Hardell v. Vanzyl

CourtListener 9620111Calctapp20.06.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/20/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

CAILIN HARDELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A168113
v.
ADRIAN VANZYL, (City & County of San Francisco
Defendant and Respondent. Super. Ct. No. CGC22602112)

Cailin Hardell appeals from the trial court’s order granting Adrian
Vanzyl’s motion to quash. Hardell sued Vanzyl, along with Waleed Mohsen
and Blumberg Capital, for sexual assault and battery, sexual harassment,
and retaliation, among other claims, relating to an incident in Miami, Florida
in March 2022. Vanzyl moved to quash service of summons of the first
amended complaint, arguing that, as a non-resident defendant, he had
insufficient contacts with California for the trial court to exercise either
specific or general personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court agreed, and
also denied Hardell’s request to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
On appeal, Hardell argues that the trial court erred in finding that
Vanzyl was not domiciled or continuously and systematically present in
California in March 2022, and otherwise that Vanzyl had insufficient suit-
related contacts with California. She also argues that the court should have
granted her request for jurisdictional discovery. We conclude that the
connection between Hardell’s claims against Vanzyl and his contacts with
California is too attenuated to support specific jurisdiction. We also conclude,
1
however, that the trial court erred in failing to consider whether it could
exercise general jurisdiction over Vanzyl notwithstanding its finding that he
was not domiciled in California in March 2022, and that it abused its
discretion in denying Hardell’s request for discovery. On remand, Hardell
must be allowed to conduct limited discovery addressing whether the trial
court may exercise general jurisdiction over Vanzyl.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual History
In 2019, Hardell founded Segmed, Inc., a medical data company, with
three other Stanford alumni. Hardell became Segmed’s CEO and worked and
resided in California until roughly March 2020, when she traveled to
Colorado and remained as a resident.
Vanzyl was a Blumberg senior director. Blumberg is a venture capital
firm that invests in privately held portfolio companies, and Mohsen was and
is the CEO of two companies in which Blumberg invested. Blumberg and
Segmed are headquartered in California and both companies operate from
California.
In October 2020, Blumberg invested in Segmed. Pursuant to the
investment agreement, Blumberg appointed Vanzyl to Segmed’s board of
directors. Starting in summer 2021, Vanzyl directed Hardell to raise more
funds for Segmed. He also assisted Hardell in her fundraising efforts,
including with respect to a particular venture capital firm, dubbed
“VC Firm A” in Hardell’s complaint. In January 2022, Vanzyl took Hardell to
lunch in San Francisco, where he explained that “he was essential to
Hardell’s and Segmed’s continued success,” and that if Blumberg expressed
support for Segmed, other investors were more likely to invest in the
company. In February 2022, Hardell met with representatives from

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VC Firm A, who tentatively suggested a large investment, subject to further
discussion with Vanzyl.
From March 6 to 9, 2022, Hardell attended a business conference in
Miami, Florida as part of her fundraising efforts for Segmed. Hardell alleges
that, while there, she attended a March 8 dinner with Vanzyl, Mohsen, and
the CEO of another Blumberg portfolio company. At the dinner, Vanzyl and
Mohsen encouraged her to drink alcohol. The two men then accompanied
her, uninvited, to a second event where she met with potential investors.
They again served her alcohol. Afterward, they purchased more alcohol at a
liquor store, and Hardell alleges that Vanzyl directed them to the beach.
“Hardell protested, asking about Vanzyl’s wife and kids.” Nevertheless, they
proceeded to the beach, drinking on the way. Vanzyl and Mohsen went
skinny-dipping. Hardell also swam but kept her undergarments on.
Back on shore, Vanzyl and Mohsen encouraged Hardell to drink more.
The three discussed work. Vanzyl had previously expressed support for
VC Firm A’s investment in Segmed, but on the beach he became
“purposefully non-committal.” He steered the conversation to the topic of sex.
He asked Hardell about her sex life. He then told her he loved her and kissed
her.
Vanzyl performed oral sex on Hardell and encouraged Mohsen to do the
same. They continued even though she repeatedly told them to stop. Hardell
then got dressed and the three went to a bar, where Mohsen asked his
roommate to vacate their hotel room. Hardell protested and explained that
she was scared of Vanzyl and Mohsen due to the power dynamic at play.
Vanzyl responded with “a ‘safe word.’ ” The men handed her two shots of
tequila and told her to drink them and then “took Hardell to Mohsen’s hotel
room and continued the assault.”

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At 5:30 a.m. on March 9, Vanzyl told Hardell “he had to get home to his
wife.” Hardell walked to her hotel room and called a rape hotline. A medical
examination revealed that she had suffered physical injuries. Hardell also
experienced severe emotional distress and was not able to return to work as
Segmed’s CEO. After she reported the incident, Hardell alleged, Blumberg
retaliated against her, causing her eventually to relinquish her role in the
promising startup that she had co-founded and directed.
II. The Lawsuit and Motion to Quash
Hardell sued Vanzyl, Mohsen, and Blumberg on September 30, 2022,
asserting claims of retaliation, unlawful conduct under Government Code
section 12964.5, sexual assault and battery, gender violence, harassment,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She named Vanzyl as a
defendant on the latter four claims.
Vanzyl lived in Australia when Hardell filed suit. She served him with
the summons and complaint on March 25, 2023. He moved to quash service,
arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. He averred
in his declaration in support of the motion that he was not a California
resident in March 2022, having permanently relocated from California to
Florida in February 2022. When he moved to Florida, and then to Australia,
he “had no intention of moving back to California to either live or work.” He
sold his house in California and purchased one in Miami, where his daughter
was enrolled in a new school. His paystubs identified Florida as his residence
for tax purposes in the latter half of February 2022. Vanzyl denied that he
owned real property in Tahoe, California, and stated that he did not have any
interaction with Hardell in California after moving to Florida. He worked for
Blumberg in Florida, not California, in March 2022, and he did not operate
any business in California in March 2022. Vanzyl asserted that he did not

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direct Hardell to attend the conference in Florida, but that she emailed him
and asked about it. He also denied directing Hardell to attend the
March 8 dinner and attached email correspondence showing that Mohsen
invited Vanzyl and Hardell to the dinner. At the time of the invitation,
Vanzyl averred, he “had already moved to, and was working in, Florida.”
Vanzyl’s realtor also submitted a declaration. The realtor helped
Vanzyl search for a home in late 2021 and early 2022. The sale of the Florida
home closed in February 2022. During her “regular” visits in February and
March 2022, she “observed that both Mr. Vanzyl and his wife had moved
their belongings into the house, had decorated the house, and appeared to be
fully moved into and living in the house.”
In opposition to the motion to quash, Hardell argued that Vanzyl’s
declaration was not credible. She provided evidence to rebut his claims of
domicile, including that court filings in another case referenced a “Vanzyl
family vacation home” in Tahoe, California. While interacting remotely,
Hardell had observed Vanzyl work from his study in the Tahoe home. Vanzyl
told Hardell in January 2022 that the Tahoe home was his “home base,” the
place to which “he and his family would consistently return,” and the place
where the family kept their important belongings. Mail addressed to Vanzyl
was forwarded or sent directly to the Tahoe home. In 2021, Vanzyl’s son
worked remotely as a Segmed intern from the Tahoe home. In filings in the
trial court, Vanzyl stated that his parents owned the Tahoe home.
After Hardell moved to Colorado in March 2020, she communicated
with Segmed employees and directors in California and at times worked from
California. In January 2022, Hardell and Vanzyl communicated by chat
about matters related to Segmed while both were in California. At a lunch in

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San Francisco the same month, Vanzyl told Hardell he was leaving
San Francisco for Miami.
A private investigator working for Hardell also submitted a
declaration. According to the declaration, Vanzyl owned and operated at
least one California business, Target Velocity Companies LLC (Target
Velocity), in 2020 and 2021. The California Secretary of State’s business
database showed in 2023 that Vanzyl was Target Velocity’s agent for service
of process, with a San Francisco address. According to Blumberg’s discovery
responses, Vanzyl’s contact email, which appeared active, had
“@targetvelocity.com” as a domain name and in 2023 Vanzyl answered a
telephone call to a number with a San Francisco area code attributed to
Target Velocity. In 2022 and 2023, Vanzyl also represented himself on
LinkedIn and Twitter as a San Francisco-based investor. His LinkedIn
profile indicated that he had been working for Blumberg in San Francisco
since October 2020, had been working from the San Francisco Bay Area, in
addition to Singapore and Thailand, since 2019, and had previously worked
for Blumberg in the San Francisco Bay Area from 2001 to 2011.
In 2022, Vanzyl also owned two residential properties in San Francisco.
Vanzyl sold his Noe Valley property on or around February 15, 2022. Vanzyl
co-owned his Potrero Hill property with Target Velocity, but sold the property
on July 30, 2022. Vanzyl purchased the Miami home through a company; the
mailing address for the company was the address of the Tahoe home. Mail
sent to Vanzyl at the Miami address was returned with the Tahoe home
listed as the forwarding address. As of December 2022, Vanzyl was renting
out the Miami home through Airbnb.
After considering the parties’ submissions on the motion to quash, the
trial court found that Hardell had not proven that it could exercise either

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specific or general jurisdiction over Vanzyl, stating as to the latter that
Vanzyl was not domiciled in California as of March 2022. The court also
declined to grant Hardell’s request for jurisdictional discovery, because
although Hardell had employed private investigators and “had the means to
gather evidence to satisfy [her] burden,” she could not do so.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to
demonstrate the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state to justify jurisdiction.” (Thomson v. Anderson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th
258, 266 (Thomson).) California’s long-arm statute, Code of Civil Procedure
section 410.10, makes California courts’ authority to exercise jurisdiction over
a defendant coextensive with federal and state constitutional limitations.
(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444,
overruled on other grounds by Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court
(2017) 582 U.S. 255, 264 (Bristol-Myers Squibb).)
This court reviews for substantial evidence disputed facts underlying
an order granting a motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction. (Thomson,
supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 266–267.) We review de novo the overarching
question whether the exercise of jurisdiction over defendant “is fair and
reasonable” based on those facts. (Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568; SK Trading Internat. Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 378, 387, 392 (SK Trading).) We review for abuse of
discretion the denial of Hardell’s request for jurisdictional discovery.
(Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894, 911.)

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II. Potential Mootness of Motion to Quash
Hardell filed a second amended complaint while the motion to quash
was pending. No party has contended that the filing of the second amended
complaint mooted the motion to quash, but we may consider the possibility of
mootness on our own motion. (City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 455, 479.) “Because there is but one complaint in a civil
action [citation], the filing of an amended complaint moots a motion directed
to a prior complaint.” (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1131.) At least one court has suggested in dicta
that a motion to quash is encompassed by this rule. (See Naylor v. Superior
Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4.) However, a motion to quash is
directed to the summons, and the filing of an amended complaint does not
require the issuance of a new summons when the parties remain the same.
(Gillette v. Burbank Community Hosp. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 430, 433.)
Accordingly, the filing of an amended complaint does not necessarily moot a
motion to quash service of summons when no new summons is required.
We recognize, however, that there may be circumstances in which the
filing of an amended complaint would moot a pending motion to quash. For
example, because the existence of specific jurisdiction is tied to the claims
asserted, if the amended pleading advanced different claims or identified
additional underlying facts, it could moot a jurisdictional analysis based on
the allegations of the prior pleading. (See Mihlon v. Superior Court (1985)
169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710 [the pleading “defines the cause of action, the nature
of which has some bearing upon the decision whether it is fair and reasonable
to require the nonresident parties to appear and defend in this state”].) Here,
however, the parties do not contend that there are differences between the
allegations of the first and second amended complaints that would affect any

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aspect of the jurisdictional analysis, and we do not discern any material
differences in our own review of the two pleadings. We therefore turn to the
merits of the parties’ arguments.
III. Specific Jurisdiction
Hardell argues that the trial court should have found Vanzyl’s conduct
in California gave rise to specific jurisdiction here, even though the assault
and battery occurred in Florida. In California, Hardell contends, Vanzyl
groomed her for the Florida assault; established the power dynamic essential
to the assault; and directed her to attend the conference in Florida. Vanzyl’s
California conduct, Hardell says, was therefore part of a “continuum . . . that
culminated in March 2022, when Vanzyl plied Hardell with drinks . . . and
sexually harassed and assaulted her.”
To determine whether specific jurisdiction exists, we look for the
“ ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” (Ford
Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (2021) 592 U.S. 351, 365
(Ford Motor Co.).) “A court ‘may exercise specific jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant only if (1) “the defendant has purposefully availed
himself or herself of forum benefits” [citation]; (2) “the ‘controversy is related
to or “arises out of” [the] defendant’s contacts with the forum’ ” [citations];
and (3) “ ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play
and substantial justice.’ ” ’ ” (SK Trading, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 387.)
We focus on the second, “relatedness” prong of the specific jurisdiction
analysis, because it lies at the crux of the parties’ dispute and is
determinative. Recently, the United States Supreme Court clarified that a
strict causal connection between the plaintiff’s claims and the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state is not required. (See Ford Motor Co., supra,
592 U.S. at pp. 361–362 [jurisdiction may lie where defendant’s contacts with

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the forum “relate to” plaintiff’s claims, even without a direct causal
connection, but such a relation has “real limits”].) Hardell has not, however,
identified any case where specific jurisdiction was founded on a causal
connection as attenuated as that here. (Cf. LG Chem, Ltd. v. Superior Court
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 348, 369–370, 374 [lack of connection between claims
against defendant and defendant’s admitted in-state contacts]; Rivelli v.
Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 406–408 [no specific jurisdiction without
evidence that individual director of company directed tortious conduct or
wrongdoing at forum]; Jacqueline B. v. Rawls Law Group, P.C. (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 243, 258–259 [no specific jurisdiction to hear legal
malpractice claim where no alleged malpractice arose from California conduct
and the only in-state contact was in underlying lawsuit]; Halyard Health, Inc.
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1072 [rejecting “causal
chain” theory to establish relatedness].)
Hardell argues that the relationship between her claims and Vanzyl’s
contacts is greater than those in which courts have found a lack of specific
jurisdiction, pointing to David L. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th
359, 366 (David L.) and Bristol-Myers Squibb, supra, 582 U.S. at page 264.
In both cases, the courts found an absolute lack of connection between the
defendants’ contacts with the forum, if any, and the plaintiffs’ claims. But
those cases do not mean that any greater connection is sufficient to establish
specific jurisdiction. Hardell also relies on Integral Development Corp. v.
Weissenbach (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 576. In that case, the defendant obtained
confidential business information as a direct result of his employment
relationship with the plaintiff, a California company, and later its wholly-
owned German subsidiary. (Id. at p. 587.) The court concluded that the
California company’s claims of misappropriation of trade secrets and unfair

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competition were “directly related to [defendant]’s contacts with [California]
in that they arise from the employment relationship.” (Ibid.) The court also
found that the defendant aimed his tortious conduct at the California
plaintiff, and therefore satisfied the “effects test” of personal jurisdiction. (Id.
at p. 588.) By contrast, Hardell was a resident of Colorado, not California,
even though she had ongoing work in this state. And although Hardell relies
on Weissenbach assertedly to show the court erred with respect to its analysis
of evidentiary matters, we see no material dispute of the evidentiary facts
informing our specific jurisdiction analysis; the connection between the
employment relationship at issue in Weissenbach and the alleged torts is
much closer than the asserted relationship here.
Hardell further asserts in her reply brief that her sexual harassment
claim is based on the parties’ employment relationship—that it “played a key
role in [Vanzyl’s] ability to direct her to attend an out-of-state conference, join
her for a business-related dinner there, ply her with drinks, and overcome
her objections to his sexual harassment.” But the causes of action Hardell
alleged against Vanzyl—including the harassment claim—are based on the
discrete events that occurred from March 8 to 9, 2022. Vanzyl’s asserted
conditioning of a benefit on sexual favors occurred on the beach in Florida.
The earlier contacts in California may well have set the stage for the alleged
power dynamic that facilitated the events in Florida, as Hardell argues,
citing Minarksy v. Susquehanna County (3d Cir. 2018) 895 F.3d 303, 314,
Vance v. Ball State Univ. (2013) 570 U.S. 421, 458 (dis. opn. of Ginsburg, J.),
and Henson v. City of Dundee (11th Cir. 1982) 682 F.2d 897, 910. But a
business-related power imbalance may exist innocuously and indefinitely. It
does not, without more, establish a sexual harassment claim, and there is no
allegation that Vanzyl made sexual overtures to Hardell, or even planned

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them, anywhere other than in Florida. Although Hardell uses the word
“grooming” in her briefing, there are no allegations in the complaint that,
while in California, Vanzyl cultivated a relationship with her with the intent
of later making sexual advances or committing a sexual assault. Vanzyl
submitted undisputed evidence that it was Hardell who first raised the
Miami conference by email in February 2023—after their January lunch in
San Francisco—and that the dinner preceding the assault was proposed by
Mohsen when Vanzyl had already moved to Florida.1 On these facts, Hardell
has not shown the requisite connection between Vanzyl, California, and any
of her claims against him.
IV. General Jurisdiction
Hardell also argues that the trial court had general jurisdiction over
Vanzyl because he was domiciled in California at the time of the assault and
because his contacts with California otherwise establish that he was
“essentially at home” here. “A court with general jurisdiction may hear any
claim against that defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the claim
occurred in a different state.” (Bristol-Myers Squibb, supra, 582 U.S. at
p. 262.) “ ‘For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile . . . ,’ ” (ibid.), but a court may also
exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the
defendant’s presence in the forum is “ ‘so “continuous and systematic” ’ ” that

1 While Hardell acknowledged in her opposition to the motion to quash

that she was the one who brought the Miami conference to Vanzyl’s
attention, she added that Vanzyl “told me I should go.” Vanzyl stated in his
declaration that he “did not propose or direct” that Hardell attend the
conference. To the extent these declarations can be read to create a factual
dispute, the resolution of that dispute is not essential given the absence of
any allegation that Vanzyl, while in California, told Hardell to attend the
conference intending that it would furnish the occasion for a sexual assault.
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the defendant is “ ‘essentially at home’ ” there. (Daimler AG v. Bauman
(2014) 571 U.S. 117, 137, 139, fn. 19; see David L., supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at
p. 366 [defendant’s contacts with the forum must be “ ‘so wide-ranging that
they take the place of physical presence in the forum’ ”].)
The trial court concluded that general jurisdiction was lacking based on
its finding that Vanzyl was domiciled in Florida in March 2022. While we
conclude that Vanzyl’s declaration constituted substantial evidence in
support of this finding, his domicile does not necessarily end the inquiry.
While it may be the “exceptional” case in which the facts would warrant the
exercise of general jurisdiction over an individual who is domiciled elsewhere
(cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 139, fn. 19 [discussing
corporations]), the “essentially at home” standard leaves open the possibility.
(See Fernandez v. Tox Corporation (C.D. Cal. 2023) 677 F.Supp.3d 1089,
1102.)
Here, there appears to be no dispute that Vanzyl had a continuous and
systematic presence in California as late as February 2022; it was his
domicile and he had worked in the state at least since 2019. While in March
he changed his domicile to Florida and apparently later to Australia, there is
evidence indicating that California remained an important locus of his
professional and personal activities. For example, Vanzyl’s social media
profiles through May 2023 describe him as a San Francisco-based investor.
He continued to own Target Velocity, a San Francisco-based company,
in 2023. In March 2023, he answered a telephone number with a
San Francisco area code attributed to Target Velocity, and he had an email
address with “targetvelocity.com” as the domain name. When he lived in
San Francisco, Vanzyl and his family spent significant time at a house in
Lake Tahoe apparently owned directly or indirectly by his parents and that

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Vanzyl described to Hardell as his “home base.” The record is unclear about
whether he would have considered himself at home there after he moved to
Florida, but at least some of his mail was sent and/or forwarded to the Tahoe
home between January and May 2023, including mail addressed to the
Florida home. Under the circumstances, we believe the trial court should
have considered whether the nature and quality of Vanzyl’s continued
contacts with California rendered him subject to general jurisdiction here
notwithstanding that he was domiciled elsewhere.2
To answer that question, we think the trial court should assess the
nature of Vanzyl’s continuing contacts with California as of the lawsuit’s
filing through the time that service was effectuated. Admittedly, the case
law on the question is not settled, with some courts also pointing to the time
of the events giving rise to suit. (See, e.g., DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1100 (DVI) [“In analyzing general jurisdiction, we
examine the defendant’s contacts when the alleged conduct occurred and at
the time of service of summons”]; Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair &
Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222 [citing DVI for the same
proposition without additional analysis]; Pecoraro v. Sky Ranch for Boys, Inc.
(8th Cir. 2003) 340 F.3d 558, 562 [“Minimum contacts must exist either at
the time the cause of action arose, the time the suit is filed, or within a
reasonable period of time immediately prior to the filing of the lawsuit”];

2 In the trial court, Vanzyl objected to some of the evidence discussed

above, including his social media profiles, information about Target Velocity
or other companies reflected in corporate filings, and Hardell’s observations
of Vanzyl and his son working from the Tahoe home. The trial court did not
rule directly on those objections but the parties agree we should assume the
court overruled them. We find it unnecessary to adjudicate them, because
even if some of the objections were meritorious, the challenged records still
furnished a good-faith basis for jurisdictional discovery, as discussed below.
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Boaz v. Boyle & Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 700, 717 [court “assume[d]” that
the relevant period was the time of the events giving rise to suit rather than
just before service].) As a well-known treatise has observed, the United
States Supreme Court has not resolved whether the relevant time for
analyzing general jurisdiction is the accrual of the claim or the filing of suit.
(4 Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. (2015) § 1067.5, p. 510).)
Most courts that identify the accrual of the claim as either a relevant or
the determinative time for assessing jurisdiction, however, cite cases
discussing specific jurisdiction or otherwise do not consider the distinction.
The DVI court itself noted that the focus on the time of the events underlying
the dispute has arisen in the context of specific jurisdiction. (DVI, supra,
104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1100–1101; see Steel v. United States (9th Cir. 1987)
813 F.2d 1545, 1549 [“When a court is exercising specific jurisdiction over a
defendant . . . the fair warning that due process requires arises not at the
time of the suit, but when the events that gave rise to the suit occurred”].)
While specific jurisdiction rests on the defendant’s conduct at issue in the
litigation, general jurisdiction means that the defendant is subject to the
court’s jurisdiction even in the absence of any connection between the forum
and the conduct giving rise to the lawsuit—a consideration that we think
makes the time of filing the more relevant measure of the defendant’s
contacts.
We have previously drawn from DVI the conclusion that “general
jurisdiction is determined no earlier than at the time a suit is filed,”
explaining that “a finding of general jurisdiction is essentially a finding that
a foreign defendant’s contacts with a forum are ‘ “so wide-ranging that they
take the place of physical presence” ’ for purposes of service of process.”
(Young v. Daimler AG (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 855, 864, fn. 6, emphasis

15
added.) As one federal court explained, reaching the same conclusion we do
here, “the time the complaint is filed is the time at which the plaintiff urges
the court to assert its authority over the defendant.” (Noonan v. Winston Co.
(1st Cir. 1998) 135 F.3d 85, 95 & fn. 10; see also Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille
Lauro (2d Cir. 1991) 937 F.2d 44, 52 (Klinghoffer).) In addition, the time of
service matters because that is the point at which the court’s authority is
actually asserted over the defendant. (See, e.g., Sabre Intern. Sec v. Torres
Advanced Enterprise Sol (D.D.C. 2014) 60 F.Supp.3d 21, 30; Brandir
International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co. (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1988,
No. 84 Civ. 1411 (CSH)) 1988 U.S.Dist.Lexis 7269, at p. *1.)
The above analysis does not mean that Vanzyl’s contacts before the
complaint was filed and served are irrelevant. The general jurisdiction
inquiry also requires a reasonable “lookback” period, typically of several
years, to determine whether the defendant’s contacts are in fact continuous
and systematic. (See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp.
(2d Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 560, 567, 569–570.) Here, however, there is no dispute
that Vanzyl had continuous and systematic contacts with California as of
February 2022, so the lookback period extends at most to March 2022; his
contacts before that date need not be considered except to the extent they
shed light on the nature and quality of the contacts that either persisted or
arose once Vanzyl was no longer domiciled here. (See Kormylo v. Forever
Resorts, LLC (S.D.Cal. Jan. 6, 2015, No. 13-cv-511 JM (WVG))
2015 U.S.Dist.Lexis 1630, at p. *28 [“In this case, the court need not look
back far, as it is undisputed that Allen was domiciled in California until . . .
one month before the initial third-party complaint was filed”].) We
emphasize that it is the extent of those later contacts, rather than his
previous contacts when domiciled in California, that will be dispositive. (See,

16
e.g., Serafini v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 70, 80; Klinghoffer,
supra, 937 F.2d at p. 52.)
In our view, the current record raises only the possibility that the
exercise of general jurisdiction could be warranted. The full nature of
Vanzyl’s California contacts after he moved to Florida is unclear, and it is
possible that they changed again with his later move to Australia.
Accordingly, we next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to grant a continuance that would allow Hardell to take jurisdictional
discovery.
V. Jurisdictional Discovery
Hardell requested jurisdictional discovery in the trial court, noting
generally her right to conduct discovery and stating that she “dispute[d] the
facts set forth in Vanzyl’s declaration” and that Vanzyl did not “present or
address significant facts related to his California contacts or current or past
domicile.” She repeats her request here. With jurisdictional discovery,
Hardell contends, she could access non-public information, in addition to
what her private investigator acquired from public sources. This would
include evidence to contradict the assertions in Vanzyl’s declaration and to
reveal information omitted from that declaration—Vanzyl’s ownership
interest in the Tahoe home, the amount of time he spent at that home, and
the extent of his business activities in California, including but not limited to
those on behalf of Target Velocity.
“A plaintiff attempting to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant is entitled to an opportunity to conduct discovery of the
jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain its burden of proof,” and “[i]n order to
prevail on a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, . . . should
demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of

17
facts establishing jurisdiction.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II
(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127; see Goehring v. Superior Court, supra,
62 Cal.App.4th at p. 911 [“A plaintiff is generally entitled to conduct
discovery with regard to a jurisdictional issue before a court rules on a motion
to quash”].) Although Vanzyl contends that his declaration answers the
relevant jurisdictional questions, we agree with Hardell that exploration of
his assertions could reveal facts sufficient to establish general jurisdiction.
(See Orchid Biosciences, Inc. v. St. Louis University (S.D. Cal. 2001)
198 F.R.D. 670, 673–674 [notwithstanding defendant’s assertion that its
employee’s two declarations answered all of plaintiff’s jurisdictional
questions, there were still “ ‘pertinent facts bearing on the question of
jurisdiction [that] were controverted,’ ” including whether the declarations
disclosed all of defendant’s contacts with California]; cf. Laub v. U.S. Dept. of
Interior (9th Cir. 2003) 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 [district court abused its
discretion in denying discovery related to subject matter jurisdiction, where
plaintiffs presented public documents that were insufficient, alone, to
establish jurisdiction, but that indicated discovery would reveal more
detailed information supporting jurisdiction]; 1880 Corp. v. Superior Court
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 840, 843 [“there is no sound reason why a plaintiff should be
deprived of [defendant as the primary] source of information” relating to
personal jurisdiction].)
Had we agreed with the trial court’s legal conclusion that Vanzyl’s
domicile was dispositive, we would likely find no abuse of discretion in the
court’s decision to deny a continuance for discovery. However, because we
have disagreed with that conclusion, we also find that the court should have
granted Hardell’s request. (See Deck v. Developers Investment Co., Inc. (2023)

18
89 Cal.App.5th 808, 824 [“A trial court’s decision is an abuse of discretion if it
is based on an error of law”].)3
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is
remanded to the trial court with directions to afford Hardell an opportunity
to conduct discovery relevant to the court’s general jurisdiction over Vanzyl
and thereafter to proceed as necessary to resolve the motion to quash. The
parties shall bear their respective costs on appeal.
GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
SMILEY, J. *

3 Because we conclude that the trial court erred by improperly limiting

the scope of its jurisdictional analysis, we do not consider Vanzyl’s remaining
arguments.
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, Alameda County, assigned by the

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
19
Trial Court: City and County of San Francisco
Superior Court

Trial Judge: Honorable Richard B. Ulmer

Counsel for Plaintiff and BAKER CURTIS & SCHWARTZ,
Appellant: Christopher D. Baker, Robert A. Dolinko

Counsel for Defendant and RUTAN & TUCKER, Brian C. Sinclair
Respondent:

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