People v. Veloz CA4/3

CourtListener 9968903Calctapp27.06.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/27/24 P. v. Veloz CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062593

v. (Super. Ct. No. 05NF0836)

ROGELIO VELOZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
M. Marc Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
A jury convicted defendant Rogelio Veloz of one count of conspiracy to
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commit murder (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187; count 1), two counts of attempted
murder with premeditation and deliberation (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 2 & 3), one
count of street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 5), one count of reckless evasion
(Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 6); and possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021,
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subd. (a); count 7). The jury also found true allegations that counts 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 were
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 182.22, subd. (b)(1)) and defendant
vicariously discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury with regard to counts 1, 2,
and 3 (§ 12022.53, subd. (d), (e)).
The court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of 5 years and a
consecutive indeterminate term of 40 years to life. In 2011, another panel of this court
remanded the matter with directions to modify defendant’s sentence. (People v. Venegas,
et al. (Feb. 15, 2011, G041958) [nonpub. opn.].) The trial court subsequently modified
defendant’s sentence to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole consecutive to 25
years to life plus a determinate term of 5 years.
In March 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under former
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section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). The trial court summarily denied the petition, and
defendant did not appeal that ruling. In December 2022, defendant filed another petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6 asserting he was eligible for relief given recent
authority. The trial court summarily denied defendant’s petition for resentencing.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
2
Section 12021 was repealed and reenacted as section 29800, operative
January 1, 2012. (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 4.) Count 4 concerned a codefendant.
3
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6,
with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).

2
Appointed counsel indicates she has found no arguable issues but requests
we exercise our discretion to independently review the record. Consistent with Anders v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, appointed counsel identified one issue to assist in our
independent review: whether the trial court erred by determining defendant was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Defendant was given the opportunity to file
written argument on his own behalf, but he has not done so. Although defendant has not
filed a supplemental brief, we exercise our discretion to conduct an independent review
of the record and appointed counsel’s brief. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216,
232.)
We have examined the entire record and have not found an arguable issue
on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the postjudgment order.

FACTS
In March 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing and averred:
“1. A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against me that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [Citation.] [¶] 2. I was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or I accepted a plea offer in
lieu of a trial at which I could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.
[Citation.] [¶] 3. I could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”
The court appointed counsel for defendant, received additional briefing
from the prosecution, and summarily denied defendant’s petition for resentencing. In a
statement of decision, the court held defendant was ineligible for relief on count 1
because section 1172.6 does not apply to convictions for conspiracy to commit murder.

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The court also held the jury instructions established defendant was ineligible for relief on
counts 2 and 3 (attempted murder). The court noted the jury was given instructions
pertaining to aiding and abetting liability (CALCRIM Nos. 400, 401), but it did not
receive any instructions on the natural and probable consequences (CALCRIM No. 403).
The court further indicated the jury instructions for murder with malice aforethought
(CALCRIM No. 520) “crossed out all references to implied malice, making it clear that
[defendant] was convicted under a theory of express malice.”
In December 2022, defendant filed another petition for resentencing. In his
petition, defendant argued he was entitled to resentencing pursuant to People v. Strong
(2013) 13 Cal 5th 698 (Strong), which was decided after the trial court denied the initial
petition. He argued he was found guilty of acting as a major participant with reckless
indifference to human life in the attempted murders. He further suggested the jury’s
findings were made prior to People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522.
The court appointed counsel for defendant, received additional briefing
from the prosecution, and conducted a prima facie hearing. At the hearing, defendant’s
counsel conceded Strong “simply does not apply in light of the fact that this was neither a
homicide nor felony murder . . . .”
The court denied defendant’s petition for resentencing. The court explained
Strong did not apply because it involved felony murder unlike the instant case. The court
also noted it had previously issued a statement of decision denying defendant’s prior
petition for resentencing.

DISCUSSION
Relief under section 1172.6 is restricted to those convicted of murder
“under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that

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person’s participation in a crime . . . .” (Id., subd. (a)(1).) Effective January 1, 2022,
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) amended section
1172.6 to expand resentencing eligibility to persons convicted of attempted murder. In
determining whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under section
1172.6, the trial court may rely on the record of conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 970-971.) The record of conviction includes the court’s own documents,
including “the trial evidence, the jury instructions, and closing arguments of counsel.”
(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) As our Supreme Court explained, “The
record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry . . .
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971.)
Here, defendant’s petition lacks merit because he was convicted of
conspiracy to commit murder, which necessarily required the jury to have found an intent
to kill, and the record of conviction established defendant was not convicted of attempted
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory. (People v. Whitson (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 22, 34-35.) The information alleges defendant “did unlawfully and with
malice aforethought attempt to kill” the victims. It further alleges defendant did so
“willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation . . . .” There is no mention of “natural
and probable consequences.” The jury also was never instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. Instead, the jury received instructions pertaining to
aiding and abetting liability (CALCRIM Nos. 400 & 401). The court did not instruct on
aiding and abetting based upon the natural and probable consequences (CALCRIM
Nos. 402 & 403). The jury further received instructions pertaining to murder with malice
aforethought (CALCRIM No. 520), and those instructions state defendant had to act with
express malice. Finally, as noted ante, the jury convicted defendant of conspiracy to
commit murder, which is a specific intent crime requiring the conspirator personally have

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a specific intent to kill. The record accordingly demonstrates defendant is ineligible for
relief.
Defendant’s reliance on Strong is misplaced. As the trial court properly
held, Strong does not apply to the instant case because it concerned felony murder.
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 709-710.) Defendant was not charged with felony
murder or any theory of felony murder. Instead, he was charged and convicted of
attempted murder.

DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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