CourtListener 9608059•People v. Boles CA2/7
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Filed 6/20/24 P. v. Boles CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B315675
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA457318)
v.
MALCOLM TYRONE BOLES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed in part,
sentence vacated with directions.
Brad Kaiserman, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Malcolm Tyrone Boles of human
trafficking of a minor for a commercial sex act, several counts of
sexual assault, and misdemeanor false imprisonment. Boles was
tried with two codefendants. On appeal, Boles contends the trial
court violated his right to confrontation by admitting a
codefendant’s redacted testimonial statement without instructing
the jury it could only use the statement against the codefendant
or alternatively by not sufficiently redacting the statement.
Boles also argues the judgment should be reversed for
instructional error regarding two charges: rape in concert and
oral copulation in concert. He additionally contends the case
should be remanded for resentencing under amended Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (b), and amended section 654.1
We conclude the admission of codefendant Kayla
Middleton’s statements was harmless error given the
overwhelming evidence of Boles’s guilt. Consistent with our
ruling in People v. Middleton (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 749
(Middleton), we determine there was no instructional error on the
rape-in-concert charge. The People concede, and we agree, that
the trial court erred in its instructions on oral copulation in
concert, but we conclude the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. We also conclude the case must be remanded
for resentencing under amended section 1170, subdivision (b),
and amended section 654. Accordingly, we affirm Boles’s
convictions, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise noted.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Information
In February 2018 the People filed a 19-count information
against Boles and codefendants Christopher Sangalang and
Middleton, alleging the following charges against Boles: human
trafficking of a minor through use of force, fear, and coercion, in
violation of section 236.1, subdivision (c)(2) (count 3); forcible
rape of a child over 14 years old in violation of section 261,
subdivision (a)(2) (counts 4 and 6); forcible oral copulation in
violation of former section 288a, subdivision (c)(2)(A) (now § 287,
subd. (c)(2)(A)) (counts 5 and 7);2 forcible rape and rape by foreign
object of a child over 14 years old while acting in concert, in
violation of section 264.1, subdivision (b)(2) (count 12); forcible
oral copulation of a child over 14 years old while acting in
concert, in violation of former section 288a, subdivision (d)(3)
(now § 287, subd. (d)(3)) (count 14); kidnapping in violation of
section 207, subdivision (a) (count 16); and kidnapping to commit
another crime in violation of section 209, subdivision (b)(1)
(count 19). The People additionally alleged the forcible rape and
forcible oral copulation counts were committed by way of
kidnapping, and Boles administered a controlled substance
2 Former Penal Code section 288a was amended and
renumbered as section 287 by Senate Bill No. 1494 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2019 (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 49).
The text was not substantively changed and the amendments do
not affect our analysis. (See § 287, Stats. 2013, ch. 282, § 1.)
3
against the victim’s will within the meaning of section 667.61,
subdivisions (a), (d), and (e).3
Boles pleaded not guilty to all charges. Boles, Middleton,
and Sangalang were tried together but before separate juries:
one jury for Boles and Middleton, and a separate jury for
Sangalang.
B. Prosecution Evidence
1. Chelsea disappears with Sangalang and Middleton
The victim was Chelsea B., a 16-year-old girl.4 At
approximately 3:45 p.m. on February 2, 2017 Chelsea’s mother
dropped Chelsea off at a friend’s house to get her hair braided.
The mother planned to pick Chelsea up about four to five hours
later. Chelsea’s mother described Chelsea as a “childlike” girl
who required adult supervision and assistance with basic self-
care. She found it difficult to read social cues and to recognize
unsafe situations.
Chelsea spent the appointment texting with Sangalang,
whom she had met on Facebook and considered a potential
boyfriend. Chelsea had told Sangalang she was 16. Chelsea had
3 The kidnapping and administration of controlled substance
circumstances were alleged in the information as to Boles as to
counts 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, and 14, but only charged to the jury as to
counts 6, 7, and 12. Rape in concert was also alleged in the
information as an additional circumstance as to Boles as to
counts 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, and 14 but not charged to the jury.
4 We draw our statement of the evidence from the record,
consistent with our previous summary of this trial in People v.
Middleton, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pages 757 to 763.
4
also communicated with Boles on Facebook and told him she was
16.
Sangalang told Chelsea he would pick her up to go to the
mall and asked her for money to buy food. Sangalang had
previously instructed Chelsea to pack extra clothes before the
appointment because they would be going to a hotel together.
Sangalang had also told her she could make a lot of money doing
sex work and live a “rich, nice life” with lots of cars and a fancy
house. Chelsea believed Sangalang was talking about just the
two of them.
Before the hair appointment, she had met Sangalang in
person twice. He had come to her bedroom window and had
asked for money, and she had given him money and her ATM
card.
Near the end of the appointment, Sangalang showed up
outside Brea Persley’s house, where Chelsea was having her hair
braided. Sangalang was accompanied by Middleton, whom
Chelsea had never met. Persley testified that she told Chelsea it
was wrong to invite people over and that she was going to call
Chelsea’s mother. Sangalang demanded Chelsea give him money
and stated angrily, “Come on. Let’s go.” When Chelsea asked
Sangalang who Middleton was, he told her Middleton was his
“homegirl.” Later Sangalang told Chelsea that Middleton worked
for him as his “ho” and “prostitute,” but in a police interview
Middleton stated she did not have a pimp and worked alone for
herself as a prostitute.
Chelsea told Persley she would be back later that night or
the next day. Persley testified she went inside to get her phone,
and while Persley was inside, Chelsea left with Sangalang and
Middleton. Persley called Chelsea’s mother and reported what
5
happened, and they both called the police to report Chelsea
missing. Chelsea’s mother and Persley texted and called Chelsea
repeatedly, but she did not respond. Chelsea’s mother testified
she circled the neighborhood in her car then drove to the
Compton sheriff’s station when she could not find Chelsea. The
police and Chelsea’s mother went to Persley’s house, and they all
searched for Chelsea until 3:00 a.m.
2. Chelsea is raped by Boles at Middleton’s apartment
complex and instructed in street prostitution by the
three codefendants and another individual
Chelsea testified that after she left Persley’s house, she
followed Sangalang and Middleton to a van driven by
Sangalang’s grandmother. Two little girls and Boles were also in
the van. Sangalang yelled at her to get in and told her to sit in
the back next to Boles.
Boles began touching Chelsea persistently, wrapping his
arm around her waist, pulling her close, squeezing her face, and
grabbing her thigh and knee. She repeatedly moved Boles’s
hands off her and told him “no, don’t touch me,” and to stop and
get away. Boles told her to stop playing “hard to get” and said he
had to “fix her attitude.” Sangalang moved into the back row on
her other side and grabbed her other thigh. Chelsea told
Sangalang to stop. Chelsea heard Boles tell Sangalang that
Chelsea was going to make them a lot of money.
They arrived at a shopping center, and Sangalang told
Middleton to watch Chelsea in the van. Sangalang and Boles got
out of the van, along with the grandmother and the little girls.
After they left, Chelsea introduced herself to Middleton. She
asked why Sangalang told Middleton to watch her; Middleton
6
looked away and changed the subject. Chelsea told Middleton
she was 16 years old. When the others returned, Boles continued
to rub her thigh and ignored Chelsea’s requests to stop.
Sangalang’s grandmother dropped Sangalang, Chelsea,
Middleton, and Boles near a gas station. Chelsea asked
Middleton where they were going, but Middleton did not reply.
Chelsea then asked Sangalang where they were going; he told
her, “Don’t worry about it.” The group walked to a smoke shop
then to the house of one of Sangalang’s friends, where they all
smoked marijuana with some other people in a parked van.
Chelsea said she wanted to return to Persley’s house.
Sangalang replied they were going to Middleton’s house first.
Before they left for Middleton’s house, a young woman named
Perfection arrived who Sangalang said was going to fix Chelsea’s
attitude. Sangalang instructed Chelsea to walk with Perfection
and meet them at Middleton’s house later. Sangalang, Boles, and
Middleton took Chelsea’s backpack, purse, and cell phone with
them as they left, and told her she would get the items back later.
Middleton had spoken earlier with Chelsea about
commercial sex work, instructing her what to charge and not to
accept less than she was told. Middleton warned Chelsea if she
did not make money Sangalang would get mad. Perfection also
told Chelsea that Sangalang expected her to make money for him
by having sex with men. Chelsea said she did not want to have
sex for money, and Perfection said Sangalang would be angry and
would hurt Chelsea if she refused. Perfection described what to
charge for different sex acts and took Chelsea to walk an area
called “the blade” in search of clients. One man offered them
each $100 for sex, but Chelsea told Perfection she did not want to
have sex. Perfection then called Sangalang, and he told Chelsea
7
he would beat her unless she made money for him. Around
11:00 p.m., a friend of Perfection’s picked them up and dropped
Chelsea off at Middleton’s apartment complex.
Middleton met Chelsea at the entrance and took her to the
complex’s laundry room where Boles and Sangalang were
waiting. Chelsea’s phone was dead. She asked for a charger, but
no one gave her one. She asked Middleton, Sangalang and Boles
if she could use their phones to contact her mother, but they
refused.
Middleton and Chelsea left to go across the street to a gas
station to get snacks. Before Middleton and Chelsea left,
Sangalang told Middleton to watch Chelsea so “no pimp [would]
get [her],” and told Chelsea she could not tell men that she was
16 because it was illegal for men to have sex with people under
18. Men in the store flirted with Chelsea and Middleton, asking
their names and ages, and Middleton and Chelsea stated they
were 20 years old. Another man asked Chelsea for her name,
age, and number. She did not respond, but Middleton told him to
give Middleton his number and she would have Chelsea call him.
Middleton and Chelsea returned and rejoined Sangalang
and Boles in the laundry room. They all smoked more marijuana,
and Sangalang gave Chelsea a pill that made her feel dizzy and
unable to walk.
Middleton told Chelsea she had to lose her virginity with
Boles or Sangalang. Chelsea told Middleton she was willing to
have sex with Sangalang but not Boles. She also told Middleton
she did not want to lose her virginity that night, but Middleton
told her older guys did not want to have sex with a virgin.
Chelsea told Middleton and Sangalang she did not want to have
sex with Boles, but Sangalang told her she had to do it.
8
Middleton told the police interviewer she knew Chelsea did not
want to have sex with Boles.
Middleton and Sangalang left the laundry room and closed
the door, leaving Chelsea alone with Boles. Chelsea told him,
“Don’t touch me” and pushed him away. Boles rubbed her thighs,
ripped her shorts, pushed her to the ground, and got on top of
her. Chelsea screamed Middleton’s and Sangalang’s names
loudly for help, but they remained outside. Boles got mad and
roughly pulled down her shorts, scratching the side of her thighs
and rubbing his penis on her leg. She pushed him off and ran out
of the room, slamming the door shut. When Chelsea ran out, she
was scared, angry and crying. She told Middleton and Sangalang
that she could not have sex and wanted to go home.
Sangalang told Chelsea he would calm Boles down and tell
him to go slow. Sangalang went into the laundry room.
Middleton told Chelsea everything would be all right and
Sangalang would talk with Boles. Sangalang came back and told
Chelsea that Boles agreed to be gentle because it was her first
time. Chelsea repeated she did not want to have sex with Boles.
Middleton and Sangalang walked Chelsea back into the
laundry room and stayed in the room while Boles continued
assaulting Chelsea over the following one to two hours. Boles
yelled at Chelsea, took off her shirt and bra, and called her
offensive names when she continued resisting. Sangalang came
over and told Chelsea to relax. Boles took off his clothes and lay
on top of Chelsea, pinning down her wrists. Boles shoved his
fingers into her vagina. Chelsea repeatedly said he was hurting
her and told him to stop, but he did not. When she looked toward
Middleton and Sangalang for help, they were having sex with
each other. Boles asked Sangalang for a condom, which
9
Sangalang brought him. Boles put his penis in Chelsea’s vagina;
she was crying in pain and told him repeatedly to stop and that it
hurt. She tried to push him off but could not because his body
was on top of hers. He got off her and took off the condom and
said he was “[going] in raw.” She told him not to, but Boles
laughed, lay on top of her, pinned her arms about her head, and
put his penis in her again, telling her to relax and calling her a
crybaby when she cried. Chelsea screamed Sangalang’s name
and continued to try to push Boles off, telling him he was hurting
her and to stop.
Boles demanded oral sex and tried to shove his penis in her
mouth. Sangalang told Chelsea to relax her lips and open her
mouth when she resisted. Boles put his penis in her mouth and
told her to relax. Boles told her she had to call him and
Sangalang “Daddy.” Chelsea refused, and Boles then choked her
and threatened to put a gun to her head and shoot her. In her
police interview, Middleton stated that Chelsea made a lot of
noise and had repeatedly told Boles to stop, and that Middleton
told Boles to leave Chelsea alone but he ignored her.
Chelsea screamed at the top of her lungs during the attack.
Middleton told her to stay quiet because people in her apartment
building would hear her and call the police. Sangalang and Boles
also told Chelsea to stop screaming and shoved a towel in
Chelsea’s mouth. Boles went back and forth between vaginally
and orally copulating her for one or two hours. Boles finally
ejaculated on Chelsea’s forehead then told her to wipe her face
and get dressed. Boles told Middleton to stay with Chelsea, and
Boles and Sangalang left the laundry room.
10
Middleton took Chelsea to her apartment and let her use
the bathroom with the door open, saying she could not leave her
alone. Chelsea was in too much pain to wipe herself and began
crying when she saw she was bleeding. Middleton refused to let
Chelsea shower, saying they had to hurry up to leave. Perfection
then picked up Chelsea, Middleton, Sangalang, and Boles and left
them near a fast food restaurant, where Sangalang gave them all
pills that made Chelsea feel high and numb.
They then walked to a burger stand where Middleton
instructed Chelsea how to conduct commercial sex work on the
street. Middleton ordered food for herself and the two men but
not for Chelsea; Sangalang told Chelsea they would feed her after
she was done working. Middleton told Chelsea she should be
able to make lots of money because many cars had been honking
at her which meant they wanted to have sex with her. Middleton
told Chelsea what to charge for different sex acts and that she
was to give the money she earned to Sangalang and he would
give some back to her. Middleton instructed Chelsea on types of
men to avoid and told Chelsea not to go home with men but have
them order a room close to Sangalang, Middleton, and Boles so
they could pick her up. Middleton gave her condoms and told her
to make sure she used them. Middleton told her if she did not
have sex with men for money, Sangalang would hurt her.
Middleton directed Chelsea to work certain locations along
Figueroa Street and Gage Avenue and to call Boles or Sangalang
if there was any trouble. Middleton told her to avoid police and
not talk to men who did not want to pay for sex. Boles told her to
walk slowly and pay attention to the cars. In her police
interview, Middleton stated she told Chelsea to have sex with
men for money and what to charge; however, Chelsea just walked
11
and did not do anything she was instructed to do. Sangalang left,
and Middleton and Chelsea went to Gage Avenue and walked
together for a while with Boles behind them, then took a bus to
Figueroa Street.
3. Chelsea is found the day after her disappearance
Around 3:00 a.m. on February 3, 2017 Chelsea’s mother
published a missing person post on Facebook with a photo of
Chelsea in the red plaid flannel shirt she was wearing when she
went missing. Around 10:00 a.m., Chelsea’s mother received a
phone call from a person who reported seeing Chelsea in the
same shirt on 66th and Figueroa Streets. Chelsea’s father
testified he drove to the area and a woman on the street told him
she had seen a young lady in a red flannel shirt with two other
people at a nearby convenience store. As he drove southbound
past the store, Chelsea’s father saw Chelsea walking with
Middleton and Boles, who were unfamiliar to him. He stopped
his car and heard Middleton and Boles both command Chelsea to
“[k]eep your fucking head down.” Chelsea’s father jumped out
and yelled at Chelsea to get in the car while he chased Middleton
and Boles, who fled.
Chelsea was crying. Her eyes were red, and her voice was
shaking. She looked “like she was on something.” She said, “I’m
sorry Daddy. I don’t know what happened; I was scared. I’m
scared.”
Chelsea was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault
examination. Chelsea’s underwear was torn, and she reported
vaginal pain and pain in her back, hip, and neck. Chelsea had
abrasions to her arms and legs and bruising to her legs. The
opening of her vagina was torn, and her hymen was torn and
12
bruised. The nurse practitioner was unable to use the speculum
as Chelsea was in too much pain. Chelsea described being
sexually assaulted by “Mac” on the laundry room floor, providing
details consistent with those summarized above.
Swabs from Chelsea’s vulva, anus, and rectum tested
positive for blood. Swabs from her right and left cheeks, mouth,
right breast, left breast, chest, neck, vulva, anus, vagina, and
back tested positive for semen. DNA tests of the semen samples
matched Boles and excluded Sangalang. Chelsea reported she
consumed marijuana and two pills. Chelsea’s urine sample
showed the presence of marijuana, hydrocodone, hydromorphone,
amphetamine, and methamphetamine.
C. Defense Evidence
Boles did not testify in his own defense and instead called
several witnesses, seeking to impeach details of Chelsea’s
testimony. The defense theory of the case was that Chelsea was
a runaway who intentionally spent the day partying and doing
drugs with the defendants, voluntarily made out with both Boles
and Sangalang, voluntarily decided to have sex with Boles after
Sangalang rebuffed her, and lied that Boles raped her. Defense
counsel emphasized that there were various inconsistencies in
her interview statements and testimony, that Chelsea never tried
to run away from the defendants, that she had expressed interest
in prostitution, and that she made a number of remarks to Boles
and the other defendants that indicated consent to sex.
Forensic interview specialist Susy Flores of the Children’s
Advocacy Center, who interviewed Chelsea in February 2017,
testified that Chelsea told her Middleton and Sangalang could
hear but not see her and Boles during the rape. Chelsea stated
13
that during the rape she was screaming or yelling and that it
hurt her. Chelsea further said she told Boles to “stop,” and that
she was scared of Boles. She stated Boles pinned her down with
his hand on her chest, told her to call him “Daddy,” and choked
her when she refused. Chelsea did not tell Flores that Boles
threatened to shoot her or to shove a pill in her mouth, nor that
Boles repeatedly called her offensive names, nor that she could
not breathe, nor that her eyes rolled back when he choked her.
Chelsea told Flores that Boles previously put his hands on her
neck in the van and it made her laugh.
Chelsea told Flores when Chelsea and Boles first went into
the laundry room, Boles put his hand on her throat and kept
telling her to shut up, but she did not listen and “kept yelling at
him saying stop it” and to get away and get off of her. Boles held
her against the wall and kissed her neck as she kept trying to get
away. Boles then pushed her to the ground, pulled his penis out,
and told her to suck his penis. Chelsea kept moving her head to
get away from Boles. Boles held her head and put his penis on
her lips and told her to open her mouth, but she would not.
Chelsea did not open her mouth, and kept getting up until he let
her leave the laundry room.
Chelsea told Flores that when they returned to the laundry
room that she was quiet and looked at Boles, “like, ‘Okay, cool,
I’m gonna go with it.’” Chelsea then described being raped by
Boles on the laundry room floor. After first having intercourse
with her when they returned to the laundry room, Boles stopped
and said he was going to slap her if she did not open her mouth.
Chelsea complied and Boles inserted his penis into her mouth,
told her to suck it, and that if she bit him he would slap her with
his penis.
14
Of the entire incident, Chelsea stated to Flores, “I really
don’t know but it was like I don’t know if it was sex or I don’t
know if it was rape because I never been through it.” Chelsea
stated to Flores there was a towel in her mouth during parts of
the attack. Chelsea said she did not call her mother because she
did not want her to know she was hanging out with friends, and
she did not say she was kept from using her cell phone. Chelsea
told Flores about Perfection, but not that she had come to “fix”
Chelsea’s attitude.
Detective Sam Dang, who spoke with Chelsea at the station
after she was found, testified she made no mention of any use or
threats of firearms in their conversation about the incident, was
unable to sit and stated her privates hurt, and told him she was
uncomfortable speaking to him because he was a man.
Detective Cynthia Sanchez, who interviewed Chelsea after
Detective Dang, testified Chelsea did not use the word “rape”;
Chelsea said she lost her virginity and that it was rough and
hard. Chelsea never mentioned being threatened with a gun,
being repeatedly called offensive names, asking for a phone
charger, any defendant taking her belongings, or any defendant
choking her to the point where she could not breathe and her
eyes rolled back.
Middleton’s father testified that on February 2 or 3, 2017,
between midnight and 4:00 a.m., Middleton brought a friend
inside their apartment to use the bathroom. At no time that
night or any other night did he hear screaming or yelling around
the laundry room or in the courtyard.
15
D. Jury Verdict, Motion for New Trial, and Sentencing
The jury convicted Boles of human trafficking of a minor for
a commercial sex act by use of force or fear (count 3; § 236.1,
subd. (c)(2)), forcible rape of a child over 14 years old (count 6;
§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); forcible oral copulation (count 7; former
§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A), now § 287, subd. (c)(2)(A)); forcible rape
and rape by foreign object of a child over 14 years old while acting
in concert (count 12; § 264.1, subd. (b)(2)); forcible oral copulation
of a child over 14 years old while acting in concert (count 14;
former § 288a, subd. (d)(3), now § 287, subd. (d)(3)); and the
lesser included charge of misdemeanor false imprisonment
(§ 237, subd. (a)) on count 16. On counts 6, 7, and 12, the jury
found not true the allegations that the offenses were committed
by way of kidnapping and that Boles administered a controlled
substance against the victim’s will under section 667.61,
subdivisions (a), (d), and (e). The jury acquitted Boles on counts
4, 5, and 19.
On Boles’s motion for a new trial, the court ruled there was
no significant evidence of force or fear on the human trafficking
count and granted the motion for a new trial as to that allegation
only, and further ruled the allegation could not be tried in front of
a jury again and that the court’s ruling was “more akin to finding
the lesser included offense.” The court denied the motion as to
the rest of the charges.
The court sentenced Boles to an aggregate prison term of
21 years and eight months, consisting of the middle term of
10 years for oral copulation in concert (count 14), as the base
term; a consecutive term of two years and eight months (one
third the middle term) for human trafficking of a minor (count 3);
a consecutive term of the middle term of nine years for forcible
16
rape (count 6); and a concurrent term of one year for false
imprisonment (count 16).
The court also imposed the middle term of six years for
forcible oral copulation (count 7) and the middle term of
nine years for forcible rape and rape by foreign object (count 12),
but those sentences were stayed pursuant to section 654. The
court imposed fines and fees and credited Boles with 1,594 days
actual credit plus 239 days good time/work time for a total of
1,833 days.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Boles argues the trial court violated his federal and state
constitutional right to confrontation by admitting into evidence a
statement from Middleton, further described below, without a
limiting instruction. He also contends the trial court gave
incorrect jury instructions regarding the rape in concert and oral
copulation in concert charges. Boles further argues he is entitled
to resentencing under amendments to sections 1170,
subdivision (b), and 654.
A. The Constitutional Right to Confrontation
1. Governing law and standard of review
The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment,
applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment, provides,
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford v.
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment bars the introduction of a
17
witness’s out-of-court “testimonial hearsay” statements at trial
unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. (Id. at pp. 68-69.)
“Testimonial” out-of-court statements expressly include those
elicited in the context of police interrogations. (Id. at p. 53, fn. 4
[noting a witness’s “recorded statement, knowingly given in
responses to structured police questioning, qualifies under any
conceivable definition” of interrogation]; accord, People v. Cage
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 978.)
If a statement is determined to be testimonial, we apply the
de novo or independent standard of review to claims that
implicate a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. (See
People v. Sweeney (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 210, 221; see also
People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 850.) “‘“‘Confrontation
clause violations are subject to federal harmless-error analysis
under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [Chapman].’
[Citation.] We ask whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that a rational jury would have reached the same verdict absent
the error.’”’” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014)
60 Cal.4th 335, 395; see People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 438
[“[W]e evaluate federal constitutional error for harmlessness
under the Chapman beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and
state law error under the [People v.] Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d
818] reasonably probable standard.”].)
Under the Aranda/Bruton rule, where two defendants are
jointly tried before the same jury, a nontestifying codefendant’s
extrajudicial statement that incriminates the other defendant is
inadmissible as a violation of the latter’s rights to confrontation
and cross-examination. (See People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d
518; Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123; see also
18
People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 868-869 [“‘“Aranda
and Bruton stand for the proposition that a ‘nontestifying
codefendant’s extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that
inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence
inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of
confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting
instruction is given.’”’”]
However, in Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200
(Richardson), the United States Supreme Court limited the scope
of the Bruton rule, holding that in a joint trial where a
codefendant’s confession does not incriminate the defendant on
its face, only by implication, “the Confrontation Clause is not
violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s
confession with a proper limiting instruction when . . . the
confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name,
but any reference to his or her existence.” (Id. at p. 211.) “‘The
[Richardson] court explained that Bruton recognized a narrow
exception to the general rule that juries are presumed to follow
limiting instructions, and this narrow exception should not apply
to confessions that are not incriminating on their face, but
become so only when linked with other evidence introduced at
trial. [Citation.] That is because, “[w]here the necessity of such
linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury
will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence.”’”
(People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 744.)
2. Middleton’s statement
Detective Sammy Cruz interviewed Middleton on
August 21, 2017, and the prosecution sought to introduce the
recording and a transcript of Middleton’s statement into
19
evidence. Middleton’s statement was redacted both to omit
reference to Boles by name and to omit reference to the existence
of an involved man or boy other than Sangalang in the laundry
room, van, and other locations. Boles initially objected to the
admission of the entirety of the interview because “all that was
done essentially was to remove [Boles’s] name. It’s still
incrimination. Everyone is going to know it’s him, so it’s the
equivalent of saying, ‘You know who did this and that.’”
Ultimately, the trial court and defense counsel reviewed the
interview to determine if any statements violated Boles’s
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him under
Bruton/Aranda, additional redactions were made, and the
redacted interview was admitted.5
After the interview had been redacted, Middleton’s
attorney argued it was “improper opinion” and “irrelevant” to
leave in Middleton’s statement that if she had been in the girl’s
place in the laundry room, she “would feel like I’m being
5 Although the People argue Boles waived his claim of
Aranda/Bruton error by withdrawing his objection to the
admission of Middleton’s interview after redactions were made,
the People also concede it was error to admit the interview
without a limiting instruction stating that it could only be used
as evidence against Middleton. Failure to timely and specifically
object on confrontation clause grounds generally forfeits this
argument. (See People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 730.)
Under the circumstances, however, because the conceded error
arguably affected the defendant’s substantial rights, we exercise
our discretion to determine whether the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 1259; People v. Smithey (1999)
20 Cal.4th 936, 976, fn. 7; People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th
1002, 1011-1012.)
20
violated.” Boles’s attorney also objected to the introduction of
this statement under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court
overruled the objections.
The redacted interview was played for the jury with no
limiting instruction in court or in the jury instructions that the
statements could only be used against Middleton.
As presented to the jury, in her statement Middleton
acknowledged having sex with Sangalang on one prior occasion in
the laundry room and stated that a week after that they hung out
with another girl present but could not remember her name.
Middleton described Sangalang’s grandmother driving her and
Sangalang in a van with some “little kids” to a house where
Sangalang got out and got the girl, then they got food and then
the grandmother dropped “me, Chris, and the girl” at a smoke
shop.
After that they went to Middleton’s apartment building
where they “went inside of the laundry mat [sic]” for “quite a few
hours,” “at least like . . . 3, 4 hours.” She stated Sangalang “had
sex with the other girl.” The girl told Middleton “she basically
ran away from home.” Middleton recalled seeing the girl leave
the laundry room, and when the girl returned, she seemed
irritated. Middleton saw her crying. The girl exited the laundry
room a second time, and Middleton told the girl she did not want
the girl going in and out because it might cause the security
guard to say that they could not be in there. Middleton stated
the girl was “unhappy” with being unable to leave the room.
Middleton stated that when she was in the laundry room,
she was a “cool distance” away and around a corner such that she
could not see anyone else. She said that if she had been in the
girl’s place in the laundry room, she “would feel like I’m being
21
violated.” Middleton confirmed the girl had sex, and stated that
although they were in the laundry room three to four hours, “the
having sex thing, that was only like an hour.” The girl made a lot
of noise in the laundry room, and Sangalang handed the girl
something to put in her mouth so she would not make as much
noise.
In the morning, the girl washed her face at Middleton’s
apartment, then they went to Western and Figueroa, where they
were “trying to put her down.” Middleton explained to the girl
that she had “sex and stuff . . . with Johns . . . for money,” and
how to walk and look in the cars. Middleton told the girl she
herself charged $100, and Sangalang told the girl to charge at
least $80 or $100. Middleton told Detective Cruz that the girl
was “gonna get beat up” if “she didn’t catch a date.” Eventually
they took the bus to Figueroa and Manchester and walked down
“to like 80th or 81st.” There, an older guy in his late 30s or early
40s pulled up in a car and started screaming at them and told the
girl to get in the car, Middleton ran away across the street, and
the girl got in the car and left with the man.
3. The trial court erred by admitting Middleton’s
statement without a limiting instruction, but the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
The parties do not dispute that Middleton’s statements to
the police were testimonial. Boles contends admission of
Middleton’s testimonial statement violated his federal and state
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Boles
alternatively argues Middleton’s interview should have been
further redacted to remove Middleton’s statement that if she had
been in the girl’s place in the laundry room, she “would feel like
22
I’m being violated.” Boles argues that although he is not
expressly named, the factual context strongly suggests Middleton
is talking about Boles.
The People concede the trial court erred by admitting
Middleton’s redacted interview without a limiting instruction
stating it could only be used as evidence against Middleton.
However, they argue the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt because Middleton’s statement did not mention Boles or
Boles’s existence, and Chelsea gave “detailed and damning
testimony” about Boles at trial.
We conclude that ample independent evidence supported
Boles’s convictions of forcible rape, rape in concert, forcible oral
copulation, oral copulation in concert, human trafficking for a
commercial sex act, and false imprisonment. In this light, the
admission of Middleton’s statement without a limiting
instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in
Middleton’s statement directly implicated Boles, whose
involvement in the sexual assault and attempted commercial sex
trafficking of Chelsea were proven by independent evidence. This
evidence included Chelsea’s detailed testimony, her consistent
statements to law enforcement, medical providers and social
workers, and medical examination and DNA analysis.
In addition to Chelsea’s testimony and statements, “there
was incontrovertible evidence that sexual intercourse occurred.”
(People v. Vargas (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 647, 663 [erroneous
admission of nontestifying victim’s testimonial statement that
sexual intercourse occurred harmless].) As in Vargas, “the
vaginal swabs taken from [Chelsea] contained spermatozoa with
[Boles’s] DNA profile. Moreover, [the nurse practitioner]
observed injuries to [Chelsea’s] genitalia consistent with blunt
23
force trauma,” including that the opening of her vagina was torn,
her hymen was torn and bruised, and she was in too much pain
for the nurse practitioner to insert a speculum. (Ibid.) Swabs
from Chelsea’s mouth and face also tested positive for semen, and
DNA tests of the semen samples matched Boles and excluded
Sangalang.
There was thus ample evidence, independent of Middleton’s
statement, to support Boles’s convictions. (See People v. Flinner,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 747 [erroneous admission of separately-
tried codefendant’s testimonial statement harmless beyond
reasonable doubt where there was “ample evidence” of guilt,
statement was cumulative of other evidence, and the admitted
portions did not directly implicate defendant].) Any implication
from Middleton’s statement that Boles violated Chelsea is at
most cumulative of other evidence.
It is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury
would have convicted Boles even in the absence of Middleton’s
redacted statement. For that reason, and because the redacted
version of Middleton’s statement admitted at trial did not directly
inculpate Boles, its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Because we conclude that any error here was harmless
under Chapman, we need not separately consider Boles’s
arguments of state law error, which would be reviewed under the
less demanding standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d
818. (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th
at p. 395.)
24
B. Boles’s Claims of Instructional Error
1. Standard of review
“‘“[A] claim that a court failed to properly instruct on the
applicable principles of law is reviewed de novo.”’” (Middleton,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 764; accord, People v. Dearborne
(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 250, 260 (Dearborne).) “‘“‘It is settled that
in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court
must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues
raised by the evidence’” and “‘necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.’”’” (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th
620, 667.)
2. The trial court did not err in its rape-in-concert
instructions
As to Boles’s argument of instructional error on the rape-in-
concert charge in count 12, we previously rejected this same
argument from his codefendant Middleton. Boles does not
address our published decision, nor does he provide any
persuasive reason to depart from our prior analysis. Accordingly,
we rely on our analysis from Middleton.
Under section 264.1, subdivision (a), a defendant commits
the crime of rape in concert “when the defendant, voluntarily
acting in concert with another person, by force or violence and
against the will of the victim, committed an act described in
Section 261 . . . , either personally or by aiding and abetting the
other person.” (Italics added.)
Section 261, subdivision (a)(2), provides in part: “(a) Rape
is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished under any of the
following circumstances: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) If it is accomplished
against a person’s will by means of force, violence, duress,
25
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the
person or another.” (Italics added.)
The court instructed the jury on rape in concert using
CALCRIM No. 1001, which provided in relevant part: “Boles is
charged in Count Twelve . . . with committing rape by acting in
concert in violation of Penal Code section 264.1. [¶] To prove
that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
that: [¶] 1. The defendant personally committed forcible rape
and voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and abetted
its commission; [¶] OR [¶] 2. The defendant voluntarily aided
and abetted someone else who personally committed forcible
rape. [¶] To decide whether a defendant committed rape, please
refer to the separate instruction that I have given you on that
crime. . . . You must apply those instructions when you decide
whether the People have proved rape in concert.”
The separate instruction regarding rape was based on
CALCRIM No. 1000. It stated in relevant part:
“Defendant Malcolm Boles is charged in Counts Two and
Four with rape by force in violation of Penal Code section 261(a).
[¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant had sexual intercourse
with a female; [¶] 2. He and the female were not married to
each other at the time of the intercourse; [¶] 3. The female did
not consent to the intercourse; AND [¶] 4. The defendant
accomplished the intercourse by force, violence, duress, menace,
or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to the female or
to someone else. [¶] . . . .
“Intercourse is accomplished by force if a person uses
enough physical force to overcome the female’s will.
26
“Duress means a direct or implied threat of force, violence,
danger or retribution that would cause a reasonable person to do
something that she would not do otherwise. When deciding
whether the act was accomplished by duress, consider all the
circumstances, including the female’s age and her relationship to
the defendant.
“Retribution is a form of payback or revenge.
“Menace means a threat, statement, or act showing an
intent to injure someone.
“Intercourse is accomplished by fear if the female is
actually and reasonably afraid.”
Boles did not object to these instructions and did not ask
for a clarifying instruction.
Boles argues that to convict him of rape in concert, the jury
had to find he, as the personal perpetrator, raped Chelsea “‘by
force or violence’”; rape by means of duress, menace or fear is not
enough. Boles further argues that by directing the jury to
CALCRIM No. 1000 to decide whether a defendant committed
rape, the jury was improperly instructed that rape in concert
could be based on a rape committed by means of duress, menace
or fear. He contends this improperly lowered the burden of proof.
As noted, the jury was instructed that to convict Boles of
rape in concert, it had to find he “personally committed forcible
rape.” The jury would understand from this that it had to find
rape by force. In Dearborne, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at page 262,
the court was faced with the same instructions used here and
concluded there was no instructional error: “[T]he word ‘force’
does not have a technical legal meaning in this context, and is
instead used in its ordinary sense. Accordingly, the court was
only required to tell the jury that the rape had to be by force. It
27
did so by telling the jury the rape had to be ‘forcible.’” (Ibid.) We
reach the same conclusion here: There was no instructional
error.
Further, as Dearborne and Middleton concluded, to the
extent the use of CALCRIM No. 1000 rendered the rape-in-
concert instruction “unclear or confusing,” Boles forfeited the
argument by failing to object at trial. (See Dearborne, supra,
34 Cal.App.5th at p. 262 [“‘A trial court has no sua sponte duty to
revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law without a
request from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification
of an otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for
purposes of appeal.’”]; accord, Middleton, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th
at p. 772.)
In any event, any instructional error would have been
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Boles argues the jury was
erroneously instructed it could convict him of rape in concert if it
found he personally committed a rape by duress, menace, or fear
as an alternative to finding he personally committed a rape by
force or violence. Even assuming the jury was so instructed and
even assuming such an instruction was erroneous, it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would still have found Boles
guilty of rape in concert if it had been given only the “correct”
instruction, which (according to Boles) would have limited the
definition of rape by force to only rape by force or violence. (See
Middleton, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 775.)
The evidence is overwhelming that the rape here was a
rape by force; Boles does not meaningfully contest that point. In
convicting Boles of rape in concert, the jury necessarily found
that he, as the personal perpetrator of the rape, committed a rape
by force. There is no evidence the rape was committed by any
28
means other than force. (See In re Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 568 [In determining whether an alternate theory error is
harmless under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18, “a reviewing court
may hold the error harmless where it would be impossible, based
on the evidence, for a jury to make the findings reflected in its
verdict without also making the findings that would support a
valid theory of liability.”]; accord, Middleton, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 775.)
3. The trial court erred in its instructions on oral
copulation in concert, but the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt
Boles was convicted of “oral copulation by acting in concert
with force” upon a child victim 14 or older in violation of former
section 288a, subdivision (d)(3) (now § 287, subdivision (d)(3)).
Boles contends, and the People concede, that the court’s
instructions erroneously allowed the jury to convict Boles on this
count without making the necessary finding that the oral
copulation was accomplished using force or fear.
The relevant statutory provision states in relevant part:
“Any person who, while voluntarily acting in concert with
another person, either personally or aiding and abetting that
other person, commits an act of oral copulation upon a victim who
is a minor 14 years of age or older, when the act is accomplished
against the victim’s will by means of force or fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person, shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 8, 10, or 12
years.” (§ 287, subd. (d)(3), italics added.)
29
The court instructed the jury on this count using CALCRIM
No. 1016, which provided in relevant part: “Boles is charged in
Count Fourteen with committing oral copulation by acting in
concert in violation of Penal Code section 288a(d). [¶] To prove
that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
that: [¶] 1. The defendant personally committed oral copulation
and voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and abetted
its commission; [¶] OR [¶] 2. The defendant voluntarily aided
and abetted someone else who personally committed oral
copulation. [¶] To decide whether a defendant committed oral
copulation, please refer to the separate instruction that I have
given you on that crime. . . . You must apply those instructions
when you decide whether the People have proved oral copulation
in concert.”
The separate instruction regarding oral copulation was
based on CALCRIM No. 1015. Although this instruction
described in full the crime of forcible oral copulation, it also
internally defined “oral copulation” without reference to force,
fear, or lack of consent. It stated in part: “Boles is charged in
Counts Five and Seven with oral copulation by force in violation
of Penal Code section 288a. [¶] To prove that the defendant is
guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant committed an act of oral copulation with someone else;
[¶] 2. The other person did not consent to the act; [¶] AND
[¶] 3. The defendant accomplished the act by force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury
to someone. [¶] Oral copulation is any contact, no matter how
slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or
30
anus of another person. Penetration is not required.”6 (Italics in
original.)
Because the CALCRIM No. 1016 oral copulation in concert
instruction itself contained no requirement that the oral
copulation be accomplished by force or fear (unlike the rape-in-
concert instruction, which stated the rape must be “forcible”), a
jury could conclude that Boles was guilty of oral copulation in
concert based on personally committing oral copulation as
defined in CALCRIM No. 1015—i.e. “any contact, no matter how
slight, between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or
anus of another person.”
This error, however, was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. The evidence was overwhelming that the oral copulation
here was accomplished by force, a point Boles does not
meaningfully contest.7 The oral copulation was committed by
6 The CALCRIM No. 1015 instruction further specified: “An
act is accomplished by force if a person uses enough physical force
to overcome the other person’s will. [¶] Duress means a direct or
implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution
that causes a reasonable person to do something that he or she
would not otherwise do. When deciding whether the act was
accomplished by duress, consider all the circumstances, including
the age of the other person and her relationship to the defendant.
[¶] Retribution is a form of payback or revenge. [¶] Menace
means a threat, statement, or act showing an intent to injure
someone. [¶] An act is accomplished by fear if the other person is
actually and reasonably afraid.” (Italics in original.)
7 This evidence includes that Chelsea resisted when Boles
first tried to shove his penis in her mouth; Boles pushed her to
the ground, pulled his penis out, and told her to suck his penis;
31
force and against Chelsea’s will. Thus, it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt the jury would still have found Boles guilty of
forcible oral copulation in concert if it had been given only the
“correct” instruction, which (according to Boles) would have
defined oral copulation for purposes of forcible oral copulation in
concert as oral copulation against the victim’s will by means of
force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.
In separately convicting Boles of forcible oral copulation
(count 7), the jury also necessarily found that he, as the personal
perpetrator of the oral copulation, did so by force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury
without Chelsea’s consent. (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); formerly
§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A).) Boles argues his conviction under count 7
cannot be used to support the requisite finding of oral copulation
accomplished by force or fear for purposes of oral copulation in
concert because the count 7 conviction could have been based on
“duress” or “menace” (terms which appear in the forcible oral
copulation instruction and statute but not in the oral copulation
in concert statute). Assuming, without deciding, this was error,
we conclude any such error would have been harmless in light of
the overwhelming evidence the oral copulation was accomplished
Chelsea kept moving her head to get away but Boles held her
head and put his penis on her lips; after first raping her, Boles
said he was going to slap her if she did not open her mouth; Boles
inserted his penis into her mouth, told her to suck it, and that if
she bit him, he would slap her with his penis and Boles
alternated between intercourse and orally copulating her for one
to two hours while she told him to stop and screamed loudly until
Sangalang placed a towel in her mouth.
32
by force, satisfying the necessary predicate finding for the oral
copulation in concert conviction.
C. There Was No Prejudice from the Cumulative Effect of the
Errors
Boles contends he suffered cumulative prejudice from
multiple errors. “‘[A] series of trial errors, though independently
harmless, may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the
level of reversible and prejudicial error.’” (In re Reno (2012)
55 Cal.4th 428, 483 [“In theory, the aggregate prejudice from
several different errors occurring at trial could require reversal
even if no single error was prejudicial by itself.”].) In evaluating
cumulative prejudice, we consider whether the aggregate errors
caused the trial to be fundamentally unfair in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee. (See People v.
Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 890; People v. Camacho (2022)
14 Cal.5th 77, 132 [cumulative error did not render trial
constitutionally unfair, observing “‘[d]efendant was entitled to a
fair trial but not a perfect one’”]; People v. Thomas (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 924, 971 [“‘The “litmus test” for cumulative error
“is whether defendant received due process and a fair trial.”’”].)
Considered cumulatively, the errors we identify did not
affect the outcome of Boles’s trial or deprive him of a fair trial.
As discussed, the admission of Middleton’s testimonial statement
and the jury instruction on oral copulation in concert were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Given the overwhelming
evidence of Boles’s guilt, these errors considered together did not
cause the trial to be fundamentally unfair.
33
D. Because the Trial Court’s Sentence Did Not Comply with
Amended Section 1170, Subdivision (b), Remand is
Necessary
Boles contends his case should be remanded for
resentencing because the trial court imposed middle term
sentences on multiple counts without complying with the
provisions of amended section 1170, subdivision (b). Specifically,
the provision that the lower term is the presumptive term for a
defendant under the age of 26 at the time of the offense whose
youth “contributed to the commission of the offense,” unless the
court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances such that imposition of the lower term
would be “contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6)(B)). Boles’s contention has merit.
1. Section 1170, subdivision (b)
At the time Boles was alleged to have committed the crimes
(February 2017), he was 19 years old. When the trial court
sentenced Boles in September 2021, former section 1170,
subdivison (b), provided, “When a judgment of imprisonment is to
be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the
choice of the appropriate term shall rest within the sound
discretion of the court.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 29, § 14.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 (2020-2021
Reg. Sess.) “amended section 1170, former subdivision (b) by
making the middle term the presumptive sentence for a term of
imprisonment unless certain circumstances exist.” (People v.
Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038 (Flores); see Stats. 2021,
ch. 731, § 1.3.) Amended section 1170, subdivisions (b)(1) and
(b)(2), now provides: “(1) When a judgment of imprisonment is to
34
be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the
court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence
not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (2). [¶] (2) The court may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Flores, at
p. 1038; Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1; see People v. Dunn (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 394, 401-403, review granted Oct. 12, 2022,
S275655 (Dunn); see also People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
459, 464 (Lopez).) “There is an exception to this rule for prior
convictions.” (People v. Ruiz (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1074,
review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283504.) “Notwithstanding
paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may consider the defendant’s
prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified
record of conviction,” without it having been stipulated to by the
defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a
jury or the judge in a court trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3); People v.
Suazo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 681, 705 (Suazo); see Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.420(c).)
Further, Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124
(2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) “added subdivision (b)(6) to section 1170,
which now provides [in relevant part] that ‘unless the court finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
35
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: . . . (B) The
person is a youth, or was a youth as defined under subdivision (b)
of Section 1016.7 at the time of the commission of the offense.’”
(Suazo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 705; see People v. Gaines
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 91, 142 [Sen. Bill No. 567 incorporates
amendments proposed by Assem. Bill No. 124 as the operative
law].) A defendant is considered a “youth” for purposes of this
provision if the defendant was “under 26 years of age on the date
the offense was committed.” (§§ 1016.7, subd. (b); 1170,
subd. (b)(6)(B); Flores, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) “Thus,
the legislation ‘establishes a presumption of the lower term if the
defendant’s youth was “a contributing factor” in [the] commission
of the crime.’” (People v. Fox (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 826, 831,
fn. 5; accord, Flores, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) But “the
court remains authorized to impose the middle term if the court
determines that the aggravating and mitigating factors show that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interest of
justice.” (People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 203).8
At least two courts addressing section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), have held that—unlike aggravating
circumstances necessary to impose the upper term under
subdivision (b)(2)—aggravating circumstances considered when
evaluating whether to impose the middle term for a youth need
not be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a
8 Effective March 2022, California Rules of Court, rule 4.420,
which sets forth the criteria for selecting the appropriate term of
imprisonment in felony sentencing, was also revised to
incorporate these amendments. (See Hilburn, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 201; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420.)
36
reasonable doubt. (See Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 204-205 [imposition of middle term under § 1170, subd. (b)(6),
does not require aggravating factors to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S.
466]; People v. Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922,
928-929 (Bautista-Castanon) [declining to import the
requirements of § 1170, subd. (b)(2), into subd. (b)(6), as a
prerequisite to imposing the middle term]; see also Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.420(d).)
Boles contends, the People concede, and we agree the
amendments to section 1170 are ameliorative changes that apply
retroactively to Boles’s nonfinal judgment. (See Dunn, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 403; People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
1098, 1108 (Zabelle); Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 465;
Flores, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.)
2. The trial court imposed middle terms for multiple
counts without deciding whether Boles’s youth was a
contributing factor to the crimes or that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice
The court sentenced Boles to an aggregate prison term of
21 years and eight months, consisting of the middle term of
10 years for oral copulation in concert (count 14), as the base
term; a consecutive term of two years and eight months (one
third the middle term) for human trafficking of a minor (count 3);
a consecutive term of the middle term of nine years for forcible
rape (count 6); and a concurrent term of one year for false
imprisonment (count 16). The court also imposed the middle
term of six years for forcible oral copulation (count 7) and the
37
middle term of nine years for forcible rape and rape by foreign
object (count 12), but those sentences were stayed pursuant to
section 654.
Regarding the base term for oral copulation in concert
(count 14), the court explained it was imposing the middle term
because there were factors both in aggravation and mitigation.
The court found factors in aggravation included Boles’s prior
criminal history and that he was on probation at the time of the
offense. The court stated factors in mitigation included that
certain evidence indicated Boles may have been induced by
Sangalang to commit the crime; the court noted there were
additional factors in mitigation argued by Boles’s counsel and in
the mitigation report, but did not make other particularized
findings regarding circumstances in mitigation or in
aggravation.9
At the time Boles was sentenced, section 1170 had not yet
been amended, and the trial court did not make the requisite
findings to sentence him to the middle term. Defense counsel
argued in Boles’s sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing
hearing that his youth was a mitigating factor, but the court did
not expressly determine whether his youth was a “contributing
factor in the commission of the offense” before examining the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The trial court also
9 The People argue that, “As to counts 3 and 6, the court
imposed the mid-term because the victim in this matter was
particularly vulnerable.” But as to these counts, the court did not
contemplate that the victim’s vulnerability warranted the middle
term, and instead stated it used this factor in its determination
that the sentences for these counts were to run consecutively.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425.)
38
did not make a finding “‘that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice’”
(Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 200), as required under the
amended statutory provision. After the statutory amendments
went into effect, “under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), the
sentencing court is tasked with assessing mitigating and
aggravating factors to impose the middle term only if it first
determines that the defendant qualifies for treatment under the
provision—because he or she . . . is a youthful offender, . . . and
those circumstances contributed to the offense.” (Id. at p. 205,
emphasis added.)
“Remand for resentencing is required in this case ‘unless
the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have
reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it
had such discretion.”’” (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
1067, 1096 (Gerson), quoting People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1354, 1391.) This is because defendants are entitled to
sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the “‘informed
discretion’” of the sentencing court. (Gerson, at p. 1096.) A court
that is not aware of the scope of its discretionary powers does not
exercise that informed discretion. (See ibid.)
We conclude the record before us does not “clearly indicate”
the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it
exercised its new discretion under amended section 1170. As
noted, because at the time Boles was sentenced section 1170 had
not yet been amended, the trial court made no finding regarding
whether Boles’s youth was a contributing factor to the
commission of the crime. And the trial court’s weighing of the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances is insufficiently
39
detailed for us to conclude that it would have determined that
imposing the lower term would be “contrary to the interests of
justice.” Here, the only aggravating factors expressly mentioned
by the trial court in selecting the middle terms were Boles’s prior
criminal history and probation status at the time of the offense,
and the only specific factor in mitigation mentioned by the court
was that Boles may have been induced by Sangalang to commit
the crime.10 The trial court acknowledged the existence of, but
did not specifically weigh, any other factors raised by the parties,
leaving us to speculate about the impact other factors or
combinations of factors may have had on its decision-making.
(Cf. Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 468 [remand required
where trial court relied on “long list” of aggravating factors but
gave no indication what decision it would make if fewer factors
were available].) Overall, we cannot say with certainty how the
court assessed other aggravating and mitigating factors, much
less whether it would conclude a middle term was warranted “in
the interests of justice” under amended section 1170. At most,
the record indicates the court weighed aggravating and
mitigating factors against each other and implicitly found they
balanced out, supporting a middle term sentence under the
former section 1170. The trial court should have the opportunity,
in the first instance, to consider whether a lower term sentence
10 Boles argues the trial court’s reliance on his criminal
history did not comply with section 1170, subdivision (b)(3). As
noted, that subdivision allows courts to consider the defendant’s
prior convictions as an aggravating factor when imposing an
upper term based on a certified record of conviction. Boles cites
no authority that applies to section 1170, subdivision (b)(3),
where, as here, the upper term is not implicated.
40
should be imposed, and the record does not clearly indicate how
the trial court would choose to exercise that discretion.
Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for the
trial court to resentence Boles under amended section 1170,
subdivision (b). (See Flores, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039
[vacating middle term sentence and remanding to the trial court
to decide in the first instance whether defendant under the age of
26 is entitled to the lower term under the amended law];
Bautista-Castanon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 928 [vacating
upper term sentence for 19-year-old defendant and remanding for
resentencing under amended § 1170, subds. (b)(1)-(3) and (b)(6)].)
On remand, “full resentencing” is warranted, including applicable
retroactive changes in the law. (People v. Jones (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 37, 46 [“the need to apply amended sections 1170,
subdivision (b), and 654 creates sufficiently “‘changed
circumstances’” [citation] to warrant a full resentencing”];
People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 902 [“the trial court
may revisit all of its sentencing choices in light of” the
amendments to § 1170, subd. (b)].) “A full resentencing may
involve the trial court’s revisiting such decisions as the selection
of a principal term, whether to stay a sentence, whether to
impose an upper, middle, or lower term, and whether to impose
concurrent or consecutive sentences.” (Jones, at p. 46; Bautista-
Castanon, at p. 927.)
“On remand, the parties are free to argue for the term they
believe is appropriate under the applicable law.” (People v.
Whitmore (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 116, 132; see Bautista-Castanon,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 931 [“at resentencing, [defendant]
may urge the court to consider any factors in mitigation that he
believes are appropriate”].) We decline to “direct the trial court
41
as to the factors it should consider or the weight it should assign
to any factor.” (Bautista-Castanon, at p. 931.)
E. The Trial Court’s Sentence Did Not Comply with Amended
Section 654, Which Must Also be Applied on Remand
At the time of Boles’s sentencing in 2021, former
section 654, subdivision (a), provided, “An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall
be punished under the provision that provides for the longest
potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or
omission be punished under more than one provision.” As
discussed, pursuant to former section 654, the trial court
sentenced Boles to 10 years for oral copulation in concert
(count 14), a consecutive term of two years and eight months for
human trafficking of a minor (count 3), a consecutive term of
nine years for forcible rape (count 6), and a concurrent term of
one year for false imprisonment (count 16). It imposed and
stayed terms of six years for forcible oral copulation (count 7) and
nine years for forcible rape and rape by foreign object (count 12),
pursuant to former section 654.
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 441) amended section 654 “to
remove the requirement that a court impose the longest sentence
when a defendant is convicted of more than one offense arising
from the same conduct.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 468;
accord, People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379
[“section 654 now provides the trial court with discretion to
impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could
result in the trial court imposing and executing the shorter
sentence rather than the longer sentence”].)
42
Boles contends, the People concede, and we agree Assembly
Bill No. 518’s changes to section 654 are ameliorative changes
that apply retroactively to nonfinal judgments under In re
Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745. (See People v. Fugit
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 981, 995-996 [defendant entitled to
retroactive benefit of Assembly Bill No. 518]; People v. Mani,
supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 379-380 [same]; see also People v.
Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308.)
Boles argues it was error for the trial court to impose and
execute the longer term sentence for oral copulation in concert
and stay the shorter term for forcible oral copulation, when each
punished him for the same act. Boles’s argument has merit.
Because at the time of sentencing, the trial court was required to
impose and execute the longest term of imprisonment, but now
has discretion as to which term of imprisonment to impose and
execute and which to stay, on remand the trial court must be
allowed to exercise its new discretion.
The People argue that the error was harmless but we reject
the argument because, as outlined above, Boles is entitled to a
full resentencing. (See People v. Jones, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 46 [“the need to apply amended sections 1170, subdivision (b),
and 654 creates sufficiently “‘changed circumstances’” [citation]
to warrant a full resentencing”]; People v. Garcia, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 902 [“the trial court may revisit all of its
sentencing choices in light of” the amendments to § 1170,
subd. (b)].)
43
DISPOSITION
The convictions are affirmed. We vacate the sentence and
direct the trial court to resentence Boles in accordance with
amended sections 654 and 1170, subdivision (b), and any other
applicable ameliorative legislation.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
RAPHAEL, J.*
* Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
44
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