People v. Spikes CA1/2

CourtListener 9716511Calctapp21.06.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/21/24 P. v. Spikes CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169346
v.
DEMOND ANTHONY SPIKES, (San Mateo County Super. Ct.
No. SC082799A)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Demond Spikes appeals from the summary denial of his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code former section 1170.95, now
section 1172.6.1 His counsel filed a brief asking us to follow the procedures
set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and
defendant filed a supplemental brief. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Underlying Crimes and Convictions
As our prior opinion on direct appeal summarized the facts and
procedural history:

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered to section 1172.6.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Although defendant filed his petition under former
section 1170.95, we cite to section 1172.6 for consistency’s sake.

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“In the early morning hours of April 13, 2014, defendant Demond
Spikes escorted Brigid Palmer to the home of Marcus Brackinridge, where
Palmer engaged in an act of prostitution with Marcus. After Palmer texted
defendant that she was having trouble with Marcus, defendant—Palmer’s
pimp—went into the Brackinridges’ yard, where he encountered Marcus.
Defendant pulled out a gun and, after a brief tussle, killed Marcus with two
shots, also shooting Marcus’s mother [Sandra Alexander], who had awakened
and witnessed the murder of her son from inside the family home.” (People v.
Spikes (June 21, 2019, A148920 & A149766) [nonpub. opn.] (Spikes), p. 1.)
“On February 24, 2015, the San Mateo County District Attorney filed
an information charging defendant with four felonies: the murder of Marcus
Brackinridge (§ 187); the deliberate and premeditated attempted murder of
Sandra Alexander (§§ 187, 189, 664); shooting at an inhabited dwelling
(§ 246); and felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The
information also alleged that defendant discharged a firearm causing death
or great bodily injury in counts one through three (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), had
suffered one prior juvenile robbery adjudication (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), and
had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
“Defendant was tried before a jury in May and June 2016. On June 9,
the jury found him guilty of first degree murder, shooting at an inhabited
dwelling, and unlawful possession of a firearm, and not guilty of attempted
murder. It found true the firearm enhancement allegations as to the murder
and shooting at an inhabited dwelling charges.
“Following a bench trial on defendant’s priors, the trial court found true
the prior robbery and one of the prior prison term allegations.
“On July 20, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 124 years
to life in state prison, which included 25 years to life for each of the section

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12022.53 enhancements.” (Spikes, supra, A148920 & A149766, p. 10, fn.
omitted.)
Defendant appealed, and in 2019 we affirmed the judgment of
conviction. (Spikes, supra, A148920 & A149766, p. 38.)
The Petition for Resentencing
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
amended sections 188 and 189 to “eliminate[ ] natural and probable
consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and
limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule.” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis), citing §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e), as
amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2, 3.) Senate Bill No. 1437 also added
what is now section 1172.6, which provides a procedure for persons convicted
of felony murder, or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, to seek retroactive relief under amended sections 188 and 189, as
amended effective January 1, 2019. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
708 (Strong).) That procedure now extends to those convicted under any
“other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see Stats. 2021,
ch. 551, § 2.)
On January 25, 2023, defendant filed a form petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. His petition alleged: (1) he was charged under a
theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime; (2) he was
convicted of murder following a trial; and (3) he could not now be convicted of
murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1,

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2019. He also requested that counsel be appointed to represent him in
connection with his petition.
On February 22, the People filed opposition to the petition. In support,
they relied on, and requested judicial notice of, the information, the signed
verdict forms, the abstract of judgment, the jury instructions, and our prior
opinion on direct appeal. On May 26, defendant—now represented by
counsel—filed a reply.
On September 28, the trial court held a hearing on the petition. After
the trial court granted the People’s request for judicial notice, the parties
presented argument. Counsel for both parties indicated that despite recent
amendments to section 1172.6 providing that “the court may . . . consider the
procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion” (§
1172.6, subd. (d)(3)), they wished the court to consider our prior opinion on
direct appeal “in its entirety,” “[i]ncluding the analysis and the factual
recitation.” Following argument, the trial court found that even without
considering our prior opinion, the record of conviction definitively refuted
defendant’s allegations in the petition, relying on the facts that defendant
was convicted of first-degree, premeditated and deliberate murder, with the
jury finding true a personal use of a firearm allegation (§ 12022.53, subd. (d))
and that there were no jury instructions permitting the defendant to be
convicted on a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. The court also concluded that the jury’s
guilty verdict on count 3 demonstrated that he was the shooter of Marcus
Brackenridge in connection with count 1, because, according to certain
testimony summarized in our prior opinion, “[i]t was the same person
shooting Marcus Brackenridge who then turned and shot at [Sandra
Alexander],” and “those two offenses happened simultaneously without

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interruption.” The trial court accordingly concluded that defendant had
failed to make a prima facie showing that he was entitled to relief and denied
the petition.
Defendant appealed, and this court appointed counsel to represent him.
DISCUSSION
As noted, appellate counsel filed a brief asking us to follow the
procedures set forth in Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. Where, as here,
counsel finds no arguable issues in an appeal from the denial of a
section 1172.6 petition, we are not required, but may exercise our discretion,
to conduct an independent review of the record in the manner prescribed in
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. (See Delgadillo, at pp. 226–231.) We
give the defendant the opportunity to file his or her own supplemental brief
and we then evaluate any specific arguments raised. (Id. at pp. 231–232.)
In compliance with Delgadillo, defendant was notified of his right to file
a supplemental brief, and he has done so, filing a seven page brief that makes
five brief arguments: (1) that there was not sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s finding that he was the perpetrator because “some [of] the material
facts were disputed at trial . . . due to Brigid Palmer’s, unavailability to stand
trial or testify,” (2) that “the evidence clearly established, imperfect self-
defense- in defense of another, and sufficient provocation” so as to “mitigate
malice 1st degree murder,” (3) that certain evidence at trial was “adduced by
impermiss[i]ble use of hearsay within hearsay,” (4) that the trial court erred
in refusing to instruct the jury on aiding and abetting, “where evidence
adduced at trial established that witnessed [sic] positively identified a third
party, engaged in a physical altercation with the victim, only seconds before
the shooting,” and (5) that defendant has filed a habeas corpus petition in the
Northern District of California, alleging that he has evidence of his actual

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innocence in the form of an alibi witness named Jonathan Green.2 In short,
defendant challenges certain of the jury’s findings and alleges error at his
trial, but he does not raise any claims that pertain to the order from which he
appeals: the order denying his section 1172.6 petition. To the extent
defendant challenges various aspects of his trial, a section 1172.6 petition, or
an appeal from the denial of such a petition, is not the appropriate vehicle for
such challenges; those issues should have been raised in his direct appeal.
(See People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [section 1172.6 “does not
afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings”]; see also People
v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865 [“Section 1172.6 does not create a
right to a second appeal, and [defendant] cannot use it to resurrect a claim
that should have been raised in his [earlier] direct appeal”].)
Because the issues that defendant raises in his supplemental brief have
no bearing on the very narrow scope of a section 1172.6 petition, they are not
properly before us, and we do not consider them.
Although defendant’s supplemental brief does not address the trial
court’s order denying his section 1172.6 petition, and although we are not
required to do so, we have exercised our discretion to independently review
the record as to the petition and found no arguable issues. (Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 221–222, 232.)
Where, as here, “the trial court receives a [section 1172.6] petition
containing the necessary declaration and other required information, the
court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has
made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition and record in

2 Defendant’s brief attaches as an exhibit a portion of his habeas corpus

petition.

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the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the
trial court may dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
In assessing whether a prima facie showing is made, the trial court
may rely on the record of conviction, which “allow[s] the court to distinguish
petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) That record includes the jury instructions and
verdict forms from the petitioner’s jury trial. (See People v. Flores (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170; People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055.)
While the court may look at the record of conviction, it does not engage in
factfinding; instead, it accepts the petition’s factual allegations as true and
preliminarily assess whether, if proven, they would entitle the petitioner to
relief. (Lewis, at pp. 971, 972.) Nevertheless, if the record of conviction
establishes facts conclusively refuting the petition’s allegations, “ ‘then “the
court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971.)
Here, the record of conviction, which includes the jury instructions and
verdict forms, conclusively demonstrates defendant is ineligible for relief.
The jury found defendant guilty of the first-degree murder of Marcus
Brackenridge with premeditation and deliberation, and in connection with
that count, found true the allegation that he personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. Before doing so, it
was instructed that it could find defendant guilty of first degree murder only
if it found that he “acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.”
This remains a valid theory of liability under the current murder statutes.
(See § 189, subd. (a).) There is no indication that the People advanced a
theory of, or that the trial court instructed the jury on, aiding and abetting,
felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or imputed

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malice.3 Thus, the record establishes that defendant was not and could not
have been convicted under a now-invalid theory of murder, and he is
therefore ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. For
these reasons, the trial court correctly denied his petition at the prima facie
stage. (See People v. Soto, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 1059 [absence of jury
instructions on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine justifies summary denial of petition]; accord, People v. Daniel (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677.)
In short, our independent review of the record discloses no arguable
issues.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

3 Although the jury was instructed regarding malice murder under

CALCRIM No. 520, which uses the words “natural and probable
consequences” in defining implied malice, implied malice and the natural and
probable consequences theory are legally distinct concepts. “Whereas implied
malice is based on ‘the “natural and probable consequences” of a defendant’s
own act,’ the natural and probable consequences doctrine was ‘a theory of
vicarious liability under which “[a]n aider and abettor [was] guilty not only of
the intended, or target, crime but also of any other crime a principal in the
target crime actually commit[ted] (the nontarget crime).’ ” (People v. Rivera
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 231–232.) Senate Bill No. 1437 “ ‘abolished the
natural and probable consequences doctrine’ as a theory of vicarious liability,
[but] ‘it maintained the viability of murder convictions based on implied
malice, and the definition of implied malice remains unchanged.’ ” (People v.
Rivera, at p. 232.)

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_________________________
Richman, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Stewart, P. J.

_________________________
Desautels, J.

People v. Spikes (A169346)

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