People v. Patterson CA1/2

CourtListener 9774046Calctapp24.06.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/24/24 P. v. Patterson CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A166334
v.
MICHAEL RALEIGH PATTERSON, (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
No. 04002007185)
Defendant and Appellant.

In February 2020 defendant Michael Patterson injured his girlfriend
Jane Doe’s friend A.G. when A.G. attempted to intervene in an incident of
domestic violence involving Patterson and Doe. Charged with various crimes
arising out of this and another incident, Patterson was convicted of them
including, as pertinent here, assault by means likely to produce great bodily
injury, with the jury also finding true the enhancement allegation that the
injuries were inflicted “under circumstances involving domestic violence.”
Patterson contends that substantial evidence does not support application of
the enhancement because he was never in a dating relationship with A.G.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On May 12, 2022, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an
amended information charging Patterson with 10 counts arising out of two

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separate incidents that took place on June 12, 2020 (counts 1–5) and
February 29, 2020 (counts 6–10): infliction of corporal injury upon a spouse
or cohabitant after a prior domestic violence conviction (Pen. Code, § 273.5,
subd. (f)(1))1 (counts 1 & 6), assault by means likely to produce great bodily
injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) (counts 2 & 7), battery with serious bodily injury
(§ 243, subd. (d)) (counts 3 & 8), contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)) (counts
4, 5, & 10), and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)) (count 9). The information
further alleged as an enhancement with respect to counts 1, 2, and 7 that
Patterson committed those offenses “under circumstances involving domestic
violence” within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (e), and also
alleged as an enhancement with respect to counts 3 and 8 that Patterson
personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of those offenses.
At trial Jane Doe and her friend A.G. both testified regarding the
February 29 incident. A.G. was staying temporarily at Doe’s home as Doe
“was scared to be alone” “[b]ecause of all of the . . . incidents with
[Patterson].” At some point that day, Patterson was present in the house and
A.G. went to the bedroom to get dressed so she could accompany Doe and
Patterson on an errand.
While she was in the bedroom, A.G. heard “what sounded like
somebody getting hit” and a sound “like a shriek a little bit.” After she heard
the noises, A.G. came out of the bedroom and “asked [Patterson] what
happened,” and he said “[n]othing.” “[She] looked over at [Doe] and she had a
mark underneath her eye” that “was all reddened.” A.G. then “started
hitting [Patterson] with a stick,” testifying she “felt like [she] was protecting
[Doe].” According to A.G.: “[T]hen a fight broke out between [Patterson] and

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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I. He threw a chair at the coffee table. It was a glass top and broke it, broke
half of it. And then took me down on top of the table when him and I were
fighting. And he hit me in the back of the head twice.” Meanwhile, Doe
grabbed Patterson’s shoulder and tried to pull him off A.G.
A.G. had a taser with her that had fallen on the ground during the
fight. After she was able to get up, she tasered Patterson. Patterson then
went to the kitchen and got a knife. Meanwhile, Doe and A.G. ran out the
front door. About four houses down the block, A.G. realized she was bleeding
from a wide cut on her right leg, and some neighbors called the police.
Patterson fled the scene before police arrived. Doe suffered swelling to her
forehead and scratches on her nose and above her left eyebrow. A.G., who
took an ambulance to the hospital, sustained cuts to both of her legs, one of
which required eight stitches.
In her closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Patterson was
guilty of count 7 based on his February 29 assault on A.G., and that the jury
should find true the enhancement allegation that that assault was committed
“under circumstances involving domestic violence.”
The jury found Patterson guilty as charged on each count and found
true the enhancement allegations.
The trial court sentenced Patterson to an aggregate term of eight years
in prison. The court set the primary count as count 1 and sentenced
Patterson to the midterm of four years plus the middle term of four years on
the section 12022.7, subdivision (e) enhancement. On count 7, the court
imposed the midterm of three years plus a consecutive midterm of four years
on the section 12022.7, subdivision (e) enhancement, to be served
concurrently with the sentence on count 1.

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DISCUSSION
Patterson’s only argument on appeal is that the jury’s true finding on
the section 12022.7, subdivision (e) enhancement with respect to count 7 is
not supported by substantial evidence because he never dated A.G., and
therefore his assault on her did not occur “under circumstances involving
domestic violence.” (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).)
Section 12022.7, subdivision (e) provides: “Any person who personally
inflicts great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence
in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an
additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three,
four, or five years. As used in this subdivision, ‘domestic violence’ has the
meaning provided in subdivision (b) of Section 13700.”2
Patterson’s argument is defeated by the jury instruction on the
enhancement. The jury was instructed—without defense objection—on the
domestic violence enhancement pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3163. Although,
as Patterson notes, that instruction provides that “Domestic violence means
abuse committed against an adult who is a person who dated or is dating the
defendant,” it also provides that “The person who was injured does not have
to be a person with whom the defendant had a relationship.” (CALCRIM
No. 3163.)
As the Attorney General argues, Patterson’s argument is also defeated
by our decision in People v. Truong (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 887 (Truong)—a

2 Section 13700, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part:“ ‘Domestic
violence’ means abuse committed against an adult or a minor who is a
spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person with whom
the suspect has had a child or is having or has had a dating or engagement
relationship.”

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case that Patterson does not even cite much less discuss.3 There, defendant
showed up at the home of his wife, from whom he was separated, at about
3:00 a.m. (Id. at pp. 890–892.) After opening the door so fast that his wife
was pushed into the wall, defendant went into the bedroom and stabbed his
wife’s current boyfriend in the leg. (Id. at pp. 891–892.) And as he left,
defendant shoved his wife’s head into the wall, bruising the right side of her
head and leaving an indentation in the wall. (Id. at p. 892.) A jury found
defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and found the true the
enhancement allegation that the assault was committed under circumstances
involving domestic violence. (Id. at p. 890.)
We rejected defendant’s arguments that the scope of the enhancement
was limited to victims of domestic violence and that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague explaining as follows:
“The language of section 12022.7, subdivision (d)[4], does not limit its
application to injuries inflicted upon the victim or perpetrator of domestic
violence. As the prosecutor argued at trial, this is in contrast to
section 12022.8, which establishes an enhancement for a defendant who
personally inflicts great bodily injury ‘on any victim’ in a violation or
attempted violation of enumerated sexual offense statutes. It is also in
contrast to subdivision (c) of section 12022.7, which describes an
enhancement for a defendant who personally inflicts great bodily injury ‘on a
person who is 70 years of age or older’ in the commission of a felony. These

3 Patterson did not file a reply brief.

4 As Truong noted, the language contained in former section 12022.7,

subdivision (d) is now contained in section 12022.7, subdivision (e). (Truong,
supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 895, fn. 3; Stats. 2000, ch. 919, § 1.)

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statutes demonstrate that the Legislature is capable of limiting the reach of
an enhancement statute quite precisely. . . .
“The Legislature in section 12022.7, subdivision (d), could easily have
limited application of the enhancement to great bodily injury inflicted upon a
‘victim of domestic violence.’ Instead, it chose the broad language ‘under
circumstances involving domestic violence.’ This broadness does not render
the statute either unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous: By its plain
language, section 12022.7, subdivision (d), establishes an enhancement for
any person who inflicts great bodily injury upon a person in the course of an
incident of domestic violence. No person of ordinary intelligence would be left
guessing as to the meaning of this language. Rather, the statute clearly
informs a defendant who commits domestic violence that infliction of great
bodily injury on any person involved in the incident, whether or not a victim
of domestic violence under the definition of section 13700, will result in an
enhanced sentence. It is easy to conjure the circumstances in which the
statute might come into play, such as when the defendant inflicts great bodily
injury upon a friend or relative who has attempted to come to the aid of the
domestic violence victim, or upon a peace officer responding to an incident of
domestic violence.” (Truong, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 899–900.)
The circumstances of this case are precisely those we described in
Truong: A.G., who had been staying with Doe because of Patterson’s history
of domestic violence, heard what sounded like Doe being subjected to
domestic violence and came to the aid of her friend, and was then herself
subjected to great bodily injury at the hands of defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
Richman, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Miller, J.

People v. Patterson (A166334)

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