People v. Martin CA2/6

CourtListener 9567549Calctapp17.06.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/17/24 P. v. Martin CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B325048
(Super. Ct. No. 2021029627)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

TRAVIS EDWARD MARTIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Travis Edward Martin appeals from a judgment following a
trial at which the jury found him guilty of seven counts of
committing a lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code1, § 288, subd. (a);
counts 1-7), posing or modeling a minor for sexual purposes
(§ 311.4, subd. (c); count 8), and possession or control of child
pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a); count 9). As to all counts,
appellant admitted two strike priors (§§ 667, 1170.12). As to each
of counts one through seven, appellant admitted two prior

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code

unless otherwise noted.
convictions for committing a lewd act upon a child (§ 667.61,
subds. (a), (d)) and a serious felony prior (§ 667, subd. (a)
(§ 667(a)). The court sentenced appellant to a total term of 610
years to life: (1) 75 years to life under the Three Strikes Law,
plus an additional five years for the section 667(a) serious felony
priors, for counts one through seven; and (2) 25 years to life for
counts eight and nine.
Regarding his convictions, appellant contends: (1) the trial
court prejudicially erred in admitting Evidence Code section 1108
evidence; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating
the evidence during closing argument; (3) the court improperly
admitted expert evidence regarding Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome; and (4) cumulative error.
Concerning his sentence, appellant asserts the court
abused its discretion in both (1) denying appellant’s request to
strike the section 667(a) serious felony prior enhancements; and
(2) sentencing appellant to a term of 610 years to life in violation
of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Background Information
Natalie Wald2 met appellant through his parents, whom
Natalie and her husband James Wald had met at church.
Natalie and James had two children—a daughter, Jane Doe, and
a son.
Appellant’s mother told Natalie appellant was incarcerated
for child sexual abuse. Appellant served a sentence of
approximately three and a half years. In 2016, several years

2 We refer to the Walds by their first names to avoid

confusion. No disrespect is intended. We refer to the charged
victim as “Jane Doe” or “Doe.”

2
after appellant’s release from prison, appellant and James
became business partners when they purchased a company called
Entertainment Technology. Appellant paid for many family trips
with the Walds, to places like Disneyland, June Lake, and Great
Wolf Lodge. Appellant also paid the private school tuition for the
Wald children.
Natalie allowed appellant to take her children to his home
in Oxnard, where he lived with his mother, once or twice a week.
The children thought of appellant as a fun uncle and his mother
as a grandmother.
Jane Doe’s Testimony
Jane Doe was seven years old when she testified at
appellant’s trial. At Great Wolf Lodge, after putting on her
swimsuit, appellant licked her vagina. Later, after a swim,
appellant licked Doe’s vagina again. He also touched Doe’s
vagina with his finger at Great Wolf Lodge. Appellant forced Doe
to put her mouth on his penis “a lot of times at his house.” At his
house, he also touched Doe’s vagina with his fingers more than
once. He orally copulated her at his home and at Disneyland.
Appellant told Doe that her mother would hate Doe if Doe told
her what he was doing.
When she was about four years old, Doe told her mother
Natalie about appellant’s conduct. Natalie did not believe Doe at
that time because appellant denied. Natalie later believed her
when they talked at the park.
Doe’s Reports to Natalie
Natalie testified that sometime before Doe turned five in
February 2020, and likely shortly before September 28, 2019, Doe
told Natalie appellant had licked her “hoo-hoo,” Doe’s word for
vagina. Natalie called appellant, who denied and said he could
no longer spend time with Doe. Doe cried and stated she did not

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know why she said appellant had done that. Natalie did not tell
Child Protective Services or the police. After a brief hiatus,
appellant began seeing the children again, and the status quo
returned within a few months.
On October 31, 2021, appellant and Natalie argued about
appellant picking up and holding Doe. The argument escalated,
and Natalie threatened to call the police. On November 3, 2021,
appellant spoke to Natalie and her husband about Natalie no
longer doing accounting work for Entertainment Technologies.
From Doe’s initial report until November 2021, Natalie had
asked Doe every few weeks if there had been “any licking going
on.” Doe had denied. On November 4, 2021, Natalie asked Doe if
anyone ever touched her, and she said no. Natalie had a feeling
Doe was lying. The next day, Natalie took Doe to the park and
asked if she had any secrets. Doe said appellant licked her “hoo-
hoo” and called it “cleaning,” and he touched her “hoo-hoo” with
his hands. Doe touched appellant’s “privates” and put her mouth
on it. Doe indicated the conduct occurred at Disneyland and
June Lake. That same day, Natalie called the police.
Police Investigation and Appellant’s Arrest
On November 9, 2021, Detective Meagan Yates interviewed
Doe, who was about six and a half years old at the time. Doe said
when she was with appellant at Great Wolf Lodge, appellant
touched her vagina with his fingers and made her touch his
private part with her hands and mouth. Appellant also touched
her vagina with his fingers and tongue at his house in Oxnard.
Doe said appellant called licking “cleaning” and told Doe not to
tell her mother. Doe said appellant never took pictures of her but
showed her a video of two four-year-old girls showering together.
Law enforcement found photos of a young female’s exposed
vaginal and anal area on appellant’s iPad. One photo appeared

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to show an adult hand spreading the child’s labia open to better
expose her vagina. Detective Yates believed clothing the female
in the photos wore matched Jane Doe’s clothing, which Natalie
had provided.
Evidence Code Section 1108 Testimony
Autumn F. was 27 years old at the time of appellant’s trial.
Appellant offered to babysit Autumn when her parents were
divorcing. Autumn was eight when she and appellant began
spending time alone. Appellant took her to the movies, to toy
stores, and on drives. When Autumn was nine, appellant asked
her to take her clothes off at his shop. Appellant wanted to
photograph her, but she refused to smile until her clothes were
back on. He inserted his fingers into her vagina for about 20 to
30 minutes, which hurt. Appellant licked her vagina. He took
quite a few photos of Autumn after she put her clothes back on.
Appellant attempted to molest Autumn at Disneyland. He
told his family she needed to take a nap. At the hotel room,
appellant told Autumn to lay down. She did, and appellant
climbed on top of her and tried to pull her pants down. Appellant
touched her vagina with his tongue over her underwear. He also
visited Autumn’s family at their home. For about a year, every
time he came into Autumn’s room to say goodnight, he would put
his fingers into her vagina. Appellant threatened to kill her
mother if she told anybody. Autumn told no one until she was
taken to the police. Appellant confessed to some of the conduct
Autumn described as occurring at the shop and at Disneyland.
In 2006, appellant was convicted of two counts of lewd and
lascivious acts with a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)) and one
count of using a minor for sex acts (§ 311.4, subd. (c)). At the
trial for his conduct against Doe, appellant stipulated to those
convictions.

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Hailee G. was 26 years old at the time of appellant’s trial.
In 2006, appellant was an adult, and she was around ten years
old. Hailee’s family moved in with appellant for about a year.
Appellant would take her shopping and buy her whatever she
wanted. But eventually, appellant started doing things she did
not like. At first, he sat next to her and put his arm around her.
Then, he would have her sit on his lap and touch her by the
waist. The conduct progressed to touching her under her clothes
but over her underwear. Ultimately, appellant started touching
Hailee’s vagina and inserting his finger inside it. She would “tell
him no,” but appellant would try to hold her. Initially, Hailee did
not tell anyone about appellant’s acts because she thought they
were friends. Later, she told her stepmom, and the police were
contacted.
Kasey N., Hailee’s sister, was 22 years old at the time of
trial. Kasey was six years old in 2006. Appellant would give her
extra sweets and would touch her inappropriately when they
were alone together. Over three times, appellant put his hand
down her pants and rubbed her vagina with his fingers. Kasey
testified that in order to keep her quiet, appellant would pretend
he was someone else, a person who lived in the home and who
Kasey loved. She kept quiet for a while but ultimately told her
mom and the police about the abuse. Neither Kasey’s nor
Hailee’s claims resulted in convictions.
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
Dr. Anthony Urquiza testified as an expert on Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). Dr. Urquiza
explained CSAAS is neither a diagnosis nor a mental health
disorder. He also testified CSAAS is not and should not be used
to identify abused victims. Instead, it is a description of common
behaviors of a sexually abused child.

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Dr. Urquiza did not interview Jane Doe, nor did he read the
police reports in her case.
DISCUSSION
Evidence Code Section 1108 Testimony
Appellant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in
admitting the Evidence Code section 1108 evidence. We disagree.
Evidence Code section 1101 generally “limits the
admissibility of so-called ‘propensity’ or ‘disposition’ evidence
offered to prove a person’s conduct on a particular occasion.”
(People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 822-823.)
Evidence Code section 11083 creates an exception to this rule
authorizing the admission of evidence of the defendant’s prior
sexual offenses unless it would be unduly prejudicial pursuant to
Evidence Code section 352.4
Evidence Code section 1108 creates a “presumption in favor
of admissibility.” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 59.)
Nevertheless, trial courts “must engage in a careful weighing
process under [Evidence Code] section 352.” Factors the court
should consider include whether the prior act is remote, “the

3 Evidence Code section 1108 states: “In a criminal action
in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of
the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses
is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not
inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd.
(a).)

4 Evidence Code section 352 provides that “[t]he court in its

discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)

7
degree of certainty of its commission, and the . . . similarity to the
charged offense. (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917
(Falsetta).) We review admission under Evidence Code section
1108 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Cordova (2015) 62 Cal.4th
104, 132.)
Appellant argues the uncharged offenses against Hailee
and Kasey were not similar because they did not involve oral
copulation or photography. But he ignores other similarities that
made the evidence highly probative. In each case, appellant
spent time with the family. He initiated a period of grooming in
which he bought toys or provided extra sweets. Then, he engaged
in sexual misconduct to varying degrees. Common to Hailee,
Kasey, and Doe was appellant using his hands to touch their
vaginas. The three were similar in age when abused.
Appellant argues Hailee’s and Kasey’s roughly 16-year-old
offenses were too temporally remote. However, courts have
repeatedly upheld admission when the offenses occurred many
years prior. (See e.g., People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th
274, 285 [similarity between offenses “‘balanced out’” a 30-year
gap]; People v. Waples (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395 [20-year
gap not too remote].) Given their similarity with the charged
crimes, the offenses against Hailee and Kasey were not too
remote.
Appellant argues Hailee’s and Kasey’s testimony was
unreliable because appellant denied their allegations, they were
never proven in court, and there was no corroboration. However,
appellant’s denial does not make the testimony unreliable, and
neither does the lack of a conviction, especially when no charges
were filed. Absence of corroboration is unsurprising given the
“secretive nature of sex crimes.” (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at

8
p. 911.) Ultimately, the jury was the judge of whether the
testimony was credible.
We have considered appellant’s additional challenges to
Hailee’s and Kasey’s testimony and find them equally
unpersuasive.
Appellant asserts the trial court should have excluded
Autumn F.’s testimony as cumulative of appellant’s confessions
and convictions. But the prosecution was not obliged to rely
solely on such antiseptic evidence. (Cf. People v. Johnson (2015)
61 Cal.4th 734, 767.) Moreover, Autumn testified about
additional acts of sexual abuse for which appellant was not
charged or convicted. The court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the Evidence Code section 1108 testimony.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Appellant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by
misstating the evidence in closing argument; he argues the error
requires reversal. We conclude appellant forfeited this claim by
failing to timely object at trial. However, even considering the
merits of the claim, the error was harmless.
“[M]ischaracterizing the evidence is misconduct.” (People v.
Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823.) To preserve a misconduct claim
for appeal, a defendant must make a timely objection unless “an
objection would have been futile . . . .” (People v. Winbush (2017)
2 Cal.5th 402, 485.)
The prosecutor misstated the evidence in closing argument
when he indicated that all the prior offenses involved oral
copulation and photography. Appellant did not object. The
objection would not have been futile. We conclude the claim is
forfeited.
Appellant argues defense counsel’s failure to object
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We are

9
unpersuaded. “[D]eciding whether to object is inherently tactical,
and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective
assistance.” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502.)
Counsel might have believed objecting “would focus the jury’s
attention on the [prior conduct] in ways that would not be helpful
to the defense.” (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1289.)
Regardless, the error was harmless under both federal and
state constitutional standards. Under the federal standard the
misstatement did not infect the trial with such “‘unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process . . . .’”
(People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 955.) Under the state
standard, it was not “reasonably probable the trial outcome was
affected.” (People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 127.)
The prosecutor’s circumscribed misstatement did not result
in a denial of due process nor is it reasonably probable the
outcome would have been different absent the error. The trial
court instructed the jury that the attorney arguments are not
evidence. (CALCRIM No. 222.) We presume the jury follows
such instructions. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30.)
Appellant contends the misconduct improperly bolstered
Doe’s credibility by exaggerating the similarity between the prior
and charged offenses. Although the prior and charged offenses
differed in some respects, they all shared many similarities.
Moreover, the prosecutor made no misstatement as to Autumn.
Ultimately, Doe’s detailed testimony was largely consistent
with her prior statements. The Evidence Code section 1108
witnesses lend credence to her account, as do photographs
recovered from appellant’s iPad. While the prosecutor slightly
overstated the similarity between prior and charged offenses, we
cannot find a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

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CSAAS Evidence
Appellant contends the trial court should have excluded Dr.
Urquiza’s CSAAS testimony. We disagree.
Appellant argues the CSAAS evidence should have been
subject to Kelly/Frye scientific reliability standards. (People v.
Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24; Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923)
293 F.1013.)
As this court recently determined in People v. Munch (2020)
52 Cal.App.5th 464, the Kelly/Frye rule does not apply to CSAAS
evidence. CSAAS is not expert testimony based on a new
scientific technique or method. We see no reason to reconsider
this well-established conclusion.
Appellant posits the trial court should have excluded the
CSAAS evidence because it improperly bolstered Jane Doe’s
credibility and allowed the jury to consider it as evidence of guilt.
Appellant maintains CALCRIM No. 11935 did not cure this error
but misstated the law.
We rejected a similar challenge in People v. Gonzales (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 494 (Gonzales). In Gonzales, as here, the CSAAS
expert testified that CSAAS is not a tool to help diagnose child
sexual abuse. (Id. at pp. 503-504.) We concluded “[t]he CSAAS

5 The jury was instructed using CALCRIM No. 1193: “You
have heard testimony from Dr. Anthony Urquiza regarding child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. [¶] Dr. Urquiza’s
testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is
not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes
charged against him or any conduct or crimes with which he was
not charged. [¶] You may consider this evidence only in deciding
whether or not [Jane Doe’s] conduct was not inconsistent with the
conduct of someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the
believability of her testimony.”

11
evidence simply neutralizes the victim’s apparently self-
impeaching behavior.” (Id. at p. 504.) “Thus, under CALCRIM
No. 1193, a juror who believes [Dr. Urquiza’s] testimony will find
both that [Doe’s] apparently self-impeaching behavior does not
affect her believability one way or the other, and that the CSAAS
evidence does not show she had been molested. There is no
conflict in the instruction.” (Ibid.)
Appellant takes issue with the instruction’s use of “‘not
inconsistent,’” contending “not inconsistent” is the same as
“consistent.” Even if true,6 the instruction provides CSAAS
evidence is to be considered “in deciding whether or not [Doe’s]
conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who
has been molested . . . .” (italics added.) As we explained in
Gonzales: “A reasonable juror would understand CALCRIM No.
1193 to mean that the jury can use [Dr. Urquiza’s] testimony to
conclude that [Doe’s] behavior does not mean she lied when she
said she was abused.” (Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at
p. 504.) CSAAS evidence and the attendant instruction serve to
“disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions of child sexual
abuse . . . .” (Id., at p. 503, citing People v. McAlpin (1991) 53
Cal.3d 1289, 1301.) Addressing those misconceptions
“neutralizes the victim’s apparently self-impeaching behavior”
(id., at p. 504), leaving the parties free to argue and the jury to
determine what the conduct may mean, including that the

6 CALCRIM No. 1193 was modified in September 2022, and

this part of the instruction now states: “You may consider this
evidence only in deciding whether or not [the alleged victim’s]
conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has
been molested, and in evaluating the believability of the alleged
victim.”

12
behavior, such as delay in reporting, could be indicative of
falsehood.
We conclude the trial court properly admitted and
instructed on the CSAAS evidence.
Cumulative Error
Appellant claims cumulative error necessitates reversal.
We detected only one error—the prosecutor’s misstatement
during closing argument—and concluded it was harmless.
Accordingly, there is no cumulative error.
Section 667(a) Serious Felony Prior Enhancements
Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to strike the section 667(a) serious felony prior
enhancements. We disagree.
Section 1385 vests the trial court with the authority to
dismiss enhancements. We review the exercise of that authority
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
287, 298.) When, “‘as here, a discretionary power is statutorily
vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion “must not
be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.”’” (People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242-243.)
Appellant contends the refusal to dismiss the section 667(a)
enhancements contradicted the trial court’s initial statement that
a single term of 75 years to life would have been sufficient.
However, the court made that statement before hearing counsels’
argument. After argument, the court found the prosecution
“summed it up well. The prior offenses were of the same type,
and the circumstances were very similar to those of this as well,
making any grant of motion to strike unwise and unwarranted in

13
this circumstance.” Openness to argument does not indicate
abuse of discretion.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Appellant argues his sentence of 610 years to life violates
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. He
maintains he “does not deserve a sentence which is the functional
equivalent of life without the possibility of parole.” Appellant
contends a sentence he cannot possibly complete serves no
rational legislative or penological purpose. We conclude
appellant’s sentence is not cruel or unusual.
Under the California Constitution, a sentence constitutes
cruel or unusual punishment if it is “‘so disproportionate to the
crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and
offends fundamental notions of human dignity.’” (People v. Dillon
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478; Cal. Const., art. 1, § 17.) Deference to
the Legislature “is an important element in any
disproportionality analysis.” (In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959,
972.) Three analytical techniques aid this deferential review:
“(1) an examination of the nature of the offense and the offender,
with particular attention to the degree of danger both pose to
society; (2) a comparison of the punishment with the punishment
California imposes for more serious offenses; and (3) a
comparison of the punishment with that prescribed in other
jurisdictions for the same offense.” (Id. at p. 973.)
Without recounting the graphic details, appellant
repeatedly sexually abused a young child. Appellant concedes
“the conduct as found true by the jury is morally reprehensible
. . . .” (See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) 535 U.S. 234,
244 [“The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an
act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people”].) Of
course, “[t]here exists a strong public policy to protect children of

14
tender years.” (People v. Olsen (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 646.)
Especially given appellant had already served prison time for
sexual abuse of a child under similar circumstances, appellant
manifestly poses a danger to society.
As to comparison with more serious offenses in California,
“lewd conduct on a child may not be the most grave of all
offenses, but its seriousness is considerable. It may have lifelong
consequences to the well-being of the child.” (People v.
Christensen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 781, 806.) Moreover, a
substantial portion of appellant’s sentence stems from his prior
convictions and the Three Strikes Law. The United States
Supreme Court has approved recidivist statutes that “deal[] in a
harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have
shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms
of society as established by its criminal law.” (Rummel v. Estelle
(1980) 445 U.S. 263, 276; Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11
[affirming a life sentence for grand theft under California’s Three
Strikes Law].) Similarly, “[w]hen faced with recidivist
defendants . . . California appellate courts have consistently
found the Three Strikes law is not cruel and unusual
punishment.” (People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354,
359.)
Appellant directs us to no jurisdiction with lesser
punishment for similar offenses. Regardless, the state
constitution “does not require California to march in lockstep
with other states in fashioning a penal code. It does not require
‘conforming our Penal Code to the “majority rule” or the least
common denominator of penalties nationwide.’” (People v.
Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1516.) Fundamentally,
appellant’s punishment is not so disproportionately harsh as to

15
shock the conscience or offend notions of human dignity. The
punishment is not cruel or unusual under the state constitution.
California courts have repeatedly affirmed sentences
exceeding the defendant’s natural life. (See, e.g., People v.
Andrade (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1309-1310 [195 years to
life upheld]; People v. Panighetti (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 978, 1000-
1004 [280 years to life].) Such punishment promotes deterrence
of potential offenders by unequivocally expressing society’s
intolerance of the punished behavior. “In practical effect,
[appellant] is in no different position than a defendant who has
received a sentence of life without possibility of parole: he will be
in prison all his life.” (People v. Byrd (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1373,
1383.)
Nor does appellant’s sentence violate the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. (U.S. Const.,
8th Amend.) The Eighth Amendment contains a “‘narrow
proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’”
(Ewing v. California, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 20 (lead opn. of
O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.).)
“Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges
to the proportionality of particular sentences have been
exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v. Estelle, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 272.)
“There is considerable overlap in the state and federal
approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently . . . [t]he
touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’” (People v. Baker
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 733.)
The Eighth Amendment analysis begins with a comparison
between the gravity of the offense and the severity of the
sentence. (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 60.) In the
“‘rare case’” this threshold comparison leads to an inference of
gross disproportionality, “the court should then compare the

16
defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other
offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences
imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” (Ibid.) For
reasons discussed above, appellant’s case is not the rare situation
in which an inference of gross disproportionality arises.
Therefore, no Eighth Amendment violation exists.
We have reviewed appellant’s remaining contentions and
conclude he has not shown grounds for reversal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

17
David R. Worley, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________

Bases & Bases, Arielle Bases, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Harris, Deputy Attorney
General, and Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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