant to section 1. (Saxon, supra, 596
U.S. at p. 456.) The court, drawing again on dictionaries contemporary with the FAA,
interpreted section 1’s text: “to be ‘engaged’ in something means to be ‘occupied,’
‘employed,’ or ‘involved’ in it. ‘Commerce,’ meanwhile, includes, among other things,
‘the transportation of . . . goods, both by land and by sea.’ [Citations.] Thus, any class of
workers directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders falls
within [section] 1’s exemption.” (Saxon, at p. 457.)

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The court found airplane cargo loaders formed “‘a class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce.’” (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 457, fn. omitted.) It
explained: “We have said that it is ‘too plain to require discussion that the loading or
unloading of an interstate shipment by the employees of a carrier is so closely related to
interstate transportation as to be practically a part of it.’ [Citation.] We think it equally
plain that airline employees who physically load and unload cargo on and off planes
traveling in interstate commerce are, as a practical matter, part of the interstate
transportation of goods.” (Ibid.)
Saxon acknowledged that the Circuit City court held section 1 “exempted
only contracts with transportation workers, rather than all employees, from the FAA,”
without providing “a complete definition of ‘transportation worker.’” (Saxon, supra, 596
U.S. at p. 458, citing Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 119.) Nonetheless, Circuit City
“indicated that any such worker must at least play a direct and ‘necessary role in the free
flow of goods’ across borders. [(Circuit City, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 121.)] Put another
way, transportation workers must be actively ‘engaged in transportation’ of those goods
across borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.” (Saxon, supra, 596
U.S. at p. 458.) The Supreme Court concluded: “Cargo loaders exhibit this central
feature of a transportation worker. . . . [O]ne who loads cargo on a plane bound for
interstate transit is intimately involved with the commerce (e.g., transportation) of that
cargo. ‘[T]here could be no doubt that [interstate] transportation [is] still in progress,’
and that a worker is engaged in that transportation, when she is ‘doing the work of
unloading’ or loading cargo from a vehicle carrying goods in interstate transit.” (Id. at
pp. 458–459.)

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D. Sorroza Falls Within Section 1’s Exemption for Transportation Workers
1. Sorroza Belonged to a Class of Workers Who Load and Unload Goods
On and Off Trucks
We apply Saxon to the present case. “We begin by defining the relevant
‘class of workers’ to which [Sorroza] belongs.” (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 455.) Our
focus is on “‘the performance of work’” and “the actual work that the members of the
class, as a whole, typically carry out.” (Id. at p. 456.) Sorroza operated a “forklift to
offload material from logistic trucks.” He also staged Jellco’s products at the dock to be
loaded onto logistic trucks or loaded the products himself.
At oral argument, Express contended for the first time Sorroza did not
frequently load and unload goods on and off trucks crossing state lines. Before the trial
court, Express presented arguments regarding only the scope of Sorroza’s duties (i.e.,
whether Sorroza was employed to load and unload shipments) rather than the frequency
of certain duties. We generally do not “consider a new contention raised for the first time
at oral argument.” (McMillin Homes Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1056, fn. 7.) Even if we were to consider these
arguments, we would find Express “has not meaningfully contested” forklift drivers like
Sorroza frequently load and unload goods. (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 456.) In his
declaration, Ramirez, a manager at Jellco, did not challenge Sorroza’s duties included
loading and unloading materials. Instead, as the trial court properly found, Ramirez
confirmed Sorroza “did perform forklift duties” and his duties were “not limited to
loading and unloading product from trucks.”
Under the substantial evidence standard of review, “‘[i]f the trial court has
made no findings, the reviewing court will infer all findings necessary to support the
judgment and then examine the record to see if the findings are based on substantial
evidence.’” (Frei v. Davey (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1512.) While the trial court did
not expressly find Sorroza frequently loaded and unloaded goods on and off trucks,

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substantial evidence supports Sorroza did. Therefore, Sorroza belonged to a class of
workers who load and unload goods on and off trucks “on a frequent basis.” (Saxon,
supra, 596 U.S. at p. 456.)
2. Sorroza Belonged to a Class of Workers Engaged in Interstate
Commerce
Next, we consider whether that class of workers “engaged in . . . interstate
commerce” under section 1. Just as the ramp supervisor in Saxon who loaded and
unloaded cargo on and off airplanes flying in interstate commerce, Sorroza loaded and
unloaded goods on and off trucks moving in interstate commerce. (Saxon, supra, 596
U.S. at p. 463.) In his declaration, Sorroza stated “[t]he main product” he unloaded
arrived from Arizona and that he loaded some trucks traveling to Arizona. (Italics
added.) He played “a direct and ‘necessary role in the free flow of goods’ across borders”
and was “actively ‘engaged in transportation’ of those goods.” (Saxon, at p. 458.)
“‘[T]here could be no doubt that [interstate] transportation [is] still in progress,’ and that a
worker is engaged in that transportation, when [the worker] is ‘doing the work of
unloading’ or loading cargo from a vehicle carrying goods in interstate transit.” (Id. at
pp. 458–459; see also Ortiz v. Randstad Inhouse Services., LLC (9th Cir. 2024) 95 F.4th
1152, 1161–1162 [applying Saxon and finding a warehouse worker who processed and
stored packages, but did not load or unload packages from shipping containers, was a
transportation worker].) Therefore, Sorroza was a transportation worker engaged in
interstate commerce.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Sorroza, who loaded and unloaded goods on and off trucks that travel in interstate
commerce, belonged to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”
(§ 1.) Sorroza was exempt from the FAA’s coverage.

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E. Express’s Additional Arguments
Express presents additional arguments that disagree with our analysis.
None is persuasive.
First, in its opening brief, Express argues section 1’s exemption applies
solely to transportation workers employed by a transportation company. It contends
Sorroza did not submit any evidence showing Express or Jellco is a transportation
company in the business of moving goods. Express attempts to distinguish Saxon from
the present case by contending, unlike the ramp supervisor in Saxon who worked for a
transportation company, Sorroza did not work for a transportation company.
This argument ignores Saxon. Saxon does not require determining whether
the transportation worker works for a transportation company. In fact, Saxon rejected
considering the business entity in its analysis of section 1’s exemption. Under Saxon, we
first determine the particular “‘class of workers’” to which the worker belongs, an
analysis that centers on the actual work performed by the class of workers and not on
what the business does generally. (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at pp. 455–456.) Then, we
consider “whether that class of workers is ‘engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.’”
(Id. at p. 455.)
Second, Express argues in its opening and reply briefs the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2022) 49
F.4th 655 (judg. vacated and cause remanded (2024) 601 U.S. 246) should dictate the
outcome here. But, during the pendency of the appeal of the instant matter, the Supreme
Court decided Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (2024) 601 U.S. 246
(Bissonnette), rejecting the Second Circuit’s reasoning. We invited the parties to file
supplemental letter briefs regarding the effect of Bissonnette on the instant matter and
received responsive supplemental briefs from both.
In Bissonnette, the “only question before” the Supreme Court was “whether
a transportation worker must work for a company in the transportation industry to be

16
exempt under [section 1] of the FAA.” (601 U.S. at p. 252.) Two franchisees of Flower
Foods, Inc. picked up baked goods from local warehouses and delivered them to local
shops in designated territories. (Id. at p. 249) They brought a putative class action
against Flower Foods, Inc., despite signing an arbitration agreement. (Id. at p. 250.) The
federal district court compelled arbitration. (Ibid.) The Second Circuit affirmed, holding
these workers were not exempt from the FAA because they worked in the baking industry
rather than the transportation industry. (Id. at p. 251.)
The Supreme Court concluded “[a] transportation worker need not work in
the transportation industry to fall within” section 1’s exemption from the FAA’s coverage.
(Bissonnette, supra, 601 U.S. at p. 256.) It explained Saxon “expressly declined to adopt
an ‘industrywide’ approach . . . .” (Id. at p. 253.) Saxon’s exemption inquiry focused on
the work performed by the class of workers, not on the employer’s industry. (Ibid.)
Bissonnette reiterated section 1’s exemption was “‘narrow’” in scope, covering only
transportation workers who “‘at least play a direct and “necessary role in the free flow of
goods” across borders.’” (Id. at p. 256.)
In its supplemental letter brief, Express argues Bissonnette demonstrates
Sorroza was not a transportation worker exempt from the FAA’s coverage because he did
not frequently load and unload cargo crossing state lines. This argument is identical to
Express’s argument at oral argument (absent the citation to Bissonnette). As discussed
3
above, we reject this argument.

3
We note the Supreme Court stated explicitly it was not addressing
whether the workers in Bissonnette fell within section 1’s exemption. (Bissonnette,
supra, 601 U.S. at pp. 252, fn. 2.) Subsequently, it devoted no attention to whether the
workers performed certain duties that would qualify them as transportation workers, the
issue on which Express focused its entire Bissonnette analysis on in its supplemental
letter brief. Although Bissonnette reiterated Saxon’s definition of a transportation worker,
the only issue in Bissonnette was “whether a transportation worker must work for a
company in the transportation industry to be exempt” from the FAA’s coverage—an issue
Express failed to discuss in its supplemental letter brief, except in a summary of the case.
(Bissonnette, at pp. 252, 256.)

17
Third, Express argues most federal courts have held only workers who are
“‘personally responsible’ for transporting goods” or who “‘oversee the transportation of
goods in the transportation industry itself’” fall within section 1’s exemption, citing,
among other federal district court cases, Veliz v. Cintas Corp. (N.D.Cal., Apr. 5, 2004,
No. C 03-1180 SBA) 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 32208. It asserts this rule remains true even
after Saxon. But Saxon rejected the argument “that only workers who physically move
goods or people across foreign or international boundaries—pilots, ship crews,
locomotive engineers, and the like—are ‘engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.’”
(Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 461.) And, as explained above, Bissonnette rejected
adopting an industrywide approach. Express’s argument therefore fails.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding Sorroza
loaded and unloaded goods on and off trucks moving across state lines to and from
Arizona. Under Saxon, one who loads cargo on or unloads “cargo from a vehicle
carrying goods in interstate transit” is “intimately involved with the commerce (e.g.,
transportation) of that cargo.” (Saxon, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 458.) Therefore, Sorroza
was a transportation worker who falls within section 1’s exemption.

18
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on
appeal.

MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

DELANEY, J.

19

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