People v. Sutton CA2/8

CourtListener 9832187Calctapp25.06.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/25/24 P. v. Sutton CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B329699

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA157431)
v.

DARIUS SUTTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed.

Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Santoro and J. Michael Lehman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
The superior court denied defendant Darius Sutton’s
motion to suppress evidence. This appeal followed. (Pen. Code,1
§ 1538.5, subd. (m) [defendant may appeal from order denying
motion to suppress evidence despite plea of guilty].) We affirm.
Sutton was charged by information with possession of a
firearm by a felon. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1).) It was also alleged he
had served a prior prison term. After the court denied his motion
to suppress, Sutton pleaded no contest to the charge and
admitted the prior prison term. He was sentenced to the upper
term of three years. Execution of sentence was suspended and
Sutton was placed on probation for a period of two years.
Citing Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21, Sutton contends
that his detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion
that a crime had been or was about to be committed and that he
was involved in that activity.
FACTS
On May 1, 2022, Los Angeles Police Officer Isaiah
Peltekian, a member of the gang enforcement detail, was
patrolling southeastern Los Angeles with two other officers. Los
Angeles Police Officer Delgado was driving and Peltekian was in
the front passenger seat. It was 9:00 p.m. Streetlights and the
police car’s headlights were on.
Peltekian had been a police officer for four and a half years.
He had worked in the area for three and a half years. During
that time, he had responded around 10 times to calls when people
or property had been hit by gunfire.
Sutton was approximately 20 yards away when Peltekian
first saw him. Sutton and two other males were standing in front

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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of 10211 South Vermont. Sutton looked toward the police car,
raised his eyebrows, dropped his mouth, jerked his head
backwards, gave a “surprised, startled look” and grabbed the
right side of his waistband with his right hand. To Peltekian it
looked like Sutton was holding on to something. At this point,
the officers were probably 10 yards from defendant. The property
facing the street had a driveway blocked off between the sidewalk
and the residence by a large, solid six-foot tall, metal gate.
Peltekian testified at the preliminary hearing. He stated
when Sutton grabbed the right side of his waistband, Peltekian
concluded he was in possession of a firearm. This was based on
Peltekian’s training and experience, Sutton’s actions, and prior
shootings and prior firearm arrests that had taken place in the
area. Peltekian stated at the preliminary hearing, “So I was
going to detain him for a weapons investigation.” (Italics added.)
Peltekian intended to detain Sutton as soon as Peltekian got out
of his vehicle.
The officers left the vehicle. As they got out, Peltekian
called out to the three individuals to stop. Peltekian gave the
command because he believed Sutton had a firearm. Peltekian
was questioned at the preliminary hearing as follows: “[District
Attorney]: Okay. So you’re shouting this to the group; right? [¶]
[Peltekian]: My attention was focused on Mr. Sutton. [¶]
“[District Attorney]: I know your attention was focused towards
Mr. Sutton, but your command was just a general ‘stop’; correct?
[¶] [Peltekian]: Correct.” Sutton continued to walk away.
Peltekian was now five feet from Sutton. Sutton’s right
arm went into a tossing motion to his left. Peltekian heard a
metallic object hit the ground. The following testimony was given
at the preliminary hearing, “[District Attorney]: When you hear—

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after seeing the motion and hearing that sound, what is the first
thought that you believed you heard? [¶] [Peltekian]: I believed,
based on my training and experience, that it was a firearm.”
The next question and answer were pivotal: “[District
Attorney]: Did you detain the defendant before you heard that
noise and saw the tossing motion, or afterward? [¶] Peltekian]:
It—I took him into custody after the tossing motion and I heard
it.”
After he had detained Sutton, Peltekian saw a firearm on
the ground. Peltekian then saw a hand come out from
underneath the gate and grab the firearm. Peltekian heard a
loud thud. Another officer climbed the roof of the building to the
south and recovered the firearm. The firearm was in working
condition.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Principles
The issue in this case is whether Sutton’s detention was
justified. Both sides cite Terry v. Ohio, but Terry v. Ohio was a
“stop and frisk” case; there was no “frisk” in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, the constitutional limitation on police action
formulated in Terry v. Ohio applies to this case as well: “[T]he
notions which underlie both the warrant procedure and the
requirement of probable cause remain fully relevant in this
context. In order to assess the reasonableness of [police] conduct
as a general proposition, it is necessary ‘first to focus upon the
governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion
upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private
citizen,’ for there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the

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invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.’ [Citation.]. And
in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.” (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at
pp. 20–21.)
The intrusion in this case was Sutton’s detention. When it
comes to detention or to a “stop”, “circumstances short of probable
cause to make an arrest may justify a police officer stopping and
briefly detaining a person for questioning or other limited
investigation.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 892,
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re
Christopher B. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 455, 460, fn. 2.)
There are limitations on the right of the police to detain or
stop a person. “[T]he courts have concluded that in order to
justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances
known or apparent to the officer must include specific and
articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity
relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur,
and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that
activity. Not only must he subjectively entertain such a
suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him to do so:
the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police
officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his
training and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal
activity and the same involvement by the person in question.
The corollary to this rule, of course, is that an investigative stop
or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is
unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good
faith.” (In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 893, fn. omitted.)

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II. Standard of Review
On review of a motion to suppress evidence made pursuant
to Penal Code section 1538.5, the trial court’s factual findings,
“whether express or implied, must be upheld if they are
supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Lawler (1973)
9 Cal.3d 156, 160; See People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th
494, 505, superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in
People v. Trujillo (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1219, 1223.) The
reasonableness of a search is an issue of law warranting
independent review of the trial court’s conclusions. (Ramos, at
p. 505.) In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation but
consider the totality of the circumstances. (United States v.
Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 8; United States v. Cortez (1981)
449 U.S. 411, 417; see People v. Silveria and Travis (2020)
10 Cal.5th 195, 232.)
III. Analysis
This case satisfies both prongs of the test outlined in In re
Tony C. As discussed below, there was activity relating to crime,
which was discarding what Peltekian had reason to believe was a
gun, and defendant was involved in that activity.
As the officers exited the vehicle, Peltekian called out to the
three individuals to stop. The question is whether this amounted
to a detention.
Peltekian did not think so as evidenced by his preliminary
hearing testimony: “Q: Now, people don’t—and what I mean by
people, the civilians that are out there while you are patrolling,
they don’t have to talk with you if they don’t want to; correct? [¶]
A: Correct. [¶] Q: If they are not under arrest, right? [¶] A: If they
are not detained I would say ‘yes.’ [¶] Q: So, Mr. Sutton turning

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around and walking away was not anything, in and of itself,
wrong that he was doing or illegal, I should say; correct? [¶]
A: Correct.”
Sutton continued to walk away despite the “stop”
command. Peltekian did not think this was wrong or illegal.
This indicates that Peltekian did not intend the “stop” command
to operate as a detention. It was not until the tossing motion
that Peltekian effectuated what he thought was Sutton’s
detention.
The record confirms that the detention did not occur until
after the tossing motion. Thus, the prosecutor asked Peltekian:
“Q: Did you detain the defendant before you heard that noise and
saw the tossing motion, or afterward?” (Italics added.) Peltekian
responded, “I took him into custody after the tossing motion and I
heard it.”
Defendant was evidently free to move about after Peltekian
called out “stop.” Objectively, Sutton could not be considered
detained if, from the officers’ point of view, he was free to move
about and disregard the instructions to stop. It was not until
Sutton attempted to throw away the gun that he was detained.
One should distinguish between factors that led Peltekian
to believe that Sutton was armed, on the one hand, and
Peltekian’s decision to detain Sutton, on the other. A number of
factors, such as Sutton’s startled reaction when he saw the
officers and Sutton grabbing his waistband, led Peltekian to
believe Sutton was armed. While Peltekian intended to detain
Sutton for a weapons investigation based on his initial
observations, he did not do so. The detention, on the other hand,
was based on the additional tossing motion and the metallic
sound when the object hit the ground. In the latter instance,

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Peltekian’s training and experience told him Sutton was
discarding a gun.
Peltekian’s belief that Sutton was attempting to discard a
gun was objectively reasonable. It was based on the officer’s
training and experience. The tossing motion alerted Peltekian to
the circumstance that an activity related to crime was occurring
in that appellant was attempting to discard what Peltekian had
reason to believe was a gun. Sutton’s attempt to divest himself of
an object at the sight of the police was an indication of criminal
activity. It was more indicative of criminal activity than a
bulging pocket (People v. Rosales (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 325, 330)
or reaching inside the jacket (People v. Lee (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d
975, 983), both of which justified the detention in those cases.
IV. People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032 (Flores)
People v. Flores is the most recent decision of the California
Supreme court discussing the legality of a detention. Unlike the
case at bar, the facts in Flores precluded a finding that there was
a reasonable probability that the defendant was engaged in
criminal activity. A comparison of the facts in Flores with the
facts of this case on the issue of reasonable probability of criminal
activity is instructive.
In Flores, our Supreme court noted that a person may
decline to engage in a consensual encounter with the police, as
Sutton did here. However, nervous, evasive behavior, including
expression of shock upon seeing a police officer “may be
particularly noteworthy,” along with presence in an area of
criminal activity. (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th pp. 1043–1044.) But,
given that there are many law-abiding citizens who live and work
in areas where criminal activity is prevalent, presence in an area
of criminal activity is not enough to detain a person. And while

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Flores’s behavior was odd in that he crouched down as if trying to
tie his shoe, a “detention is not satisfied simply because a
person’s behavior is ‘odd’.” (Id. at p. 1045.)
That Flores was in an area known for narcotics did not
justify the detention. “Notably, [the police] did not see Flores
engage in any conduct suggesting he was there to buy or sell
drugs or was otherwise involved in illegal conduct. He did not
see Flores interact with anyone, or retrieve or hide anything.”
(Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1045.) The court held: “[B]efore
an officer can compel compliance with a show of authority,
articulable facts must support a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. In the absence of such facts, the person is
constitutionally protected and empowered to go on his or her
way.” (Id. at p. 1051.)
In the case at bar, there were three facts underlying
Peltekian’s initial opinion that Sutton was armed. They were in
a high crime area where shootings had occurred, and Sutton
expressed shock and clutched his waistband when he saw the
officers. In and of themselves, these facts did not justify a
detention, but Peltekian could certainly take note of them. It was
not until Sutton threw away what Peltekian justifiably believed
was a gun that Sutton was detained. The act of jettisoning the
gun was what brought about the detention.
These facts distinguish this case from Flores. The act of
attempting to hide what he was carrying justified the detention.
V. Sutton’s Other Contentions
Sutton contends that walking back to his property did not
justify his detention. But Sutton was not detained because he
walked back to his property. He was detained because the officer
believed he threw away a firearm. Sutton cites a number of

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sources that have commented adversely on police detentions of
African-American males, which describes Sutton and his
companions. But this was not one of those cases. Peltekian saw
that Sutton and his companions were African American, but he
did not initiate the detention based on that observation.
Next, Sutton contends that the nature of the area did not
justify his detention. Contrary to Sutton’s contention, he was not
detained because there had been shootings in the area or because
this was a “high crime” area. While both of these circumstances
existed, they were not the reason for his detention. Nor was the
detention based on a “Black male in a bad neighborhood” as
Sutton contends. The detention occurred because it appeared to
the officer that Sutton discarded the gun he was carrying.
Sutton concedes that appellant grabbing his waistband
may have given Peltekian the “reasonable suspicion necessary”
for a pat down search if he was “constitutionally detain[ed]” but,
according to Sutton, he was not lawfully detained. We disagree.
The detention was based on Sutton’s act of throwing away his
gun; the detention was lawful. The concession that Sutton
grabbing his waistband would justify a pat down search concedes
a point not at issue since there was no pat down search.
Sutton makes the unlikely argument that he did not
abandon his privacy interest in the gun when he threw it away
on his own property, which means that he “still had a
recognizable privacy interest” in the gun. The point of this
argument is that the gun could not be seized by the police.
Sutton concedes this is a new argument in that “neither of
the two courts nor the prosecutor ever addressed whether
appellant abandoned his Fourth Amendment privacy interest in
the firearm.” That Sutton “still had a recognizable privacy

10
interest” in the gun yields to the reality that he was an ex-felon
in possession of a gun. In any event, as an argument advanced
for the first time on appeal, it is forfeited. (People v. Jones (1998)
17 Cal.4th 279, 299, fn. 1 [“ ‘it would be wholly inappropriate to
reverse a superior court’s judgment for error it did not commit
and that was never called to its attention’ ”].) It is of marginal
interest, therefore, that, as the Attorney General points out, the
gun was recovered from a nearby roof outside appellant’s
property.
Finally, defendant contends the magistrate relied on
decisions that do not apply because all three decisions cited by
the magistrate held that pat-down searches following a detention
were unlawful. These decisions are People v. Pentoja (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 483, King v. State of California (2015)
242 Cal.App.4th 265, and People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th
952. However, the magistrate cited these cases for the general
proposition that officers may act on a reasonable belief that a
person is armed. In this case, Sutton was not detained when
Peltekian first formed the opinion that appellant was armed; he
was detained only after he was seen making the tossing motion.
The magistrate was heading in the right direction in focusing on
the officer’s belief that appellant was armed.

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

WILEY, J.

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