CourtListener 9885677•People v. Browder CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/26/24 P. v. Browder CA2/8
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B321402
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA481424)
v.
DAITREON THOMAS
BROWDER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Laura F. Priver, Judge. Affirmed in part and
remanded with directions.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
On February 7, 2024, we affirmed Daitreon Browder’s
convictions for murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)),
premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)),
shooting from a motor vehicle (§ 26100, subd. (c)) and shooting at
an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246). We also reversed the true
findings on the section 186.22 gang enhancement allegations and
the section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22) gang-related special
circumstance allegation. We held that the collective engagement
requirement of newly amended section 186.22 required that a
predicate crime be committed with at least one other gang
member, and there was insufficient evidence of the participation
of another gang member in the predicate crimes. There was a
split of authority on this issue at the time, and the People’s
petition for review was granted by the California Supreme Court,
which has now transferred the matter to us with directions to
vacate our decision and to reconsider the cause in light of People
v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743 (Clark). We do so now, and affirm
the judgment of conviction, including the true findings on the
gang enhancement allegations and the gang-related special
circumstance allegation. We remand this matter to permit the
trial court to exercise its discretion under section 1385 concerning
the firearm enhancement.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
BACKGROUND
On September 4, 2019, about 1:10 p.m., Timothy Phillips
began backing his gray car out of the driveway outside his house
on South Harvard Boulevard. James Carter, a passenger in the
car, knocked Phillips’s cigarette out of his hand. Phillips stopped
his car near the curb and bent down to pick up his cigarette.
Phillips heard several gunshots as glass began breaking all
over the car. Phillips noticed that Carter had been shot and
appeared to be unconscious. He drove to a friend’s house and put
Carter into her car. She drove Carter to the hospital. Carter
died from a gunshot wound.
Phillips returned to his home and spoke with police. He
told them he saw a four-door burgundy vehicle with tinted
windows, which looked like a Mitsubishi or a Mazda. It was the
only car on the street. Phillips believed there were two people
inside, and that the shots came from the passenger side of the
vehicle.2 He did not hear anything before the shooting began,
and nobody in the burgundy vehicle said anything to him.
Much of the police investigation focused on video
surveillance footage. Police recovered footage from about
20 locations.
At trial, Detective John Flores testified that surveillance
footage from September 4, 2019, showed appellant Browder and
Levon Tippit driving a 2003 burgundy Toyota which was
registered to appellant. Video surveillance footage from a house
on La Salle Avenue captured a partially obscured view of events
on Harvard Boulevard. The footage showed Phillips walking
2 At trial, Phillips denied that he saw anything.
3
from his front door to his driveway. It then showed Phillips’s
gray car backing out of the driveway and stopping along the curb.
The video showed a white vehicle stop about 20 feet before the
intersection with 89th Street, back up and then move forward
onto 89th Street, going west. About 1:13 p.m., appellant’s
burgundy Toyota appeared next to Phillips’s car, paused for two
to three seconds and then turned right onto 89th Street.
Phillips’s car immediately went south on Harvard Boulevard.
At trial, Inglewood Police Department Detective Samuel
Bailey testified as an expert on gangs, primarily in Inglewood.
One such gang is the Inglewood Family Bloods, which has a
number of cliques, including the 80th Street clique. Detective
Bailey opined that appellant and Tippit were members of the
Inglewood Family Bloods and that appellant belonged to the 80th
Street clique.
The prosecution offered evidence of three predicate
offenses, all committed in 2016 by Inglewood Family Bloods gang
members: an assault by means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury by Maasai Lopez, an attempted murder by Mitchell
Grace, and a first degree murder by Kenny Birdine. As discussed
in more detail below, Detective Bailey provided additional
information about the facts of the offenses.
According to Detective Bailey, the Inglewood Family Bloods
are enemies and rivals of the Neighborhood Crips, including the
Rolling 90’s Neighborhood Crips. The Rolling 90’s claim as their
territory the intersection of 91st Street and Hobart Boulevard,
which is one block from the Harvard Boulevard residence where
the shooting occurred.
4
In response to a hypothetical mirroring of the facts of this
case, Detective Bailey opined that the shooting was committed for
the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a
criminal street gang. He described the benefit as “to establish
and maintain the fearsome reputation I talked about with their
rivals and the neighborhood . . . and law enforcement.” As
discussed in more detail below, Detective Bailey provided
additional testimony that the shooter was targeting a rival gang
in that gang’s territory. The direction and association elements
were satisfied by the fact that two gang members committed the
shooting in concert.
DISCUSSION
A. Lack of Instruction on the New Collective Engagement
Element Was Harmless.
In Clark, the Supreme Court explained that when
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333)
amended section 186.22, subdivisions (e)(1) and (f), the
amendment created what is effectively a new element for the
enhancement, collective engagement by the gang in a pattern of
criminal activity. (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 763.)3 This new
3 Assembly Bill 333 was signed into law in 2021 (see Stats.
2021, ch. 699, § 3) and amended section 186.22 in a number of
ways. As relevant here, amended subdivision (f) of section 186.22
defines the term “criminal street gang” to mean “an ongoing,
organized association or group of three or more persons, . . .
whose members collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a
pattern of criminal gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics
added.) The amended subdivision (e)(1) of section 186.22 in turn
defines “pattern of criminal gang activity,” to mean, in pertinent
5
element “requires a nexus between the individual predicate
offenses and the gang as an organized, collective enterprise.”
(Clark, at p. 749.)
It is undisputed that the jury in this matter was not
instructed on this new element of collective engagement as
described in Clark. In his supplemental brief on remand,
appellant contends this error was not harmless, and so this
matter must be remanded for a new trial on the section 186.22
and section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22), gang enhancement
allegations. We find the error harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th 743, the California Supreme
Court considered what the collective engagement requirement of
amended subdivisions (e) and (f) of section 186.22 means. (Clark,
at p. 749.) The Court held “that collective engagement requires a
nexus between the individual predicate offenses and the gang as
an organized, collective enterprise. This organizational nexus
part, the commission of two offenses enumerated in the statute,
“provided . . . [they] were committed on separate occasions or by
two or more members” of the gang and the offenses provided a
benefit to the gang that is more than reputational. (§ 186.22,
subd. (e)(1), italics added.)
In his opening brief in this matter, appellant noted there
was a split of authority on whether this new definition could
constitutionally be applied to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22),
the gang special circumstance allegation; appellant contended
that it could be, and we agreed. The California Supreme Court
has now held that it is constitutional. (People v. Rojas (2023)
15 Cal.5th 561, 566.)
6
requirement is satisfied by showing a connection between the
predicate offenses and the organizational structure, primary
activities, or common goals and principles of the gang.” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court explained that the collective engagement
requirement “calls for an inquiry not just into how the predicate
offenses benefited the gang, but also how the gang works together
as a gang. It calls for a showing of a connection, or nexus,
between an offense committed by one or more gang members and
the organization as a whole.” (Id. at p. 762.)
The Court elaborated: “This organizational nexus may be
shown by evidence linking the predicate offenses to the gang’s
organizational structure, meaning its manner of governance; its
primary activities; or its common goals and principles. By
reference to these elements of a gang’s affairs and operations, we
do not mean to overstate the degree of formality required. As we
have recognized, some gangs have a ‘ “loose” ’ structure [citation],
while others are ‘highly ordered and disciplined,’ with a ‘well-
defined’ hierarchy [citation]. Similarly, some gangs may have
loosely defined goals and principles, while others may have
clearly defined missions. Given this variability, collective
engagement will be established in different ways.” (Clark, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 762.)
The Supreme Court provided examples of evidence which
could show the requisite collective engagement. As relevant here,
“evidence might show a . . . general, well-understood expectation
that members must engage in certain types of offenses. (E.g.,
People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 528 [189 Cal.Rptr.3d
518, 351 P.3d 1010] [junior members received a general order to
attack rivals to support the gang and earn their status].) In
other cases, collective engagement might be shown by
7
demonstrating that the offenses are reflective of the primary
activities of the gang, or else adhere to a common goal or plan
characteristic of the gang in question. (E.g., People v. Johnson
[(2013)] 57 Cal.4th [250, 256] [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 70, 303 P.3d 379]
[members played different roles in carrying out the gang’s
activities, either selling drugs, patrolling the gang’s territory, or
killing rivals]; People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 16 [275
Cal.Rptr.3d 2, 480 P.3d 550] [a gang’s complex robberies followed
a common plan of targeting similar victims and relying on
members to play specific roles].)” (Clark, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 762.)
The Court described the collective engagement requirement
as a “new” element that applied retroactively and recognized that
then-current instructions did not contain this element. (Clark,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 763.) The Court found that the lack of
instruction on this element could be found to be harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. (Ibid., citing People v. Cooper (2023)
14 Cal.5th 735, 742 (Cooper).) We ask whether, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the error did not contribute to the verdict. (See
Clark, at p. 764.) More specifically, as Cooper explains: “When a
jury instruction has omitted an element of an offense, our task ‘is
to determine “whether the record contains evidence that could
rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted
element.” ’ ” (Cooper, at pp. 742–743.)
Here, we conclude there is no such contrary evidence for
any of the three predicate offenses. At the same time, the
evidence concerning two of the predicate offenses overwhelmingly
established the required organizational nexus. Only two
8
predicate crimes were required.4 Thus, beyond a reasonable
doubt, a properly instructed reasonable jury would have made
the required findings.
The evidence showed that two of the predicate offenses
involved attacks by a member of the Inglewood Family Bloods
gang on an individual believed to be a member of one of the gangs
which together make up the Neighborhood Crips. Inglewood
Family Bloods gang member Maasai Lopez was convicted of an
assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury on a
perceived member of the Crips Rolling 60’s gang and Mitchell
Grace was convicted of the attempted murder of a perceived
member of the Crips Rolling 100’s gang, in Rolling 100’s territory.
Detective Bailey testified that due to the long-standing
rivalry and “on again, off again shooting war” between
Neighborhood Crips and Inglewood Family Bloods, “[t]here’s no
meeting. There’s no written order. There’s no text message,
calls, or emails. It’s understood that if you’re from specifically a
Blood gang from Inglewood, specifically Inglewood Family, and
you have the opportunity to attack one of your rivals, specifically
the Neighborhood Crips, that—that you don’t have to check in
with anybody. You can go out and Nap bash. You’re expected to
do that without receiving some kind of official order from some
hierarchy in the gang. [¶] And let’s make it from the other
direction. If you had opportunity and you didn’t do it, then you’d
be dealt with from inside the gang.”
4 The evidence to support an organizational nexus for the
third predicate offense is less overwhelming. In general,
Detective Bailey’s testimony suggested a possible lack of personal
knowledge of some details of this offense.
9
Detective Bailey’s testimony shows the required
organizational nexus between the predicate crimes and the gang:
the existence of a general understanding that Inglewood Family
Bloods members should attack members of rival Neighborhood
Crips gangs when the opportunity arises. (See Clark, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 762 [collective engagement may be shown by
evidence of a “general, well-understood expectation that members
must engage in certain types of offenses,” such as attacking rivals
or by evidence “demonstrating that the offenses are reflective of
the primary activities of the gang, or else adhere to a common
goal or plan characteristic of the gang in question” such as killing
rivals].)
Given the overwhelming evidence of collective engagement
and the lack of contrary engagement, we conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained.
B. No Instructions on the Amended Requirement for Gang
Benefit Was Harmless.
As respondent acknowledges, because we reversed the gang
allegation findings based on the insufficiency of the evidence of
collective engagement, we did not address appellant’s claim that
he was prejudiced by the absence of an instruction on Assembly
Bill 333’s new requirement that both the predicate offenses and
charged offenses benefitted the gang in a way that was more than
reputational. We address that claim now and find harmless the
absence of such an instruction.
Section 186.22, subdivision (g), now provides: “Examples of
a common benefit that are more than reputational may include,
but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation,
targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or
10
silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (g).)
As the Supreme Court has explained, the requirement that
the benefit to the gang be more than reputational in effect creates
a new element for the enhancement. (People v. Tran (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207.) Thus, “reversal is required unless ‘it
appears beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the jury verdict would
have been the same in the absence of the error.” (Ibid.)
As we have just discussed, the evidence was overwhelming
that the two predicate crimes involved attacks on individuals who
were perceived to be gang rivals. This is one of the statutory
examples of a common benefit that is more than reputational.
Thus, beyond a reasonable doubt the jury finding would have
been the same in the absence of the error.
The evidence is similar for the current offense. There was
overwhelming evidence that appellant targeted a rival gang.
Detective Bailey testified that the offense took place on
September 4, which was a “hood day” for one of the Inglewood
Family Bloods subsets. A hood day was a day of celebration for a
gang. Members of other Inglewood Family Bloods subsets could
show up to the party or put money into the party or “that kind of
stuff” or, if they were not going to show up they could “go hunt
[the] enemy, which is favorable, well-looked upon.” The route
appellant and Tippit took to and from the shooting was a route
Inglewood Family Bloods members commonly took from their
territory to the territory of the Rolling 90’s subset of the
Neighborhood Crips. Phillips and Carter were not gang
members. However, Phillips’s house was in the territory claimed
by the Rolling 90’s subset of the Neighborhood Crips gang. More
specifically, Phillips’s house was about a block from the
11
intersection of 91st Street and Hobart Boulevard, which was a
“common” hangout spot for the Rolling 90’s Crips. There had
been several incidents in this intersection involving Rolling 90’s
gang members, and several shootings in the area. Again, beyond
a reasonable doubt, the jury finding would have been the same in
the absence of the error.
C. Failure to Bifurcate the Section 186.22 Enhancement
Allegations Was Harmless.
Assembly Bill 333 amended the Penal Code to add section
1109, which requires bifurcation of section 186.22 gang
enhancement allegations upon request by the defendant. In his
opening brief in this matter, appellant contended the amendment
applies retroactively to his case and requires a new trial. At the
time, there was a split of appellate authority on the retroactivity
issue, but we found any error would be harmless. The California
Supreme Court has now held that section 1109 does not apply
retroactively. (People v. Burgos (June 3, 2024, S274743)
___ Cal.5th ___ [2024 WL 2808198].)
D. Resentencing is Appropriate for the Firearm Enhancement
in Light of Senate Bill No. 81.
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), enacted in 2021,
amended section 1385 to specify various factors that the trial
court must consider in deciding whether to strike enhancements
in the interests of justice. As relevant here, amended section
1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), provides that when multiple
enhancements have been imposed, all but one “shall” be
dismissed and section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), provides that
when the application of an enhancement could result in a
12
sentence of over 20 years, the enhancement “shall” be dismissed.
(§ 1385, subds. (c)(2)(B), (C).)
Appellant contends these provisions would apply to the
25 years-to-life sentence imposed for the true finding on the
section 12022.53 enhancement. He acknowledges that
notwithstanding the use of the word “shall,” several Courts of
Appeal have held that trial courts maintain discretion to impose
an enhancement if dismissing it would endanger public safety.
(People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 290–293; People v.
Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233 [304 Cal.Rptr.3d 532],
review granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786; People v. Lipscomb (2022)
87 Cal.App.5th 9, 15–21; People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
386 [302 Cal.Rptr.3d 468], review granted Mar. 22, 2023,
S278309.)
Appellant contends that pending further guidance from the
Supreme Court, the matter should be remanded for resentencing
to permit the trial court to consider the factors in amended
section 1385 and exercise its discretion to decide whether to
strike the section 12022.53 enhancement. We agree. (See, e.g.,
People v. Ochoa (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 841, 852–853 [where the
record is at the very least ambiguous as to the whether the trial
court understood and exercised its sentencing discretion, remand
is appropriate].)
13
DISPOSITION
We remand the sentence on the firearm enhancement to
permit the trial court to exercise its discretion under section
1385. The judgment of conviction is affirmed in all other
respects.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
GRIMES, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
14
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