In re K.N. CA1/2

CourtListener 9986601Calctapp28.06.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/28/24 In re K.N. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re K.N., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES BUREAU,
A167920
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. J2200562)
N.N. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
N.N., the presumed father of nineteen-month-old K.N., appeals the
disposition order entered after a contested combined jurisdiction/disposition
hearing. While the appeal was pending, father also filed a petition for writ of

1Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code. We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background
because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or should know,
“the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness
of trial court’s decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].)

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mandate challenging the juvenile court’s subsequent order terminating his
reunification services and setting a hearing under section 366.26. In a prior
opinion already issued, we issued a writ directing the juvenile court to order
the return of K.N. to father’s physical custody barring new developments (see
§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1)), or in the event of new developments, to continue the
case to an 18-month review hearing and afford father reasonable
reunification services. (N.N. v. Contra Costa Superior Court (June 27, 2024
A169941) [nonpub. opn.].) We presume the parties’ familiarity with our prior
opinion.
In this appeal, father raises two issues. He challenges the exercise of
jurisdiction over K.N. under section 300, subdivision (j) (sibling abuse), and
argues the juvenile court erred in declining to return K.N. to his physical
custody at the disposition hearing. No reply brief has been filed.2
First, father has not demonstrated the juvenile court erred in asserting
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (j), based on the circumstances of a
pending dependency proceeding involving K.N.’s two older siblings.3 He
contends that because the superior court dismissed the allegations

2 Mother appealed the disposition order too, raises no independent
issues and simply joins in father’s arguments.
3 Section 300, subdivision (j) authorizes jurisdiction where “[t]he child's
sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e),
or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected,
as defined in those subdivisions.” (§ 300, subd. (j), italics added.) It states
that “[t]he court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or
neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the
abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or
guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining
whether there is a substantial risk to the child.” (Ibid.)

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concerning his own current substance abuse, there was no basis to assert
jurisdiction against him under subdivision (j).4
We reject this contention. The fact that father was no longer deemed a
threat to the child because of his own drug abuse is not determinative.
Under subdivision (j), “ ‘[t]he “nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling” is
only one of many factors that the court is to consider in assessing whether the
child is at risk of abuse or neglect in the family home.’ ” (In re I.J. (2013)
56 Cal.4th 766, 774.) It “ ‘allows the court to take into consideration factors
that might not be determinative if the court were adjudicating a petition filed
directly under one of [the other subdivisions listed in it].’ ” (Ibid.) Its “ ‘broad
language . . . clearly indicates that the trial court is to consider the totality of
the circumstances of the child and his or her sibling in determining whether
the child is at substantial risk of harm, within the meaning of any of the
subdivisions enumerated in subdivision (j),’ ” and “ ‘thus accords the trial
court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has
been found to have been abused than the court would have in the absence of
that circumstance.’ ” (Ibid.)
Regardless of whether father had a current substance abuse problem,
mother did. And so here, the Bureau defends the exercise of jurisdiction
under subdivision (j) on the basis of father’s inability at the jurisdictional
stage to appreciate the danger posed by mother’s substance abuse. Father,
who has not filed a reply brief, does not contest that point. And we deem it
sufficient to sustain the court’s jurisdictional findings. There is substantial
evidence that father minimized the dangers posed by mother’s serious

4 We exercise our discretion to decide the merits of this issue despite
its technical mootness (i.e., because the juvenile court properly exercised
jurisdiction over K.N. on alternative grounds due to mother’s circumstances).

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substance abuse: at the jurisdiction hearing, he testified he did not believe
mother had been using methamphetamine during her pregnancy and
continued to dispute the results of the positive toxicology report at the time of
K.N.’s birth confirming her use of methamphetamine. Because of these
circumstances, the juvenile court expressed concern that father was in denial
about mother’s substance abuse. Although the evidence is not overwhelming,
there is substantial evidence that father would not protect K.N. from the
dangers posed by mother (see § 300, subd. (b)(1)(A)), and the juvenile court
did not err in assuming jurisdiction under subdivision (j). (See In re Carlos T.
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 806-807 [affirming jurisdictional findings under
subdivision (j) because “there was evidence from which the juvenile court
could conclude that mother would not protect the children from [sexual]
abuse” by father, despite her participation in individual counseling and
completion of a child sex abuse treatment program].) Father does not argue
otherwise.
Having said that, we agree with father the juvenile court erred by
ordering K.N.’s removal from him at the disposition stage.
A dependent child may not be removed from a parent’s physical custody
unless the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here
is or would be a substantial danger” to the child if returned home “and there
are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be
protected” short of removing the child from parental custody. (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).) On appeal, we review that issue for substantial evidence, taking
into account the heightened, clear and convincing standard of proof. (See
generally Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005 [substantial
evidence review incorporates clear and convincing standard].)

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Here, whatever the dangers posed by father’s minimization of mother’s
drug use during her pregnancy, there is no evidence—much less clear and
convincing evidence—that there were no reasonable means of protecting K.N.
from mother without removing her from father’s custody. (See, e.g., David B.
v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 797 [concluding same]).)
Unlike in the authority cited by the Bureau (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th
195, 215-217), father testified in substance he would do whatever was
necessary to ensure K.N.’s safety if she were returned to him. As we stated
in our prior opinion, he “testified at the combined jurisdiction/disposition
hearing that he would comply with all court orders; would not allow mother
to visit K.N. unsupervised; agreed that parental drug abuse poses a safety
danger to children and would not allow K.N. to be around someone actively
using drugs; could “definitely” recognize the signs of mother’s drug use; and
would not allow her to have any contact with K.N. if she were under the
influence of drugs.” (N.N. v. Superior Court, A169941.) He also testified he
was presently living with mother’s mother who would continue to help him
abide by all rules of visitation. And the social worker testified he told her he
was willing to live apart from mother. We agree with father that the social
worker’s concern that father would not abide by court orders if K.N. were
returned to his custody, and thus would be unable to protect K.N., was purely
speculative.
The Bureau does not meaningfully address the record on this issue.
Instead, it argues there were no reasonable alternative means of protecting
K.N. short of depriving father of custody of her only because “there would be
no way of monitoring Father’s travels with Mother to visit family outside of
Contra Costa County.” That is non-responsive. There was no fool-proof way
of “monitoring” his compliance with any aspect of a court order restricting

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mother’s contact with K.N. (such as restrictions that her visitation be
supervised, or time-limited). The Bureau’s inability to “monitor” a parent at
all times is not clear and convincing evidence that K.N. would be in danger in
father’s custody; such a standard would render it impossible ever to return
any child to parental custody. We are aware of no authority, and the Bureau
cites none, requiring effective round-the-clock surveillance as a condition of a
parent maintaining physical custody of a dependent child. (Cf. David B. v.
Superior Court, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 797 [detriment standard does
not require “an absolute guarantee of safety”].) Assessments of a parent’s
likelihood of defying court orders must depend on concrete evidence from
which a likelihood of future harm or danger can reasonably be inferred, and
here there was none.
The Bureau also faults father for not disclosing to the social worker on
a timely basis he was presently living with mother and on that basis asserts
he cannot be trusted. Father testified about his present living arrangements
at the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing.5 His non-disclosure is not
clear and convincing evidence he would not abide by court orders restricting

5 On direct examination by his counsel, father testified he was
presently living in Antioch with mother’s grandparents, facts that were
already generally disclosed in the disposition report. Asked if he had
provided his address to the social worker, he responded, “I don’t know that I
have or have not yet,” and then gave the address. He testified that if he
reunified with K.N., though, he planned to live with the maternal
grandmother with whom K.N. was presently placed, and the grandmother
was amenable to that plan and also willing to provide childcare support to
him while he worked. On cross-examination, he testified he had been living
with the maternal grandparents in Antioch for about four months since K.N.
was born, and mother was presently living there too. He also testified they
lived together at the home of various maternal relatives when in Madera
County.

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where he would be permitted to live, or with whom, and limiting mother’s
contact with K.N. The Bureau does not assert, and cites no evidence, that
father lied about whether he had been living with mother or deliberately
withheld that information from the Bureau. For example, it does not state
that it had advised him or the court had ordered him to disclose that fact.6
Simply put, the Bureau did not meet its burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that removal was justified under section 361,
subdivision (c), and the juvenile court erred by concluding otherwise.
Accordingly, we reverse the disposition order with instructions to reconsider
the matter based on any new developments that might have transpired while
this appeal was pending. (See, e.g., In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th
522, 531 [reversing dispositional order for out-of-home placement that was
not supported by clear and convincing evidence and remanding for further
proceedings “with consideration of [minor’s] current circumstances”].) Unless
the Bureau proves by clear and convincing evidence that current
circumstances warrant removal from father’s physical custody under
section 361, subdivision (c), the juvenile court shall order the immediate
return of K.N. to his custody, subject to reasonable conditions to facilitate an
orderly transition consistent with her best interest, with any reasonable
orders to ensure her safe return. Such proceedings shall take precedence
over, and potentially render moot, the conduct of a continued review hearing

6 We ourselves note the detention order’s boilerplate language required
both parents only to “keep the court, the agency, and their attorneys advised
of their current addresses . . . and provide written notification of any changes
to their mailing addresses.” It did not require them to disclose with whom
they lived.

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required by the writ of mandate issued by this court in father’s recently
concluded writ proceeding (case number A169941).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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STEWART, P. J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

DESAUTELS, J.

In re K.N. (A167920)

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