CourtListener 9567529•People v. Townsend CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/17/24 P. v. Townsend CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B327087
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA100011)
v.
DEVAUGHN CLIFFORD
TOWNSEND,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Scott T. Millington, Judge. Affirmed.
Caneel C. Fraser, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
Defendant and appellant Devaughn Clifford Townsend
was found guilty of forcible rape and domestic violence and was
sentenced to six years in prison. He contends the trial court
committed evidentiary error, instructional error and sentencing
error.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The victim in this case, M.J., first met defendant in May
2018 and quickly fell into a romantic relationship with him.
Defendant was charming at first but within a few days of their
meeting, he began showing a jealous, controlling and aggressive
side to his personality.
On June 8, 2018, defendant picked up M.J. after she got off
work to celebrate her birthday. They made a few stops, including
at a liquor store, a restaurant and defendant’s cousin’s
apartment. They drank alcohol and got four ecstasy pills from
defendant’s cousin.
On the drive back to M.J.’s apartment, defendant was
angry and yelling at M.J., accusing her of being flirtatious and
wanting to sleep with his cousin. Defendant called her a “stupid
bitch,” repeatedly told her to “shut the fuck up” and slapped her
face. He was driving fast and aggressively. At some point, when
they stopped at an intersection next to a truck with two men in it,
defendant yelled out the window to them, asking if they wanted
M.J., telling them she was “for sale.”
Once they got back to M.J.’s apartment, M.J. felt she had
no choice but to let defendant come inside. She was scared of his
behavior but hoped she could settle him down. They talked for
awhile to no avail. Defendant told M.J. that his plan for that
night had been to get her drugged and have her gang-raped by
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the men at his cousin’s apartment because he was mad at her,
believing she had been saying bad things about him. Sometime
close to 2:00 a.m., M.J. thought defendant had fallen asleep, so
she went to a nearby store to buy cigarettes.
Defendant repeatedly called M.J. on her phone while she
was out buying cigarettes. When she returned to her apartment,
defendant was angry and resumed yelling at her and calling her
names. He picked up her small dog, held it out over the balcony
and threatened to drop it. M.J. grabbed her dog away from
defendant and locked it in the bathroom to protect it. Defendant
lit a cigarette and threatened to burn her repeatedly. M.J. said
he did not touch her with it, but some portion of the cigarette
eventually fell on her chest and burned her.
Defendant forcefully “headbutted” M.J. causing her to fall
to the floor and hit her head. Defendant ordered M.J. to get up
and get on the bed. She briefly refused but was scared of getting
hit again so she sat on the edge of the bed. He hit her in the
throat causing her to lose her breath. When M.J. would not lie
down, defendant hit her in the throat again. M.J. told defendant
to stop and said no several times. She tried to keep her knees
together but defendant forced her legs apart and raped her, all
the while yelling at her and telling her to “shut the fuck up” and
learn how to listen to him.
After defendant left her apartment, M.J. called a friend and
had him drive her to her father’s home. After reporting the rape
to police later that morning, she was taken to the hospital and a
rape examination was performed.
Registered nurse Leanne Heiland testified about the rape
examination she performed on M.J. and explained the various
physical injuries she documented, including to M.J.’s face, back of
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her head, chin, collarbone, right arm and leg, and her back.
Ms. Heiland explained that she did not see injuries to M.J.’s
vagina, but that in her experience about 50 percent of individuals
examined after a rape do not have visible injuries.
The officer who spoke with M.J. on the day she reported the
rape testified that she was upset and crying and had visible
bruising on her face.
Photographs of M.J.’s injuries were shown to the jury and
admitted into evidence.
The parties stipulated that DNA testing confirmed the
presence of defendant’s semen in samples collected during M.J.’s
rape examination.
Defendant exercised his right not to testify. He presented
the testimony of his longtime friend, Eric Gooden. Mr. Gooden
said that M.J. told him sometime in May 2018 that she would
“fuck [defendant] up” if he ever left her. She also told him one
day when she was looking for defendant that she would sleep
with him if he would tell her where defendant was. Mr. Gooden
said he had seen M.J. acting angry and belligerent when she
drank alcohol.
Defendant also elicited testimony from Detective Nancy
Ladner who said she had difficulty scheduling interviews with
M.J. and that on one of the days they met, M.J. appeared to be
intoxicated.
The jury found defendant guilty of forcible rape (Pen. Code,
§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 1) and injuring a girlfriend after a prior
domestic violence conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2).
In a bifurcated bench proceeding, the court received
evidence regarding the prior strike allegation and aggravating
factors. The court found the prosecution failed to prove
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defendant’s out-of-state conviction for battery with the use of a
deadly weapon qualified as a strike under California law. The
court found true six of the seven alleged aggravating factors,
including that defendant took advantage of a position of a trust
with the victim, defendant had engaged in violent conduct that
indicated a serious danger to society, defendant’s prior
convictions were numerous or of increasing seriousness,
defendant had served a prior term in prison or county jail,
defendant was on probation at the time the current offenses were
committed, and defendant’s prior performance on probation was
unsatisfactory. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11), (b)(1)-(5).)
The court also found, for purposes of count 2, that defendant had
suffered a prior conviction for domestic violence in May 2017.
The court then continued the matter for sentencing,
acknowledging the recent amendments to Penal Code
section 1170 and allowing the parties to submit supplemental
sentencing briefs.
The court sentenced defendant to a midterm of six years on
count 1, plus a concurrent four-year midterm on count 2. The
court awarded defendant 985 days of presentence custody credits
(857 actual, 128 conduct) and issued a protective order in favor of
M.J.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. The Admission of Certified Records of Prior
Domestic Violence Conviction (Exhibit 28)
Evidence Code section 1109, subdivision (a)(1) provides in
relevant part that “evidence of the defendant’s commission of
other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101
if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.”
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(Ibid.) As noted in People v. Merchant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
1179, 1192, the “statute reflects the Legislature’s determination
that in domestic violence cases, similar prior offenses are
uniquely probative of a defendant’s guilt on a later occasion.”
The prosecutor here moved to introduce the certified
records of defendant’s prior domestic violence conviction from
May 2017 as propensity evidence pursuant to Penal Code
section 1109. In that prior case (case No. BA452173), defendant
pled no contest to a violation of section 273.5 regarding a former
girlfriend (D.R.) and was placed on five years of probation. The
certified records, marked as exhibit 28, consisted of 33 pages of
minute orders.
The prosecutor requested an order allowing D.R. to testify
and also allowing the admission of the certified records. D.R. had
been served with a subpoena, but the prosecutor asked for an
order allowing the admission of the records alone in the event
D.R. failed to appear. Defense counsel objected, saying the
records of conviction should not be admitted if D.R. did not
testify. At no point did defense counsel argue for any portion of
the certified records to be sanitized or redacted.
The trial court, citing People v. Wesson (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 959, ruled the prosecution could present
evidence of the prior conviction through the testimony of D.R. and
also by offering the certified records of the prior conviction.
D.R. did not testify at trial. At the conclusion of its case-in-
chief, the prosecution moved exhibit 28 in its entirety into
evidence. At sidebar, the court asked defense counsel if there
was any objection to the records being admitted other than what
had been previously argued. Defense counsel said no.
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Defendant concedes the admissibility of the fact of his prior
domestic violence conviction. But he says the admission of all
33 pages of unredacted minute orders related to that conviction
was prejudicial error. Defendant contends the court “ran far
afoul” of the requirements of Evidence Code section 352 by failing
to redact the irrelevant and inflammatory portions of the minute
orders. He says the error denied him his right to due process and
a fair trial.
This contention has been forfeited. (People v. Fuiava (2012)
53 Cal.4th 622, 670 [a defendant’s failure to object to content of
records or ask the trial court to redact them, forfeits the claimed
evidentiary error on appeal].) Despite ample opportunity to do
so, defendant never asked the court to sanitize or redact
exhibit 28. The court was never asked to conduct an analysis of
any portion of exhibit 28 under Evidence Code section 352 and to
redact those portions found to be more prejudicial than probative.
The issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 (Partida) [“A party cannot
argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not
asked to conduct.”].) We also reject defendant’s brief, conclusory
argument in his reply brief that if we find forfeiture, we should
find his trial counsel ineffective. (People v. Johnson (2016)
62 Cal.4th 600, 653 [claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
generally not appropriate for resolution on direct appeal].)
In any event, even if we were to assume for the sake of
argument that the trial court committed error in not sua sponte
redacting the certified records under Evidence Code section 352,
it is not reasonably probable defendant would have achieved a
more favorable outcome in the absence of such error. (People v.
Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 227 [“application of ordinary rules
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of evidence like Evidence Code section 352 does not implicate the
federal Constitution”; error is reviewed for state law error under
reasonable probability standard of People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818].)
The evidence of defendant’s guilt was strong. M.J. testified
credibly and in some detail about defendant’s assaultive behavior
that culminated in him forcibly raping her in her own home.
M.J.’s testimony was corroborated by the DNA evidence and the
evidence documenting her physical injuries, including multiple
photographs. None of the facts defendant now claims is
objectionable in exhibit 28, such as defendant having been found
to have violated probation and failing to appear in his prior
domestic violence case, is more shocking or inflammatory than
the details attested to by M.J. about defendant’s conduct on the
night of the rape. Moreover, defendant failed to present any
defense that provided a coherent alternate explanation for how
M.J. received her injuries, other than by attacking her credibility
with the testimony of a longtime friend of defendant’s.
Defendant has not demonstrated it was reasonably probable he
could have obtained a more favorable outcome had certain details
from exhibit 28 been redacted.
Defendant argues the error violated his right to due process
and therefore we should assess prejudice under the more
stringent federal standard. “But the admission of evidence, even
if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation
only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.” (Partida, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 439.) Defendant has not shown his trial was
fundamentally unfair.
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2. Unanimity Instruction (Count 2)
Defendant contends the court erred by failing to instruct
the jury it had to unanimously agree on which of the multiple
acts of violence constituted the domestic violence charged in
count 2 (Pen. Code, § 273.5). We disagree.
The trial court has a sua sponte duty to provide a
unanimity instruction if the evidence warrants it. (People v. Riel
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1199.) But a unanimity instruction is not
required where multiple acts committed by a defendant
constitute a continuous course of conduct. (People v. Covarrubias
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 879.)
As the Supreme Court explained in People v. Williams
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 682, “ ‘[t]he “continuous conduct” rule
applies when the defendant offers essentially the same defense to
each of the acts, and there is no reasonable basis for the jury to
distinguish between them.’ ” In Williams, the prosecutor argued
there were two crimes occurring close in time but the defendant
“did not offer a defense based on a showing that he committed
either the attempted robbery or the completed robbery, but not
both. Rather, his defense was that he was not present at the
scene of the crime and therefore played no role whatsoever in any
of the crimes committed there. A unanimity instruction therefore
was not required.” (Ibid., italics added.)
The same analysis applies here. Defendant offered only
one defense based on the victim’s credibility. Defendant did not
offer different defenses to the various violent acts attested to by
M.J. that occurred over a period of hours culminating in the
forcible rape. Defendant argued only that M.J. was simply not to
be believed—that none of the incidents of violence occurred and
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that any injuries she suffered occurred through no fault of
defendant’s. A unanimity instruction was therefore not required.
Assuming for the sake of argument it was error to not give
a unanimity instruction, we conclude any such error was
harmless by any standard. Where, as here, “the defendant
offered the same defense to all criminal acts and ‘the jury’s
verdict implies that it did not believe the only defense offered,’
failure to give a unanimity instruction is harmless error.’ ”
(People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 577; accord,
People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307; People v. Thompson
(1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 843, 853 [where “record indicates the jury
resolved the basic credibility dispute against the defendant and
therefore would have convicted him of any of the various offenses
shown by the evidence, the failure to give the unanimity
instruction is harmless”].)
3. Aggravating Factors
Defendant also contends the court committed sentencing
error by making improper dual use of two aggravating factors.
Defendant says the court misapplied the factors that defendant
occupied a position of trust with his victim and used violence,
both of which were elements of the charged offenses.
Defendant forfeited this contention by failing to raise it in
the trial court. In People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356, the
court held that “complaints about the manner in which the trial
court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its
supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”
This includes complaints that the court erred “because it double-
counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various
factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number
of valid reasons.” (Id. at p. 353.)
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We reject defendant’s contention the sentence imposed was
unauthorized such that the doctrine of forfeiture does not apply.
The court took great care in considering defendant’s argument
regarding the statutory changes effected by Senate Bill No. 567
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) and Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) and his request to impose a low term sentence
pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). The
court allowed supplemental briefing and allowed ample
opportunity for argument. The court said it believed defendant
had suffered childhood trauma that may have contributed to
defendant’s criminal conduct, but specifically noted several times
that it was relying on the statutory exception to impose a
midterm sentence. The court referred to the statutory language
of subdivision (b)(6), explaining that a low term sentence need
not be imposed where the court finds “the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, [and] that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interest of
justice. I do find that to be the case.”
The court made clear it was concerned with defendant’s
criminal history and his inability to learn from past mistakes.
The court referred to defendant’s behavior as predatory and that
he had to consider defendant’s “long history of abusing women” in
crafting an appropriate sentence. The court also pointed out that
defendant’s Static 99 score was a 5, meaning he was an above
average risk for reoffending. The court then recited the six
aggravating factors it had previously found true and imposed a
midterm sentence on both counts and ran the terms concurrently.
The court acted well within its sentencing discretion and within
the bounds of the applicable statutory law.
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In any event, any error was harmless. Defendant does not
challenge the court’s findings on four of the aggravating factors:
defendant’s prior convictions were numerous or of increasing
seriousness, defendant had served a prior term in prison or
county jail, defendant was on probation at the time the current
offenses were committed, and defendant’s prior performance on
probation was unsatisfactory. These four factors, related to
defendant’s criminal history and recidivism, amply support the
court’s sentencing choices. Given the court’s focus on defendant’s
criminal history throughout the sentencing proceedings,
defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of a
different outcome.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
GRIMES, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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