Chang v. Fire Insurance Exchange CA2/7

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Filed 6/24/24 Chang v. Fire Insurance Exchange CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

WILD CHANG et al., B326896

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC650876)
v.

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE
et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed.
Wild Chang, in pro. per., Kenneth Lo, in pro. per.,
Wild Chang, Jr., in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Woolls Peer Dollinger & Scher, Gregory B. Scher and
H. Douglas Galt for Defendants and Respondents.
________________________
INTRODUCTION

Wild Chang and Kenneth Lo were insured under a policy
issued by defendant Fire Insurance Exchange. They submitted a
claim under the policy, which they alleged was handled in bad
faith. Chang, Lo, and Chang’s son, Wild Chang, Jr. (Chang Jr.),
sued Farmers Insurance Company, Inc. (Farmers), Fire
Insurance Exchange, and agent Stacy Chern for breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, fraud, and other related causes of action. In their
operative third amended complaint, filed in propria persona,
Chang, Lo, and Chang Jr. also sued the law firm of Woolls Peer
Dollinger & Scher (Woolls Peer), alleging it engaged in fraud
while representing other defendants in this consolidated
litigation. The trial court sustained Farmers’ demurrer to the
third amended complaint without leave to amend and entered a
judgment of dismissal in Farmers’ favor, which this court
affirmed on appeal. (See Chang v. Farmers Insurance Company,
Inc. (June 16, 2023, B321411) [nonpub. opn.].) Woolls Peer filed a
special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16, which the trial court granted and this court also affirmed
on appeal. (See Chang v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc.
(June 14, 2023, B317518) [nonpub. opn.].)
While the previous two appeals were pending, the trial
court issued several discovery orders with which Chang and Lo
(the remaining plaintiffs) did not comply. The trial court
subsequently granted a motion for terminating sanctions filed by
Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern (the only remaining
defendants) and entered judgment against Chang and Lo. We
affirm.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs’ Insurance Claim and Consolidated Actions
These consolidated actions arise out of an insurance claim
that plaintiffs submitted for losses caused by a fire in their home
in December 2014. In February 2017, plaintiffs Chang and Lo
filed their original complaint against Farmers, Fire Insurance
Exchange, Stacy Chern Insurance Agency, and Chern.
In August 2017, Chang and Lo filed a second amended
complaint that substituted Farmers Insurance Group of
Companies for Farmers. In January 2018, plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed the action with prejudice as to Farmers Insurance
Group of Companies.
In January 2021, plaintiffs Chang, Lo, and Chang Jr. filed
a second action against Farmers, Fire Insurance Exchange, Stacy
Chern, and Woolls Peer. The actions were consolidated and the
operative third amended complaint deemed filed in July 2021.
In the third amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged causes of
action for fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, breach of contract, unfair business practices, professional
negligence, and emotional distress against all defendants.
Plaintiffs alleged Farmers and Fire Insurance Exchange, acting
in bad faith, made a grossly deficient settlement offer for the
claim plaintiffs submitted for their fire loss. Plaintiffs also
alleged Farmers, Fire Insurance Exchange, and Chern engaged
in a fraudulent scheme to “convert the ‘insurance’” plaintiffs
allegedly purchased from Farmers “into a mere ‘self-owned
membership’ in an unincorporated association, i.e., [Fire
Insurance Exchange] . . . in order to insulate [Farmers] and its
agents from all of the legal liabilities arising from the deceptive
and non-conforming insurance sold to [p]laintiffs.”

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Plaintiffs alleged that Farmers acted as the
“principal/agent” of other defendants, including Fire Insurance
Exchange, and that Fire Insurance Exchange “act[ed] as a ‘veil’”
so that Farmers could limit its liability. Plaintiffs also alleged
Chern acted as an agent of Farmers, not Fire Insurance
Exchange.
Plaintiffs alleged that, after the fire, defendants failed to
properly investigate the damage caused by the fire, failed to
provide temporary housing as required by the policy, and failed to
provide adequate compensation for the claim. Plaintiffs also
alleged defendants threatened to terminate the policy at a time
they knew plaintiffs could not obtain coverage elsewhere.
Defendants took more than a year to complete their investigation
and finally issued a check for the allegedly grossly deficient
amount of $19,925.91, even though estimates for repairs
exceeded $150,000. Plaintiffs alleged the offer to pay $19,925.91
was made in bad faith. Plaintiffs rejected the offer and sued.
Plaintiffs also alleged that stress from the experience
caused Chang to suffer a stroke, the aftermath of which his minor
son, Chang Jr., witnessed.
Plaintiffs alleged defendants’ counsel Woolls Peer
participated in the alleged fraud through actions taken in the
litigation, including by representing Fire Insurance Exchange,
which plaintiffs characterize as a “non-party”; moving to dismiss
Farmers on the ground that Farmers was not the insurer; and
filing various other motions. Plaintiffs alleged that Woolls Peer
made false representations in court filings and in
communications with opposing counsel and that Woolls Peer
failed to conduct sufficient due diligence before agreeing to
represent Farmers and Fire Insurance Exchange. Plaintiffs
alleged Woolls Peer’s litigation activities constituted a “form of
malicious prosecution.”

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Woolls Peer filed a special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP
motion) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, which the
trial court granted in October 2021, and this court affirmed on
appeal. (Chang v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc., supra,
B317518.)
Farmers demurred to the third amended complaint on
numerous grounds, including that Farmers was not a party to the
insurance contract and did not owe plaintiffs any duty. The trial
court sustained Farmers’ demurrer without leave to amend in
October 2021, and entered a judgment of dismissal in Farmers’
favor in May 2022, which this court affirmed on appeal.
(Chang v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc., supra, B321411.)
The trial court also sustained demurrers by Fire Insurance
Exchange and Chern to the fraud and emotional distress causes
of action, including those of Chang Jr. Plaintiffs filed a petition
for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the trial court’s order
sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend, which this
court denied. (Chang v. Superior Court (January 5, 2022,
B317135).) That left Chang and Lo as the only remaining
plaintiffs.
At the time of the motion for terminating sanctions at issue
in this appeal, the remaining defendants were Fire Insurance
Exchange and Chern, and the remaining causes of action were
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of
contract, and unfair business practices against Fire Insurance
Exchange, and professional negligence against Chern.

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B. Relevant Discovery History and Events Leading to the
Terminating Sanctions Against Chang and Lo
1. Written discovery requests, and orders to compel
responses and sanctions
In May and August 2019, defendants served Chang and Lo
each with sets of special interrogatories, requests for production
of documents, and requests for admission. Defendants
propounded additional written discovery requests on Chang and
Lo in May 2020, including form interrogatories, additional sets of
special interrogatories, and additional requests for production.
Chang and Lo did not provide substantive responses nor
did they respond at all to the May and August 2019 discovery
requests. In June 2020, defendants filed motions to compel
responses or supplemental responses to these discovery requests,
with requests for monetary sanctions in conjunction with each
motion.
On October 28, 2020, the trial court granted defendants’
motions to compel further responses to special interrogatories
(Set 2) to Chang, further responses to requests for production
(Set 2) to Chang, responses to special interrogatories (Set 3) each
to Chang and Lo, and responses to requests for production (Set 3)
each to Chang and Lo.1 The trial court ordered plaintiffs to
provide verified responses and supplemental responses within
30 days, and further ordered Chang and Lo to pay sanctions
totaling $2,748 within 60 days. At plaintiffs’ request, the court
extended the deadline to pay the sanctions to March 2021.

1 The court initially stated its intent to grant defendants’
motions to deem admitted requests for admission served on
Chang and Lo, but ultimately denied these motions as moot
because Chang and Lo each filed responses on October 27, 2020.

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Plaintiffs did not comply with the October 28, 2020 order to
provide verified and supplemental responses within 30 days and
instead served objections to the discovery requests in January
2021. Contemporaneously, plaintiffs served their initial
responses to the discovery propounded in May 2020; these
responses were six months late and consisted solely of objections.
Defendants filed several motions to compel responses from
Chang and Lo to the discovery propounded in May 2020 and to
compel supplemental responses to the discovery propounded in
May and August 2019, with requests for monetary sanctions.
The trial court granted these motions in four separate orders.
First, on February 25, 2021, the court ordered Chang and
Lo each to provide verified supplemental responses, without
objections, to form interrogatories (Set 1); it further ordered each
of them to pay sanctions in the amount of $669.65.
Next, on February 26, 2021, the court ordered Chang and
Lo each to provide verified supplemental responses, without
objections, to special interrogatories (Set 4); it further ordered
each of them to pay sanctions in the amount of $479.65.
Third, on March 1, 2021, the court ordered Chang and Lo to
produce responsive documents and provide verified supplemental
responses, without objections, to requests for production of
documents (Set 4); it further ordered each of them to pay
sanctions in the amount of $517.65.
Finally, on March 4, 2021, the court ordered Chang to
produce responsive documents and to provide verified
supplemental responses, without objections, to special
interrogatories (Set 2) and further responses to requests for
production of documents (Set 2); it further ordered Chang to pay
additional sanctions in the amount of $1,301.30. The court

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admonished both plaintiffs that “[f]urther failure to provide code
compliant responses and document production may result in
further sanctions, including exclusion orders.”
One year later, plaintiffs still had not complied with any of
the court’s discovery and sanctions orders.2
In March 2022, Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern moved
for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary
sanctions precluding plaintiffs from introducing at trial evidence
they failed to produce. They also sought monetary sanctions in
the amount of fees and costs incurred to bring the motion.
On April 20, 2022, the court granted defendants’ motion in
part by imposing evidentiary and monetary sanctions against
plaintiffs. The court granted evidentiary sanctions precluding:
(1) evidence that Fire Insurance Exchange or Chern breached
their duties to plaintiffs, (2) evidence of tort damages, and (3)
evidence regarding any work that had been done or needed to be
completed on the property. The court noted that
“[n]otwithstanding the court orders dated February 25, 2021,
February 26, 2021, March 1, 2021, and March 4, 2021 requiring
Plaintiffs to serve supplemental responses to discovery within
30 days, no additional responses have been served, nor have any
sanctions been paid.” The court declined to impose terminating

2 Unrelated to this appeal, in March 2022, the trial court
denied several motions to compel by plaintiffs, and it ordered
plaintiffs to redraft certain of their discovery requests, granted in
part a motion for protective order filed by defendants, and further
ordered plaintiffs to pay $1,030.65 in sanctions for unsuccessfully
opposing the motion for protective order. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 2019.030, subd. (c), 2017.020, subd. (b).). Plaintiffs did not
comply with this order either, but it was not a basis for
defendants’ motion for terminating sanctions.

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sanctions but stated that “it is appropriate to issue evidentiary
sanctions at this time in order to produce Plaintiffs’ compliance
with the discovery rules.” The court also determined “monetary
sanctions are warranted for Plaintiff’s [sic] failure to comply with
the Court’s October 28, 2020, February 25, 2021, February 26,
2021, March 1, 2021, and March 4, 2021 orders,” and ordered
plaintiffs to pay $2,279 for misuse of the discovery process. (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).)
In June 2022, plaintiffs filed several petitions for writ of
mandate seeking to vacate the trial court’s orders of October 28,
2020, February 25, 2021, February 26, 2021, March 1, 2021,
March 4, 2021, March 8, 2022, and April 20, 2022, all of which
this court denied. (Chang v. Superior Court (June 8, 2022,
B320676, B320682, B320683, B320684, B320685, B320686,
B320687.)
2. Attempts to depose Chang and Lo, and further court
orders and sanctions
In March 2022, Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern sought
to depose plaintiffs in advance of trial but Chang and Lo did not
respond to requests for available dates. Defendants noticed
plaintiffs’ depositions for April 6 and 7, offering that defendants
would re-notice them for different dates if plaintiffs provided
alternative deposition dates. Plaintiffs did not respond or appear
for their noticed depositions.
Defendants moved to compel the depositions of Chang and
Lo. Plaintiffs opposed, arguing that defendants “have exhausted
all the legitimate questions” about the fire incident and
“Plaintiffs will not oblige to Defendants’ manipulations designed
to trap Plaintiff Lo” through discovery requests, depositions, and
“wrongful sanctions by the court.” Defendants argued that

9
plaintiffs’ opposition provided no justification for not appearing at
their noticed depositions or for not providing alternative
deposition dates.
On October 14, 2022, the trial court granted the motion to
compel the depositions, ordering Chang to appear remotely for
deposition on October 27 and Lo on November 1; it further
ordered each to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of
$1,466.15.
Chang cancelled his court-ordered October 27 deposition by
email on October 26 stating, “‘I have had a flare-up of my
poststroke medical condition, causing severe numbness and
impairing my already limited ability to speak,’” and asking to
reschedule the deposition to November 7. Given the
November 14 trial date, defendants’ counsel requested an earlier
date; Chang suggested November 4, and defendants’ counsel re-
noticed Chang’s deposition for November 4.
On October 28, plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the trial
court proceedings arguing their then-pending appeals in this
court required an automatic stay. Plaintiffs filed an ex parte
application to advance the hearing on their motion for stay,
which the court denied.
On October 31, plaintiffs notified the defendants that Lo
would not be appearing at his court-ordered deposition on
November 1 because Lo would be appearing at the ex parte
hearing on the application that plaintiffs had just filed.
On November 2, plaintiffs filed an amended motion for
stay, and once again applied ex parte to advance the hearing on
their amended motion for stay, which the court denied “for lack of
good cause.”

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On November 3, plaintiffs notified the defendants that
Chang would not be appearing at his rescheduled deposition on
November 4 because he had “‘not recovered well enough.’”

3. Plaintiffs’ failure to file pretrial documents
Defendants also attempted to confer with plaintiffs about
whether plaintiffs would participate in filing joint pre-trial
documents, as required by local rule, but received no response.3
Defendants thereafter filed their own pre-trial documents.
Plaintiffs filed only an exhibit list.
On November 4, 2022, the trial court ordered that because
plaintiffs had not filed a witness list or jury instructions before
the final status conference, they were precluded from calling any
witnesses at trial, and the trial would be a court trial.

C. The Trial Court Grants Terminating Sanctions
Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern again moved for
terminating sanctions against Chang and Lo. Plaintiffs opposed,
arguing that their rescheduling of depositions was for “medical
and conflicts reasons” and that they had offered to be deposed
November 10 or 11; no orders specified they had to supply
pretrial documents such as jury instructions or witness lists by a

3 Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 3.25(f)(1) provides
in relevant part: “At least five days prior to the final status
conference, counsel must serve and file lists of pre-marked
exhibits to be used at trial (Local Rules 3.151, 3.53, and 3.149),
jury instruction requests, trial witness lists, and a proposed short
statement of the case to be read to the jury panel explaining the
case. Failure to exchange and file these items may result in not
being able to call witnesses, present exhibits at trial, or have a
jury trial.”

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certain date before trial; and, they had complied with discovery
orders “until discovery of fraud” allegedly perpetrated by
Farmers, Wools Peer, Fire Insurance Exchange, and Chern.
Defendants argued in their reply brief that plaintiffs provided no
support for Chang’s claim of medical inability to attend the court-
ordered depositions; plaintiffs suggested the November 10 and 11
dates only after the motion for terminating sanctions was filed;
and the court had issued an order specifying the requisite
pretrial documents and identifying the applicable local rules.
On November 14, 2022, the first day of trial, the trial court
heard argument on the terminating sanctions motion. Plaintiffs
did not appear. The trial court granted the motion for
terminating sanctions and struck the third amended complaint.
The court ruled that “terminating sanctions are warranted here”
due to “Chang and Lo’s failures to answer discovery, to appear for
Court-ordered depositions, and to pay monetary sanctions as
ordered.”
The court found that Chang’s and Lo’s failure to appear for
their depositions was “willful” because: Lo set an ex parte
hearing on the date of his court-ordered deposition; Chang failed
to appear at his rescheduled deposition on a date he suggested;
and Chang failed to provide a medical note attesting to his
medical inability to appear remotely for deposition. The court
also noted that lesser sanctions—in the form of its prior discovery
and sanctions orders—were “ineffective in mandating Chang and
Lo’s compliance with discovery rules.” The court determined the
current violations were “preceded by a history of abuse, and the
Court agrees with Defendants that the evidence shows that less
severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the

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discovery rules.” The court also ordered Chang and Lo to pay
defendants $2,314.15 in monetary sanctions.
The court entered judgment against Chang and Lo and in
favor of Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern on November 30,
2022.
Plaintiffs timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
To enforce discovery obligations and curtail misuse of the
discovery process, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030
provides that courts may impose monetary sanctions, issue
sanctions, evidence sanctions, contempt sanctions, or terminating
sanctions (including by dismissing the offending party’s action or
rendering judgment by default against that party). (See Code
Civ. Proc, § 2023.030, subds. (a)-(e); New Albertsons, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1422
[“Section 2023.030 describes the types of sanctions that a court
may impose, including monetary, issue, evidence, terminating,
and contempt sanctions.”].) “If a monetary sanction is authorized
by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction
unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with
substantial justification or that other circumstances make the
imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030,
subd. (a); accord, Manlin v. Milner (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1004,
1023.) Courts may issue monetary sanctions for misuse of the
discovery process against parties, counsel, or both, in the amount
of “the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by
anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.30,

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subd. (a); see City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 466, 502.) “An issue sanction is an order
that designated facts are deemed established in favor of the party
adversely affected by the misuse of the discovery process, or an
order prohibiting the sanctioned party from supporting or
opposing designated claims or defenses. ([Code Civ. Proc,
§ 2023.030], subd. (b).) An evidence sanction is an order
prohibiting designated matters from being introduced in
evidence. (Id., subd. (c).)” (New Albertsons, Inc., at p. 1422.)
Misuse of the discovery process includes, among other
things, failing to respond or submit to discovery, disobeying a
court order to provide discovery, and making an unmeritorious
objection or evasive response to discovery. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2023.010, subds. (d)-(g); Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390 (Los Defensores).) “Notwithstanding
the outcome of the particular discovery motion,” monetary
sanctions shall also be imposed for failure to confer as required
on a discovery motion, in the amount of the “reasonable expenses,
including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that
conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.020; see Safechuck v. MJJ
Productions, Inc. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 675, 700, fn. 4.) “The
trial court should consider both the conduct being sanctioned and
its effect on the party seeking discovery and, in choosing a
sanction, should ‘“attempt[ ] to tailor the sanction to the harm
caused by the withheld discovery.”’” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors
Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992 (Doppes).)
“The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to
discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending
with the ultimate sanction of termination.” (Doppes, supra,
174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) “If a lesser sanction fails to curb

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misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of
the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions
until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse.” (Ibid.)
“The trial court may order a terminating sanction for discovery
abuse ‘after considering the totality of the circumstances: [the]
conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful; the
detriment to the propounding party; and the number of formal
and informal attempts to obtain the discovery.’” (Los Defensores,
supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.)
“We review a trial court’s decision to impose terminating
sanctions for abuse of discretion, drawing all reasonable
inferences in support of the court’s ruling.” (Karton v. Ari Design
& Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 749.) “‘The
power to impose discovery sanctions is a broad discretion subject
to reversal only for arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical action.’ A
decision to impose the ultimate sanction—a judgment in the
opposing party’s favor—should not be made lightly. ‘But where a
violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the
evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce
compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in
imposing the ultimate sanction.’” (Parker v. Wolters Kluwer
United States, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 285, 297 (Parker).)
“The appellant bears the burden on appeal of
demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing a discovery sanction.” (Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co.
(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1191.) Likewise, on appeal “[t]he
burden of proving ‘substantial justification’ for failing to comply
with a discovery order” is on the losing party. (Doe v. United
States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1435;

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accord, Padron v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York,
Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1246, 1269 (Padron).)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Imposing
Terminating Sanctions
Although it is plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate the trial
court abused its discretion in imposing terminating sanctions (see
Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1191), plaintiffs’ opening brief makes virtually no mention of
the parties’ discovery history; does not address the court’s
numerous discovery and deposition orders; and provides no
discernible argument why the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing terminating sanctions. Plaintiffs also do not challenge
the underlying discovery orders that led to terminating sanctions.
Instead, plaintiffs reargue the merits of this court’s prior two
appeals.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
issuing terminating sanctions because the record reflects
plaintiffs’ repeated willful failure to comply with discovery
requests and several court orders.4 As detailed above, the record
demonstrates that despite the trial court’s orders: plaintiffs
failed to provide responsive or timely written discovery; failed to
appear at their noticed depositions; violated the trial court’s
orders to provide verified responses, supplemental responses,
responsive documents, and other written discovery; violated the

4 Although the trial court based its terminating sanctions
order in part on plaintiffs’ failure to pay monetary sanctions and
to file certain pretrial documents, we do not affirm the trial
court’s order on the basis of plaintiffs’ failure to pay monetary
sanctions or their failure to file pretrial documents.

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court’s orders to submit to deposition; and failed to confer with
opposing counsel regarding discovery requests and deposition
scheduling. (See Los Defensores, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at
p. 390; Parker, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 297.)
The trial court’s orders were appropriately tailored, and it
imposed orders of increasing severity designed to obtain
plaintiffs’ compliance. “If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a
greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the
discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until
the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse.” (Doppes, supra,
174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) When plaintiffs did not comply with
orders directing compliance with discovery obligations, the trial
imposed lesser sanctions in the form of monetary sanctions and
then turned to the greater sanction of three evidentiary
sanctions. These orders of increasing severity, however, did not
appear to change plaintiffs’ unwillingness to cooperate in the
discovery process. Indeed, only the threat of terminating
sanctions appeared to prompt any response from plaintiffs.
Here, “the record is replete with evidence of [plaintiffs’]
failures to answer discovery requests . . . . Time and again, [they]
refused to respond despite the issuance of court orders and
monetary sanctions.” (Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 262, 280 (Mileikowsky).) When the trial court
was considering terminating sanctions, plaintiffs had not
complied with the court’s prior discovery orders and lesser
sanctions had been ineffective to induce plaintiffs to comply with
their discovery obligations. Further, the trial court found this
refusal was willful, a finding plaintiffs do not challenge. The
record before us supports the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs’
noncompliance was willful. Among other things, plaintiffs

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repeatedly failed to provide answers to several discovery requests
despite court orders directing them to respond, Chang
rescheduled his court-ordered deposition and then failed to
appear, and Lo did not appear for a deposition because it
conflicted with a hearing on an ex parte application he set. This
refusal to respond to discovery, to follow discovery orders, or to
appear for depositions over three years of litigation amply
supports the trial court’s imposition of terminating sanctions.
“[T]he sanctioned party’s history as a repeat offender is not only
relevant but also significant, in deciding whether to impose
terminating sanctions.” (Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL
Administrators, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1106.) “The
court was not required to allow this pattern of abuse to continue
ad infinitum.” (Mileikowsky, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 280.)
For the first time on reply, plaintiffs argue that they
“complied with the court order[s], providing all responses without
objection,” until January 2021 when they discovered the alleged
fraudulent conspiracy among the defendants that became the
central focus of their complaint. Thereafter, plaintiffs objected to
discovery requests they believed were designed to trap them into
agreement with fraudulent factual assertions by defendants.
Plaintiffs further argue that “[a]s a matter of fact on the record, it
is Respondents/Defendants that have consistently refused to
respond to all of discovery requests by Appellants/Plaintiffs.”
Plaintiffs have forfeited these arguments because they did
not support them with record citations or legal authority, let
alone explain how their assertions demonstrate the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing terminating sanctions. (See
United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 158 [“‘We will not ordinarily consider issues

18
raised for the first time in a reply brief. . . . Fairness militates
against allowing an appellant to raise an issue for the first time
in a reply brief because consideration of the issue deprives the
respondent of the opportunity to counter the appellant by raising
opposing arguments about the new issue.’”]; Los Angeles Unified
School District v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 480, 497 (Torres) [“‘“to demonstrate error, an
appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent
argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the
record”’”; “failure to supply record citations or a fully developed
argument” forfeits claim of error]; Hernandez v. First Student,
Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 [courts may disregard
conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal
authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant
reached the conclusions he wants court to adopt].)
Plaintiffs present no separate argument regarding the
terminating sanctions order imposing $2,314.15 in monetary
sanctions beyond attacking the order itself. “Because we do not
agree the underlying order was invalid, we affirm the monetary
sanctions assessed.” (Mileikowsky, supra,128 Cal.App.4th at
p. 280.)

C. A Stay of Trial Court Proceedings Was Not Warranted
During the Pendency of the Two Prior Appeals Involving
Different Defendants
Plaintiffs also contend the trial court erred in not
automatically staying all trial court proceedings under Code of
Civil Procedure section 916 while their appeals involving
Farmers and Woolls Peers were pending. Plaintiffs argue that
upon the perfecting of these appeals, the trial court lost subject

19
matter jurisdiction, all proceedings should have been stayed, and
subsequent trial court rulings—including the terminating
sanctions order—were void.
Defects in subject matter jurisdiction “‘“may be raised at
any point in a proceeding, including for the first time on appeal”’
[citation], and may be raised through any available procedural
vehicle.” (Corrales v. California Gambling Control Com. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 286, 300.) We review de novo whether a ruling is
void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See LAOSD Asbestos
Cases (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 862, 871.)
Generally, “‘the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in
the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon
the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including
enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may
proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not
affected by the judgment or order.’” (Varian Medical Systems,
Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189 (Varian); Code Civ.
Proc, § 916, subd. (a).) A stay pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 916 divests the trial court of subject matter
jurisdiction over the affected matters. (See Varian, at p. 198.)
But “the automatic stay does not suspend trial court proceedings
on the remaining components of the litigation, for example,
claims against other parties[,] . . . not resolved by the judgment
or order under appeal.” (Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 564, 580, fn. 11 (Hedwall).)
To determine if a proceeding is “embraced in” or “affected
by” an appeal, we “consider the appeal and its possible outcomes
in relation to the proceeding and its possible results.” (Varian,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 189; see Elsea v. Saberi (1992)
4 Cal.App.4th 625, 629 [“[W]hether a matter is ‘embraced’ in or

20
‘affected’ by a judgment within the meaning of section 916
depends upon whether postjudgment trial court proceedings on
the particular matter would have any impact on the
‘effectiveness’ of the appeal. If so, the proceedings are stayed; if
not, the proceedings are permitted.”].) The purpose of an
automatic stay is to preserve the appellate court’s jurisdiction
and “‘prevent[] the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by
altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting other
proceedings that may affect it.’” (Varian, at p. 189; accord,
Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 35, 51.)
The prior pending appeals dealt only with Woolls Peer and
Farmers. By contrast, the proceedings before the trial court here
dealt with the remaining causes of action against Fire Insurance
Exchange and Chern, constituting “claims against other
parties[,] . . . not resolved by the judgment or order under
appeal.” (Hedwall, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 580, fn. 11.) Trial
court proceedings involving Fire Insurance Exchange and Chern
would not have any impact on the appeals involving Woolls Peer
and Farmers and thus did not “embrace” the issues presented in
those appeals or necessitate a stay. Accordingly, the trial court
had jurisdiction to issue the discovery orders and the terminating
sanctions.5

5 We deny plaintiffs’ “request that any of the justices or
judges that have adjudicated on the other two appeals (B317518
and B321411) be recused from this appeal and from any
discussion with the justices and judges to be assigned to this
appeal,” in order “[t]o avoid . . . any potential, predisposition or
bias that is unfair and prejudicial to this appeal.” A party’s
“subjective, unilateral perception of bias” is not a recognized
ground for disqualification. (Haas v. County of San Bernardino

21
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed, and the order granting
terminating sanctions is also affirmed. Fire Insurance Exchange
and Chern are entitled to recover their costs on appeal.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.

(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017, 1034.) And to the extent plaintiffs’
request is based on rulings against them, it has long been the law
that “rulings against a litigant . . . do not [support] a charge of
bias and prejudice.” (Dietrich v. Litton Industries, Inc. (1970)
12 Cal.App.3d 704, 719.)

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